1 2026:CGHC:2336 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 499 of 2016 1 - Rajesh Kumar Ratre S/o Salikram Ratre Aged About 20 Years R/o Dihipara Nagri, Police Station Nagri, District Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh, Chhattisgarh ... Appellant(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Station House Officer, Police Of Police Station Nagri, District Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Smt.Indira Tripathi, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Shri Rishabh Chandra Singh Deo, PL (Hon’ble Shri Justice Arvind Kumar Verma) Judgment on Board 14/01/2026 This criminal appeal has been preferred under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the appellant questioning the legality, propriety and correctness of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 06.04.2016 passed by the learned Additional 2 Sessions Judge (F.T.C.), Dhamtari in Special Case No. 09/2016, whereby the appellant has been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years with fine of Rs.2,000/-, with default stipulation. 2. The appellant was acquitted of the charges under Sections 363 and 366 IPC, but convicted under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. Aggrieved thereby, the present appeal has been filed. 3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 21.11.2015, the complainant - father of the prosecutrix, lodged a written report at Police Station Nagri, District Dhamtari alleging that on 14.11.2015 at about 6–7 a.m., his daughter aged about 17 years, had left the house without informing anyone and had not returned thereafter. He expressed suspicion that someone might have enticed and taken her away. On the basis of the said report, FIR was registered under Section 363 IPC against an unknown person. During investigation, the prosecutrix was recovered from the company of the present appellant Rajesh Ratre from the house of one Lamban Bharti situated at village Khursun, Police Station Arjunda, District Balod.The statements of the prosecutrix and witnesses were recorded under Section 161 CrPC. The prosecutrix was medically examined. Her statement under Section 164 CrPC was also recorded. Upon completion of investigation, charge-sheet was filed for offences under Sections 363, 366 IPC and Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012.The learned trial Court framed charges accordingly. 3 4. In order to prove its case, the prosecution has examined as many as 9 witnesses. No defence evidence was led. Statement of the accused under Section 313 CrPC has also been recorded where he has simply taken a plea of innocence and false implication in the case. 5. Learned trial Court, on appreciation of the evidence of the witnesses, convicted and sentenced the accused/appellant as per the description given hereinbefore vide judgment dated 06.04.2016 which is under assail in this appeal. 6. Learned counsel for the appellant assailed the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence dated 06.04.2016 passed by the learned Special Judge (POCSO), contending that the findings recorded by the trial Court suffer from serious legal and factual infirmities and are unsustainable in law. 7. At the outset, it is submitted that the learned trial Court failed to properly appreciate the evidence on record, particularly the testimony of the prosecutrix herself, whose deposition does not support the prosecution case of forcible sexual assault or coercion. It is argued that the prosecutrix did not allege force or compulsion at any stage and, on the contrary, admitted that she accompanied the appellant voluntarily and stayed with him for several days. Learned counsel submits that the prosecutrix was declared hostile as she did not support the prosecution version regarding abduction or forceful sexual assault. Even during cross-examination, she did not attribute any threat or compulsion to the 4 appellant. In such circumstances, it is contended that the very substratum of the prosecution case collapses, and conviction could not have been recorded merely on presumptions. 8. A principal challenge raised by the appellant concerns the age of the prosecutrix. Learned counsel submits that the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the prosecutrix was below eighteen years of age on the date of the alleged incident. It is argued that the trial Court relied solely upon school admission and scholar register entries without examining the foundational basis of those entries. 9. She submits that the testimony of the school authority witness, who admitted that the date of birth was recorded at the time of admission based only on information furnished by guardians and not on any authentic document such as a birth certificate or municipal record. It is submitted that in the absence of proof regarding the source of such entry, school records cannot be treated as conclusive proof of age. She further submits that no birth certificate, municipal record, hospital record, or contemporaneous public document was produced by the prosecution. No ossification or medical age determination test was conducted either. Such omissions, it is argued, assume critical importance since minority of the prosecutrix forms the foundation for invoking provisions of the POCSO Act. 10. It is next contended that the prosecutrix stayed with the appellant for a considerable period and travelled to different places without protest 5 or resistance. The evidence, according to counsel, indicates voluntary companionship rather than abduction or coercion. It is argued that the conduct of the prosecutrix, both during and after the incident, clearly indicates consent and absence of force. 11. She further submits that even assuming physical relations occurred, the same were consensual in nature. Once the age of the prosecutrix becomes doubtful, her voluntary conduct assumes legal relevance in appreciating the entire factual matrix. It is also contended that the medical evidence does not reveal injuries suggestive of forcible sexual assault. No external or internal injuries were detected, and there was no medical indication of violence. In a case where consent and age are disputed, absence of injuries assumes corroborative significance in favour of the accused. 12. Counsel for the appellant further argues that the learned trial Court mechanically applied statutory presumptions under the POCSO Act without first conclusively establishing that the prosecutrix was a minor. It is submitted that such presumptions cannot substitute proof of foundational facts required in criminal law. Another limb of submission is that the appellant has no prior criminal antecedents and has already undergone a substantial portion of incarceration. Even assuming conviction were to be sustained, she submits that the sentence imposed is harsh and disproportionate in the facts and circumstances of the case. 13. It is argued that the appellant belongs to a rural background, and 6 the relationship, if any, arose out of mutual affection rather than criminal intent. Prolonged incarceration in such circumstances would cause irreparable injustice. She therefore submits that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt and that the benefit of doubt must necessarily go to the appellant. The impugned judgment, it is contended, suffers from misappreciation of evidence and non-application of settled principles of criminal jurisprudence. She therefore submits that the appeal be allowed and the conviction and sentence be set aside, and the appellant be acquitted of all charges. In the alternative, it is prayed that the sentence be suitably reduced to the period already undergone. 14. Per contra, learned State counsel supported the impugned judgment passed by the learned Special Judge (POCSO) and submitted that the conviction recorded against the appellant is based upon proper appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence and does not call for interference in appellate jurisdiction. It is submitted that the prosecution successfully established that the prosecutrix was below eighteen years of age at the time of the incident. The learned trial Court rightly relied upon official school records maintained in the Government Primary School where the prosecutrix had studied. Certified copies as well as original registers were produced before the Court and duly proved through the testimony of the Headmistress. 15. Learned State counsel submits that the entries in school registers were made in the ordinary course of official business and carry 7 presumption of correctness unless disproved. The defence failed to produce any evidence showing manipulation or fabrication in those records. Therefore, the trial Court rightly accepted the recorded date of birth as genuine. It is further submitted that the prosecutrix herself stated her date of birth consistent with the school records, thereby corroborating documentary evidence. According to the State, the convergence of documentary and oral evidence sufficiently proves minority. 16. He submits that once the prosecutrix is found to be a minor, her consent, even if assumed, becomes legally immaterial. Under the provisions of the POCSO Act, sexual acts with a minor attract strict liability, irrespective of alleged consent. It is submitted that the prosecutrix was taken away from the lawful guardianship of her parents and remained with the appellant for several days. Even if she later turned hostile or resiled from portions of her statement, the Court is not bound to discard the entire prosecution case. Testimony of a hostile witness may be relied upon to the extent it supports prosecution. 17. Learned State counsel contends that medical evidence supports occurrence of sexual intercourse. Absence of injuries, it is argued, does not negate sexual assault, particularly where the victim is accustomed or where force is not resisted due to fear or emotional influence. He further submits that the trial Court has carefully evaluated the evidence and found the prosecution case credible. The appellate Court, it is argued, should not interfere merely because another view is possible, 8 especially where findings of fact are based on evidence. 18. It is also contended that the conduct of the prosecutrix accompanying the appellant cannot be construed as voluntary consent, particularly when she was below eighteen years of age and legally incapable of consenting. It is therefore submitted that the learned trial Court correctly applied statutory provisions and precedents governing offences under the POCSO Act and recorded conviction after proper evaluation of evidence and therefore the offences under the POCSO Act are grave in nature and require strict punishment to deter crimes against children. Therefore, reduction of sentence would send a wrong signal and defeat legislative intent. It is thus submitted that the appeal being devoid of merit deserves to be dismissed and the conviction and sentence imposed by the trial Court deserve to be affirmed. 19. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material on record. 20. The following points arise for determination: (i) Whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the prosecutrix was below 18 years of age on the date of incident? (ii) Whether the conviction of the appellant under Section 6 of the POCSO Act is sustainable? 21. At first, whether the prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the prosecutrix was below 18 years of age 9 on the date of incident? This Court has undertaken a complete re-appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence on record, including the material relied upon by the learned trial Court while returning a finding that the prosecutrix was below eighteen years of age on the date of occurrence. 22. The school admission and scholar registers maintained in the Government Primary School, Risemil Para, Nagri, District Dhamtari. Certified extracts of the relevant entries were produced and proved through the testimony of the Headmistress, Smt. Mohini Kashyap, examined as prosecution witness. The registers reflected the prosecutrix’s date of birth as 30.06.1998, and recorded her admission and subsequent schooling details. The entries also mentioned the names of her parents and admission particulars, which, according to the trial Court, established continuity and authenticity of the records. It has come on record that the original registers were produced before the Court, verified, and compared with certified copies seized during investigation. The Investigating Officer also deposed regarding seizure and production of these records. No material discrepancy was noticed in the entries, and the defence could not bring on record any contradiction or manipulation in the registers. During examination before the Court, the prosecutrix herself disclosed her date of birth as 30.06.1998, which corresponded with the school records. According to the trial Court, this reinforced the correctness of the entries. However, upon independent scrutiny, this Court finds that although the registers were formally proved, the source of the date of birth entry remained 10 unverified. The Headmistress admitted that entries in the admission register are ordinarily made on the basis of information supplied by guardians at the time of admission. No birth certificate, municipal record, hospital record, or contemporaneous public document forming the basis of such entry was produced. 23. Criminal law requires strict proof where age constitutes the foundational fact attracting stringent penal consequences under the POCSO Act. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that school records gain probative value only when the basis of entry is satisfactorily established. 24. The prosecution relied upon school admission register and scholar register to prove the age of the prosecutrix. However, from the evidence of P.W.-3 (Headmistress), it is evident that the date of birth was entered on the basis of information supplied at the time of admission, without verification from any contemporaneous document such as birth certificate. 25. In the present case, the prosecution relied primarily upon school admission register and scholar register entries. However, the witness from the school (P.W.-3) candidly admitted that the date of birth was entered at the time of admission on the basis of information supplied by guardians, without verification from any birth certificate or contemporaneous public record. The Supreme Court has held that the transfer certificate which is issued by government school and is duly signed by the Headmaster would be admissible in evidence under 11 Section 35 of the Evidence Act 1872. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the prosecutrix in the absence of any material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The Hon'ble Supreme court held that the date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. 26. In paragraphs 40,42,43,44 and 48 of its judgment in Alamelu (Supra), the Supreme Court has observed as under : “ 40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June,1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person,who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined.- 42. Considering the manner in which the facts 12 recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit, observed as follows:- "The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined....Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted." 43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, where this Court observed 13 as follows:- "The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue"." 44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P. held as follows:- "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented 14 therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted.” 27. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs.State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under : “33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. XXXX XXXX XXXX 15 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the JJ Act, 2000 or sub-section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub-section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinized and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on 16 record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7 This Court has observed that a hyper technical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the JJ Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted 17 solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015.” 28. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under : “14. Section 94 (2)(iii) of the JJ Act clearly indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through “an ossification test” or “any other latest medical age determination test” conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, i.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not 18 have been fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2)(i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence.” 29. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs.in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: 20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical 19 opinion could be sought from a duly constituted Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year.” 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that: “Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i)indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain @ Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West 20 Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted in order of preference.” 30. Similarly, in Mahadeo v. State of Maharashtra (2013) 14 SCC 637, the Supreme Court observed that though school records may be considered, the Court must be satisfied about their authenticity and reliability, particularly with respect to the source of the date of birth mentioned therein. In the present case, though the school records were exhibited through school authorities, the prosecution failed to examine the author of the entry or to establish the source of information on the basis of which the date of birth of the prosecutrix was recorded in the school register. There is no evidence to show whether the date of birth was recorded on the basis of any contemporaneous document such as a birth certificate, or merely on the oral declaration of the parents at the time of admission. In Mahadeo (supra), the Supreme Court has laid down that : “the date given in the matriculation or equivalent certificate must first of all be considered for the purpose of determining the age of the prosecutrix on the date of offence and, if that is not available, other means of determining the age of prosecutrix must be resorted to. While laying down this proposition, the Supreme Court took inspiration from rule 12(3) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 (referred hereinafter as “Rules of 2007”). The said rule provided various means of assessing the age of a juvenile in conflict with law. The Supreme Court applied the same parameters for determining the age of a prosecutrix under the POCSO. Under rule 12(3) of 21 the Rules of 2007, the age determination inquiry shall obtain evidence relating to the age of the juvenile firstly, from the matriculation or equivalent certificates if available [r. 12(3)(a)(i)] and in its absence, the date of birth certificate from the school first attended (other than a play school) [r. 12(3)(a)(ii)], and in its absence, the birth certificate given by a municipality, corporation or a panchayat [r. 12(3)(a)(iii)]. Thereafter, the Supreme Court refers to rule 12(3)(b) and opines that it is only in the absence of any of the means provided in rr. 12(3)(a) (i) to (iii), that medical opinion could be sought to determine the age of the juvenile. Thereafter, the Supreme Court applies the same standard to determine the age of the prosecutrix under POCSO. 15. The question before this Court is whether the judgment of the Supreme Court in Mahadeo supra binds all inferior Courts to accept the date of birth of the prosecutrix as entered in the school register as an indelible fact, prohibiting any enquiry into the reliability of such an entry? In Haryana Financial Corporation and anr., Vs.Jagdamba Oil Mills and Anr – (2002) 3 SCC 496, the Supreme Court held in paragraph 19 that judgements are not to be interpreted as statutes and the observations of the Courts are not to be assigned the mathematical rigidness of a Euclid’s theorem. The observations of the Court are to be understood in the backdrop of the facts in which the judgment was passed.” 31. A plain reading of the judgment in Mahadeo (supra) reveals that the Supreme Court had to borrow the means of determining the age of the prosecutrix from the provisions of r.12(3) (i) to (iii) of the Rules 8 of 2007, on account of the absence of an analogous provision in the POCSO. However, the Supreme Court never intended its opinion to forbid an enquiry by the Courts into the reliability of the date of birth of the prosecutrix, as entered in the school register. Such a view is further sustainable in the light of stringent and draconian provisions in the POCSO which require that the enquiry by the Court to ascertain the 22 guilt of an accused under the provisions of the POCSO should be detailed and intense to ensure that there is no miscarriage of justice by convicting an innocent or acquitting the guilty. The judgment does not require that the Courts consider the date of birth of the prosecutrix entered in the school register as gospel truth.” 32. In the absence of proof of the source of the date of birth, reliance solely on school records becomes unsafe. Applying the above principles, this Court finds that the prosecution has failed to establish the age of the prosecutrix with the degree of certainty required in criminal law. It is a settled principle that where two views are possible, the one favourable to the accused must be adopted. In Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 263, the Supreme Court reiterated that while school records may be considered, their evidentiary value depends upon strict proof of their origin and authenticity. 33. In the present case, the absence of any birth certificate, municipal record, ossification or medical age determination creates a serious dent in the prosecution case. Moreover, the person who furnished the birth details at the time of admission was not examined. The prosecution did not establish the foundational document or source of information underlying the school entries.Consequently, the benefit of doubt regarding age necessarily ensures to the appellant. The prosecutrix, examined as P.W.-1, did not support the prosecution case of force or coercion. She clearly stated that she accompanied the appellant voluntarily and remained with him for a prolonged period. 23 34. Thus, although the prosecution produced school records and the trial Court accepted them as reliable, this Court finds that the evidentiary foundation necessary to conclusively prove minority remains insufficient, creating reasonable doubt regarding age. 35. In criminal jurisprudence, such doubt must operate in favour of the accused. Accordingly, this Court holds that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the prosecutrix was below 18 years of age at the time of occurrence. Though consent of a minor is legally immaterial, once the age itself becomes doubtful, the voluntary conduct of the prosecutrix assumes considerable significance. (ii) Whether the conviction of the appellant under Section 6 of the POCSO Act is sustainable? 36. The applicability of Section 6 of the POCSO Act presupposes that the victim is a child within the statutory definition. Once the age itself becomes doubtful, the foundation for conviction under the Act is substantially weakened. 37. Apart from age, the surrounding evidence reveals that the prosecutrix accompanied the appellant and remained with him for several days. Her testimony does not convincingly establish forcible confinement or coercion. The medical evidence also does not reveal injuries indicative of violent sexual assault. Though consent of a minor is legally immaterial, once minority itself is not conclusively proved, the conduct of parties assumes relevance in appreciating the overall factual 24 matrix. The trial Court primarily relied upon statutory presumptions flowing from minority. However, once minority itself becomes doubtful, those presumptions cannot operate against the accused. 38. Consequently, sustaining conviction under Section 6 of the POCSO Act becomes legally untenable. Thus, Point No. (ii) is answered in favour of the appellant, holding that conviction under Section 6 of the POCSO Act cannot be sustained. 39. Upon a cumulative and careful re-appreciation of the entire oral and documentary evidence on record, and in the light of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Alamelu v. State (2011) 2 SCC 385, Mahadeo v. State of Maharashtra (2013) 14 SCC 637 and Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana (2013) 7 SCC 263, this Court is of the considered opinion that although the trial court has relied upon the schools records to conclude minority, the prosecution prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the prosecutrix was below 18 years of age on the date of the alleged incident, which is the foundational requirement for attracting the rigours of the POCSO Act. 40. Once the age of the prosecutrix becomes doubtful, the very substratum of the prosecution case under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 collapses. The evidence on record further reveals that the prosecutrix had accompanied the appellant voluntarily and had not supported the allegation of forcible sexual assault during trial. The medical evidence does not conclusively support the prosecution case of sexual assault by force. In absence of 25 cogent, reliable and legally admissible proof of minority, conviction of the appellant under Section 6 of the POCSO Act cannot be sustained in law. 41. Consequently, this Court holds that the conviction and sentence recorded by the learned trial Court are unsustainable and liable to be set aside. The appellant is acquitted of the charge under Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The appellant is on bail. His bail bonds will remain in force for six months in view of Section 437-A of Cr.P.C. A copy of this judgment be sent to the trial Court for information and compliance. Sd/- (Arvind Kumar Verma) Judge SUGUNA DUBEY Digitally signed by SUGUNA DUBEY Date: 2026.02.05 11:23:03 +0530