( 2026:HHC:14836 ) IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CMPMO No. 481 of 2025. Reserved on 23.04.2026. Date of Decision: 04.05.2026. _______________________________________________________ Shahina Alam …….Petitioner. Versus Nadeem Alam and others … Respondents. _______________________________________________________ Coram: Hon’ble Mr. Justice Romesh Verma, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? 1 For the petitioner: Mr. Karan Singh Kanwar, Advocate. For the respondents: Mr. Arsh Chauhan, Advocate. Romesh Verma , Judge. The present petition arises out of the order as passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Nahan, District Sirmaur, H.P. dated 16.6.2025, whereby the objections filed by the present petitioner to the execution petition under Order 21 Rule 11 and 34 read with Section 151 of CPC for implementing the award passed in Lok Adalat in Case No. 1243/4 of 2018, dated 26.4.2019 has been dismissed. 2. The facts of the case are that the present petitioner Shahina Alam filed a complaint under Section 12 of the Protection of 1 Whether the reporters of the local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 ( 2026:HHC:14836 ) Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (in short ‘DV Act’) in the Court of learned CJM, Nahan on 25.11.2016. The said application was duly contested by the respondents. The learned CJM, Nahan passed an interim order under Section 23 of the Act in CMA No. 89/4 of 2016 on 26.11.2016, whereby the Court below observed that the present petitioner Shahina Alam being the wife of respondent No.1 is entitled to remain in her matrimonial home at her right and not at the mercy of anybody. Further, she has a right to work and she cannot be tortured or harassed or even thrown out from the place of the work. It was held that she is entitled to work where she is working and not be kept at the mercy of the respondents, who are her in-laws and thus passed the ex parte interim order on 26.11.2016 restraining the respondents from preventing the petitioner from staying in her matrimonial home or going to her workplace. The ex parte interim order passed by the learned Trial Court was made absolute on 27.2.2017 till final decision of the petition. 3. That the petitioner under the provisions of Section 31 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 filed an application on account of breach of interim order passed by the learned Trial Court and the copy of the application has been placed on record as Annexure P-7. 3 ( 2026:HHC:14836 ) 4. That during the pendency of the application, filed under Section 31 of the Act, the parties compromised the matter before the Lok Adalat on 26.4.2019 in the following manner:- “Matter taken up before Lok Adalat. Conciliation tried between the parties, which has been fructified. Joint statement of the complainant and the accused recorded. In view of joint statement of the complainant and the accused, the present complaint is disposed of to the following terms:- 1. That the complainant Shahina Alam shall continue to reside in the house wherein, she is at present residing till final disposal of the main petition having been filed by her under Section 12 of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act and the accused shall continue to reside at village Shambhuwala, where they are residing at present. 2. That the complainant shall continue to work as the Principal of New Era Academy High School and she shal pay to accused No.1 Nadeem Alam monthly rent of the building of the aforesaid school @ Rs. 35,000/- only per month, which shall be deposited by her in the bank account of accused No.1. 3. That whenever, both the children intended to meet the complainant and complainant wanted to meet them, then the accused shall not raise any objection in respect of such meeting. Let award of the Lok Adalat be drawn accordingly. File after due completion, be consigned to record room.” 5. That the compromise was effected in the proceedings and on the basis of the joint statements of the present petitioner and respondent, the matter was closed. 6. That the Lok Adalat passed the award on 26.4.2019 and thereafter execution petition under Order 21 Rule 11 and 34 read with Section 151 of CPC for implementing the said award passed by the Lok Adalat was filed by the respondent before the learned CJM Nahan. 7. In the execution petition, it was averred that the present petitioner has not complied with the compromise, therefore, warrants 4 ( 2026:HHC:14836 ) of arrest be ordered to be issued against the present petitioner by sending her to the civil imprisonment. It was averred in the application that the JD/present petitioner had agreed to pay a sum of Rs. 35,000/- per month to the DH/respondent and out of which petitioner had paid only Rs. 55,000/- (i.e. Rs 20,000/- for February,2021 and Rs. 35,000/- for March, 2021). Apart from this, JD-Shahina Alam has not paid any penny of the monthly amount and as such at present she is in arrears of Rs. 3,365,000/- from March, 2020 to March,2021, whereas the total amount of Rs. 4,20,000/- and similarly JD-Shahina Alam has also committed a breach again voluntarily and deliberately in order to humiliate and harass the decree holder for not paying the monthly amount for the session 2021-2022. 8. That she again paid Rs.35,000/- in April, 2021 and Rs. 20,000/- in May and June, 2021, as such she is in arrear of Rs. 4,15,000/- from Apri, 2021 to May, 2022 and in this manner, she is in arrears of Rs. 7,80,000/-. Thereafter the present petitioner has not paid any single penny despite the direction of learned Sessions Judge, Sirmaur at Nahan, whereby he had directed the present petitioner to pay the amount to the tune of Rs., 1,75,000/- from January 2023 to May, 2023 but the present petitioner has failed to comply with the order on one pretext or the other, therefore, execution 5 ( 2026:HHC:14836 ) was filed praying that a direction be issued to the present petitioner to pay the entire amount of Rs. 14,10,000/- along with interest @ 7% per annum till date or by issuance of warrant of recovery. 9. The present petitioner filed reply/objection to the execution petition by raising various objections. It was stated that the execution petition is not maintainable and all the averments as made in the execution petition were denied and refuted. It was stated that the order which was passed by the Lok Adalat on 26.4.2019 does not fall within the definition of decree, as there is no formal expression of which mean to be put to execution. 10. Learned CJM vide the impugned order dated 16.6.2025 allowed the application and the objections as filed by the petitioner was ordered to be dismissed. 11. Feeling dissatisfied the JD/petitioner has approached this Court by filing the present petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. It is contended by Mr. Karan Singh Kanwar, learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order as passed by the learned Executing Court is neither legal nor sustainable in the eyes of law. He further submits that the order as passed by the learned Executing Court is a nullity. He further submits that the Court below has not appreciated the provisions of the DV Act in its letter and spirit and the impugned order is liable to be set aside. 6 ( 2026:HHC:14836 ) 12. On the other hand Mr. Arsh Chauhan, learned counsel for the respondent defended the impugned order by submitting that since the parties entered into a compromise before the Lok Adalat, therefore, the objections as preferred by the present petitioner is not sustainable and liable to be rejected. He further submitted that the parties are governed and bound by the terms and conditions of the compromise which was effected with their open eyes before the Lok Adalat. He further submitted that the award as passed by the Lok Adalat is an executable decree, therefore, the impugned order whereby the objections as per the present petitioner has rightly been rejected. 13. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the case minutely. 14. The admitted facts of the case are that the present petitioner filed an application under Section 12 of the DV Act and in the said complaint an application was filed under Section 23 sub Sections 23(2), 25(2) read with section 28 of the DV Act for the grant of interim direction. 15. Learned Trial Court vide its ex parte interim order restrained the respondent from denying stay of petition staying in the matrimonial home or going to her workplace. The ex parte interim order stands confirmed. Against the violation of the interim order, 7 ( 2026:HHC:14836 ) application under Section 31 of the Act on account of breach of the interim order was filed before the learned Trial Court. 16. That since the matter was reconciled between the parties with the intervention of the learned Court, the case was listed before the Lok Adalat on 26.4.2019. The statements were made by the parties before the Lok Adalat and based upon that, the case was disposed of having been compromised and the award was passed by the Lok Adalat as per the terms and conditions of the compromise. It was agreed that the present petitioner shall continue to work as Principal New Era High School and she shall pay the present respondent monthly rent of the building @ 35,000/- per month, which shall be deposited by her in the bank account of respondent No.1. That since the present petitioner failed to honour and comply with the terms and conditions of the Lok Adalat on 26.4.2019 , especially Clause 2 of the compromise, the respondents were constrained to file the execution petition before the learned CJM. The perusal of the order dated 26.4.2019 shows that the compromise was effected before the Lok Adalat by invoking the provisions of Legal Services Authority Act. As per the provisions and Section 2(b) the Lok Adalat means Lok Adalat organized under Chapter VI. Chapter VI of the Act and Section 19 (5) reads that Lok Adalat shall have the jurisdiction to determine and to arrive at a compromise or settlement 8 ( 2026:HHC:14836 ) between the parties in respect of Chapter VI in case any case pending before; or any matter which is falling within the jurisdiction of, and is not brought before, any court for which the Lok Adalat is organized Provided that the Lok Adalat shall have no jurisdiction in respect of any case or matter relating to an offence not compoundable under any law. The provisions clearly shows that the Lok Adalat has the jurisdiction to determine and arrive at a compromise between the parties with respect to any case pending. 17. The compromise was effected between the parties by invoking the provisions of Legal Services Authority Act and the Hon’ble Apex Court in case titled K. Govindan Kutti Menon Vs. C.D. Shaji 2011 STPL 32911 SC has held that the Legal Services Authority Act does not make out any distinction between the reference made by the Civil Court or Criminal Court. There is no restriction of the Lok Adalat to pass an award based on the compromise arrived at between the parties in case the criminal court under Section 138 of the NI Act and by virtue of the provisions which has to be treated as decree by the Civil Court. It has further been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that there is no restriction in respect of the cases referred to by various courts (both Civil and Criminal) i.e. Tribunal, Rent Controller, MACT and other Forum of similar nature. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said case has held as follows: 9 ( 2026:HHC:14836 ) xxx 23. A statutory support as evidenced in the statement of Objects and reasons of the Act would not only reduce the burden of arrears of work in regular courts, but would also take justice to the door steps of the poor and the needy and make justice quicker and less expensive. In the case on hand, the Courts below erred in holding that only if the matter was one which was referred by a civil court it could be a decree and if the matter was referred by a criminal court it will only be an order of the criminal court and not a decree under Section 21 of the Act. The Act does not make out any such distinction between the reference made by a civil court and criminal court. There is no restriction on the power of Lok Adalat to pass an award based on the compromise arrived at between the parties in a case referred by a criminal court under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, and by virtue of the deeming provision it has to be treated as a decree capable of execution by a civil court. In this regard, the view taken in Subhash Narasappa Mangrule (supra) and M/s Valarmathi Oil Industries (supra) supports this contention and we fully accept the same. 24. It is useful to refer the judgment of this Court in State of Punjab & Anr. vs. Jalour Singh and Ors. (2008) 2 SCC 660. The ratio that decision was that the "award" of the Lok Adalat does not mean any independent verdict or opinion arrived at by any decision making process. The making of the award is merely an administrative act of incorporating the terms of settlement or compromise agreed by the parties in the presence of the Lok Adalat, in the form of an executable order under the signature and seal of the Lok Adalat. This judgment was followed in B.P. Moideen Sevamandir and Anr. vs. A.M. Kutty Hassan (2009) 2 SCC 198. 25. In P.T. Thomas vs. Thomas Job, (2005) 6 SCC 478, Lok Adalat, its benefits, Award and its finality has been extensively discussed. 26. From the above discussion, the following propositions emerge: 1) In view of the unambiguous language of Section 21 of the Act, every award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decree of a civil court and as such it is executable by that Court. 2) The Act does not make out any such distinction between the reference made by a civil court and criminal court. 10 ( 2026:HHC:14836 ) 3) There is no restriction on the power of the Lok Adalat to pass an award based on the compromise arrived at between the parties in respect of cases referred to by various Courts (both civil and criminal), Tribunals, Family court, Rent Control Court, Consumer Redressal Forum, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal and other Forums of similar nature. 4) Even if a matter is referred by a criminal court under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and by virtue of the deeming provisions, the award passed by the Lok Adalat based on a compromise has to be treated as a decree capable of execution by a civil court.” 18. The perusal of the judgment as passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court has categorically laid down the law with respect to the fact that there is no restriction on the Lok Adalat to pass an award in respect of the cases either civil or criminal or any kind of Tribunal /Court. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Lok Adalat does not have the jurisdiction to grant any benefit to the present respondent, which has not been stipulated under the DV Act does not hold good in view of the judgment as passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Lok Adalat has passed the award by invoking the provisions of Legal Services Authority Act and the powers of the Lok Adalat have been defined in the judgment as passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of K.N. Govindan Kutty Menon, supra. 11 ( 2026:HHC:14836 ) 19. Therefore, the stand which is being adopted by the present petitioner that no relief could have been granted to the present respondent No.1 before the Lok Adalat is untenable and liable to be rejected. Once the petitioner has entered into a compromise with her open eyes before the Lok Adalat and she has also made a statement before the Lok Adalat, now she cannot be permitted to resile from the said compromise after utilizing the fruits of the award as passed by the Lok Adalat. The objections which are being raised are without any substance and the same are baseless and not maintainable. It is a matter of record that when the order was passed before the Lok Adalat, Clause-2 was incorporated in the compromise. Neither any objection was raised by the present petitioner nor the said award has been challenged till date. It is admitted by both the parties that the said award has attained its finality, therefore in the absence of any challenge to the said award now the petitioner cannot be permitted to resile from the compromise without any substance and basis. 20. The conduct of the petitioner is writ large that as per the terms and conditions, it was agreed that she shall be allowed to run the school in the premises of the respondent No.1 and in lieu of that she shall pay a sum of Rs. 35,000/- per month to him and now an objection has been raised that such kind of relief could not have been 12 ( 2026:HHC:14836 ) granted to him since such relief could not have been granted as per the provisions of DV Act. 21. The petitioner is trying to wriggle out of the compromise which was effected between the parties with their consent and on the basis of the statement, which cannot be permitted to be resiled in the execution petition. The objections which are being raised by the petitioner are baseless and without any merit. Learned Executing Court has rightly determined the application and there is no illegality, infirmity or jurisdictional error in the same That this Court was informed that the complaint under Section 12 of the DV Act ,which was filed by petitioner Shahina Alam Vs. Nadem Alam and others stands dismissed by the learned CJM, Nahan on 29.11.2025. The learned Trial Court has rightly passed the impugned order, consequently the present petition being devoid of any merit deserves to be dismissed. 22. Consequently there is no merit in the petition and the same is dismissed with costs. (Romesh Verma), Judge 04th May, 2026 (Guleria)