Page No.# 1/28 GAHC020005592025 2026:GAU-NL:267 THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) KOHIMA BENCH Case No. : WP(C)/173/2025 SHRI HOTOSHE S/O LT. SHIKUTO SUMI OF KICHILIMI VILLAGE, R/O A.G. COLONY, KOHIMA NAGALAND VERSUS STATE OF NAGALAND AND 4 ORS REPRESENTED BY THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVT. OF NAGALAND 2:THE HOME COMMISSIONER NAGALAND KOHIMA 3:THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE PHQ NAGALAND KOHIMA 4:THE DY. INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POICE (ADM) PHQ NAGALAND KOHIMA 5:THE COMMANDANT 12TH NAP BN. (INDIA RESERVE) CHINGTOK LONGLEN Advocate for the Petitioner : Z. ZHIMOMI, NEWTON ZHIMOMI,KUPULI SWU,LOVIKATO SWU,ZUCHAMO Y KIKON Advocate for the Respondent : GOVT ADV NL, Page No.# 2/28 BEFORE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAJESH MAZUMDAR JUDGMENT AND ORDER (ORAL) 14.05.2026 Heard Ms. Z. Zhimomi, learned counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. E. Thiba Phom, learned Government Advocate for all the respondents. 2. This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has been preferred by the writ petitioner, challenging the initiation of a fresh departmental inquiry against the petitioner, as well as the impugned Memorandum of Charge dated 27.08.2025 and the impugned order dated 29.08.2025, appointing an Inquiry Officer and the Presenting Officer. 3. The petitioner was appointed as a Constable (General Duty) in the 12th NAP Battalion (India Reserve), on 17.01.2014. During the course of his service, the petitioner was posted at the residence of the Commandant of the Battalion located in Dimapur, Nagaland. On a certain fateful evening, there was a quarrel between the petitioner and one of his colleagues, who served as a cook. As a consequence of the quarrel, by an order dated 09.06.2016, the temporary service of the petitioner was terminated by respondent No. 5, Commandant, 12th NAP Battalion, with immediate effect on disciplinary grounds. It is an admitted position that respondent No. 5 was then posted at Purulia, West Bengal, and the termination order had been sent through a fax message to the Battalion Page No.# 3/28 Headquarters. 4. The petitioner filed WP(C) No. 16 (K)/2019 before this Court. By an order dated 27.02.2019, this Court expressed a view that the petitioner had not submitted a representation to the appropriate authorities with regard to his grievances against the termination order dated 09.06.2016. Therefore, the writ petition was closed, granting liberty to the petitioner to file a representation to the appropriate authority with regard to the petitioner's prayer for setting aside the order dated 09.06.2016. 5. Pertinent to note that the Court also took a view that no notice had been issued to the petitioner, nor had any inquiry been initiated against him prior to the termination of his service. 6. Following the aforesaid, the petitioner was reinstated in service by the order dated 05.04.2019 with immediate effect, with the condition that a departmental inquiry would be initiated and held against him. On the same date itself, a memorandum of charge was supplied to the petitioner with directions to submit a written statement in defense within 10 days of receiving the memorandum. 7. Two articles of charge were framed against the petitioner, which are quoted herein for ease of reference. “STATEMENT OF ARTICLE OF CHARGE FRAMED AGAINST NO. 121293 CONSTABLE HOTOSHE ARTICLE-1: That the said. NO. 121293 Constable Hotoshe, under the influence of Page No.# 4/28 alcohol, manhandled No. 137 NCE Satrudhan Thakur on 7th June 2016 while both of them attached with Shri. K.K Chishi, IPS, then Commandant. He violated Rule 4 (iii) of the Nagaland Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1968 which mentioned, do nothing which is unbecoming of government servants. ARTICLE-II- No. 121293 Constable Hotoshe, being a trained/disciplined force, failed to maintain devotion to duty and acted in a manner which is unbecoming of a government servant. He violated Rule 4 (i), (ii)and (iii) of the Nagaland Government Servants Conduct Rules, 1968. Which mentioned, maintained absolute integrity, maintain devotion to duty and do nothing which is an unbecoming of government servants.” 8. By another order of the same date, an Inquiry Officer to inquire into the charges and a Presenting Officer to present the case before the Inquiry Authority were appointed. On 05.04.2019 itself, the Inquiry Officer issued an order, directing that the preliminary hearing would be conducted on 12.04.2019, at 11:00 hours. An inquiry report was submitted on 12.04.2019 itself, wherein it was stated that the charged individual had admitted and pleaded guilty to both articles of charge framed against him. On 05.04.2019, the Commandant of the Battalion issued a show cause notice to the petitioner, whereby it was observed that, considering the seriousness and gravity of the offence committed by the delinquent, the petitioner was required to show cause as to why he should not be terminated from service. 9. By another order dated 14.06.2019, the Commandant expressed the Page No.# 5/28 opinion that the petitioner did not have any valid reason to justify his act of offence and his misbehavior, which implies that he has no concern or commitment to continue in service. Therefore, in exercise of powers under the Nagaland Service (Disciplinary and Appeal) Rules, 1967, read with Section 9(A) of the NAP Act, 1966, the petitioner was terminated from service with immediate effect. 10. The petitioner thereafter preferred an appeal against the order dated 14.06.2019, the rejection of which was informed to the petitioner by a letter dated 24.01.2020. The petitioner thereafter approached this Court by filing WP(C) No. 235/2023, challenging the termination, claiming the same to be illegal and in violation of the provisions of the Nagaland Service (Disciplinary and Appeal) Rules, 1967. 11. By the order dated 10.04.2025, this Court had recorded the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner in the following manner:- “3. It is seen that on 08.04.2025, another additional affidavit was filed by the petitioner. In the said affidavit, a very vital aspect of the matter has been brought to the attention of this Court. It has been submitted that the provisions of the Nagaland Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1967 (for short, “the Rules of 1967”) is applicable for the purpose of conducting inquiry against any misconduct. 4. Ms. Z. Zhimomi, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner making reference to the Memorandum dated 05.04.2019 submitted that the Page No.# 6/28 Memorandum was issued in terms with Rules 9(2) of the Rules of 1967. The learned counsel further submitted that as per the said Memorandum, the petitioner was granted time to submit the statement of defence within 10 days from the date of the receipt of the said Memorandum. The learned counsel further submitted that in terms with Clause 9 (4) of the said Rules of 1967, it is only on receipt of the written statement of the defence or if no such statement is received within the time specified, the Disciplinary Authority may itself inquire into such of the charges as are not admitted or, if it considers it necessary to do, appoint for the purpose a Board of Inquiry or an Inquiring Officer. 5. Ms. Z. Zhimomi, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that in the instant case the Inquiry Officer was appointed on 05.04.2019 on the very date on which the Memorandum of Charge was issued. The petitioner thereupon was called by the Inquiry Officer on 12.04.2019 wherein the petitioner had admitted that he had committed the misconduct. The learned counsel however submitted that there could not have been any inquiry before the completion of 10 days as have been specifically mentioned in the Memorandum dated 05.04.2019 inasmuch as until the expiry of the said period, the question of appointment of an Inquiry Officer is not envisaged under Rule 9(4) of the Rules of 1967. 6. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner further submitted that when a particular procedure has been stipulated in the Rules, the said procedure has to be followed or not at all is the well settled principle of law. She therefore submitted that basing on any admission so made by the petitioner before the Inquiry Officer on 12.04.2019 when the Inquiry Officer did not have the authority, the inquiry report could not have been submitted and therefore the inquiry report so submitted contained materials which were Page No.# 7/28 extraneous and could not have been relied upon. She therefore submitted that as in terms with Rule 9(1) of the Rules of 1967, there can be no imposition of penalty upon a Government servant as mandated under Rule 7 of the Rules of 1967 without any inquiry and as the entire Departmental Proceedings is based upon extraneous materials, the Departmental Proceedings cannot be sustained in law. 7. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner further submitted that the Respondent Authorities have taken a vindictive attitude against the petitioner. She submitted that a second show case notice was issued on 15.04.2019 wherein it was mentioned that the petitioner was granted one month time to submit his reply. The learned counsel further submitted that the second show cause notice was based upon a nonest inquiry report. However, a perusal of the show cause notice would show that the said inquiry report was also not furnished to the petitioner. The learned counsel further submitted that it was only on 04.06.2019, the said show cause notice was actually served upon the petitioner which would be apparent from Annexure- H to the writ petition. Accordingly, the petitioner had one month time for the purpose of filing his reply to the show cause notice. 8. The learned counsel further submitted that on 14.06.2019 the Respondent Authorities passed the order whereby the petitioner was again terminated. She therefore submitted that this is a fit case where the entire Disciplinary Proceedings has to be set aside and the petitioner be reinstated along with all back wages from the date of his termination.” 12. When the matter stood thus, the respondent No. 4 issued instructions to the Government Advocate representing the department in Page No.# 8/28 the matter, conveying that the disciplinary authority would reinstate the petitioner, however, without back wages. In view of the above, this Court closed the writ petition by passing the following order on 05.08.2025:- “Heard Ms. Z. Zhimomi, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Ms. Livika V. Sumi, the learned Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents. 2. The petitioner herein has assailed the termination of the petitioner vide order dated 14.06.2019 on the ground of alleged misconduct. 3. This Court heard the instant writ petition on 08.04.2025. While taking up the issue pertaining to the proportionality of the punishment, a submission was made on behalf of the respondents that instructions be allowed to be placed as to whether the respondents would like to reinstate the petitioner without back- wages. Taking into account the said submission, this Court fixed the matter on 10.04.2025. 4. On 10.04.2025, this Court had duly taken note of the submission so made by the learned counsel for the petitioner and as no instruction was obtained from the respondents, fixed the matter again on 24.04.2025 as to whether the respondents would be ready to reinstate the petitioner without back-wages. 5. Today, Ms. Livika V. Sumi, the learned Government Advocate has placed before this Court an instruction dated 19.05.2025 issued by the Deputy Inspector General of Police, (ADM), Nagaland, Kohima whereby she was informed that the Disciplinary Authority is ready to reinstate the petitioner without back-wages. The said communication is kept on record and marked with the letter “X”. 6. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that Page No.# 9/28 though the petitioner ought to have been granted some back-wages, but taking into account that the petitioner’s livelihood is the question, the petitioner would not insist upon the back-wages but would be satisfied if the petitioner is reinstated as constable without backwages. 7. Taking into account the stand so taken by the Disciplinary Authority as recorded in the document kept on record marked with the letter “X”, this Court therefore disposes of the instant writ petition thereby directing the respondent authorities more particularly the respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 to take steps forthwith for reinstating the petitioner upon a certified copy of the present order is served upon the respondent No.4. The said reinstatement so directed to be made shall not be later than 15 days from such certified copy is submitted to the respondent No.4. ” 13. It is the case of the petitioner that while he was waiting anxiously for a reinstatement, an official of the Battalion called up the petitioner and asked him to reach the Battalion location on 27.08.2025. On 27.08.2025, the petitioner was supplied the following documents:- “(a) Impugned letter NO.PHQ (B-X) HC/8/2023/488 dated 19 th Aug. 2025 issued by the Respondent NO.4 directing the Respondent NO. 5 to proceed with fresh Departmental enquiry against the petitioner without re-instating the petitioner in service (b) Impugned order NO.12BN (IR)/BN/RO-42/ 2025-26/276 dated 29 th August, 2025 Constituting Enquiry Officer and Presenting Officer to enquire into the charges framed against the petitioner. (c) Impugned Memorandum NO.NO.12BN(IR)/BN /RO-42/2025-26/276 dated Page No.# 10/28 27 th August, 2025 with proposed Article of charges to hold inquiry against the petitioner with Article of charges and directing the petitioner to submit his written statement within 5(Five) days in his defence.” 14. Being aggrieved with the intent of the disciplinary authority to initiate another disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner on the same set of charges, the petitioner had filed the present writ petition on 29.08.2025 with the prayers as already indicated herein above. 15. By the order dated 29.08.2025, while keeping the impugned memorandum dated 27.08.2025 in abeyance, this Court observed as follows:- “5. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner submitted that the Respondent Authorities are acting with malice in law taking into account that the said Respondent Authorities have granted a bare minimum 5 (five) days to the petitioner to submit the reply. The learned counsel further submitted that the action on the part of the Respondent Authorities in issuance of the fresh Memorandum dated 27.08.2025 are illegal and unauthorized as well as uncalled for, taking into account that the issue has already stood settled in WP(C) No. 235/2023. 6. Ms. A. Ayemi, the learned Government Advocate, Nagaland, submitted that she has no instruction(s) in respect to the said matter. 7. This Court upon hearing the learned counsels for the parties and also taking into account the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner that there is a necessity for passing urgent interim directions, else, the Respondent Authorities would take steps which would not only go Page No.# 11/28 against the order passed by this Court on 05.08.2025 passed in WP(C) No. 235/2023, but the petitioner would again have to face a similar ordeal is of the opinion that the petitioner has been able to make out a case for passing of certain interim directions. 8. This Court further finds it relevant to observe that if no order is passed, the entire writ petition would become infructuous. 9. Considering the above, this Court, therefore, stays the impugned Memorandum dated 27.08.2025 till the next date.” 16. The petitioner had filed an additional affidavit on 01.09.2025, whereby it was asserted that on 30.08.2025, the officials serving under the respondent No.5 had sent an order dated 26.08.2025 and an acknowledgement receipt dated 30.08.2025 through WhatsApp to the petitioner. The petitioner asserted in his additional affidavit that the letter dated 26.08.2025 reflected that the respondent No.5 had reinstated the petitioner into service without back wages with effect from the date of his reporting for duty, that is, on 26.08.2025 and further directed that the period of dismissal with effect from 09.06.2016 to 25.08.2025, that is a period of nine years, two months and fifteen days, would be treated as such and would not be counted as qualifying service for salary, increment and leave due incurred during the period of dismissal. Pertinent that there is no denial to the fact that the petitioner had been summoned and appeared in the Battalion location on 27.8.2025 and not on 26.8.2025 as asserted in the order dated 26.8.2025. Page No.# 12/28 17. On subsequent dates, the respondents sought time to file their response to the writ petition. The affidavit in opposition was ultimately filed on 12.02.2026, to which the petitioner filed a reply on 19.03.2026. The writ petition was admitted by the order dated 26/03/2026, and today, with the consent of the parties, the matter has been taken up for disposal. 18. This Court has perused the records attached with the writ petition and also the copy of the affidavit in opposition filed by the respondents No. 1 to 4 in WP(C) No.235 (K)/2023, a copy of which was provided to this Court during the hearing and the authenticity of which was not questioned by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents. 19. This Court has also considered the submissions made at the bar by the learned counsel for the contesting parties. The provisions of the Nagaland Services (Discipline and Appeal Rules, 1967), (hereinafter called the Rules of 1967 for the sake of convenience and brevity) would be relevant for an adjudication in the matter. Part-IV of the Rules of 1967 deals with discipline, where the nature of the penalties has been described at Rule 7(seven), and the disciplinary authority has been described at Rule 8(eight). Rule 9(nine) of the Rules of 1967 lays down the procedure for imposing penalties upon a delinquent Government servant, while Rule 10(ten) provides the procedure to be followed after the submission of the Page No.# 13/28 report by the enquiry officer, in the event a major penalty is imposed upon the delinquent officer. 20. For ease of reference, Rule 9(nine) and Rule 10(ten) of the Rules of 1967 are quoted herein below: “9. Procedure for imposing penalties: 1) Without prejudice to the provisions of the Public servants (Inquiry) Act, 1850, no order imposing on a Government servant any of the penalties specified in rule 7 shall be passed except after an inquiry, held as far as may be, in the manner hereinafter provided. 2) The Disciplinary Authority shall frame definite charges on the basis of the allegations on which the inquiry is proposed to be held. Such charges, together with a statement of the allegations on which they are based, shall be communicated in writing to the Government servant, and he shall be required to submit, within such time as may be specified by the Disciplinary Authority, a written statement of his defence and also to state whether he desires to be heard in person. Standard Form of Memorandum of Charge-Sheet and Memorandum are specified in Schedule IV and V. Explanation: In this sub-rule and in sub-rule (3), the expression "Disciplinary Authority" shall include the authority competent under these rules to impose upon the Government servant any of the penalties specified in rule 7. 3) The Government servant shall, for the purpose of preparing his defence, be permitted to inspect and take extracts from such official Page No.# 14/28 records as he may specify, provided that such permission may be refused, if, for reasons to be recorded in writing, in the opinion of the Disciplinary Authority such records are not relevant for the purpose or it is against the public interest to allow him access thereto. Provided that when a Government servant is permitted to inspect and take extracts from official records due care shall be taken against tampering, removal or destruction of records. 4) On receipt of the written statement of defence, or if no such statement is received within the time specified, the Disciplinary Authority may itself inquire into such of the charges as are not admitted or, if it considers it necessary so to do, appoint for the purpose a Board of Inquiry or an Inquiring Officer. 5) The Disciplinary Authority may nominate any person to present the case in support of the charges before the Authority inquiring into the charges (hereinafter referred to as the Inquiring Authority). The Government servant may present his case with the assistance of any other Government servant approved by the Disciplinary Authority, but may not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose unless the person nominated by the Disciplinary Authority, as aforesaid, is a legal practitioner or unless the Disciplinary Authority, having regard to the circumstances of the case, so permits. A Standard Form of order relating to appointment of Inquiry Officer is specified in Schedule V. 6) The Inquiry Authority shall, in the course of the inquiry consider such documentary evidence and take such oral evidence as may be relevant or materials in regard to the charges. The government servant shall be entitled to cross examined in witnesses examined in support of the Page No.# 15/28 charges and to give evidence in person, and to adduce documentary and oral evidence in his defence. The person presenting the case in support of the charges shall be entitled to cross examine the government servant and the witnesses examined in his defence. If the Inquiring Authority declines to examine any witness or to admit any document in evidence on the ground that his evidence or such document is not relevant or material, it shall record its reasons in writing. 7) At the conclusion of the inquiry, the Inquiring Authority shall prepare a report of the inquiry, recording its findings on each of the charges together with reasons therefore. 8) The record of the Inquiry shall include i) the charges framed against the Government servant and the statement of allegations furnished to him under Sub-rule (2). ii) his written statement of defence, if any; iii) the oral evidence taken in the course of the inquiry; iv) the documentary evidence considered in the course of the inquiry; v) the orders, if any, made by the Disciplinary Authority and the Inquiring Authority in regard to the inquiry; and vi) a report setting out the findings on each charges and the reasons therefore. 9) The Disciplinary Authority shall, if it is not the Inquiring Authority, consider the record of the inquiry and record its findings on its charges. 10. Major Penalties: i) If the Disciplinary Authority having regard to its findings on all or any of the articles of charges and on the basis of the evidence adduced Page No.# 16/28 during the inquiry is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in Clause (v) to (ix) of rule 7 should be imposed on the Government servant it shall make an order imposing such penalty and it shall not be necessary to give the Government servant any opportunity of making representation on penalty proposed to be imposed. Provided that in every case in which it is necessary to consult the Commission, report of Inquiry shall be forwarded in Form No. VII specified in the Schedule by the Disciplinary Authority to the Commission for its advice and on receipt of the advice of the Commission, the Disciplinary Authority shall pass appropriate orders in the case, taking into consideration the advice given by the Commission. Provided further that in cases involving the integrity of the delinquent Government servants, the record of the enquiry shall be forwarded by the Disciplinary Authority to the Vigilance Commission, for its advice and on receipt of the advice oft vigilance Commission, the Disciplinary Authority shall pass appropriate orders in the case taking into consideration the advice given by the Vigilance Commission and in such cases the Commission need not be consulted. ii) In any case in which it is not necessary to consult the Commission, the Disciplinary Authority shall determine what penalty, if any, should be imposed on the Government servant and pass appropriate orders. iii) Orders passed by the Disciplinary Authority shall be communicated to the Government servant who shall also be supplied with a copy of the report of the Inquiring Authority and where the Disciplinary Authority is not the Inquiring Authority, a statement of its findings together with brief reasons for disagreement, if any, with the findings of the Inquiring Page No.# 17/28 Authority and also a copy of the Advice, if any given by the Public Service Commission or Vigilance Commission as the case may be and where the Disciplinary Authority has not accepted the advice of the Commission, a brief statement of the reasons for such non-acceptance.” 21. In the earlier round of litigation, the petitioner had been served with a memorandum containing charges, which have already been quoted herein before. In essence, the charge in the earlier round of disciplinary proceedings was that the petitioner, under the influence of alcohol, had manhandled a colleague while both of them were attached to the then commandant. The respondent authorities had, in unequivocal terms, submitted before this Court that the petitioner would be reinstated in his service, albeit without back wages. It is only on account of such submission that this Court had closed WP(C) No. 235/2023. 22. Pertinent, while making the aforesaid submissions, the respondent authorities did not pray for leave. They did not express any intention with regard to holding a fresh disciplinary proceeding/departmental inquiry against the petitioner. In this view of the matter, I am of the considered opinion that the respondents could not have initiated another disciplinary proceeding based on the same charge, namely, that he, while being attached to the residence of the Commandant, had assaulted a colleague under the influence of alcohol on 07.06.2016. Page No.# 18/28 23. Apart from the above, this Court also notices that this is not the first time that the respondents have initiated a disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner; rather, this is the third proceeding on the same issue. 24. The learned counsel for the respondent has referred to the affidavit- in-opposition filed on behalf of the respondents, wherein it is stated that the respondents had submitted before the Court in the proceedings of WP(C) No.235/2023 that they are willing to reinstate the petitioner with their back wages. Accordingly, the respondent No.4 had reinstated the petitioner by the order dated 26.08.2025 with a condition that the period of dismissal shall be treated as such and would not be counted as qualifying service. 25. The learned counsel has submitted that there was nothing in the judgment and order dated 05.08.2025, passed in WP(C) No. 235/2023, setting aside and quashing the disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner or restraining a further disciplinary proceeding. He submits that since neither the proceedings had been interfered with nor were the respondents barred from conducting a fresh inquiry, the State respondents continued to enjoy the liberty to proceed with a fresh inquiry in the interest of justice. 26. He has submitted that the decision to reinstate the petitioner in service had been taken because there were procedural flaws while Page No.# 19/28 conducting the earlier inquiry, and not on the merits of the case. It was under such circumstances, according to the affidavit-in-opposition, that the disciplinary authority, after reinstating the petitioner, had ordered a fresh inquiry to establish the fact. The affidavit-in-opposition also refers to the hearing conducted on 12.04.2019 in the earlier enquiry proceedings, where the petitioner had allegedly admitted and pleaded guilty to both the Articles of Charges framed against him. The submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the respondents on the basis of the affidavit-in-opposition have to be considered, only to merit a rejection. 27. The earlier bout of litigation had been closed by this Court since the respondents had submitted that the petitioner would be reinstated without back wages, to which the petitioner had agreed to and apparently, no leave was sought for from this Court nor was this Court informed at the relevant point of time that the respondents intended to initiate a fresh departmental proceeding against the petitioner on the same cause of action. Therefore, when no leave was sought for, nor was the Court informed regarding such intention, in the considered opinion of this Court, the respondents are required to be restrained from proceeding further to hold an inquiry into the same charges, the disciplinary proceeding of which they had already recalled. 28. On a consideration of the fresh Memorandum of Charges issued by Page No.# 20/28 the respondent authorities on 27.8.2025, this Court notices that the same violate the provisions of the Nagaland Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1967. The Rules of 1967 provide that the Disciplinary Authority has to frame definite and distinct charges, providing an opportunity to the Delinquent Officer to submit a written statement. The Rules of 1967 required that on receipt of the written statement of defence, or if any such statement is not received within the time specified, the Disciplinary Authority may proceed to enquire into the charges itself or may appoint an Inquiry Officer. 29. In the present case, it is a matter of record that the Memorandum of Charges dated 27.08.2025 required the petitioner to submit a written statement within 5(five) days of receipt of the Memorandum of Charges, and it is an undenied position that the said Memorandum of Charges had been served upon the petitioner on 27.08.2025. The Disciplinary Authority also appointed the Inquiry Officer and the Presenting Officer by orders passed on the same date, i.e., 27.08.2025, without even waiting for the written statement in defence to be submitted by the petitioner or allowing the period of 5 days granted to expire. The uncalled-for haste of the disciplinary authority gives rise to a reasonable presumption that the disciplinary authority had already decided to proceed with the inquiry even without waiting for a written statement from the petitioner. It appears that the disciplinary authority did not deem it fit to consider the written Page No.# 21/28 statement filed by the petitioner, if any, thereby also indicating that the disciplinary authority desires to proceed with the inquiry without considering the fact that the petitioner may be able to explain the reasons why the disciplinary proceeding against him may not be called for. 30. This Court has also noticed that even before serving a copy of the reinstatement order dated 26.08.2025, on the petitioner, the respondents had served a copy of the memorandum proposing the disciplinary proceeding. While the memorandum dated 27.08.2025 proposing the inquiry was served upon the petitioner on the same date, it was only when the petitioner had approached this Court and the respondents were informed of the interim orders passed by this Court, that on 30.08.2025, the respondents served a copy of the reinstatement order dated 26.08.2025 upon the petitioner, that too through WhatsApp. 31. The view of this Court that the disciplinary authority may have decided to proceed with the inquiry, notwithstanding any defence to be taken by the petitioner, finds support in the statement made in the affidavit-in-opposition where a reference has been made to the alleged admission of guilt made by the petitioner in the earlier disciplinary proceeding. Therefore, this Court finds force in the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that there is reasonable apprehension that the disciplinary authority has decided to proceed with a presumption of guilt of the petitioner. In such circumstances, the attempt of the Page No.# 22/28 disciplinary authority to proceed with a fresh disciplinary proceeding deserves an interference on grounds of reasonable grounds to infer absence of impartiality, equity and administrative fairplay also. 32. The Memorandum of Charges, when perused by this Court, also reflect that the only documents which were sought to be relied upon during the proposed inquiry were copies of the show cause notice and a copy of the earlier “orderly room”. No list of witnesses had been supplied along with the memorandum dated 27.08.2025. This Court also notices that the documents sought to be relied upon have not been defined either by Office issue numbers or by a date of issuance. There is no assertion that the petitioner was subjected to any medical or general examination immediately after the alleged incident to verify whether any of the parties involved in the quarrel were under the influence of intoxicants. Reliance is sought to be placed only on the previous proceedings, which have lost all relevance in view of the subsequent events. 33. In view of the above findings, I am of the considered opinion that the Memorandum of Charges dated 27.08.2025 issued to the petitioner deserves interference of this Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India since the same are not only in violation of the relevant provision of the Nagaland Services (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1967, and also because the proposed it has displayed characteristics from where a reasonable presumption of absence of impartiality can be Page No.# 23/28 deciphered. It is also apparent that the charges are not based on any evidence worth their value; in fact, in the absence of witnesses, there is no evidence sought to be relied upon by the disciplinary authority. 34. In the case of Chairman-Cum-M.D., Coal India Ltd., & Ors. -Versus- Ananta Saha & Ors., reported in (2011) 5 SCC 142, the Apex Court had held as follows: “30. It is a settled legal proposition that if initial action is not in consonance with law, subsequent proceedings would not sanctify the same. In such a fact-situation, the legal maxim “sublato fundamento cadit opus” is applicable, meaning thereby, in case a foundation is removed, the superstructure falls. 31. In Badrinath v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu & Ors.,26 AIR 2000 SC 3243, this Court observed that once the basis of a proceeding is gone, all consequential acts, actions, orders would fall to the ground automatically and this principle of consequential order which is applicable to judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings is equally applicable to administrative orders. (See also State of Kerala v. Puthenkavu N.S.S. Karayogam & Anr.,27 (2001) 10 SCC 191; and Kalabharati Advertising v. Hemant Vimalnath Narichania & Ors.28 AIR 2010 SC 3745). 32. As in the instant case, there had been no proper initiation of disciplinary proceedings after the first round of litigation, all other consequential proceedings stood vitiated and on that count no fault can be found with the impugned judgment and order of the High Court. (emphasis supplied). “ Page No.# 24/28 35. Accordingly, the Memorandum dated 27.08.2025 issued by the Commandant, 12th NAP (IR) Battalion by Memo No. 12NAP(IR)BN/RO- 42/205-26/275 is set aside and quashed. Consequently, the order dated 27.08.2025 appointing the Inquiry Officer and the Presenting Officer is also set aside and quashed. 36. Insofar as the order dated 26.8.2025 reinstating the petitioner in his services, the petitioner has assailed the attempt of the respondent authorities to deny the petitioner service benefits, including increment, leave dues, etc., for the aforesaid period from 14.06.2019 to 25.08.2025. This Court notices that the petitioner had given up his claim for back wages for the aforesaid period. 37. The learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance on the judgment of this Court passed in Yanpothung Lotha -Versus- State of Nagaland and Ors reported in (2015) 1 GLT 142, wherein, while setting aside the disciplinary proceeding, this Court had directed that, though the petitioner therein would not be entitled to back wages, his service continuity should be maintained, providing all other benefits, including incremental benefits. The learned counsel for the petitioner has thereafter placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in Director of Printing, Stationery & Publication, Orissa -Versus- Prakash Chandra Bisoi reported in Page No.# 25/28 (1997) 11 SCC 596, where the Apex Court had held that upon reinstatement, the respondents therein had forgone the entire back wages; however, continuity of service for other benefits is the appropriate relief to be granted in the case. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Central Bank of India and Ors -Versus- Dragendra Singh Jadon reported in (2022) 8 SCC 378. In the said case, it was the stand of the respondents that when the limited relief of reinstatement without back wages had been granted, in the absence of a specific or general direction for continuity of service of the respondent or consequential benefit, the respondent in that said case would not be entitled to such benefits upon reinstatement. The Apex court had noted that in the proceeding before both the Single Bench and the Division Bench, the petitioner had been granted all benefits except back wages, construing him to be in service from the date of removal till the date of actual reinstatement of service. The appellant in the case had been held to be entitled to regular salary from the date of the award. The learned counsel has referred to paragraph-19 of the judgment where the Apex Court had held that reinstatement would mean to return a person or thing to its previous position or status. An order or reinstatement puts a person back in the same position. The Apex Court had drawn a line of distinction between reappointment and reinstatement. Page No.# 26/28 38. I agree with the proposition put forward by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The respondents in the earlier round of litigation had proposed a reinstatement of the petitioner without back wages, and this Court had also accepted such a proposal and had directed the respondents to reinstate the petitioner in service. In such circumstances, the petitioner has to be held to be entitled to continuity of service for the benefit of fixation of pay, seniority and for granting relief for pensionary benefits, etc. However, he would not be entitled to any back wages for his absence from service from 14.06.2016 to 25.08.2025. The respondents are accordingly directed to allow all consequential service benefits to the petitioner for the aforesaid period, save and except back wages. 39. The next issue to be considered is whether any liberty is required to be granted to the respondent authorities to proceed against the petitioner through a de novo/fresh departmental inquiry. This Court has already observed that the petitioner had faced departmental inquiries on the same set of charges twice prior to this inquiry and on both occasions has suffered termination of service. The initial termination of the petitioner occurred in the year 2016 when he was barely 2 years into his service. The petitioner was reinstated in service on 05.04.2019 and served a Memorandum of Charges on the same date itself. The Disciplinary Authority had proceeded to appoint the Page No.# 27/28 Presenting officer and the Inquiry officer on 05.04.2019 itself. The petitioner was thereafter terminated from service by the order dated 14.06.2019. When the petitioner had been reinstated pursuant to the second round of litigation, he had given up his claim to back wages. The show cause notice now issued to the petitioner is again involving the same charges, and this Court had already noticed the inherent flaw in the Memorandum of Charges and has also expressed the opinion that the petitioner may not be facing a wholly unbiased and impartial inquiry. This Court also notices that the incident allegedly occurred in the year 2016 and the same relates to a quarrel between two colleagues who were posted at the same location. Even during the earlier disciplinary proceeding conducted against the petitioner in the year 2019, there is no indication that any witnesses were proposed to be examined in support of the charges against the petitioner or that any documents were proposed to be exhibited during the inquiry proceeding. In the present proceeding, there are no witnesses proposed to be examined, and further, the two documents that were listed to be used in support of the charges are devoid of any particulars. 40. This Court in the case of Santosh Singh Kumar -Versus- The Union of India reported in (2019) 3 GLT 609 had held that when allegations are stale, and the delinquent had remained out of service for a Page No.# 28/28 considerable period of time, the incident had lost relevance. No useful purpose would be served by granting liberty to the disciplinary authority to conduct a de novo/fresh inquiry proceeding. The findings of the Single Bench were not interfered with in the intra-court appeal. 41. In the present case, we find that allowing the respondent authorities to conduct fresh disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner on the same set of charges would not be in the interest of equity. As was observed in the case of Santosh Singh Kumar (supra), this Court is also satisfied that the de novo or fresh disciplinary inquiry into the same set of charges may not be feasible now since there is an apparent absence of witnesses even in the Memorandum of Charge itself. Moreover, with the passage of time, the incident has surely lost its relevance. Therefore, the respondents are restrained from conducting a disciplinary proceeding against the petitioner on the same set of charges. 42. With the above direction, the writ petition stands allowed, without any order on costs. JUDGE Comparing Assistant