APHC010437072009 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3397] FRIDAY, THE 17th DAY OF JULY 2026 PRESENT THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VENUTHURUMALLI GOPALA KRISHNA RAO APPEAL SUIT NO: 167/2009 Between: Adbala Parvathi and Others ...APPELLANT(S) AND Adabala Maridayyakapu ...RESPONDENT Counsel for the Appellant(S): 1. N SIVA REDDY Counsel for the Respondent: 1. VENKAT CHALLA 2. VARREY VENKATA NAGA VISHNU TEJA The Court made the following: VGKR, J. AS_167_2009 HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE V. GOPALA KRISHNA RAO APPEAL SUIT No.167 of 2009 JUDGMENT: This Appeal, under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure [for short „the C.P.C.’], is filed by the Appellants/Defendant Nos.1 to 4 challenging the Decree and Judgment, dated 22.12.2008, in O.S.No.64 of 2005 passed by the learned I Additional District Judge, East Godavari, Rajahmundry [for short „the trial Court’]. 2. The appellants herein are the defendant Nos.1 to 4 and the respondent is the plaintiff. During the pendency of the appeal, the appellant No.3 died and the appellant Nos.5 to 7 are brought on record as the legal representatives of the deceased appellant No.3. 3. Originally, the plaintiff in O.S.No.64 of 2005 filed the suit against the sole-defendant, seeking to (i) grant preliminary decree of partition of plaint schedule properties into four equal shares and allot three such shares by metes and bounds and put him in possession in respect of item No.2 of the plaint schedule property and to pass a final decree in terms of the preliminary decree, (ii) grant mesne profits from the date of suit in respect of item No.2 of the plaint schedule property; (iii) grant a decree for Rs.54,000/- with subsequent interest at 12% per annum from the date of suit till the date of realization; (iv) appoint advocate commissioner for ascertaining the mesne profits and for costs of the suit. VGKR, J. AS_167_2009 During the course of the trial before the trial Court, the defendant Nos.2 to 4 were added as parties to the suit vide orders dated 03.08.2007 in I.A.No.1623 of 2007. 4. Both parties in the appeal will be referred to as they were arrayed before the trial Court. 5. The case of the plaintiff as per the plaint averments in O.S.No.64 of 2005, in brief, is as follows: I. The plaintiff pleaded that the plaintiff is the adoptive son of late Adabala Sankara Narayana Brahmanandam @ Brahmananda Rao and the defendant No.1 herein, and the natural father of the plaintiff is one Adabala Appa Rao and the natural mother of the plaintiff is one Suryakantham, and the adoptive father is the elder brother of the natural father of the plaintiff. The plaintiff further pleaded that his adoptive parents had no issues and he was given in adoption by his natural parents to the adoptive parents during his 8th year by following all the formalities, including the ceremony of Datta Homa, etc. The plaintiff further pleaded that the said adoption took place in the presence of close relatives and friends like Adabala Lakshminarayana, Talatam Pedakapu, Velugubantla Veerraju, Yalamarthi Ammi Raju, and others, and ever since the date of adoption, the plaintiff has been brought up by the adoptive parents and became the son of his adoptive parents. The plaintiff further pleaded that, in order to have a record of such adoption, the natural parents and the adoptive parents of the VGKR, J. AS_167_2009 plaintiff executed a registered adoption deed dated 04.06.1979, wherein it is clearly mentioned that the plaintiff was adopted during his childhood and, to have a record of past adoption, the adoption deed was executed. II. The plaintiff further pleaded that Item No.1 of the plaint schedule property consists of agricultural lands and the same are ancestral properties devolved on the plaintiff and his adoptive father from their ancestors. The plaintiff further pleaded that Item No.2 of the plaint schedule property is a residential house which was purchased by his adoptive father with the income derived from Item No.1 of the plaint schedule property and, therefore, the said properties are also considered as joint Hindu family ancestral properties. The plaintiff further pleaded that his adoptive parents performed his first marriage with one Sitamahalakshmi, who died during childbirth, and again the adoptive parents of the plaintiff performed his marriage with one Raghavamma, through whom the plaintiff begot two daughters. The plaintiff further pleaded that the defendant started demanding the plaintiff to perform the marriage of the eldest daughter with her nephew by name N.V.V.Satyanarayana, but the plaintiff and his adoptive father did not agree to the same, and they performed the marriage of the eldest daughter of the plaintiff with another person. III. The plaintiff further pleaded that the adoptive father of the plaintiff died intestate on 12.04.2001 and the plaintiff is in possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule properties. The plaintiff further pleaded that after VGKR, J. AS_167_2009 the death of his adoptive father, his adoptive mother has been acting in a hostile manner and has been taking the sides of her nephews. The plaintiff further pleaded that the defendant, because of her hostile attitude exhibited towards the plaintiff, joined hands with her nephews and is trying to create sham and nominal documents and is also fabricating several documents to the detriment of the plaintiff and also creating encumbrances and liabilities on the properties. As such, the plaintiff was constrained to file the suit for partition of the plaint schedule properties. 6. The defendant No.1 filed the written statement and the case of the defendant No.1 as per the written statement is as follows: I. The defendant No.1 pleaded that the plaintiff is not the adopted son of herself and her husband, Adabala Sankara Narayana Brahmanandam @ Brahmanadarao, and the plaintiff was never given in adoption. The defendant No.1 further pleaded that the said Datta Homa and the adoption ceremony did not take place in the presence of Adabala Lakshminarayana, Talatam Pedakapu, Velugubantla Veeranna, Yalamarthi Ammi Raju. The defendant No.1 further pleaded that the plaintiff never lived in the house of the defendant No.1 and that her husband, during his lifetime, executed a Will dated 09.05.2000 in a sound and disposing state of mind and bequeathed Ac.6.25 cents of land in R.S.No.88/2 of Doddigunta Village in favour of the defendant No.1 and Ac.6.99 ½ cents, i.e., Ac.4.63 cents in R.S.No.89 and Ac.1.56 VGKR, J. AS_167_2009 ½ cents in R.S.No.115/5 of Doddigunta Village in favour of his Abhimana Putrudu and nephew by name Nagireddi Veera Venkata Satyanarayana Murthy, reserving the life interest for himself and recognizing his title, possession, and enjoyment of those properties. The defendant No.1 further pleaded that the Revenue authorities granted Ryotwari Pattadar Pass Books in favour of the defendant No.1 and, till today, the plaintiff was never in possession and enjoyment of Item No.1 of the plaint schedule and never managed the same nor enjoyed the usufruct from the aforesaid properties in Item No.1. The defendant No.1 further pleaded that Item Nos.1 and 2 of the plaint schedule properties were never in the possession and enjoyment of the plaintiff. II. The defendant No.1 further pleaded that after the demise of her husband on 12.04.2001, the defendant No.1, along with her nephews, sold her Sampara property under sale deeds dated 05.09.2002 and 08.09.2003 and, out of the consideration received by her, she discharged the family debts and utilized the balance amount for the improvement of her properties. The defendant No.1 further pleaded that she and her husband had never performed the marriage of the plaintiff with one Sita Mahalakshmi and that the wedding invitation was got printed by the plaintiff. The defendant No.1 further pleaded that in the school records and voters' list, the plaintiff was shown as the son of Apparao and was never shown as the adopted son of the defendant VGKR, J. AS_167_2009 No.1. The defendant No.1 further pleaded that the plaintiff is not entitled to any share in any of the properties of the defendant or her husband and the plaintiff can never be termed to be in constructive joint possession of the plaint schedule properties, and Item No.1 of the plaint schedule is in the physical possession and enjoyment of the nephews of the defendant No.1. The defendant No.1 further pleaded that Item No.2 was settled in favour of Nagireddi Veera Venkata Satyanarayana Murthy by the defendant No.1 under a registered settlement deed dated 29.07.2002 and that the plaintiff has no right to question the acts of the defendant No.1. The defendant No.1 further pleaded that there is absolutely no cause of action for the suit and, further, the cause of action stated in paragraph No.9 of the plaint is not true and correct. III. The defendant No.1 further pleaded that the plaintiff was aged about 21 years on the date of the alleged adoption and the plaintiff, being the eldest son of his parents, would never be given in adoption, as under the Hindu Dharma Shastra, the eldest son has to perform the obsequies and other religious ceremonies of his parents. The defendant No.1 further pleaded that by the date of the alleged adoption, the plaintiff was already 21 years old, and under Section 13 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, the plaintiff can never be termed an adopted son, and the adopted son does not deprive the adoptive father or mother of the power to dispose of his or her property by transfer inter vivos or by Will. The defendant No.1 further pleaded that, taking VGKR, J. AS_167_2009 advantage of the innocence, illiteracy, and lack of worldly knowledge of the defendant No.1 and her husband, the document dated 04.06.1979 was brought into existence and that the plaintiff and his father requested the defendant No.1 and her husband to lease out their properties and represented that they would properly pay the rents to them, and when the defendant No.1 and her husband believed the said representations of the plaintiff and his father, they executed and registered the adoption deed. As such, the defendant No.1 requested for dismissal of the suit with costs. 7. The plaintiff filed a rejoinder before the trial Court and pleaded that he was adopted when he was aged about 8 years and, subsequently, a deed of adoption was executed on 04.06.1979 and the same was registered before the Sub-Registrar by the natural parents and also the adoptive parents to record the past adoption. The plaintiff further pleaded that at the time of his adoption, he was aged about 8 years and was already admitted to school by his natural parents and that no changes were effected in the school records by his adoptive parents. After filing of the rejoinder by the plaintiff in the year 2007, the defendant No.2 filed a written statement, and the same was adopted by defendant Nos.3 and 4, and they supported the case of the defendant No.1 in all aspects. 8. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues: VGKR, J. AS_167_2009 1) Whether the plaintiff is adopted son of the defendant and her husband Adabala Brahmananda Rao? 2) Whether the plaintiff is in possession of item No.1 of plaint schedule property? 3) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for partition of plaint schedule property into four equal shares and allotment of three shares as prayed? 4) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for mesne profits on item No.2 of plaint schedule? 5) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for decree for Rs.54,000/- with interest at 12% per annum as prayed? 6) To what relief? On 30.10.2007, the trial Court framed the following additional issues: 1) Whether the Registered settlement deed dated 30.10.2002 is true, valid and binding on the plaintiff? 2) Whether the Relinquishment deed dated 23.06.2005 is true, valid and binding on the plaintiff? 9. During the course of trial in the trial Court, on behalf of the plaintiff, P.Ws.1 to 6 were examined and Ex.A-1 to Ex.A-5 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, D.Ws.1 and 2 were examined and Ex.B-1 to Ex.B-11 were marked. 10. After completion of the trial and on hearing the arguments of both sides, the trial Court decreed the suit in part vide its judgment, dated 22.12.2008, VGKR, J. AS_167_2009 against which the present appeal is preferred by the appellants/defendant No.1 to 4 in the suit. 11. Learned counsel for the appellants would contend that the judgment and decree of the trial Court are erroneous, contrary to law, and weight of the evidence. He would further contend that the trial Court erred in relying on the evidence of P.W.2 to P.W.4 and came to a conclusion that the plaintiff is the adopted son of the defendant and her husband. He would further contend that the trial Court committed a grave mistake in observing that the plaintiff is entitled to the presumption envisaged under Section 16 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act and that the reasoning given by the trial Court in support of the same is perverse. He would further contend that the trial Court came to a wrong conclusion and decreed the suit in part, and that the appeal may be allowed by setting aside the findings of the trial Court that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of partition of Item No.1 of the plaint schedule property. 12. Per contra, Sri P.Veera Reddy, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent/plaintiff, would contend that, on appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the learned trial Judge rightly arrived at a correct conclusion that the plaintiff is the adopted son of the defendant No.1 and her husband and that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief of partition of Item No.1 of the plaint schedule property. He would further contend that there are no grounds to interfere with the decree and judgment passed by the trial Court VGKR, J. AS_167_2009 and that the appeal may be dismissed by confirming the decree and judgment passed by the trial Court. 13. Heard Sri M.Radha Krishna, learned counsel, representing Sri N.Siva Reddy, learned counsel for the appellants and Sri P.Veera Reddy, learned Senior Counsel, representing Sri Varre Venkata Naga Vishnu Teja and Sri Venkat Challa, learned counsel for the respondents. 14. Now, in deciding the present appeal, the points that arise for determination is as follows: 1) Whether the plaintiff is the adopted son of the defendant No.1 and her husband Adabala Brahmananda Rao? 2) Whether the trial Court is justified in decreeing the suit for partition of Item No.1 of the suit schedule property? 3) Whether the decree and judgment passed by the trial Court needs any interference? 15. Point No.1: Whether the plaintiff is the adopted son of the defendant No.1 and her husband Adabala Brahmananda Rao? The case of the respondent/plaintiff is that the plaintiff is the adopted son of Adabala Sankara Narayana Brahmanandam alias Brahmananda Rao and the defendant No.1 herein, and the adoptive father is the elder brother of the natural father of the plaintiff. The plaintiff further pleaded that the adoptive parents of the plaintiff had no issues and that the plaintiff was given in VGKR, J. AS_167_2009 adoption by the natural parents to the adoptive parents at the age of his 8th year by following all the formalities, including the ceremony of Datta Homa, etc., in the presence of close relatives and friends like Adabala Lakshminarayana, Talatam Pedakapu, Velugubantla Veerraju, Yalamarthi Ammi Raju, and others, and ever since the date of adoption, the plaintiff has been brought up by the adoptive parents and, for all purposes, he had become the son of his adoptive parents. The plaintiff further pleaded that, subsequently, in order to have a record of the past adoption, the natural parents and the adoptive parents executed a registered adoption deed dated 04.06.1979, wherein it was clearly recited that the plaintiff had been adopted during his childhood days and, to have a record of the adoption, the said registered adoption deed was executed. The appellants contended that the plaintiff is not the adopted son of the defendant No.1 and her husband and they never adopted the plaintiff. 16. The plaintiff, to discharge his initial burden, relied on the evidence of P.W.1. P.W.1 is the plaintiff, P.W.2 and P.W.3 are the witnesses to the adoption of the plaintiff at the age of 8 years by the defendant No.1 and her husband. P.W.4 is the natural father of the plaintiff. P.W.5 is the attestor to Ex.A-1. P.W.2 and P.W.3 narrated in their evidence that they were present when the plaintiff was given in adoption to the defendant No.1 and her husband by the natural parents of the plaintiff, when the plaintiff was 8 years old. They further deposed that the natural parents handed over the plaintiff to the defendant No.1 and her husband physically in the presence of the Purohit, VGKR, J. AS_167_2009 relatives, and friends by following all formalities, including the ceremony of Datta Homa. P.W.2 and P.W.3 further deposed that, along with them, Talatam Pedakapu, Velugubantla Veeraju, and others were present at the time of adoption and ever since the date of adoption, the plaintiff was brought up in the house of defendant No.1 and her husband as their own son. They further deposed that the two marriages of the plaintiff were performed by the defendant No.1 and her husband and the plaintiff performed the last rites of his adoptive father. It is admitted by the defendant No.1 that P.W.2 is their relative. It is the specific case of the plaintiff that P.W.3 is the common relative of the plaintiff and the defendant No.1, but the same is denied by D.W.1. It is not the case of the defendant No.1 that she has enmity with P.W.2 and P.W.3, due to that they deposed falsehood against her. To prove the valid adoption, it would be necessary to prove that there had been an actual giving and taking ceremony. The evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.3 proves about the actual giving and taking ceremony of the plaintiff by the defendant No.1 and her husband at the age of 8 years of plaintiff, by following the formalities, including the ceremonies of Datta Homa. 17. P.W.4, who is the natural father of the plaintiff, asserted in his evidence that his elder brother and the defendant No.1 had no issues, and they themselves requested him and his wife to give them the plaintiff, who was given in adoption to the defendant No.1 and her husband, and the adoption ceremony took place in their joint house. He further stated that P.W.2, P.W.3, and others attended the adoption ceremony and that he and his wife VGKR, J. AS_167_2009 physically handed over the plaintiff to the defendant No.1 and her husband and that at the time of adoption the Purohit was also present and performed Datta Homa, and ever since the date of adoption, the plaintiff has been residing in the house of the defendant No.1 and her husband, and they brought him up like their own son. He further asserted that, to record the said past adoption, a registered adoption deed was executed, and the same was registered on 04.06.1979 itself. The evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.3 is well corroborated by the evidence of P.W.4. 18. The learned counsel for the appellants stressed upon Section 7 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, and contends that the consent of the wife/defendant No.1 is essential to prove the validity of the adoption and no consent was given by the defendant No.1 to adopt the plaintiff at the age of 8 years. 19. Learned counsel for the appellants placed a case law in Ghisalal Vs Dhapubai (Dead) by L.Rs. and others1, wherein the Hon‟ble Apex Court held as follows: “20. The term `consent' used in the proviso to Section 7 and the explanation appended thereto has not been defined in the Act. Therefore, while interpreting these provisions, the Court shall have to keep in view the legal position obtaining before enactment of the 1956 Act, the object of the new legislation and apply the rule of purposive interpretation and if that is done, it would be reasonable to say that the consent of wife envisaged in the proviso to Section 7 should either be in writing or reflected by an affirmative/positive act voluntarily and willingly done by her. If the adoption by a Hindu male becomes subject matter of challenge before the Court, the party supporting the adoption has to adduce evidence to prove that the same was done with the consent of his wife. This can be done either by producing document evidencing her consent in 1 2011 AIR SCW 592 VGKR, J. AS_167_2009 writing or by leading evidence to show that wife had actively participated in the ceremonies of adoption with an affirmative mindset to support the action of the husband to take a son or a daughter in adoption. The presence of wife as a spectator in the assembly of people who gather at the place where the ceremonies of adoption are performed cannot be treated as her consent. In other words, the Court cannot presume the consent of wife simply because she was present at the time of adoption. The wife's silence or lack of protest on her part also cannot give rise to an inference that she had consented to the adoption. In the present case, the adoption of the plaintiff is denied by defendant No.1 in the written statement itself. It is not the case of defendant No.1 that her husband did not obtain her consent at the time of the adoption of the plaintiff, and the same is not pleaded or deposed to in her evidence by the defendant No.1. It is also not the case of the defendant No.1 that her presence at the time of adoption was that of a mute spectator and not that of an active participant. The natural father/P.W.4 asserted in his evidence that his elder brother and his wife/defendant No.1 had no issues and they requested him and his wife to give the plaintiff in adoption, accordingly, during the plaintiff's 8th year, the plaintiff was given in adoption to the defendant No.1 and her husband. It is undisputed that the defendant No.1 and her husband had a cordial relationship with the plaintiff‟s natural parents. The adoptive father of the plaintiff/the husband of the defendant No.1 died on 12.04.2001. Subsequently, the disputes arose between the plaintiff and D.W.1. It was not suggested to P.W.4 in cross-examination by the learned counsel for the appellants that, at the time of the alleged adoption, the consent of the defendant No.1 was not at all obtained. As on the date of giving evidence, i.e., 07.11.2006, the plaintiff was aged about 51 years. It seems that he was born in the year 1955. As per the case of the plaintiff, he was adopted by the VGKR, J. AS_167_2009 defendant No.1 and her husband at the age of 8 years, i.e., around the year 1963; therefore, it is highly impossible for the plaintiff to remember what was happened at the age of 8 years, after a lapse of more than 40 years about the manner of adoption and the details of the adoption. P.W.2 and P.W.3, who were aged about 60 years and 70 years, respectively, were competent persons to depose about the details and manner of the adoption, as they were present at the time of the adoption ceremony of the plaintiff. The presence of P.W.2 and P.W.3 at the time of the adoption ceremony was also asserted by the natural father/P.W.4 in his evidence. The evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.3 inspires confidence to prove the manner of adoption of the plaintiff at the age of 8 years by the defendant No.1 and her husband. 20. The plaintiff, to prove the alleged adoption at the age of 8 years, relied on Ex.A-1, the registration extract of the adoption deed. The past adoption was recorded in the original of Ex.A-1; it is a registered adoption deed. The learned counsel for the appellants would contend that the original was not produced by the plaintiff and placed reliance on a case law of a Five Judge Bench of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in The Roman Catholic Mission vs. The State of Madras and another2, and contended that the original was not produced by the plaintiff before the Court and no foundation was laid for the establishment of the right to give secondary evidence and that Ex.A-1 cannot be looked into. As seen from the plaint averments, the certified copy of the registered adoption deed dated 04.06.1979 was executed by the natural 2 AIR 1966 SUPREME COURT 1457 VGKR, J. AS_167_2009 parents of the plaintiff and the adoptive parents of the plaintiff to record the past adoption of the plaintiff. Accordingly, the natural parents and the adoptive parents executed a registered adoption deed under the original of Ex.A-1, and the certified copy of the registered adoption deed was filed along with the plaint, and the same was marked as Ex.A-1. At the time of exhibiting the said document as Ex.A-1, no objection was raised by the defendants or their counsel before the trial Court. 21. The law is well settled that “ordinarily, an objection to the admissibility of evidence should be taken when it is tendered and not subsequently. The objections as to admissibility of documents in evidence may be classified into two classes: (i) an objection that the document which is sought to be proved is itself inadmissible in evidence; and (ii) where the objection does not dispute the admissibility of the document in evidence but is directed towards the mode of proof alleging the same to be irregular or insufficient. In the first case, merely because a document has been marked as "an exhibit", an objection as to its admissibility is not excluded and is available to be raised even at a later stage or even in appeal or revision. In the latter case, the objection should be taken when the evidence is tendered and once the document has been admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit, the objection that it should not have been admitted in evidence or that the mode adopted for proving the document is irregular cannot be allowed to be raised at any stage subsequent to the marking of the document as an exhibit. The latter proposition is a rule of fair play. The crucial test is whether an objection, if taken at the appropriate VGKR, J. AS_167_2009 point of time, would have enabled the party tendering the evidence to cure the defect and resort to such mode of proof as would be regular. The omission to object becomes fatal because by his failure the party entitled to object allows the party tendering the evidence to act on an assumption that the opposite party is not serious about the mode of proof”. 22. In the present case, Ex.A-1 is not a suit document. Ex.A-1 reveals that it was executed to record the past adoption, and a registered adoption deed was executed by the natural parents and the adoptive parents. The natural father of the plaintiff/P.W.4 asserted that the original adoption deed was retained by the defendant No.1 and her husband. The plaintiff is not a party to the document under Ex.A-1; therefore, P.W.4, who is a party to the document, i.e., the natural father of the plaintiff, is the best person to speak about the custody of the original of Ex.A-1. It was suggested to D.W.1 in cross- examination by the learned counsel for the plaintiff that the defendant No.1 had custody of the original of Ex.A-1, the said suggestion was denied by D.W.1. As per the case of D.W.1, her husband was literate, and the contention of the defendant No.1 is that the plaintiff obtained the adoption deed under the guise of a lease deed. It clearly goes to show that D.W.1 is admitting the execution of Ex.A-1, but she is disputing the contents of Ex.A-1. Since D.W.1 admitted the execution of Ex.A-1, therefore, it is for the defendant No.1/D.W.1 to prove that the plaintiff obtained the adoption deed fraudulently under the guise of a lease deed. VGKR, J. AS_167_2009 23. To prove Ex.A-1 document, the plaintiff relied on the evidence of P.W.5, who is one of the attestors to Ex.A-1. The defendant No.1 asserted in her evidence that she does not have any enmity with P.W.5 and that he worked as the Village Munsif. As per the evidence of P.W.5, he worked as the Village Munsif, and he had personal knowledge about the adoption of the plaintiff by the defendant No.1 and her husband, as they were issueless, and the plaintiff was brought up by D.W.1 and her husband, and his two marriages were performed by the defendant No.1 and her husband. He further asserted that the natural parents and the adoptive parents wanted to execute a registered adoption deed evidencing the past adoption that took place during the childhood days of the plaintiff, and the same was executed and registered in the Sub-Registrar's office, and he acted as one of the attestors to the adoption deed dated 04.06.1979. 24. The defendant No.1 admitted that she does not have any enmity with P.W.5 and that P.W.5 also acted as the identifying witness before the Sub- Registrar in a sale deed executed by D.W.1 and her nephews, and the same was elicited from D.W.1 in cross-examination by the learned counsel for the plaintiff. So far as Ex.A-1 is concerned, in cross-examination, except giving formal suggestions to deny Ex.A-1, nothing was elicited from P.W.5 to disbelieve the Ex.A-1 document. It was not suggested to P.W.4 and P.W.5 in cross-examination by the learned counsel for the defendant No.1 that the original of Ex.A-1 was obtained under the guise of a lease deed. Furthermore, VGKR, J. AS_167_2009 the defendant No.1 admits that she does not know under what circumstances Ex.A-1 came into force. 25. The defendant No.1 is not denying the execution and registration of the original of Ex.A-1 on 04.06.1979 before the Sub-Registrar. The contention of the appellants is that the adoption deed was obtained on 04.06.1979 on the pretext of a lease deed. It is undisputed fact that there was no enmity between both the families till the husband of the defendant No.1 died in the year 2001, and both families had cordial terms. After the death of the husband of D.W.1, disputes arose between both the families. Admittedly, no notice was issued by the defendant No.1 or her husband stating that a registered adoption deed was obtained under the guise of a lease deed. The defendant No.1 kept quiet for a period of more than 25 years and, for the first time, the defendant No.1 pleaded in the written statement in the year 2005 that an adoption deed was obtained under the guise of a lease deed. 26. It is also relevant to note that if a document is registered in accordance with law, it is presumed that the adoption has been made in compliance of the provisions of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956. It is relevant to note Section 16 of the Act: “Section16. Presumption as to registered documents relating to adoption.―Whenever any document registered under any law for the time being in force is produced before any court purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption, the court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of this Act unless and until it is disproved.” VGKR, J. AS_167_2009 27. In the present case, the plaintiff proved Ex.A-1 by examining one of the attestors to the original of Ex.A-1 as P.W.5. It is the admitted case of the defendant No.1 that she is having cordial terms with P.W.5 and that P.W.5 worked as the Village Administrative Officer and was an elder of the village. Furthermore, the natural father of the plaintiff asserted that the defendant No.1 and her husband themselves requested him and his wife to give the plaintiff in adoption since they had no issues and, accordingly, during the plaintiff's 8th year, the plaintiff was given in adoption to the defendant No.1 and her husband, and the adoption ceremony took place in their joint house. P.W.2 and P.W.3 attended the adoption ceremony of the plaintiff at the age of 8 years, and at the time of adoption, the Purohit also performed Datta Homa and, subsequently, to record the past adoption, a registered adoption deed was executed in the year 1979. To disprove Ex.A-1, no rebuttal evidence was produced by the defendant No.1. 28. It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the plaintiff failed to prove the validity of the adoption. It is well settled that "for a valid adoption, the physical act of giving and taking is an essential requisite, a ceremony imperative in all adoptions whatever the caste, and the consent of both the parties is also an essential requisite for a valid adoption." In the present case, at the age of 8 years of plaintiff, about more than 40 years prior to the filing of the suit, the plaintiff was adopted by the defendant No.1 and her husband from the natural parents by performing all the necessary ceremonies required for a valid adoption and, to record the past adoption, a registered VGKR, J. AS_167_2009 adoption deed was executed by the natural parents and the adoptive parents in the year 1979. It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the defendant No.1 had not given any consent and the consent of the wife is an essential requisite to prove a valid adoption. As stated supra, it is not the case of the defendant No.1 that she stood as a mute spectator at the time of adoption and her consent was not obtained by her husband. For the first time after 50 years, i.e., after the death of her husband, due to love and affection on her brother‟s children, the defendant No.1 came with a stand that she was not a consenting party to the adoption and that the said adoption is invalid. 29. To prove the valid adoption, which was happened at the age of 8 years, the plaintiff relied on the evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.3. The plaintiff pleaded in the plaint itself that the adoptive parents of the plaintiff had no issues and that the plaintiff was given in adoption by the natural parents of the plaintiff to the adoptive parents during his 8th year by performing all the ceremonies, including the ceremony of Datta Homa, in the presence of P.W.2, P.W.3, and other relatives. The plaintiff pleaded in the plaint itself that he was adopted at the age of 8 years by performing all the necessary ceremonies by the adoptive parents from the natural parents. The presence of P.W.2 and P.W.3 at the time of the adoption ceremony at the age of 8 years of the plaintiff was narrated by the plaintiff in the plaint itself. 30. It is well settled that “in the matter of appreciation of evidence of witnesses, it is not the number of witnesses but quality of their evidence which is important, as there is no requirement in Law of Evidence that any particular VGKR, J. AS_167_2009 number of witnesses is to be examined to prove/disprove a fact. It is time- honoured principle, that evidence must be weighed and not counted. The test is whether the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy or otherwise. The legal system has laid emphasis on value provided by each witness, rather than multiplicity or plurality of witnesses. It is quality and not quantity, which determines the adequacy of evidence as has been provided by Section 134 of the Evidence Act. 31. In the present case, it is an admitted case of the defendant No.1 that P.W.2 is their relative. It is not the case of the defendant No.1 that she is having enmity with P.W.2 and P.W.3, and as noticed supra, the evidence of P.W.2 and P.W.3 is inspiring confidence to prove the valid adoption of P.W.1. 32. As stated supra, to prove the valid adoption, the person who claims to be an adopted son, namely the plaintiff herein, placed cogent and reliable evidence to prove the valid adoption. It is the specific case of the plaintiff that he performed the last rites of the husband of the defendant No.1, i.e., of his adoptive father/the husband of the defendant No.1, and the same is asserted by P.W.2 to P.W.4 in their evidence. The defendant No.1/D.W.1 also did not deny the said aspect, but she pleaded ignorance. 33. The learned counsel for the appellants has drawn the attention of this Court by showing variations in the wedding cards and also relying on the voters‟ list. In my view, the wedding cards and the voters‟ list are not conclusive proof to disbelieve the valid adoption. It was contended by the learned counsel for the appellants that the school records show that the VGKR, J. AS_167_2009 plaintiff continued as the son of the natural parents and if the plaintiff was really adopted by the defendant No.1 and her husband, their names would have been entered in the school records. Here, the plaintiff was a school- going boy at the time of adoption, i.e., at the age of 8 years, and had already been admitted to school by then; therefore, the names of the natural parents continued in the school records and, therefore, no changes were effected in the school records. Furthermore, the plaintiff herein is working as an employee of the Road Transport Corporation. By the time of the alleged adoption, both the families were living in the joint house, and the plaintiff was none other than the son of the own brother of the husband of D.W.1. The plaintiff was aged about 8 years at the time of the alleged adoption. There is evidence on record to show that the plaintiff was adopted at the age of 8 years by the adoptive parents by performing all the ceremonies and that the said adoption took place with the consent of both the parties and, to record the past adoption, a registered adoption deed dated 04.06.1979 was executed by both the parties. 34. In the present case, D.W.1/defendant No.1 changed her version from time to time. In her written statement, she narrated that her husband, during his lifetime, executed a Will dated 09.05.2000 in a sound and disposing state of mind and bequeathed Ac.6.25 cents of land in R.S.No.88/2 of Doddigunta Village in her favour and Ac.6.99 ½ cents, i.e., Ac.4.63 cents in R.S.No.89 and Ac.1.56 ½ cents in R.S.No.115/5 of Doddigunta Village, in favour of his Abhimana Putrudu, who is his nephew by name Nagireddi Veera Venkata VGKR, J. AS_167_2009 Satyanarayana Murthy, reserving the life interest for herself and recognizing his title, possession, and enjoyment of the properties, and the Revenue authorities also granted pattadar pass books. But, in her evidence, she asserted that no such Will was executed by her husband. As noticed supra, the plaintiff proved that he is the adopted son of the defendant No.1 and her husband, but the defendant No.1 failed to produce any rebuttal evidence to disprove the original of Ex.A-1 and the adoption of the plaintiff. Though the defendants relied on the evidence of D.W.2, D.W.2 pleaded ignorance about the adoption of the plaintiff by the defendant No.1 and her husband on the pretext that he was not born at that time. 35. Learned counsel for the appellants placed a case law in Nivritti Pandurang Nale Vs. Uttam Ganu Nale and Others3, wherein the High Court of Bombay held as follows: “24. ……the plea of adoption could not be accepted based on the production of some documents to prove the adoption if the party claiming adoption fails to prove giving and taking. 26. Only because the adoption deed is a registered document it cannot be accepted as having presumptive value under Section 16. The presumption under Section 16 is applicable only if the document records the particulars of the adoption made and it is signed by the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption. In the present case, admittedly, the document is not signed by the person giving in adoption. On the date of the adoption deed, the biological mother was alive; thus, in the absence of her signature, the presumption under Section 16 shall not be applicable.” 36. Learned counsel for the appellants placed a case law in Jai Singh Vs. Shakuntala4, wherein the Hon‟ble Apex Court held as follows: 3 2025 SCC OnLine Bom 1135 4 AIR 2002 SUPREME COURT 1428 VGKR, J. AS_167_2009 “Section 16 envisages a statutory presumption that in the event of there being a registered document pertaining to adoption there would be a presumption that adoption has been made in accordance with law. Mandate of the Statute is rather definite since the Legislature has used "shall" instead of any other word of lesser significance. Incidentally, however the inclusion of the words "unless and until it is disproved" appearing at the end of the statutory provision has made the situation not that rigid but flexible enough to depend upon the evidence available on record in support of adoption. It is a matter of grave significance by reason of the factum of adoption and displacement of the person adopted from the natural succession - thus onus of proof is rather heavy. Statute has allowed some amount of flexibility, lest it turns out to be solely dependent on a registered adoption deed. The reason for inclusion of the words "unless and until it is disproved" shall have to be ascertained in its proper perspective and as such the presumption cannot but be said to be a rebuttable presumption.” 37. Learned counsel for the appellants placed a case law in M.Vanaja Vs. M.Sarla Devi (Dead)5, wherein the Hon‟ble Apex Court held as follows: “10. Section 6 of the Act of 1956, prescribes the pre- requisites for a valid adoption, which are:- “6 Requisites of a valid adoption – No adoption shall be valid unless – (i) the person adopting has the capacity, and also the right, to take in adoption, (ii) the person giving in adoption has the capacity to do so; (iii) the person adopted is capable of being taken in adoption; and (iv) the adoption is made in compliance with the other conditions mentioned in this Chapter” 11. Section 7 provides that the male Hindu who is of sound mind and is not a minor has the capacity to take a son or a daughter in adoption. The consent of his wife has been made mandatory by the proviso to Section 7. Section 9 deals with persons who are capable of giving a child in adoption. The other conditions for a valid adoption are stipulated in Section 11 of the Act of 1956. One such condition is 11 (6) which is as under:- “11. Other conditions for a valid adoption. xx (vi) the child to be adopted must be actually given and taken in adoption by the parents or guardian concerned or under their authority with intent to transfer the child from the family of his birth (or in the case of an abandoned child or child whose parentage is not 5 AIR 2020 SUPREME COURT 1293 VGKR, J. AS_167_2009 known, from the place or family where it has been brought up) to the family of its adoption: Provided that the performance of data homam shall not be essential to the validity of adoption”. 38. It is well settled that "in judging whether an adoption pleaded by a party has been satisfactorily proved or not, the Court has to determine the lapse of time between the date of the alleged adoption and the date on which the concerned party is required to adduce proof." In the present case, the adoption took place when the plaintiff was 8 years of age, i.e., about more than 40 years ago. On the date of adoption, the plaintiff was aged about 8 years, and his natural father/P.W.4 explained in detail about the manner of adoption of the plaintiff, and he also explained that, to record the past adoption, a deed was executed in the year 1979 by the adoptive parents and the natural parents, which was registered before the Sub-Registrar. It is an undisputed fact that by then both the families had cordial relations and they had talking terms. As noticed supra, the husband of D.W.1 died in the year 2001; subsequently, disputes arose between both the parties. As per the case of the plaintiff, after the death of his adoptive father, in view of the hostile attitude of D.W.1 in favour of the sons of the natural brother of D.W.1, the disputes arose between both the parties. It is also evident and is an undisputed fact that from the date of the alleged adoption till the death of the husband of D.W.1, both the families had cordial relations and no disputes arose between both the parties. It is not at all the case of the appellants that both the families did not have cordial terms. Therefore, in view of the hostile VGKR, J. AS_167_2009 attitude of the defendant No.1 towards her nephews, the disputes cropped up between both the parties, and later, the defendant No.1 came up with a stand that the plaintiff is not an adopted son. But, there is cogent evidence to show that the plaintiff was adopted by the defendant No.1 and her husband at the age of 8 years of plaintiff and the said adoption took place with the consent of both the parties, and the past adoption was recorded in the year 1979 by way of a registered adoption deed, and the said registered adoption deed is in force and remain unchallenged. 39. Learned counsel for the appellants placed a case law in Moturu Nalini Kanth Vs. Gainedi Kaliprasad (dead, through Lrs.)6 . In the present case on hand, where a natural father, who has given his son in adoption at a young age, appears in the witness box and proves the valid adoption and also, to prove the past adoption, the plaintiff placed the certified copy of the registered adoption deed under the original of Ex.A-1, which was proved through P.W.5. As stated supra, the adoption of the plaintiff was corroborated by the common relative of both the parties, namely P.W.2. As noticed supra, the learned counsel for the respondent/plaintiff contended that P.W.3 is also the common relative of both the parties, the learned counsel for the appellants contended that nowhere D.W.1 admitted that P.W.3 is the common relative of both the parties. It is not at all the case of D.W.1 that she is having enmity with P.W.2 and P.W.3 and that they deposed falsely against the appellants. As stated supra, the said adoption was not questioned by the 6 AIR Online 2023 SC 952 VGKR, J. AS_167_2009 defendant No.1 and her husband. The husband of the defendant No.1 died in the year 2001 and, subsequently, the disputes arose between both the parties, which led to the filing of the present suit by the plaintiff. As stated supra, the plaintiff pleaded and asserted in the plaint, rejoinder, and also in his evidence that, after the death of the husband of D.W.1 and in view of the hostile attitude towards the nephews of D.W.1, the disputes arose between both the parties. 40. For the aforesaid reasons, I am of the considered view that the plaintiff, by placing cogent and reliable evidence, proved the valid adoption, and there is an ample evidence on record to prove the occurrence of the giving and taking ceremony and with the consent of the natural parents and the adoptive parents, the adoption was taken place. Furthermore, it is not at all the case of D.W.1 that, without her consent, the plaintiff was adopted and she stood as a silent spectator at the time of the alleged adoption of the plaintiff. As seen from the written statement of the defendant No.1, it is nowhere pleaded in the written statement by the defendant No.1 that, in the absence of her consent, the alleged adoption took place. The trial Court, on an appreciation of the entire evidence on record, found that the said alleged adoption was valid. 41. For the aforesaid reasons, this Court is of the considered view that the plaintiff is the adopted son of the defendant No.1 and her husband. Accordingly, Point No.1 is answered against the appellants. 42. Point No.2: VGKR, J. AS_167_2009 Whether the trial Court is justified in decreeing the suit for partition of Item No.1 of the suit schedule property? The plaintiff in the suit before the trial Court sought the relief of partition of item Nos.1 and 2 of the plaint schedule properties and also sought the relief of past and future profits. On a thorough appreciation of the oral and documentary evidence, the learned trial Judge partly decreed the suit by granting the relief of partition of item No.1 of the plaint schedule property, and the learned trial Judge dismissed the relief of partition of item No.2 of the plaint schedule property, and the relief of past and future profits was also negatived by the learned trial Judge by assigning reasons. Against the said partly decreed suit, the defendants filed a first appeal before this Court. To challenge the negative findings arrived at by the trial Court, the plaintiff has not filed any cross-objections in the present appeal filed by the defendants. Therefore, the said findings reached their finality. 43. As per the case of the appellants, D.W.1 executed Ex.B-8 registered gift deed in favour of the defendant Nos.2 to 4 by retaining a life interest with regard to item No.1-A of the landed property covered in R.S.No.88/2 to an extent of Ac.6.25 cents, and it was pleaded by the appellants that later D.W.1 relinquished her life interest under Ex.B-8 by receiving a sum of Rs.80,000/- in favour of the defendant Nos.2 to 4 under Ex.B-9, and the appellants relied upon Ex.B-8 and Ex.B-9. As stated supra, the plaintiff, being an adoptive son of defendant No.1 and her husband, is entitled to a 3/4th share in item No.1 of the plaint schedule property, and the defendant No.1 is entitled to a 1/4th VGKR, J. AS_167_2009 share in item No.1 of the plaint schedule property. Since the defendant No.1 is having a 1/4th share in item No.1 of the plaint schedule property, in my view, at best she can alienate or gift only her 1/4th share in item No.1 of the plaint schedule property; she cannot transfer or alienate more than the 1/4th share which she had in item No.1 of the plaint schedule property. Therefore, those two documents under Ex.B-8 and Ex.B-9 are not binding on the plaintiff to the extent of his 3/4th share in item No.1 of the plaint schedule property. The trial Court, on an appreciation of the entire evidence on record, rightly came to the conclusion that the plaintiff herein is entitled to a 3/4th share in item No.1 of the plaint schedule property. Accordingly, Point No.2 is answered. 44. Point No.3: Whether the decree and judgment passed by the trial Court needs any interference? In view of my findings on Point Nos.1 and 2, I do not find any illegality in the decree and judgment passed by the trial Court. Therefore, there is no need to interfere with the findings arrived at by the trial Court. 45. In the result, the present appeal suit is dismissed, confirming the decree and judgment dated 22.12.2008 passed in O.S.No.64 of 2005 by the learned I Additional District Judge, East Godavari, Rajahmundry. On considering the facts and circumstances of the case, each party shall bear its own costs in the appeal suit. VGKR, J. AS_167_2009 As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the Appeal shall stand closed __________________________ V. GOPALA KRISHNA RAO, J. Date: 17.07.2026 SRT Whether the order is: Speaking Reasoned ☑ Reportable Non-reportable ☑