2026:HHC:21 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 338 of 2014 Reserved on: 15.12.2025 Decided on: 01.01.2026 State of Himachal Pradesh ...…. Appellant Versus Sunil Kumar …. Respondent Coram The Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Appellant /State : Mr. Ajit Sharma, Deputy Advocate General. For the Respondent : Mr. Ajay Sharma, Senior Advocate with Mr. Atharv Sharma, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 25.04.2014, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class (II), Dehra, District Kangra, H.P. (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Section 187 of the Motor Vehicles Act (MV Act). (Parties shall 1 Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the Judgment?Yes. 2 2026:HHC:21 hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the IPC and Section 187 of MV Act. It was asserted that Kashmir Singh (PW- 2) was driving the bus bearing registration No. HP-48-7505 on 14.11.2028. A truck bearing registration No. HP-51B-0619 came from the opposite side at high speed towards the wrong side and hit the bus at Dehrian at 1:15 p.m. One passenger sustained injury in the accident. The truck driver ran away from the spot. An intimation of the accident was given to the Police. ASI Raffo Dass (PW-8) went to the spot and recorded the informant’s statement (Ext.PW-2/A) and sent it to the Police Station, where F.I.R. (Ext.PW-6/A) was registered. ASI Raffo Dass (PW-8) investigated the matter. He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW-8/A). Ashwani Kumar (PW-10) took the photographs of the spot (Ext. A1 to Ext. A6) whose negatives are Ext.A7 to Ext. A12. Kashmir Singh (PW2) produced the documents of the bus, which were seized vide memo (Ext.PW-1/A). ASI Raffo Dass (PW-8) seized the truck bearing registration No. HP-51B-0619 3 2026:HHC:21 vide memo (Ext.PW-1/B). An application (Ext.PW8/B) was filed for the medical examination of the injured Kishori Lal. His medical examination was conducted, and multiple injuries were found on his person. MLC (Ext.PA) was issued. Dev Raj (PW-3) examined the bus and truck and found that there was no defect in them, which could have led to the accident. He issued reports (Ext.PW-3/A and Ext.PW-3/B). The statements of prosecution witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 337 of the IPC and Section 187 of the MV Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined ten witnesses to prove its case. Chaman Lal (PW-1) produced the documents. Kashmir Singh (PW-2) is the informant. Dev Raj (PW-3) examined the vehicles. Krishan Kumar (PW-4) is an eyewitness. Sushil Kumar (PW-5) is the General Power of Attorney of the owner. 4 2026:HHC:21 ASI Ved Parkash (PW-6) signed the F.I.R. HHC Sohan Lal (PW- 7) carried the statement to the Police Station. ASI Raffo Dass (PW-8) investigated the matter. Des Raj (PW-9) did not support the prosecution’s case. Ashwani Kumar (PW-10) took the photographs. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the prosecution’s case in its entirety. He claimed that he was innocent, and the witnesses deposed falsely against him. He did not produce any evidence in defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the prosecution’s version regarding the manner of the accident was highly doubtful. The informant stated that he had stopped the bus, but it was not supported by the mechanical report. Krishan Kumar (PW-4) admitted that the truck was being driven on its own side, which falsifies the prosecution’s version that the accused was driving the truck towards the wrong side of the road. The owner was not examined to prove that he had employed the accused as a driver. The prosecution had failed to prove that the accused was driving the truck at the time of the accident or that 5 2026:HHC:21 his rashness or negligence led to the accident. Consequently, the accused was acquitted. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has preferred the present appeal, asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in appreciating the evidence. The statements of prosecution witnesses were discarded without any reason. The mechanical report proved that there was no defect in the vehicle, which could have led to the accident. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant and Mr Ajay Sharma, learned Senior Counsel, assisted by Mr Atharv Sharma, learned counsel for the respondent. 9. Mr Ajit Sharma, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant, submitted that the prosecution had proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt and the learned Trial Court erred in acquitting the accused. The testimonies of the informant and eyewitnesses were wrongfully discarded. The special power of attorney of the owner proved that the accused 6 2026:HHC:21 was employed as a driver at the time of the accident. This was not challenged in the cross-examination, and the learned Trial Court was not justified in rejecting this version. Therefore, he prayed that the present revision be allowed and the judgment of the learned Trial Court be set aside. 10. Mr Ajay Sharma, learned Senior Counsel, for the respondent/accused, submitted that the statement for Krishan Kumar (PW-4) made the prosecution’s case doubtful that the truck was being driven towards the wrong side of the road. Learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on 7 2026:HHC:21 misreading/omission to consider the material evidence and reached at a conclusion which no reasonable person could have reached. It was observed at page 440: “12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 13. This position was reiterated in P. Somaraju v. State of A.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2291, wherein it was observed: “ 12. To summarise, an Appellate Court undoubtedly has full power to review and reappreciate evidence in an appeal against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. However, due to the reinforced or ‘double’ presumption of innocence after acquittal, interference must be limited. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the record, the acquittal should not be disturbed. Judicial intervention is only warranted where the Trial Court's view is perverse, based on misreading or ignoring material evidence, or results in a manifest miscarriage of justice. Moreover, the Appellate Court must address the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal before reversing it and assigning its own. A catena of the recent judgments of this Court has more firmly entrenched this position, including, inter alia, Mallappa v. State of Karnataka 2024 INSC 104, Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund v. The State of Madhya Pradesh 2024 INSC 258, Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 INSC 320, and 8 2026:HHC:21 Constable 907 Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand 2025 INSC 114.” 14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. Krishan Kumar (PW-4) stated in his cross- examination that there was a slight curve at the place of the accident, and the truck driver was driving the truck on its own side. He was not cross-examined to challenge this version. He was put forward as a witness of truth by the prosecution, and his testimony is binding upon the prosecution. His testimony clearly shows that the prosecution’s version that the accused was driving the truck towards the wrong side of the road is not correct, and the truck was being driven towards its own side. 16. In the present case, the version that the truck was being driven towards its correct side is in favour of the accused and has to be preferred to the version of the prosecution that the accused was driving the truck towards the wrong side of the road. 17. The informant, Kashmir Singh, stated in his cross- examination that he had stopped the bus. This is not supported by the report of the mechanical examination. Dev Raj (PW-3) found that ten small and one large glass of the bus were 9 2026:HHC:21 damaged. The damage caused to ten small and one large glass shows that both vehicles were in motion; otherwise, the damage would have been caused only to that portion of the bus, which was hit by the truck and not to a large portion of the bus. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had rightly declined to rely upon the informant’s testimony. 18. Des Raj (PW-9) did not support the prosecution’s case. He stated that he was sleeping at the time of the accident, and he did not know how the accident had occurred; therefore, his testimony does not establish the prosecution’s version. 19. Sushil Kumar (PW-5) stated that he is general power of attorney of the owner. The accused was employed as a driver. He stated in his cross-examination that he did not know who was driving the truck at the time of the accident. He volunteered to say that he had two vehicles, and the drivers changed their shift. 20. The testimony of this witness does not establish that the accused was driving the truck at the time of the accident, and no advantage can be derived from his testimony. There is no other evidence to prove that the accused was driving the truck at the time of the accident, and the learned Trial Court 10 2026:HHC:21 was justified in doubting the identity of the accused as the driver of the truck. 21. It was submitted that witnesses stated the truck was being driven at a high speed, which is sufficient to prove the negligence of the accused. This submission is not acceptable. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohanta Lal vs. State of West Bengal 1968 ACJ 124 that the use of the term ‘high speed’ by a witness amounts to nothing unless it is elicited from the witness what is understood by the term 'high speed'. It was observed: “Further, no attempt was made to find out what this witness understood by high speed. To one man, the speed of even 10 or 20 miles per hour may appear to be high, while to another, even a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour may appear to be a reasonable speed. On the evidence in this case, therefore, it could not be held that the appellant was driving the bus at a speed which would justify holding that he was driving the bus rashly and negligently. The evidence of the two conductors indicates that he tried to stop the bus by applying the brakes; yet, Gopinath Dey was struck by the bus, though not from the front side of the bus, as he did not fall in front of the bus but fell sideways near the corner of the two roads. It is quite possible that he carelessly tried to run across the road, dashed into the bus and was thrown back by the moving bus, with the result that he received the injuries that resulted in his death.” 22. This position was reiterated in State of Karnataka vs. Satish 1998 (8) SCC 493, wherein it was held: 11 2026:HHC:21 “Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution, and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject, of course, to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur.” 23. This Court also held in State of H.P. Vs. Madan Lal 2003 Latest H.L.J. (2) 925 that speed alone is not a criterion for judging rashness or negligence. It was observed: - “It may be pointed out that speed alone is not a criterion to decide rashness or negligence on the part of a driver. The deciding factor, however, is the situation in which the accident occurs.” 24. This position was reiterated in State of H.P. Vs. Parmodh Singh 2008 Latest HLJ (2) 1360 wherein it was held: “Thus, negligent or rash driving of the vehicle has to be proved by the prosecution during the trial, which cannot be automatically presumed even on the basis of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Mere driving of a vehicle at a high speed or slow speed does not lead to an inference that negligent or rash driving had caused the accident resulting in injuries to the complainant. In fact, speed is 12 2026:HHC:21 no criterion to establish the fact of rash and negligent driving of a vehicle. It is only a rash and negligent act as its ingredients, to which the prosecution has failed to prove in the instant case.” 25. In the present case, none of the witnesses has given an approximate speed of the truck, and the use of the term “high speed” is not sufficient to hold the accused liable. 26. It was submitted that the informant, Kashmir Singh (PW-2) and Krishan Kumar (PW-4) stated that the accident had occurred due to the negligence of the truck driver, and this evidence is sufficient to prove the negligence of the accused. This submission cannot be accepted. Negligence is an inference drawn from the facts. A witness can only depose about the fact which had occurred in his presence, and he is not permitted to draw inferences from the facts. The inferences have to be drawn by the Jury or the Judge when he is sitting without a Jury. It was laid down by Goddard LJ in Hollington v. Hawthorn 1943 KB 507 at 595 that a witness cannot depose about negligence. It was observed: “It frequently happens that a bystander has a full and complete view of an accident. It is beyond question that while he may inform the court of everything he saw, he may not express any opinion on whether either or both of the parties were negligent. The reason commonly assigned is that this is the precise question the court has to decide, but in truth, it is because his opinion is not 13 2026:HHC:21 relevant. Any fact that he can prove is relevant, but his opinion is not.” 27. Similar is the judgment in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922 (HP), where it was held: “It is not necessary for a witness to say that the driver of an offending vehicle was driving the vehicle rashly. The issue whether the vehicle was being driven in a rash and negligent manner is a conclusion to be drawn on the basis of evidence led before the Court.” 28. Thus, no advantage can be derived from the statements of informant Kashmir Singh (PW-2) and Krishan Kumar (PW-4) that the negligence of the accused led to the accident. 29. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court will not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court even if another view is possible. 30. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of 31. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹50,000/- with one surety of the like 14 2026:HHC:21 amount to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar (Judicial) of this Court/ learned Trial Court which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the respondent on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 32. A copy of the judgment, along with the record of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) 01st January, 2026. Judge (ravinder)