JUDGMENT : P.V. Kunhikrishnan, J. The above writ petition is filed with following prayers : 1) “Declare that the 1st petitioner has carried out the construction of the building complex on the strength of the building permit No. 39 1991issued by 3rd Respondent Municipality and he has completed the construction accordingly and his application for regularization has to be dealt with and regularity of the construction has to be assessed only on the basis of the law existing at the time of issuance of permit and construction of the building and an ex post facto application of the building Rules cannot be made to the said construction. (2) Call for the entire proceedings leading to the issuance of Exhibit P1 and P9 , set aside the same as they were issued against law and further direct the Respondents Nos. 2 and 4 to reconsider the irregularities pointed out in Exhibit P1 and P9 against the application for regularization submitted by the petitioners on the strength of the building Rules applicable at the time of issuance of the building permit and completion of the building complex by the 1st petitioner and allow the application for regularization within a period of time as fixed by this Hon’ble Court. (3) Grant such other reliefs as the Hon’ble court be may deem fit and proper to grand in the nature of the petition.” [sic] 2. The petitioners submitted an application for regularisation of their building before the 3 rd respondent and it was forwarded to the office of the 2 nd respondent-Town Planner, Ernakulam. The 2 nd respondent issued Ext.P1 letter noting defects and asked the 4 th respondent- Secretary of the Municipality to resubmit the application after curing the defects. Accordingly, the petitioners submitted the application curing the defects along with the sketch before the 4 th respondent is the submission. In the meanwhile, the 5 th respondent filed a complaint before the 2 nd respondent that while constructing the building complex, the 1 st petitioner encroached into the Puramboke land. It is submitted that, as per Ext.P2, the office of the 2 nd respondent directed the 4 th respondent to consider the above complaint also. In the meanwhile, the 5 th respondent filed a complaint before the 2 nd respondent that while constructing the building complex, the 1 st petitioner encroached into the Puramboke land. It is submitted that, as per Ext.P2, the office of the 2 nd respondent directed the 4 th respondent to consider the above complaint also. Since there was delay on the part of the 2 nd and 4 th respondent in considering and disposing the application for regularisation, the petitioners submitted Ext.P6 representation before the Municipality and thereafter, filed W.P.(C.) No. 16588/2022 before this Court which resulted in Ext.P7 judgment fixing time frame for disposing the application for regularisation. Ext.P7 judgment was not complied by the respondents , which constrained the petitioners to prefer contempt case before this Court is the further submission. In the affidavit filed by the respondents in the above case, it was submitted that the petitioners failed to cure the defects noted by the 2 nd respondent as per Exts.P1 and P9. The defects noted therein were on the basis of the Kerala Municipality Building Rules, 2019 . According to the petitioners, the same is not applicable and the rule applicable is prior to the Kerala Municipality Building Rules, 1999 . Aggrieved by the same, this writ petition is filed. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Government Pleader. 4. According to the 1 st petitioner, he started construction G+2 (ground floor and two other floors) in 1991 and obtained building number for two floors. The 1 st petitioner wants permission for the construction of the 2 nd floor, in which the number is already given for ground and 1 st floors. It is submitted that the building permit was issued in the year 1991. The Apex Court in T. Vijayalakshmi and others v. Town Planning Member and another [ 2006 KHC 1534 ] observed that the application for grant of sanction or approval would be decided in accordance with law applicable on the day on which the permission is granted. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted hereunder : 13. “Town Planning Legislations are regulatory in nature. The right to property of a person would include a right to construct a building. Such a right, however, can be restricted by reason of a legislation. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted hereunder : 13. “Town Planning Legislations are regulatory in nature. The right to property of a person would include a right to construct a building. Such a right, however, can be restricted by reason of a legislation. In terms of the provisions of the Karnataka Town and Country Planning Act, a comprehensive development plan was prepared. It indisputably is still in force. Whether the amendments to the said comprehensive development plan as proposed by the Authority would ultimately be accepted by the State or not is uncertain. It is yet to apply its mind. Amendments to a development plan must conform to the provisions of the Act. As noticed hereinbefore, the State has called for objection from the citizens. Ecological balance no doubt is required to be maintained and the courts while interpreting a statute should bestow serious consideration in this behalf, but ecological aspects, it is trite, is ordinarily a part of the town planning legislation. If in the legislation itself or in the statute governing the field, ecological aspects have not been taken into consideration keeping in view the future need, the State and the Authority must take the blame therefor. We must assume that these aspects of the matter were taken into consideration by the Authority and the State. But the rights of the parties cannot be intermeddled so long as an appropriate amendment in the legislation is not brought into force. 14. Nobody questioned the validity of the existing law. The High Court has not held that the existing laws are ultra vires. It merely proceeded on the assumption that the law which may be brought into the State book would be more eco friendly. 15. The law in this behalf is explicit. Right of a person to construct residential houses in the residential area is a valuable right. The said right can only be regulated in terms of a regulatory statute but unless there exists a clear provision the same cannot be taken away. It is also a trite law that the building plans are required to be dealt with in terms of the existing law. Determination of such a question cannot be postponed far less taken away. Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation in a case of this nature would have a role to play. 16. It is also a trite law that the building plans are required to be dealt with in terms of the existing law. Determination of such a question cannot be postponed far less taken away. Doctrine of Legitimate Expectation in a case of this nature would have a role to play. 16. In Director of Public Works and Another v. Ho Po Sang and Others (1961 AC 901), interpreting the provisions of the Landlord and Tenant Ordinance, 1947, it was held : "In summary, the application of the second appellant for a rebuilding certificate conferred no right on him which was preserved after the repeal of S.3A-E, but merely conferred hope or expectation that the Governor in Council would exercise his executive or ministerial discretion in his favour and the first appellant would thereafter issue a certificate. Similarly, the issue by the first appellant of notice of intention to grant a rebuilding certificate conferred no right on the second appellant which was preserved after the repeal, but merely instituted a procedure whereby the matter could be referred to the Governor in Council. The repeal disentitled the first appellant from thereafter issuing any rebuilding certificate where the matter had been referred by petition to the Governor in Council but had not been determined by the Governor." 17. The question came up directly for consideration in Howrah Municipal Corporation and Others v. Ganges Rope Co. Ltd. and Others , 2004 (1) SCC 663 , wherein it was held : "The context in which the respondent Company claims a vested right for sanction and which has been accepted by the Division Bench of the High Court, is not a right in relation to "ownership or possession of any property" for which the expression "vest" is generally used. What we can understand from the claim of a "vested right" set up by the respondent Company is that on the basis of the Building Rules, as applicable to their case on the date of making an application for sanction and the fixed period allotted by the court for its consideration, it had a "legitimate" or "settled expectation" to obtain the sanction. In our considered opinion, such "settled expectation", if any, did not create any vested right to obtain sanction. In our considered opinion, such "settled expectation", if any, did not create any vested right to obtain sanction. True it is, that the respondent Company which can have no control over the manner of processing of application for sanction by the Corporation cannot be blamed for delay but during pendency of its application for sanction, if the State Government, in exercise of its rule making power, amended the Building Rules and imposed restrictions on the heights of buildings on G. T. Road and other wards, such "settled expectation" has been rendered impossible of fulfillment due to change in law. The claim based on the alleged "vested right" or "settled expectation" cannot be set up against statutory provisions which were brought into force by the State Government by amending the Building Rules and not by the Corporation against whom such "vested right" or "settled expectation" is being sought to be enforced. The "vested right" or "settled expectation" has been nullified not only by the Corporation but also by the State by amending the Building Rules. Besides this, such a "settled expectation" or the so called "vested right" cannot be countenanced against public interest and convenience which are sought to be served by amendment of the Building Rules and the resolution of the Corporation issued thereupon." 18. It is, thus, now well settled law that an application for grant of permission for construction of a building is required to be decided in accordance with law applicable on the day on which such permission is granted. However, a statutory authority must exercise its jurisdiction within a reasonable time. (See Kuldeep Singh v. Government of NCT of Delhi , JT 2006 (6) SC 293). 19. For the views we have taken, the first respondent is hereby directed to consider the application for grant of sanction or approval of the building plans submitted before it at an early date but not later than eight weeks in accordance with law.” 5. I think the 2 nd respondent has to reconsider the matter, in the light of the above principle laid down by the Apex Court. To facilitate the 2 nd respondent to pass fresh orders, Ext. P9 can be set aside and there can be a direction to the 2 nd respondent to reconsider the matter. Therefore, this writ petition is disposed of with the following directions : 1) Ext.P9 is set aside. To facilitate the 2 nd respondent to pass fresh orders, Ext. P9 can be set aside and there can be a direction to the 2 nd respondent to reconsider the matter. Therefore, this writ petition is disposed of with the following directions : 1) Ext.P9 is set aside. 2) The 2 nd respondent is directed to reconsider the matter, in the light of the dictum laid down by the Apex Court in T.Vijayalakshmi's case (supra), after giving an opportunity of hearing to the petitioners as expeditiously as possible, at any rate within two months from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment. 3) Based on the decision of the 2 nd respondent, the 3 rd respondent will take necessary steps.