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2026 DAILYLAW 576 (KER)

Siraj P. , S/o. Abdul Khader v. State of Kerala Represented By The Public Prosector

2026-05-18

Jobin Sebastian

body2026
JUDGMENT : JOBIN SEBASTIAN, J. This Criminal Revision Petition has been filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure challenging the judgment dated 08.03.2016 in Criminal Appeal No. 408 of 2010 on the file of the Sessions Court, Thalassery, arising out of the judgment dated 18.09.2010 in C.C. No. 499 of 2009 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court-I, Kannur, whereby the revision petitioner herein, along with the second accused in the said case, was found guilty and convicted for the offence punishable under Section 394 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code . The revision petitioner herein is the first accused in the said case. 2. The prosecution case is that, on 13.07.2009 at about 6:15 p.m., the first and second accused, in furtherance of their common intention, arrived on a motorcycle bearing Registration No. KL-13/T- 4496, approached PW1 while she was walking along a public road, and, after pushing her down, snatched away her gold chain weighing 4.5 sovereigns. According to the prosecution, apart from the loss of the gold chain, PW1 also sustained injuries in the course of the incident. Thus, the accused are alleged to have committed the offence punishable under Section 394 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code . 3. During the trial, in order to bring home the guilt of the accused, the prosecution had examined nine witnesses as PW1 to PW9 and marked Exts. P1 to P6. MO1 was identified and marked. 4. After trial, the learned Magistrate found both the accused guilty of the offence punishable under Section 394 r/w 34 IPC and convicted and sentenced them to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years each. 5. Aggrieved by the same, the first accused preferred an appeal before the Sessions Court, Thalassery. The learned Sessions Judge who heard the appeal confirmed the judgment of conviction as well as the order of sentence passed by the Trial Court and accordingly dismissed the appeal. The said judgment is impugned by way of this revision petition. 6. Heard Smt. Namitha, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, and Smt. Anima M., the learned Public Prosecutor, and also perused the records. 7. The said judgment is impugned by way of this revision petition. 6. Heard Smt. Namitha, the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, and Smt. Anima M., the learned Public Prosecutor, and also perused the records. 7. The learned counsel further urged that, apart from the testimony of PW1, the only other evidence relied upon by the prosecution is that of her minor daughter, who is stated to have been present with PW1 at the time of the incident. According to the learned counsel, in the absence of any independent corroborative evidence, it would be unsafe to place reliance on the evidence of PW1 and her daughter, particularly since they are interested witnesses. The learned counsel also raised grievances regarding the quantum of sentence imposed by the trial court. On these premises, it was contended that the judgment passed by the appellate court, which is under challenge in this revision petition, is liable to be set aside and the accused is entitled to be acquitted. 8. Per contra, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that both the trial court as well as the appellate court have recorded their findings after properly appreciating the evidence adduced in the case, and therefore no interference is warranted in the present revision petition. According to the learned Public Prosecutor, both the trial court and the appellate court have placed reliance mainly on the evidence of PW1 on the ground that she is an injured witness. It was submitted that the testimony of an injured witness carries great evidentiary value and is entitled to due weightage, particularly when the same is corroborated by the evidence of PW2, who was accompanying PW1 at the time of the incident, as well as the medical evidence adduced in the case. Moreover, the learned Public Prosecutor submitted that there is no legal requirement that the testimony of an injured witness must necessarily be corroborated by independent evidence before it can be acted upon. 9. Before entering into a discussion on the rival contentions, it is pertinent to note that it is well settled through a series of judicial pronouncements that a court exercising revisional jurisdiction will interfere with the judgments or orders of the courts below only if the same suffer from illegality, impropriety, or perversity. 9. Before entering into a discussion on the rival contentions, it is pertinent to note that it is well settled through a series of judicial pronouncements that a court exercising revisional jurisdiction will interfere with the judgments or orders of the courts below only if the same suffer from illegality, impropriety, or perversity. Unless the judgment passed by the learned magistrate or by the appellate court is perverse or the view taken by the court is unreasonable, or there is non- consideration of any relevant material, or there is palpable misreading of records, the revisional court is not justified in interfering with the judgment. The revisional court cannot act like an Appellate Court. 10. In State of Kerala v. Jathavedan Namboodiri [ AIR 1999 SC 981 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus: “In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of Supervisory Jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an Appellate Court nor can it be treated even as a second Appellate Jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.” 11. Keeping in mind the above principles while reverting to the facts of the present case, it can be seen that the prosecution mainly relies on the evidence of PW1, the de facto complainant, whose gold chain was allegedly snatched by the accused. There is a specific allegation that, in the course of committing the offence, the accused caused injuries to PW1. A perusal of the testimony of PW1 clearly reveals that she had narrated the entire sequence of events that transpired on the ill-fated day. According to her version, the assailants, who arrived on a motorbike, approached her with clear criminal intent, and the first accused snatched away her gold chain after pushing her to the ground. A perusal of the testimony of PW1 clearly reveals that she had narrated the entire sequence of events that transpired on the ill-fated day. According to her version, the assailants, who arrived on a motorbike, approached her with clear criminal intent, and the first accused snatched away her gold chain after pushing her to the ground. Although PW1 was subjected to rigorous cross-examination, her evidence remains unshaken. It is also free from material contradictions and omissions. 12. Importantly, the evidence of PW1 finds strong corroboration in the medical evidence on record. As evident from the materials, the incident occurred on 13.07.2009. Ext. P4 wound certificate shows that PW1 sought medical treatment on the very same day from the hospital, where she was examined, and injuries were noted in the medical examination on the neck of PW1. 13. It is also significant that the doctor who issued the certificate was examined as PW6 and he categorically deposed that PW1 had given a history of assault in connection with robbery. A conjoint reading of the testimony of PW1 and the medical evidence on record leaves no room for doubt regarding the occurrence of the incident as spoken to by PW1. 14. Moreover, PW1 is an injured witness. It is well settled through a catena of judicial pronouncements that the testimony of an injured witness carries special evidentiary value and stands on a higher footing, as the presence of such a witness at the scene of occurrence is ordinarily established beyond doubt. An injured witness would normally not allow the real assailants to escape and falsely implicate innocent persons, unless there are strong reasons to do so. In the present case, there is no suggestion that PW1 had any animosity or ill-will towards the accused to falsely implicate them. In the absence of any such motive, there is no reason to disbelieve her testimony. 15. The evidence of PW1 is further corroborated by the testimony of PW2, the daughter of PW1, who was accompanying her at the relevant time. Though PW2 is related to PW1, mere relationship is not a ground to discard her testimony if it inspires confidence. In the facts of the present case, PW2 is a natural witness, having accompanied PW1 at the time of the incident. Therefore, her presence at the scene cannot be doubted, and her evidence appears to be consistent and reliable. Though PW2 is related to PW1, mere relationship is not a ground to discard her testimony if it inspires confidence. In the facts of the present case, PW2 is a natural witness, having accompanied PW1 at the time of the incident. Therefore, her presence at the scene cannot be doubted, and her evidence appears to be consistent and reliable. In that view of the matter, I find no reason to disbelieve the evidence of PW1 and PW2, which is also corroborated by the medical evidence on record. 16. It is also relevant to note that although the stolen gold chain was not recovered in its original form, the gold allegedly derived therefrom, after being melted, was stated to have been recovered from the jeweller PW5. In his evidence, PW5 deposed that the accused had brought the gold chain to his shop, that he purchased the same, and that it was subsequently melted and converted into gold. The jeweller also identified the accused as the person who brought the gold chain to his shop. The recovery of the gold article, in the manner spoken to by PW5, provides additional assurance to the prosecution version and lends further corroboration to its case. 17. As regards the contention relating to non-conduct of a test identification parade, it is well settled that identification in court is substantive evidence, whereas a test identification parade is only corroborative in nature. In the present case, the incident occurred at about 6:15 p.m., and there is nothing to suggest that there was insufficient light at the time of occurrence. 18. Further, the assailants had sufficient opportunity to be seen by PW1, as they approached her on a motorbike and committed the offence after pushing her down. In such circumstances, the witness would have had a clear opportunity to observe their features, which would enable her to identify them subsequently in court. 19. Therefore, I find no reason to disbelieve the identification of the accused made by PW1 before the court merely on the ground that no test identification parade was conducted. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the absence of a test identification parade is not fatal to the prosecution case. 20. In the light of the above discussion, I am of the view that no interference is warranted with the findings of the trial court as well as the appellate court. 21. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the absence of a test identification parade is not fatal to the prosecution case. 20. In the light of the above discussion, I am of the view that no interference is warranted with the findings of the trial court as well as the appellate court. 21. Coming to the question of sentence, it is seen that the trial court imposed a sentence of rigorous imprisonment for three years, which was confirmed in appeal. However, it is also evident that at the time of commission of the offence, the accused was aged about 29 years. From the submissions made by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, it is apparent that a prolonged period of incarceration would adversely affect his family, as he is a married man with children. Taking into account the said mitigating circumstances, some leniency can be shown in the matter of sentence. 22. Accordingly, while maintaining the conviction, the sentence imposed on the revision petitioner is modified as follows: 23. The revision petitioner/first accused is sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year for the offence punishable under Section 394 r/w 34 of the IPC . Needless to say, the petitioner shall be entitled to set off, if any, as provided under Section 428 of the Code of Criminal Procedure . With the above modification of sentence, the Criminal Revision Petition is allowed in part.