JUDGMENT : JOHNSON JOHN, J. 1. These writ petitions are filed, challenging the orders of the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Kochi, restricting the arrears of pension to three years prior to the filing of the Original Applications before the Tribunal. 2. The petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 36386 of 2023 joined the army service on 28.09.1977 and he was discharged from the army service on 30.6.1997. Subsequently, he re-enrolled on 31.3.2000 and was discharged from service on 31.5.2014. Aggrieved by the denial of second service pension, he preferred O.A. No. 221 of 2023 before the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Kochi. Though the Tribunal partly allowed the application as per order dated 29.11.2023 directing the respondents to grant the petitioner second service pension, he was allowed arrears of pension only for three years prior to the date of filing of the Original Application. 3. In W.P.(C) No. 6629 of 2024, the petitioner joined the army service on 05.06.1974 and after his discharge from army service on 31.10.1993, he was again enrolled on 11.9.1995 and was discharged from service on 30.11.2009. Aggrieved by the denial of second service pension, he filed O.A. No. 111 of 2023 before the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Kochi. Even though, as per the impugned order dated 23.8.2023, the Tribunal directed the respondents to grant the petitioner second service pension, arrears of pension was restricted to three years prior to the date of filing of the Original Application. 4. The petitioner in W.P.(C) No. 16423 of 2024 was enrolled under the army service on 17.01.1971 and was discharged on 31.8.1989. Thereafter, he re-enrolled on 25.06.1992 and was discharged from service on 31.5.2007. Aggrieved by the denial of second service pension, he filed O.A. No. 57 of 2023 before the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Kochi. Even though, as per the impugned order dated 24.11.2023, the Tribunal directed the respondents to grant second service pension to the petitioner, the arrears of pension was restricted to three years prior to the filing of the Original Application. 5. In W.P.(C) No. 30723 of 2024, the petitioner joined the Indian army on 19.4.1972 and was discharged on 28.2.1995. Thereafter, he was re-enrolled on 09.05.1995 and subsequently, discharged on 31.01.2010. Aggrieved by the denial of second service pension, he filed O.A. No. 70 of 2022 before the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Kochi. 5. In W.P.(C) No. 30723 of 2024, the petitioner joined the Indian army on 19.4.1972 and was discharged on 28.2.1995. Thereafter, he was re-enrolled on 09.05.1995 and subsequently, discharged on 31.01.2010. Aggrieved by the denial of second service pension, he filed O.A. No. 70 of 2022 before the Armed Forces Tribunal, Regional Bench, Kochi. Even though the Tribunal granted second service pension to the petitioner, the arrears of pension was restricted to three years prior to the filing of the Original Application. 6. We have heard the arguments of the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Central Government Counsel for the respondents. 7. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in respective cases argued that the Armed Forces Tribunal has committed serious error in restricting the arrears of pension to three years prior to the filing of the Original Application and cited the decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court in S.K. Mastan Bee v. General Manager, South Central Railway and another,  2003 KHC 733, M.L. Patil (Dead) Through LRs. v. The State of Goa and Another,  2022 Live Law (SC) 537, Union of India through its Secretary & Ors. v. SGT Girish Kumar and Ors. 2026 SCC OnLine SC 194 [C.A. Nos. 6820-6824 of 2018]. 8. Per contra, the learned Central Government Counsel cited the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in Union of India and Ors. v. Tarsem Singh , (2008) 8 SCC 648 and argued that insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply and therefore, the Tribunal is justified in restricting the consequential relief relating to arrears to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the Original Application. 9. It is true that in Tarsem Singh (supra), the Honourable Supreme Court has held that if there is an inordinate delay, normally the court should not grant the arrears and it should be restricted for a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the petition. But, in a subsequent decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in SGT Girish Kumar (supra), it was held as follows in para 22: “ 22. But, in a subsequent decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in SGT Girish Kumar (supra), it was held as follows in para 22: “ 22. The reliance placed by the appellant on the decision of a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Tarsem Singh (supra) is of no assistance to it, as the legal landscape did not remain static after decision in Tarsem Singh. Subsequently, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Ram Avtar (supra), decided the issue of applicability of instruction dated 31.01.2001 and the aforesaid decision is in rem. For, yet another reason, the decision in Tarsem Singh (supra) has no application to the case in hand as ex-servicemen in the instant appeals are already in receipt of disability pension and are only seeking re-computation of the disability pension. The right to approach the Tribunal accrued to ex-servicemen only on 10.12.2014 i.e., when the decision in Ram Avtar (supra) was rendered by this Court. Therefore, the bar contained in Section 22(1)(c) of the Act has no application to the claims filed by the ex-servicemen before the Tribunal. In the facts and circumstances of the case, we find that the original applications filed by the ex-servicemen do not suffer from any delay or laches disentitling them from claiming the relief of arrears of disability pension. Thus, the objections founded on the delay and limitation are without any merit. “ 10. In a batch of connected appeals in Union of India v. Balakrishnan Mullikote, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 464 : 2026 INSC 286 , the Honourable Supreme Court had occasion to re-visit the law laid down in Tarsem Singh (supra) and SGT Girish Kumar (supra) and to make the following observations in para 43 of the said judgment: “ 43. Since the judgment of this Court in Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 648 was not invoked during the course of arguments, this Court refrains from examining the issue of limitation in the present matter. Nonetheless, it is pertinent to note that a recent coordinate Bench, in Union of India through its Secretary v. SGT Girish Kumar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 194, has reaffirmed the settled principle that pension is neither a bounty nor an ex gratia payment dependent upon the largesse of the State. Nonetheless, it is pertinent to note that a recent coordinate Bench, in Union of India through its Secretary v. SGT Girish Kumar, 2026 SCC OnLine SC 194, has reaffirmed the settled principle that pension is neither a bounty nor an ex gratia payment dependent upon the largesse of the State. It constitutes a deferred portion of compensation for past service, which, upon fulfilment of the governing conditions, matures into a vested and enforceable right. Pensionary entitlements, therefore, partake the character of property and cannot be withheld, curtailed, or extinguished save by authority of law. The relevant portion of the judgment passed by the coordinate Bench in Union of India through its Secretary v. SGT Girish Kumar (supra) is reproduced hereinbelow: “…This Court has, in a consistent line of decisions, recognised that right to receive disability pension is a valuable right and once found due, the benefit of the same has to be given from the date it became due. The same cannot be curtailed by restricting the benefit to a period of three years preceding the filing of the original application……The reliance placed by the appellant on the decision of a two-Judge Bench of this Court in Tarsem Singh (supra) is of no assistance to it, as the legal landscape did not remain static after decision in Tarsem Singh. Subsequently, a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Ram Avtar (supra), decided the issue of applicability of instruction dated 31.01.2001 and the aforesaid decision is in rem……Thus, the objections founded on the delay and limitation are without any merit….” In any event, the said question of law is left open.” 11. It is well settled that pension is a deferred portion of compensation for past service and when it matures into a vested and enforceable right, the benefit of the same has to be given from the date it became due and the same cannot be curtailed by restricting the benefit to a period of three years preceding the filing of the Original Application and therefore, we find that the order of the Tribunal restricting the arrears of pension to the period of three years prior to the filing of the Original Application is liable to be set aside and hence, we do so. In the result, the writ petitions are allowed and the respondents are directed to issue pension payment orders to the petitioners granting arrears of second service pension from their respective date of discharge at the earliest, at any rate, within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment, failing which the unpaid arrears would carry interest at 7% per annum.