2026:UHC:3834 HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL Writ Petition Misc. Single No. 1536 of 2020 18 May, 2026 The Bazpur Cooperative Sugar Factory Ltd. --Petitioner Versus Harjinder Singh --Respondent ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Presence:- Mr. T.A. Khan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner. Mr. V.K. Guglani, learned counsel for the respondent. ---------------------------------------------------------------------- JUDGMENT 1. Respondent (Harjinder Singh) was engaged as daily wager in Bazpur Cooperative Sugar Factory Ltd. on 10.06.1982 and his services were subsequently regularised on the post of permanent Welder Grade-II (skilled category). He was made to retire from service w.e.f. 31.05.2022. Respondent/workman raised a dispute by contending that age of superannuation in the Sugar Factory is 60 years and his date of birth is 01.07.1968, therefore, he is entitled to continue in service till 30.06.1968. He relied upon Employees Provident Fund Record for challenging his retirement w.e.f. 31.05.2022. 2. The matter was sent for conciliation and when conciliation proceedings failed, dispute was sent to Labour Court, Kashipur, which was registered as Adjudication Case No. 28 of 2017. Learned Labour Court decided the reference in favour of respondent/workman by holding that at the time of his 1 2026:UHC:3834 appointment as daily wager, his date of birth was mentioned as 1st July, 1968 in the Employees Provident Fund (EPF) record, therefore, employer could not have changed his date of birth, while regularising his service. Employer has challenged the award rendered by learned Labour Court in this writ petition. 3. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 4. It is an admitted position that in the EPF Register maintained by employer, date of birth of respondent is recorded as 1st July, 1968. It is also not in dispute that said date of birth was recorded in the EPF Register, while petitioner was serving as daily wager. It is also not in dispute that date of birth of respondent was altered to 01.05.1962 at the time of his regularisation/fitment made in 2005. The employer contends that alteration in date of birth was made based on an affidavit filed by respondent/workman. 5. Learned counsel for the respondent, however, submits that respondent was compelled to give affidavit in which a column, regarding his date of birth, was left blank and respondent was told that regular status would not be given to him unless, he puts his signature on the dotted lines in that affidavit. He submits that the employer mentioned incorrect date of birth in that affidavit in the place left blank for that purpose, therefore, the employer cannot rely upon such forged and fabricated affidavit for retiring respondent prematurely in 2022, when he was entitled to continue in service till 2028. 2 2026:UHC:3834 6. The award rendered by learned Tribunal is on record as Annexure 1 to the writ petition. Perusal of the award, reveals that respondent himself appeared as witness before learned Labour Court, while employer examined one Sri Umesh Chandra Pathak as witness. Employer contended before learned Labour Court that it does not come within the definition of “industry”, learned Labour Court, by relying upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, (1978) 2 SCC 213 held that petitioner establishment comes within the meaning of the term “industry”, as defined under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Learned Labour Court relied upon Clause (LL) of the Standing Order governing the conditions of employment of workman in Vacuum Pan Sugar Factories, which reads as under:- “LL. Retirement of workman on reaching the age of superannuation. 1. A workman may be retired from service on reaching the age of superannuation which shall be 60 years. 2. The Provident Fund record of the factory specifying the workman’s age should, to begin with, be taken as the reliable record of the age of workman for purposes of retirement. 3. This record of age shall stand modified as may be warranted by the followings:- (a) Date of birth as given in High School Certificates. If the school leaving certificate is below High School then such certificate must be authenticated by the District Inspector of Schools or by the District Education Officer, as the case may be. (b) Date of birth as certified by a Municipal Corporation Municipal Board, a Cantonment Board, a Notified Area or a Town Area Committee. (c) an insurance policy taken before November 1, 1960, provided that: (i) Where the date, month and the year of birth of a workman are recorded in 3 2026:UHC:3834 provident Fund records shall be taken as final. (ii) Where only the month and year of birth are given, the date shall be taken as the 1st of that month; and (iii) Where the Provident Fund record of the workman does not specify the date or month of birth in that the 1st November of the year shall be deemed to be the date for retirement.” 7. This Court concurs with the reasoning given by learned Labour Court for deciding the reference in favour of the workman. As per the applicable Standing Orders, the date of birth as recorded in Provident Fund record, has to be taken as reliable evidence regarding age of workman for the purpose of retirement. 8. Admittedly, in the EPF record, date of birth of respondent is mentioned as 01.07.1968. It is nobody’s case that date mentioned in EPF record was changed on the request of concerned workman. Employer contended before learned Labour Court that date of birth mentioned in EPF Register if accepted as correct, would render respondent minor on the date he was engaged as daily wager. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon Sub Clause (a) of Clause (LL)(3) of the Standing Orders for contending that since respondent had not passed High School, therefore, the School Leaving Certificate produced by him should have been authenticated by District Inspector of School/District Education Officer concerned while Transfer Certificate, relied by respondent, was not so authenticated by the Competent Authority. He submits that this vital aspect was overlooked by learned Labour Court. 4 2026:UHC:3834 10. The submission made on behalf of petitioner cannot be accepted for the simple reason that this Court is exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. It is now well settled that while exercising supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution, this Court does not sit as a court of appeal over decision of subordinate courts/tribunals. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Syed Yakoob vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan & others reported in 1964 AIR 477 has held as under:- “7. The question about the limits of the jurisdiction of High Courts in issuing a writ of certiorari under Article 226 has been frequently considered by this Court and the true legal position in that behalf is no longer in doubt. A writ of certiorari can be issued for correcting errors of jurisdiction committed by inferior courts or tribunals: these are cases where orders are passed by inferior courts or tribunals without jurisdiction, or is in excess of it, or as a result of failure to exercise jurisdiction. A writ can similarly be issued where in exercise of jurisdiction conferred on it, the Court or Tribunal acts illegally or properly, as for instance, it decides a question without giving an opportunity, be heard to the party affected by the order, or where the procedure adopted in dealing with the dispute is opposed to principles of natural justice. There is, however, no doubt that the jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari is a supervisory jurisdiction and the Court exercising it is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. This limitation necessarily means that findings of fact reached by the inferior Court or Tribunal as result of the appreciation of evidence cannot be reopened or questioned in writ proceedings. An error of law which is apparent on the face of the record can be corrected by a writ, but not an error of fact, however grave it may appear to be. In regard to a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal, a writ of certiorari can be issued if it is shown that in recording the said finding, the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence, or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, if a finding of fact is based on no evidence, that would be regarded as an error of law which can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In dealing with this category of cases, however, we must always bear in mind 5 2026:UHC:3834 that a finding of fact recorded by the Tribunal cannot be challenged in proceedings for a writ of certiorari on the ground that the relevant and material evidence adduced before the Tribunal was insufficient or inadequate to sustain the impugned finding. The adequacy or sufficiency of evidence led on a point and the inference of fact to be drawn from the said finding are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Tribunal, and the said points cannot be agitated before a writ Court. It is within these limits that the jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 to issue a writ of certiorari can be legitimately exercised (vide Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Syed Ahmad Ishaque [(1955) 1 SCR 1104] Nagandra Nath Bora v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals Assam [(1958) SCR 1240] and Kaushalya Devi v. Bachittar Singh [AIR 1960 SC 1168]” 11. Similar view was taken by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., reported in (2003) 3 SCC 524. Para 7 of the said judgment is extracted below:- “7. The supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution is confined only to see whether an inferior court or tribunal has proceeded within its parameters and not to correct an error apparent on the face of the record, much less of an error of law. In exercising the supervisory power under Article 227 of the Constitution, the High Court does not act as an appellate court or the tribunal. It is also not permissible to a High Court on a petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution to review or reweigh the evidence upon which the inferior court or tribunal purports to have passed the order or to correct errors of law in the decision.” 12. Learned Labour Court rightly relied upon Clause (LL) of the Standing Orders applicable to petitioner’s establishment for holding that the date of birth, as mentioned in the EPF record, has to be treated as correct. Reliance placed by learned counsel for the petitioner on sub-clause (a) of Clause (LL) (3) of the Standing Order is erroneous, as that condition has to be met when the request for correction of date of birth 6 2026:UHC:3834 is made by an employee/workman. In the present case, workman never requested for correction, therefore insistence upon the condition of authentication of School Leaving Certificate by the District Inspector of School/District Education Officer is of no avail. 13. Learned counsel for the respondent points out that coordinate Bench of this Court in a judgment dated 27.02.2026 rendered in WPMS No. 1630 of 2018 has decided similar controversy in favour of workman and against the Sugar Mill. Para 8 of the said judgment is reproduced below:- “8. Having heard learned counsel for the parties at length and upon perusal of the material available on record, this Court proceeds to determine the present writ petition. The challenge in the present writ petition is to the order dated 10.05.2018 passed by the learned Deputy Labour Commissioner, Kumaun Region, Haldwani, whereby the petitioner–employer has been directed to correct the date of birth of the respondent– workman as 20.11.1963 and to extend consequential benefits on the finding that the respondent had been prematurely retired from service. The principal submission advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that the date of birth of the respondent had long stood recorded in the service record as 04.06.1956 on the basis of a medical assessment conducted in the year 1983 and that any request for modification of the same at the verge of retirement is barred in view of the Certified Standing Orders as well as the settled principles of law governing such matters. This Court is unable to accept the said contention. The material placed on record clearly indicates that the entry of date of birth in the service record was not founded upon any documentary evidence but upon a mere medical estimation of age. On the other hand, the record of the Employees Provident Fund Organization, which is a statutory record, reflects the date of birth of the respondent as 20.11.1963. The said entry is not shown to have been made unilaterally by the respondent but is a record maintained in the ordinary course of statutory compliance. The same also finds corroboration from other independent documents brought on record before the authority. The distinction between a case where an employee seeks alteration of an admitted date of birth at the end of service and a case where correction of an erroneous entry is sought on the basis of reliable documentary record must be kept in mind. The present case falls in the latter category.” 7 2026:UHC:3834 14. This Court finds substance in the submission made by learned counsel for the respondent that the controversy involved here is covered by aforesaid judgment, therefore, this writ petition deserves to be decided in terms of the said judgment. 15. In view of the aforesaid facts and reasons, this Court do not find any scope for interference with the impugned award. 16. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and is dismissed. (Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.) 18 May, 2026 Aswal 8