ORDER : 1. Under challenge in this revision petition is the conviction and sentence rendered against the revision petitioner under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short “N.I. Act”). 2. The revision petitioner is the accused in CC No.165/1999 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate-II, Kannur. 3. The case of the complainant is that the accused borrowed a sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- from the complainant, and in discharge of the said liability, the accused issued two cheques on the same day for Rs.1,50,000/- each, one dated 11.01.1999 and the other dated 28.01.1999, for the said amount in the complainant’s favour. However, upon presentation, the cheque was dishonoured, stating the reason “funds insufficient.” Thereafter, the complainant issued a statutory notice dated 18.02.1999 to the accused informing her of the dishonour and demanding payment of the cheque amount, which was returned on 22.02.1999. The accused neither paid the amount nor sent a reply. Hence, the accused is alleged to have committed an offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. 4. During the trial, the complainant himself got examined as PW1 and marked Exts.P1 to P6. From the side of the defence, the accused was examined as DW1 and marked Exts.D1 & D2. 5. On appreciation of the evidence on record, the trial court found the accused guilty of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and convicted her. The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month and to pay an amount of Rs. 1,50,000/- as compensation to the complainant under Section 357(3) of CR.P.C. In default of payment of compensation, the accused was directed to undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of two months. 6. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the accused preferred Crl. A. No.333/2009 before the Sessions Court, Thalassery. The learned Sessions Judge, who heard the appeal, dismissed the same. Aggrieved thereby, the present revision petition has been filed. 7. Heard the learned counsel appearing for both sides and perused the records. 8. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that the trial court as well as the appellate court entered into a finding of guilt under Section 138 of the NI Act against the accused without properly appreciating the facts and evidence brought out in this case. 7. Heard the learned counsel appearing for both sides and perused the records. 8. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner submitted that the trial court as well as the appellate court entered into a finding of guilt under Section 138 of the NI Act against the accused without properly appreciating the facts and evidence brought out in this case. According to the learned counsel, although a serious challenge was raised by the defence regarding the signature on Ext.P1 cheque, undermining the same, the trial court as well as the appellate court found that the complainant had succeeded in proving the execution of Ext.P1 cheque. The learned counsel further urged that the complainant miserably failed to prove the transaction alleged in this case, as well as the execution of Ext.P1 cheque and therefore, the accused is entitled to be acquitted. 9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent/complainant submitted that there is nothing to interfere with the well-considered judgment passed by t he trial court, which was confirmed in appeal. According to the learned counsel, the complainant had adduced sufficient evidence to prove the transaction alleged as well as the execution of Ext.P1 cheque, and hence, the trial court is absolutely right in drawing a presumption in favour of the complainant under Section 139 of the N.I. Act. On these premises, it was urged that the impugned order requires no interference. 10. Before delving into a detailed discussion regarding the rival contentions raised, it is worthwhile to note that the scope of interference in a revision petition is limited. By a series of judicial pronouncements, it is well settled that a court exercising revisional jurisdiction will interfere with the findings of the trial court or the appellate court only when such findings suffer from illegality, impropriety, or perversity. Unless it is shown that the judgment of the Trial Court or the Appellate Court is perverse, unreasonable, or suffers from non-consideration of relevant material or misreading of evidence, interference in revision is not warranted. The revisional court cannot reappreciate the evidence as an Appellate Court and substitute its own view merely because another view is possible. 11. Unless it is shown that the judgment of the Trial Court or the Appellate Court is perverse, unreasonable, or suffers from non-consideration of relevant material or misreading of evidence, interference in revision is not warranted. The revisional court cannot reappreciate the evidence as an Appellate Court and substitute its own view merely because another view is possible. 11. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, AIR 1999 SC 981 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus: “In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of Supervisory Jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an Appellate Court nor can it be treated even as a second Appellate Jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.” 12. Keeping in mind the above and reverting to the case at hand, it can be seen that the complainant has a definite case that the accused borrowed an amount Rs.3,00,000/- and towards the discharge of the said liability, she had issued two cheque l eaves for Rs.1,50,000/- each and Ext.P1 cheque is one among them. According to the complainant, on presentation of the said cheque, the same was returned dishonoured, stating the reason “funds insufficient”. In order to prove the complainant’s case, the complainant himself was examined as PW1. On examination before court, PW1 had given evidence in conformity with the averments contained in the complaint. Although PW1 was subjected to piercing cross-examination, nothing was brought out to discredit or disbelieve his evidence. From the impugned judgments, it is discernible that the trial court as well as the appellate court had meticulously examined the evidence on record and found that the complainant had succeeded in proving the transaction alleged as well as in establishing the execution of Ext.P1 cheque. 13. From the impugned judgments, it is discernible that the trial court as well as the appellate court had meticulously examined the evidence on record and found that the complainant had succeeded in proving the transaction alleged as well as in establishing the execution of Ext.P1 cheque. 13. Undoubtedly, w hen a complainant in a case of this nature succeeds in establishing the execution of the cheque, the presumption under section 139 will operate in his favour that the said cheque was issued towards the discharge of a debt or liability. When such a presumption arises, it is for the accused to rebut the said presumption. As evident from the impugned judgment, the accused, in her attempts to rebut the presumption, put forward a case that Ext.P1 cheque leaf was misused by her brother, who had a financial transaction with the complainant. Although a defence as stated above was canvassed from the side of the accused, no convincing evidence has been produced to substantiate the same. Even the brother of the complainant was not examined as a witness on the side of the defence. Moreover, she has not offered any explanation as to the circumstances under which her cheque leaves came into the possession of her brother. 14. Therefore, I am of the considered view that the defence canvassed by the accused stands unestablished and she failed to rebut the presumption which is available in favour of the complainant under Section 139 of the NI Act. 15. Considering all these aspects, I find no reason to interfere with the well-considered judgment passed by the trial court, which was confirmed on appeal by the learned Session Judge. However, considering the nature of the offence, the y ear of the alleged transaction and other attending circumstances, I am of the view that the sentence imposed on the accused is on the higher side and the same has to be modified in the interest of justice. In the result, this revision petition is allowed in part, and without altering the finding, the sentence imposed on the accused for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act is modified as follows: (i) The accused shall undergo imprisonment till the rising of the court and shall pay compensation of Rs.1,50,000/- to the complainant under Section 357(3) of Cr.P.C. In default of payment of compensation, the accused shall undergo simple imprisonment for one month. If the revision petitioner/accused had deposited any amount before the trial court pursuant to the direction, if any, issued by the appellate court or by this court, the said amount will be treated as part of the compensation to be paid by her. The revision petitioner shall appear before the trial court on 02.11.2026 to receive the sentence.