JUDGMENT : A. BADHARUDEEN, J. 1. The sole accused in S.C.No.193 of 2016 on the files of the Special Court under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (`POCSO Act’ for short hereafter), Manjeri, has filed this appeal challenging the conviction and sentence imposed against him in the above case. 2. Heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the learned Special Public Prosecutor in detail. Perused the judgment under challenge and the records of the Special Court. 3. Here the prosecution alleges commission of offences punishable under Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code (`IPC’ for short hereafter) as well as under Sections 5(j)(ii), 5(l), 5(o), 5(p) r/w 6 of POCSO Act and under Section 23 of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act (`JJ Act’ for short), by the appellant. The case of the prosecution is that the appellant/accused had subjected the victim to aggravated sexual assault and made her pregnant, and in consequence thereof she had given birth to a child at Eranad Hospital, Manjeri. 4. The learned Special Judge proceeded with trial of the matter on completing pre-trial formalities. During trial, PW1 to PW23 were examined and Exts.P1 to P24 were marked on the side of prosecution. No defence evidence was adduced. 5. On evaluation of evidence and after hearing both sides, the learned Special Judge found that the accused had committed the offences punishable under Section 376(2)(n) of IPC as well as under Sections 5(j)(ii) r/w 6, 5(l) r/w 6, 5(o) r/w 6, 5(p) r/w 6 of POCSO Act as well as under Section 23 of the JJ Act and accordingly convicted and sentenced the accused as under: “1. Accused is convicted and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) U/s 5(1) r/w 6 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act. In default of payment of fine, the accused is sentenced to undergo Simple Imprisonment for 4 (four) months. 2. The accused is convicted and sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 10 (ten) years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,00,000/- (one lakh only) U/s 5(j)(ii) r/w 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act. In default of payment of fine, the accused is sentenced to undergo Simple Imprisonment for 4 (four)months. 3. 2. The accused is convicted and sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 10 (ten) years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,00,000/- (one lakh only) U/s 5(j)(ii) r/w 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act. In default of payment of fine, the accused is sentenced to undergo Simple Imprisonment for 4 (four)months. 3. The accused is convicted and sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 10 (ten) years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,00,000/- (one lakh only) U/s 5(o) r/w 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act. In default of payment of fine, the accused is sentenced to undergo Simple Imprisonment for 4 (four)months. 4. The accused is convicted and sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 10 (ten) years and to pay a fine of Rs.1,00,000/- (one lakh only) U/s 5(p) r/w 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act. In default of payment of fine, the accused is sentenced to undergo Simple Imprisonment for 4 (four)months. 5. The accused is convicted and sentenced to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for 6 (six) months and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/- (ten thousand only) U/s 23 of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act. In default of payment of fine, the accused is sentenced to undergo Simple Imprisonment for 1 (one) month.“ 6. The learned counsel for the appellant/accused argued that in this case even though the prosecution adduced evidence in support of the allegations, it failed to prove a vital point so as to attract the offence punishable under Section 23 of the J.J Act and the age of the victim as a minor, aged below 18 years, not at all proved properly. It is submitted that if at all sexual intercourse between the victim and the accused to be discernible from the prosecution case, the deposition of PW2, the victim herself, would reveal that it was a consensual sexual relationship and, therefore, none of the other offences would be attracted against the appellant/accused. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, in the instant case the prosecution relied on Ext.P6 birth certificate issued from the school to prove the age of the victim through PW6, apart from that Ext.P1 tendered in evidence through PW1 to prove the age of the victim. According to the learned counsel for the appellant, in the instant case the prosecution relied on Ext.P6 birth certificate issued from the school to prove the age of the victim through PW6, apart from that Ext.P1 tendered in evidence through PW1 to prove the age of the victim. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant/accused further that the said documents cannot be relied upon as the sole basis to prove the age of the victim. Therefore, the best evidence was failed to be adduced to prove the age of the victim. In this regard the learned counsel placed a decision of the Apex Court reported in [ Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra , 2006 (1) SCC 283 : 2006 (1) KLT SN 115 : AIR 2006 SC 508 : 2006 (1) KLD 670 : 2006 Cri. L.J. 303 : 2006 KHC 29] where the Apex Court held that the prosecution must produce acceptable documents to prove the age of the prosecutrix, and that once it is found that the victim is above 18 years of age, none of the offences under the POCSO Act would be attracted. Thus, the learned counsel sought for interference in the verdict of the trial court. 7. Whereas it is submitted by the learned Public Prosecutor that in this case, PW2 the victim, PW1 the father and PW3 the mother supported the prosecution case and the date of birth of the victim has been proved as 05.09.1997 by examining PW6 as well as Ext.P6. In addition to that the prosecution tendered, Ext.P1 also supported by the oral evidence of PW1 to prove the date of birth of the victim as 05/09/1997, and therefore the contention canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant/accused regarding the absence of proof of the victim’s age below 18 years is untenable. In all other respects, the prosecution has succeeded in establishing the offences committed by the accused, and therefore the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 8. In view of the rival submissions, the points arise for consideration are: (i) Whether the learned Special Judge is right in holding that the appellant/accused committed the offence punishable under Section376(2)(n) of IPC? (ii) Whether the learned Special Judge properly appreciated the evidence while holding that the appellant/accused committed the offence punishable under Section 5(j)(ii) r/w 6 of POCSO Act? In view of the rival submissions, the points arise for consideration are: (i) Whether the learned Special Judge is right in holding that the appellant/accused committed the offence punishable under Section376(2)(n) of IPC? (ii) Whether the learned Special Judge properly appreciated the evidence while holding that the appellant/accused committed the offence punishable under Section 5(j)(ii) r/w 6 of POCSO Act? (iii) Whether the learned Special Judge is right in holding that the appellant/accused committed the offence punishable under Section 5(l)r/w 6 of POCSO Act? (iv) Whether the learned Special Judge is right in holding that the appellant/accused committed the offence punishable under Section 5(o)r/w 6 of POCSO Act? (v) Whether the learned Special Judge is right in holding that the appellant/accused committed the offence punishable under Section 5(p)r/w 6 of POCSO Act? (vi) Whether the learned Special Judge is justified in finding that the accused committed the offence punishable under Section 23 of the JJ Act? (vii) Is it necessary to interfere with the impugned judgment in any manner? (viii) The order to be passed? Points (i) to (viii) 9. Here the crucial witness spoke about the occurrence is none other than PW2, the victim herself. She had deposed supporting the prosecution case. According to her, she was aged 24 years on the date of her examination (20.10.2021) and she identified her original SSLC book already marked as Ext.P1 showing her date of birth as 05.09.1997. According to her, she used to participate in stage programs at the instance of the accused and there were rehearsals at the institution of the accused and at the house of one Sathyettan and also at her house. Further, she used to attend the institution run by the accused to study dance and folk songs. She identified the accused at the dock after the curtain placed in front of the victim was lifted. PW2 testified further that the institution was located about a five-minutes walkable distance from her house and was functioning in a rented premises. She narrated the stature of the hall and the nature of the building. She deposed that rehearsals would be conducted from 5 p.m to 10 p.m on school days, and on holidays from 10 a.m. to 7 p.m. On 01.03.2014, she went to the institution of the accused at 5 p.m. for rehearsal and found the accused alone there. She narrated the stature of the hall and the nature of the building. She deposed that rehearsals would be conducted from 5 p.m to 10 p.m on school days, and on holidays from 10 a.m. to 7 p.m. On 01.03.2014, she went to the institution of the accused at 5 p.m. for rehearsal and found the accused alone there. He instructed her to fold the dress for the program, and while she was doing so, the accused came from behind and forcibly laid her on the floor and subjected to sexual intercourse. She was wearing leggings and a top at the time of the occurrence and the accused removed all those items and she cried and objected the same. But the accused threatened to kill her if she would make noise. Thereafter the accused removed his dress and laid on her and committed rape. When she decided to go to her house, the accused directed her not to go there, instead to go for rehearsal. Again on 04.03.2014 when the victim reached the institution of the accused, she found the accused along with another person. Soon thereafter the accused had sent that person away for purchasing something and at 5.30 p.m the accused again committed rape on her. According to her, on 04.10.2014, she felt stomach pain and went to Al Abeen Hospital, Keezhissery, along with her mother. She was examined by a doctor, and the doctor informed her that she was pregnant. Thereafter, she was taken to Ernad Hospital, Manjeri, on 08.10.2014. Subsequently, on 04.12.2014, she was admitted to the same hospital for delivery, and she gave birth to a child on 05.12.2014.She also identified the dress worn by her at the relevant time. She also deposed that she had narrated the occurrence to the doctor and she had given a similar statement before the Magistrate. She further stated that, while giving her statement before the Magistrate, the month was mistakenly recorded as May instead of March. During cross-examination of PW2 nothing was elicited to discredit the testimony of PW2. It is in this context that the learned counsel for the appellant/accused confined his challenge mainly on the issue relating to the age of the victim. 10. Apart from the evidence of PW2, PW1 the father of the accused also supported the prosecution case and it was through him Ext.P1, SSLC book of the victim was tendered in evidence. It is in this context that the learned counsel for the appellant/accused confined his challenge mainly on the issue relating to the age of the victim. 10. Apart from the evidence of PW2, PW1 the father of the accused also supported the prosecution case and it was through him Ext.P1, SSLC book of the victim was tendered in evidence. During chief examination, PW1 stated that he had produced Ext.P1 and he identified Ext.P2 as the kaichit for getting back the birth certificate for production before the court during evidence. PW3 is the mother of the victim and she also supported the prosecution case. 11. As already pointed out, in this matter, as per Ext.P1, the copy of SSLC book, as well as Ext.P3 proved through PW6, who is none other than the Principal, Higher Secondary School, Kuzhimannam, the date of birth of the victim is 05.09.1997. During cross examination, PW6 categorically stated that Ext.P6 is an extract taken from the original school admission register and he had denied the suggestion that he had no power to issue Ext.P6 certificate, while affirming that he had the competence to issue Ext.P6. Insofar as the question as to what all documents by which the age of a minor victim under the POCSO Act is to be proved is well settled. In the decision reported in [ Joseph @ Sabu v. State of Kerala ,  2026 KHC OnLine 331] this Court considered the issue regarding the age determination of the victim. In paragraph Nos.7 to 9 as well as 12, this Court discussed the legal issue and held as under relying on various decisions of the Apex Court as well as this Court. The same are extracted as under: “7. The learned counsel for the appellant/accused placed decision of the Apex Court in Yuvaprakash P v. State Rep. by Inspector of Police, 2023 KHC 6709 with reference to paragraph Nos.16 and 19, where the Apex Court considered the evidence required to prove the age of the victim in PoCSO Act cases and held as under: "16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in S.94(2) of the JJ Act, this Court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in S.94(2) of the JJ Act, this Court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta v. The State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. 2019 (9) SCR 735 that: "Clause (i) of S.94(2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. S.94(2)(a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in R.12(3)(a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under R.12(3) (a)(i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In S.94(2)(i) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 19. It is clear from the above narrative that none of the documents produced during the trial answered the description of "the date of birth certificate from the school" or "the matriculation or equivalent certificate" from the concerned examination board or certificate by a corporation, municipal authority or a Panchayat. In these circumstances, it was incumbent for the prosecution to prove through acceptable medical tests / examination that the victim's age was below 18 years as per S.94(2) (iii) of the JJ Act. PW - 9, Dr. Thenmozhi, Chief Civil Doctor and Radiologist at the General Hospital at Vellore, produced the X - ray reports and deposed that in terms of the examination of M, a certificate was issued stating "that the age of the said girl would be more than 18 years and less than 20 years". In the cross – examination, she admitted that M's age could be taken as 19 years. However, the High Court rejected this evidence, saying that "when the precise date of birth is available from out of the school records, the approximate age estimated by the medical expert cannot be the determining factor". This finding is, in this Court's considered view, incorrect and erroneous. However, the High Court rejected this evidence, saying that "when the precise date of birth is available from out of the school records, the approximate age estimated by the medical expert cannot be the determining factor". This finding is, in this Court's considered view, incorrect and erroneous. As held earlier, the documents produced, i.e., a transfer certificate and extracts of the admission register, are not what S.94(2)(i) mandates; nor are they in accord with S.94(2)(ii) because DW - 1 clearly deposed that there were no records relating to the birth of the victim, M. In these circumstances, the only piece of evidence, accorded with S.94 of the JJ Act was the medical ossification test, based on several X - Rays of the victim, and on the basis of which PW - 9 made her statement. She explained the details regarding examination of the victim's bones, stage of their development and opined that she was between 18- 20 years; in cross - examination she said that the age might be 19 years. Given all these circumstances, this Court is of the opinion that the result of the ossification or bone test was the most authentic evidence, corroborated by the examining doctor, PW - 9." 8. Apart from that, the learned counsel for the appellant /accused relied on the decision in Deny Bora v. State of Assam, 2014 KHC 4542 with specific reference to paragraph-12, where the Apex Court held as under: "12 .............It is well settled in law that conviction can be based on the testimony of a singular witness. It has been held in Sunil Kumar v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), (2003) 11 SCC 367 that as a general rule the court can and may act on the testimony of a single witness provided he is wholly reliable. There is no legal impediment in convicting a person on the sole testimony of a single witness. That is the logic of S.134 of the Evidence Act, 1872. But, if there are doubts about the testimony the courts will insist on corroboration. The same principle has been reiterated in Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 14 SCC 150 by stating that it is open to a competent court to fully and completely rely on a solitary witness and record conviction, if the quality of the witness makes the testimony acceptable." 9. The same principle has been reiterated in Namdeo v. State of Maharashtra, (2007) 14 SCC 150 by stating that it is open to a competent court to fully and completely rely on a solitary witness and record conviction, if the quality of the witness makes the testimony acceptable." 9. here as, the learned Public Prosecutor opposed the contention raised by the learned counsel for the appellant/accused and submitted that even though the mode of proof of the age of the victim in PoCSO offences to be established following the ratio of the decision of the Apex Court in Jarnail Singh v. State of Haryana, (2013) 7 SCC 263 , in a subsequent decision in Biju v. State of Kerala, 2024 (2) KHC 297 , a Division Bench of this Court held that the unchallenged oral testimony of the victim and her mother would be sufficient proof to prove the age of the victim. The observation of the Division Bench reads as under: "14. As regards the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the conviction of the appellant cannot be sustained since the Prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the victim was below 18 years of age at the time of the incident, we are afraid we cannot accept the same. While the oral testimony of the victim PW1 is of sterling quality and speaks to the commission of the offence, the fact that the victim was only 16 years old at the time of the commission of the offence is proved through her own testimony and the testimony of her mother PW2. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that Ext.P8 certificate, proved through PW13 Sainaba Beebi, and showing the date of birth of the victim as 28.05.2001, cannot be relied upon since it is not a document mentioned under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act for proving the age of a juvenile, is also one that we find ourselves unable to accept. Firstly, there is nothing under the POCSO Act that indicates that the unchallenged oral testimony of the mother of the victim cannot be taken as proof of the date of birth of the victim. Firstly, there is nothing under the POCSO Act that indicates that the unchallenged oral testimony of the mother of the victim cannot be taken as proof of the date of birth of the victim. Secondly, we are of the view that the provisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act that deal with the documents that can be relied upon to prove the age of a juvenile for the purposes of that Act do not, and indeed cannot, preclude a court considering a question regarding the age of a victim under the POCSO Act from placing reliance on other evidence admissible as per the Indian Evidence Act. We are of the view that the objects of both legislation being different, with the former being concerned with issues regarding the competence of a juvenile in conflict with the law to stand trial before a court and the latter being concerned with issues regarding the physical and mental effects on a child, of an offence committed against her, the manner of establishing the age of a child for the latter legislation can be in any one of the ways permitted under the Indian Evidence Act. In the instant case, we find the testimony of PW2 to be the most reliable evidence as regards the age of the victim for the purposes of S.5 of the POCSO Act, and consequently for the purpose of attracting the presumption under S.29 thereof to the appellant. The decisions in Justin @ Renjith & Anr. v. UOI & Ors . 2020 (6) KHC 546 ; Shaju @ Shaju v. State of Kerala & Anr. 2022 (5) KHC 663 and Yuvaprakash P. v. State ,  2023 KHC OnLine 6709 (SC) relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant, are thus clearly distinguishable on facts." 12. Point Nos.(i) and (ii) In paragraph No.23 of Jarnail Singh's case (supra), the Apex Court held that even though R.12 is strictly applicable only to determine the age of a child in conflict with law, we are of the view that the aforesaid statutory provision should be the basis for determining age, even of a child who is a victim of crime. For, in our view, there is hardly any difference insofar as the issue of minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and a child who is a victim of crime. For, in our view, there is hardly any difference insofar as the issue of minority is concerned, between a child in conflict with law, and a child who is a victim of crime. Therefore, in our considered opinion, it would be just and appropriate to apply R.12 of the 2007 Rules, to determine the age of the prosecutrix VW, PW 6. The manner of determining age conclusively has been expressed in sub-rule (3) of R.12 extracted above. Under the aforesaid provision, the age of a child is ascertained by adopting the first available basis out of a number of options postulated in R.12(3). If, in the scheme of options under R.12(3), an option is expressed in a preceding clause, it has overriding effect over an option expressed in a subsequent clause. The highest rated option available would conclusively determine the age of a minor. In the scheme of R.12(3), matriculation (or equivalent) certificate of the child concerned is the highest rated option. In case, the said certificate is available, no other evidence can be relied upon. Only in the absence of the said certificate, R.12(3) envisages consideration of the date of birth entered in the school first attended by the child. In case such an entry of date of birth is available, the date of birth depicted therein is liable to be treated as final and conclusive, and no other material is to be relied upon. Only in the absence of such entry, R.12(3) postulates reliance on a birth certificate issued by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Yet again, if such a certificate is available, then no other material whatsoever is to be taken into consideration for determining the age of the child concerned, as the said certificate would conclusively determine the age of the child. It is only in the absence of any of the aforesaid, that R.12(3) postulates the determination of age of the child concerned, on the basis of medical opinion.” In view of the legal position, Ext.P1, a certificate equivalent to matriculation, is a highest rated option to prove the age of the victim and in such view of the matter, the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant to unsustain the verdict on the ground that the age of the victim failed to be proved by the prosecution found to be absolutely untenable. 12. 12. Apart from the evidence, prosecution examined the other witnesses. That PW8 was the WCPO, who recorded the statement of the victim and produced the victim before the doctor for medical examination. PW9 was another WCPO attached to Kondotty police station who produced the victim before the Medical Officer, Forensic Department in Medical College Hospital for taking DNA samples. PW10 examined in this case was the senior CPO who witnessed the production of the letter before the Circle Inspector of Police by PW9. Ext.P9 was marked through him. Ext. P9 is the seizure mahazer for taking a letter into custody. PW11 was the Secretary, Kuzhimanna grama panchayat. Ext.P10 ownership certificate was marked through him. PW12 was the Village officer attached to Kuzhimanna village. Ext.P11 was marked through him. Ext.P11 was the eye sketch. PW13 was the owner of the building No. I/108. PW13 admitted that during the year 2013 to 2015 he had rented out the building to the accused for conducting dance and song classes. 13. PW14 was the Asst. Professor in General Surgery attached to Government Medical College Hospital, Manjeri. He testified that at about 12.05 pm on 10.01.2015 he had conducted potency test of the accused. Ext.P12, the potency certificate was tendered in evidence through him. PW15 was the medical officer attached to Government Medical College Hospital, Manjeri. His evidence is that at about 8.30 pm on 09/01/2015, he had examined the victim in this case. 14. PW16 examined in this case was the Asst. Professor, Forensic Department, Government Medical College Hospital, Manjeri who had conducted DNA test of the accused on 21.1.2015. Ext. P14 and Ext. P15 documents were marked through him. Ext. P14 is the letter issued by Dr. Sanjay and Ext. P15 is the carbon copy of the letter from Dr. Sanjay. Exts.P14 and P15 would show that the accused was subjected to DNA examination. PW17 was also the Medical Officer who was in charge of blood bank, General Hospital, Thrissur, who collected blood samples of two months old male child brought by WCPO attached to Kondotty police station in this case. 15. PW18 was the CPO, attached to Circle Inspector Office Kondotty. On 4.9.2015 he had witnessed to seizure mahazer for taking birth certificate into custody by Circle Inspector of Police. PW19 was the PRO attached to Eranad Hospital, Manjeri. He had witnessed preparation of Ext.P7mahazer for taking the case sheet into custody. 15. PW18 was the CPO, attached to Circle Inspector Office Kondotty. On 4.9.2015 he had witnessed to seizure mahazer for taking birth certificate into custody by Circle Inspector of Police. PW19 was the PRO attached to Eranad Hospital, Manjeri. He had witnessed preparation of Ext.P7mahazer for taking the case sheet into custody. PW20 was the doctor who attached to Eranad Hospital, Manjeri. On 8.11.2014, PW20 had examined the victim. According to PW20 at the time of examination the victim was pregnant, PW20 further deposed that at 3.10 a.m. on 5.12.2014 the victim delivered a male child having 2.450 kilo weight. 16. PW21 was the Sub Inspector of Police, Kondotty police station, who registered FIR vide crime No. 44/2015, on the basis of the complaint lodged by PW1. FIR was marked as Ext. P3(a). PW21 further affirmed his signature on Ext.P3(a). PW22 was the joint director (research) in FSL, Thiruvananthapuram, who examined the samples forwarded by the investigating agency. The result of the examination would show that the accused, Mohandas as the biological father of the child and Satyarthi (PW2) as the biological mother of the child. 17. PW23 was the investigating officer in this case. On9.1.2015 he took over the investigation in this case. As a part of investigation, PW23 subjected the victim for medical examination and obtained relevant certificates from the doctor. During the process of the investigation PW23 proceeded to the place of occurrence and prepared Ext. P5 scene mahazer in the presence of the witness. As per Ext.P5 mahazer, the place of occurrence is a room in a building No.1/108 owned by PW13. He testified further that as part of investigation at 5.30 pm on 09.01.2015, the accused was arrested. The arrest memo and arrest intimation were marked as Exts.P21 and P22. Further the accused was brought before the Medical College Hospital, for conducting potency result and obtained Ext. P12 certificate, Ext. P23 is the report forwarded by PW23 for adding the name and address of the accused in FIR. On 21.1.2015 accused was given custody to PW23 for taking DNA profiling and taking blood samples. Further PW23 prepared Ext. P7 seizure mahazer for taking letters into custody. Thereafter, the victim was brought before Medical College Hospital, Manjeri for taking blood samples for DNA profiling. Ext. P9 was prepared by PW23 for taking the blood samples from the Medical College Hospital, Manjeri into custody. Further PW23 prepared Ext. P7 seizure mahazer for taking letters into custody. Thereafter, the victim was brought before Medical College Hospital, Manjeri for taking blood samples for DNA profiling. Ext. P9 was prepared by PW23 for taking the blood samples from the Medical College Hospital, Manjeri into custody. PW23 further deposed that he produced material objects involved in this case before the court. Exts.P7, P8 and P9 documents were the mahazers prepared by PW23 for taking material objects into custody. PW23 collected case sheets from Medical College Hospital as per Ext. P7 seizure mahazer. Thereafter, PW23 obtained Ext. P6 birth certificate from PW6. Ext.P24 is the report to add Sections 5(j) (ii), 5(1), 5(0), 5(p) r/w 6 of POCSO Act. PW23 testified that after verification of the investigation report he laid the charge against the accused. 18. Going through the evidence as discussed, penetrative sexual assault at the instance of the appellant/accused against a minor victim (aged below 18 years), consequential pregnancy by the victim and delivery of a child are proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubts. Since the victim is a minor, the question of consent in the sexual intercourse cannot be considered. The evidence tendered by PW2, the victim, is supported by other material evidence as already discussed. Therefore, the learned Special Judge rightly held that the accused committed the said offences, and the conviction is liable to be confirmed. 19. Coming to the sentence, going through the sentence imposed on par with the nature and seriousness of the offences committed by the appellant/accused, no interference in the sentence is found justifiable. Therefore, the sentence also is liable to be confirmed. 20. In the result, this appeal fails and is dismissed by confirming the conviction and sentence under challenge. Registry is directed to forward a copy of this judgment to the Special Court for information.