Date of reserved for orders : -- Date of pronouncement : 10.07.2026 Date of uploading : APHC010298242026 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3521] FRIDAY, THE 10th DAY OF JULY 2026 PRESENT THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 4772/2026 Between: 1. RAGHUNATH GOUD GOUNDLA, S/O LACHHA GOUD, AGED ABOUT 33 YEARS, R/O H.NO. 1-72, VENKATAPURAM VILLAGE, TEKMAL MANDAL, MEDAK DISTRICT, TELANGANA STATE. ...PETITIONER/ACCUSED AND 1. THE SENIOR INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Regional Office, Visakhapatnam, Rep. by its Special Public Prosecutor / Senior Standing counsel for DRI and DGCI, High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati. ...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT Counsel for the Petitioner/accused: 1. SASANKA BHUVANAGIRI Counsel for the Respondent/complainant: 1. SANTHI CHANDRA(Sr.STANDING COUNSEL FOR DRI AND DGGI) The Court made the following: 2 ORDER: The Criminal Petition has been filed under Sections 480 and 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for brevity ‘the BNSS’), seeking to enlarge the Petitioner/Accused No.6 on bail in SC.NDPS.No.88 of 2026 on the file of the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge-cum-I Additional District Judge-cum-Special Judge for Trial of Offences under NDPS Act, Visakhapatnam. 2. The case of the prosecution is that, acting on specific intelligence, the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), Visakhapatnam Regional Unit, conducted a search on 16/17.08.2025 at the premises of M/s Averx Drugs Private Limited, Atchuthapuram, Anakapalli District. During the search, in the presence of independent panch witnesses, about 119.40 kgs of suspected Alprazolam, 87.80 kgs of intermediate substance, and manufacturing equipment were seized under a Panchanama. The total seized material was 207.20 kgs, later confirmed through chemical analysis to be Nordazepam, a psychotropic substance under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for brevity ‘the NDPS Act’). The Panchanama was recorded as F.No.DRI/HZU/VRU/48/ENO-2(INT-2)/2025. On 18.08.2025, the Petitioner along with seven other accused persons was arrested at Visakhapatnam. The Petitioner, arrayed as Accused No.6, was found present in the drier room of the factory during the search. His arrest memo and 3 medical examination report were prepared, and he was remanded to judicial custody. 3. Mr. Sasanka Bhuvanagiri, learned counsel for the Petitioner, submits that the case is false and concocted, and the Petitioner has been falsely implicated without any prima facie evidence under ‘the NDPS Act.’ He submits that the Petitioner is only a driver by occupation, with no knowledge or involvement in the manufacture of psychotropic substances, and was merely present at the premises accompanying his cousin. No contraband or incriminating material was recovered from his personal possession, and his role is at best peripheral. The investigation has been completed, the chargesheet filed, and all evidence secured, leaving no scope for tampering or influencing witnesses. The Petitioner has been in custody for nearly 10 months despite having no criminal antecedents and being the sole breadwinner, with a six‑year‑old daughter suffering from a brain tumour, operated in 2024 and presently undergoing chemotherapy, whose care and financial support urgently require his presence. He is a permanent resident of Medak District, not a flight risk, and undertakes to comply with any conditions that may be imposed by the Court. Hence, it is urged to allow the Criminal Petition. 4. On the other hand, Mrs. Santhi Chandra, learned Senior Standing Counsel for DRI and DGGI, filed a detailed counter-affidavit wherein it is 4 mentioned that the Petitioner was apprehended inside the factory premises during the search and was part of the group engaged in illicit manufacture of psychotropic substances. It is submitted that a huge commercial quantity of Nordazepam was seized from M/s Averx Drugs Private Ltd., and the Petitioner’s presence in the drier room establishes his active participation. The prosecution contends that the Panchanama and subsequent chemical analysis confirm the offence under ‘the NDPS Act’, and the Petitioner cannot claim ignorance of the illegal activity. It is further argued that Section 37 of ‘the NDPS Act’ imposes stringent conditions for bail in cases involving commercial quantity, which are not satisfied here. The Petitioner’s role as a driver/financier does not absolve him from liability under conspiracy provisions. Hence, it is urged to dismiss the Criminal Petition. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the Petitioner and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. Perused the record. 6. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the both the learned Counsel. I have perused the record. 7. In the light of the case of the prosecution and the contentions of the learned Counsel for both the sides, now the point for consideration is: “Whether the Petitioner is entitled for grant of bail?” 8. On perusal of the record, it is seen that the Petitioner was arraigned as Accused No.6. He was arrested on 18.08.2025. He has been in judicial 5 custody for the past 325 days. After thorough investigation, the police filed the chargesheet which has been numbered as SC.NDPS.No.88 of 2026 on the file of the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge‑cum‑I Additional District Judge‑cum‑Special Judge for Trial of Offences under the NDPS Act, Visakhapatnam. The alleged seized contraband is a commercial quantity of 207.20 kgs of Alprazolam. The Petitioner is admittedly the driver of Accused No. 4, and it is alleged that he invested Rs. 2,00,000/‑ in the said contraband. 9. The High Court of Telangana State in Guntupalli Srinivas Rao v. State of Telangana1 at paragraph No.16 held as under: “16.Perusal of remand report and remand application reveals that upon reliable information regarding the whereabouts of the absconding accused/petitioner herein, the investigating officer visited the spot by 07.30 p.m. on 17.07.2024, intercepted and brought him along with his car to EOW Police Station, Cyberabad at 09.30 p.m. and effected his arrest. It is further revealed that due to late night, the investigating officer could not record the confessional statement of the accused. It is also revealed that after giving information to the father of the petitioner viz. G.Purnachandra Rao to his phone No.08632246788, after informing the grounds of arrest and after following the procedural aspects, the investigating officer effected arrest of the petitioner. It is further revealed that the petitioner was produced before the Magistrate at 09.45 p.m. on 18.07.2024. When the time of arrest and production of accused before the Magistrate concerned is observed, no doubt, the production of the accused is beyond the period of 24 hours. The proposition of law is settled that while calculating 24 hours, the time taken for transit of the accused shall be excluded. It is an admitted fact that upon reliable information with regard to the whereabouts of the absconding 1Crl.R.C.No.781 of 2024 dated 30.09.2024 6 accused, the investigating officer intercepted the petitioner/A2 at 07.30 p.m. on 17.07.2024 near Red Rose Mart, Engine Bowli, Falaknuma, Hyderabad and after completing all the required formalities, he produced the petitioner/A2 before the learned Principal Junior Civil Judge-cum-Metropolitan Magistrate, Ranga Reddy District at LB Nagar at 09.45 p.m. on the next day i.e. on 18.07.2024. Admittedly, both the place of interception of the petitioner/accused and the location of the Court where the petitioner/accused was produced are not at a distance which can invariably result-in occurrence of delay in production of the accused beyond the period of 24 hours of his arrest and hence, the delay in production of the accused caused, cannot be waived under the guise of transit. Further, except stating that due to late night confessional statement of the accused could not be completed, no plausible explanation is offered by the investigating officer to give leverage or support to the delay occurred in production of the accused before the Magistrate concerned. Even otherwise the confessional statement of the accused was recorded on the next day, it does not take much time as pleaded by the investigating officer to produce the accused before the Magistrate concerned for being forwarded him to the judicial remand. Apropos, it can safely be held that there is apparent error on the findings of the trial Court warranting interference of this Court in exercise of its revisional powers while setting aside the impugned order.” 10. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana 2 wherein at paragraph Nos.11, 12, 16, 18 and 21 (f) it is held as under: 11. The view taken in the case of Pankaj Bansal was reiterated by this Court in the case of Prabir Purkayastha In paragraphs nos. 28 and 29, this Court held thus: 28. The language used in Article 22(1) and Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India regarding the communication of the grounds is exactly the identical. Neither of the constitutional provisions require that the "grounds" of "arrest" or "detention", as the case may be, must be communicated in writing. Thus, interpretation to this important facet of the fundamental right as 2Special Leave Petition (Crl.).No.13320 of 2025 7 made by the Constitution Bench while examining the scope of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India would ipso facto apply to Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India insofar as the requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest is concerned. 29. Hence, we have no hesitation in reiterating that the requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest or the grounds of detention in writing to a person arrested in connection with an offence or a person placed under preventive detention as provided under Articles 22(1) and 22(5) of the Constitution of India is sacrosanct and cannot be breached under any situation. Non-compliance of this constitutional requirement and statutory mandate would lead to the custody or the detention being rendered illegal, as the case may be." (emphasis added) 12. This Court held that the language used in Articles 22(1) and 22(5) regarding communication of the grounds is identical, and therefore, this Court held that interpretation of Article 22(5) made by the Constitution Bench in the case of Harikisan v. State of Maharashtra, shall ipso facto apply to Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India insofar as the requirement to communicate the ground of arrest is concerned. We may also note here that in paragraph 21, in the case of Prabir Purkayastha, this Court also dealt with the effect of violation of Article 22(1) by holding that any infringement of this fundamental right would vitiate the process of arrest and remand. Paragraph 21 reads thus: 21. The right to be informed about the grounds of arrest flows from Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and any infringement of this fundamental right would vitiate the process of arrest and remand. Mere fact that a charge-sheet has been filed in the matter, would not validate the illegality and the unconstitutionality committed at the time of arresting the accused and the grant of initial police custody remand to the accused." (emphasis added) 3 1962 SCC OnLine SC 117. 16 ...Accepting such arguments, with great respect to the learned senior counsel, will amount to completely nullifying Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution. Once it is held that arrest is unconstitutional due to violation of Article 22(1), the arrest itself is vitiated. Therefore, continued custody of such a person based on orders of remand is also vitiated. Filing a charge sheet and order of cognizance will not validate an arrest which is per se unconstitutional, being violative of Articles 21 and 22(1) of the Constitution of India. We cannot tinker with the most important safeguards provided under Article 22. 8 18. In the present case, 1st respondent relied upon an entry in the case diary allegedly made at 6.10 p.m. on 10th June 2024, which records that the appellant was arrested after informing him of the grounds of arrest. For the reasons which will follow hereafter, we are rejecting the argument made by the 1 st respondent. If the police want to prove communication of the grounds of arrest only based on a diary entry, it is necessary to incorporate those grounds of arrest in the diary entry or any other document. The grounds of arrest must exist before the same are informed…” 21(f)… When a violation of Article 22(1) is established, it is the duty of the court to forthwith order the release of the accused. That will be a ground to grant bail even if statutory restrictions on the grant of bail exist. The statutory restrictions do not affect the power of the court to grant bail when the violation of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution is established.” 11. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi)3 wherein at paragraph No.49 it is held as under: “49.It may be reiterated at the cost of repetition that there is a significant difference in the phrase 'reasons for arrest' and 'grounds of arrest'. The 'reasons for arrest' as indicated in the arrest memo are purely formal parameters, viz., to prevent the accused person from committing any further offence; for proper investigation of the offence; to prevent the accused person from causing the evidence of the offence to disappear or tempering with such evidence in any manner; to prevent the arrested person for making inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to the Investigating Officer. These reasons would commonly apply to any person arrested on charge of a crime whereas the 'grounds of arrest' would be required to contain all such details in hand of the Investigating Officer which necessitated the arrest of the accused. Simultaneously, the grounds of arrest informed in writing must convey to the arrested accused all basic facts on which he was being arrested so as to provide him an opportunity of defending himself against custodial remand and to seek bail. Thus, the 'grounds of arrest' would invariably be personal to the accused 3Crl.A.No.42896 of 2023 9 and cannot be equated with the 'reasons of arrest' which are general in nature.” 12. A learned Single Judge of this Court in Eepu Ramana v. Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Visakhapatnam4 at paragraph No.8 it is held as under: “8…It requires a mention here that the respondent seems to be aware of the legal mandate. In the remand report, it is mentioned in the following words: "The entire Panchanama proceedings were conducted in a peaceful manner and concluded at 09.00 hours of 16.02.2024 and allowed the accused freely by informing that a summons would be issued for personal appearance" This would make one to think that the respondent having arrested the petitioners without warrant from the court, having completed the necessary investigative work of seizure and preparation of Panchanama left the petitioners to their liberty even without obtaining any bonds. If that be the case, how were they produced before the learned Magistrate is a matter for consideration. In the next page of the remand application, the following is noticed…” 13. The High Court of Telangana State in T.Ramadevi v. State of Telangana5 at paragraph No.8, the learned Single Judge while referring the decision of the High Court Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Iqbal Kaur Kwatra v. Director General of Police, Rajasthan State6 mentioned at Paragraph No.23 as under: 4Crl.P.No.5439 of 2024 dated 01.10.2024 5W.P.No.21912 of 2024 61996 A.P.L.J.370 (HC) 10 “23. Thus it is seen that a police officer cannot detain any person in custody without arresting him and any such detention will amount to a wrongful confinement within the meaning of Sec. 340 of the Penal Code, 1860. Actual arrest and detention do not appear to be necessary, A person incustody cannot be detained without producing him before a Magistrate under the colourable pretension that no actual arrest is made and the burden of proving the reasonable ground is on the arrester that the time occupied in the journey was reasonable with reference to the distance traversed as also other circumstances and in case of continuation of detention for twenty four hours, particularly, when the police officer has reason to believe that the investigation cannot be completed within twenty-four hours, he must produce the accused forthwith before the magistrate and cannot wait for twenty-four hours.” 14. The High Court of Telangana in T.Ramadevi supra at Paragraph Nos.11 and 12 it is held as under: “11. In the aforesaid backdrop, when we look into the provisions of Section 57of Cr.P.C, the very first line of the said provision refers to the term detention. It does not use the term "from the time of arrest", which further strengthens the case of the petitioner when they say that period of detention starts the moment they stand apprehended by the police, as from that moment itself there is a restraint so far as personal liberty of the concerned person and there is also an arrest of his movement, as he remains under confines of police personnel. Thus, it would amount to a detention of a person right from the time he is apprehended by the police personnel. Thus, in terms of the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of Ashak Hussain (supra), the arrest of a person commences from the time restraint is placed on his liberty and not from the time of the arrest officially recorded by the arresting officers. 12. Accordingly, this Bench has no hesitation in reaching to the conclusion that question No.1 as regards the commencement of the period of apprehension is concerned, it is held that the period of apprehension is also to be taken into consideration for the purpose of calculating the period of 24 hours as is envisaged under Section 57 of Cr.P.C. In other words, 24 hours is not to be calculated from the time of the official arrest being shown by the 11 police personnel in the arrest memo, but from the time he was initially apprehended or taken into custody.” 15. The High Court of Telangana in Vishal Manoher Mandrekar v. State of Telangana, at Paragraph Nos.10 and 12 it is held as under: “10…. Article 22 (2) of the Constitution of India mandates that every person who is arrested and detained in police custody shall be produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of 24 hours, excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of the arrest to the court of the magistrate and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period without the authority of a magistrate. 12. The above two provisions came up for consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court on several occasions and the Hon'ble Apex Court in certain terms held that without the authorization of the Magistrate, no accused can be detained in the custody of the police beyond 24 hours from the time of arrest excluding the time taken for the journey from the place of arrest to the court.” 16. The Division Bench of this Court in Motakatla Jhansi Vani Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh 7 at paragraph Nos.10 to 15 held as under: “10. Non-intimation, required under Section 47 (1) of BNSS, would render any further detention of the person illegal. The word "forthwith" makes it amply clear that intimation under Section 47 (1) of BNSS has to be served at the time of arrest or immediately thereafter. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Prabhir Purkayastha Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) had held that violation of such provision would render the arrest illegal. The Judgment in Prabhir Purkayastha (1-supra) came to be delivered under the provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. A Division Bench of this Courtin the case of Pappula Chalama Reddy vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, had held that the principles laid down in the case of Prabhir Purkayastha (1-supra) would be applicable to even cases under BNSS. The principle laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Prabhir Purkayastha (1-supra) is extracted below: 7W.P.No.5444 of 2025 dated 11.03.2025 12 “28. The language used in Article 22(1) and Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India regarding the communication of the grounds is exactly the identical. Neither of the constitutional provisions require that the 'grounds of "arrest" or "detention", as the case may be, must be communicated in writing. Thus, interpretation to this important facet of the fundamental right as made by the Constitution Bench while examining the scope of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India would ipso facto apply to Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India insofar the requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest is concerned. 29. Hence, we have no hesitation in reiterating that the requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest or the grounds of detention in writing to a person arrested in connection with an offence or a person placed under preventive detention as provided under Articles 22(1) and 22(5) of the Constitution of India is sacrosanct and cannot be breached under any situation. Noncompliance of this constitutional requirement and statutory mandate would lead to the custody or the detention being rendered illegal, as the case may be." 11. The further question of the maintainability of the Writ Petition, in view of the fact that there is an order of remand by the appropriate Magistrate, would also arise. A Divison Bench of this Court, in the case of Pappula Chalama Reddy (2-supra), had held, following the Judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, that in the normal course, a Writ of Habeas Corpus would notbe maintainable where an order of remand has already been passed by the appropriate Magistrate. However, the Division Bench had also held that the said bar would not operate where the Magistrate has passed an order without application of mind. 12. In the present case, the Magistrate after finding that intimation of arrest, under Section 47 (1) of BNSS had not been given, should have immediately set the detenue at liberty. Instead of taking this step, the Magistrate returned the remand report for subsequent compliance. 13. The action of the Magistrate, in returning the remand report, for subsequent compliance, is an act of clear non-application of mind. The provisions of Section 47 (1) of BNSS are mandatory and peremptory. Violation of this provision can only result in a declaration that the arrest and subsequent detention is invalid. 14. The learned Government Pleader would further contend that even if the initial arrest is invalid, the Investigating Officer can always re- arrest the detenue and relied upon a Judgment of the Hon'ble High Court of Allahabad in the case of Rama Kant vs. State. He would contend that there was a re-arrest of the detenue. 15. A perusal of the remand report does not show that there was a re- arrest. In fact, the remand report continues to show only the arrest at 9.00 P.M. on 24.02.2025. In the circumstances, the order of remand 13 passed by the Learned III Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class FAC, Vijayawada, dated 25.02.2025, is set aside and the detenue is to be set at liberty.” 17. In State v. B. Ramu8, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that in a case of recovery of a huge quantity of narcotic substance, the Courts should be slow in granting even regular bail or anticipatory bail more so when accused is alleged to have criminal antecedents. In this regard, paragraph Nos.9 & 11, relevant paragraphs, are extracted hereunder: “9. A plain reading of statutory provision makes it abundantly clear that in the event, the Public Prosecutor opposes the prayer for bail either regular or anticipatory, as the case may be, the Court would have to record a satisfaction that there are grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence alleged and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. 11. In case of recovery of such a huge quantity of narcotic substance, the Courts should be slow in granting even regular bail to the accused what to talk of anticipatory bail more so when the accused is alleged to be having criminal antecedents." 18. In Union of India v. Ajay Kumar Singh9, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that no person accused of offence involving trade in a commercial quantity of narcotics is entitled to be released on bail unless the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence. 8 2024 SCC OnLine SC 4073 9 2023 SCC OnLine SC 346 14 19. The Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Kerala V. Rajesh10, wherein at paragraph Nos.17, 19 and 20 held that: “17. The jurisdiction of the court to grant bail is circumscribed by the provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act. It can be granted in case there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence, and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. It is the mandate of the legislature which is required to be followed. 19. The scheme of Section 37 reveals that the exercise of power to grant bail is not only subject to the limitations contained under Section 439 Cr.P.C, but is also subject to the limitation placed by Section 37 which commences with non obstante clause. The operative part of the said section is in the negative form prescribing the enlargement of bail to any person accused of commission of an offence under the Act, unless twin conditions are satisfied. The first condition is that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to oppose the application; and the second, is that the court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence. If either of these two conditions is not satisfied, the ban for granting bail operates. 20. The expression "reasonable grounds" means something more than prima facie grounds. It contemplates substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The reasonable belief contemplated in the provision requires existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. In the case on hand, the High Court seems to have completely overlooked the underlying object of Section 37 that in addition to the limitations provided under the Cr.P.C, or any other law for the time being in force, regulating the grant of bail, its liberal approach in the matter of bail under the NDPS Act is indeed uncalled for.” 20. In Narcotics Control Bureau v. Mohit Aggarwal11, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that the length of the period of judicial custody and the fact that the 10 (2020) 12 SCC 122 11 (2022) 18 SCC 374 15 charge sheet has been filed and the trial has commenced are by themselves not considerations that can be treated as persuasive grounds for granting relief to the respondent under Section 37 of ‘the NDPS Act.’ In that regard, the relevant paragraph Nos.18 and 19 are extracted hereunder: “18. Even dehors the confessional statement of the respondent and the other co-accused recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act, which were subsequently retracted by them, the other circumstantial evidence brought on record by the appellant-NCB ought to have dissuaded the High Court from exercising its discretion in favour of the respondent and concluding that there were reasonable grounds to justify that he was not guilty of such an offence under the NDPS Act. We are not persuaded by the submission made by learned counsel for the respondent and the observation made in the impugned order that since nothing was found from the possession of the respondent, he is not guilty of the offence for which he has been charged. Such an assumption would be premature at this stage. 19. In our opinion the narrow parameters of bail available under Section 37 of the Act, have not been satisfied in the facts of the instant case. At this stage, it is not safe to conclude that the respondent has successfully demonstrated that there are reasonable grounds to believe that he is not guilty of the offence alleged against him, for him to have been admitted to bail. The length of the period of his custody or the fact that the charge-sheet has been filed and the trial has commenced are by themselves not considerations that can be treated as persuasive grounds for granting relief to the respondent under Section 37 of the NDPS Act.” 21. In Union of India v. Shiv Shanker Kesari12, the Hon’ble Apex Court held about recovery of 400 kgs. of poppy straw from possession of accused respondent that two conditions to be satisfied under Section 37 of ‘the NDPS Act.,’ for granting bail: First, the satisfaction of the Court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that accused not guilty, and second that he 12 (2007) 7 SCC 798 16 is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. If either of conditions are not satisfied, the accused cannot be granted bail. In that regard, the relevant paragraph Nos.6, 7 and 11 are extracted here under: “6. As the provision itself provides no person shall be granted bail unless the two conditions are satisfied. They are; the satisfaction of the Court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. Both the conditions have to be satisfied. If either of these two conditions is not satisfied, the bar operates and the accused cannot be released on bail. 7. The expression used in Section 37(1)(b)(ii) is "reasonable grounds". The expression means something more than prima facie grounds. It connotes substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged and this reasonable belief contemplated in turn points to existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify recording of satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the offence charged. 11. The Court while considering the application for bail with reference to Section 37 of the Act is not called upon to record a finding of not guilty. It is for the limited purpose essentially confined to the question of releasing the accused on bail that the Court is called upon to see if there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty and records its satisfaction about the existence of such grounds. But the Court has not to consider the matter as if it is pronouncing a judgment of acquittal and recording a finding of not guilty.” 22. In Union of India v. Mohd. Nawaz Khan13, the Hon’ble Apex Court held that given the seriousness of offences punishable under ‘the NDPS Act.,’ and to curb the menace of drug-trafficking in the country, stringent parameters for grant of bail under ‘the NDPS Act.,’ have been prescribed. 13 (2021) 10 SCC 100 17 23. In Bharat Chaudhary v. Union of India14, the Hon’ble Apex Court held at paragraph No.14 as under: “14. In the absence of any psychotropic substance found in the conscious possession of A-4, we are of the opinion that mere reliance on the statement made by A-1 to A-3 under Section 67 of the NDPS Act is too tenuous a ground to sustain the impugned order dated 15-7-2021 {Union of India Vs. Bharat Choudary, 2021 SCC OnLine Mad 6554}. This is all the more so when such a reliance runs contrary to the ruling in Tofan Singh {Tofan Singh Vs. State of Tamil Nadu, (2021) 4 SCC 1}. The impugned order qua A-4 is, accordingly, quashed and set aside and the order dated 2-11-2020 passed by the learned Special Judge, EC & NDPS cases, is restored. As for Raja Chandrasekharan (A-1), since the charge-sheet has already been filed and by now the said accused has remained in custody for over a period of two years, it is deemed appropriate to release him on bail, subject to the satisfaction of the trial court.” 24. In Narcotics Control Bureau v. Pallulabid Ahmad Arimutta15, the Hon’ble Apex Court held at paragraph Nos.11 and 12 as under: “11. Having gone through the records along with the tabulated statement of the respondents submitted on behalf of the petitioner NCB and on carefully perusing the impugned orders passed in each case, it emerges that except for the voluntary statements of A-1 and A-2 in the first case and that of the respondents themselves recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act, it appears, prima facie, that no substantial material was available with the prosecution at the time of arrest to connect the respondents with the allegations levelled against them of indulging in drug trafficking. It has not been denied by the prosecution that except for the respondent in SLP (Crl.) No. 1569 of 2021, none of the other respondents were found to be in possession of commercial quantities of psychotropic substances, as contemplated under the NDPS Act. 12. It has been held in clear terms in Tofan Singh v. State of T.N. that a confessional statement recorded under Section 67 of the NDPS Act will remain inadmissible in the trial of an offence under the NDPS Act. In the teeth of the aforesaid decision, the arrests made by the petitioner NCB, on the basis of the confession/voluntary statements of the respondents or the 14 (2021) 20 SCC 50 15 (2022) 12 SCC 633 18 co-accused under Section 67 of the NDPS Act, cannot form the basis for overturning the impugned orders releasing them on bail. The CDR details of some of the accused or the allegations of tampering of evidence on the part of one of the respondents is an aspect that will be examined at the stage of trial. For the aforesaid reason, this Court is not inclined to interfere in the orders dated 16-9-2019 passed in SLP (Crl.) No. arising out of Diary No. 22702 of 2020, SLP (Crl.) No. 1454 of 2021, SLP (Crl.) No. 1465 of 2021, SLPs (Crl.) Nos. 1773-74 of 2021 and SLP (Crl.) No. 2080 of 2021 respectively. The impugned are, accordingly, upheld and the special leave petitions filed by the petitioner NCB seeking cancellation of bail granted to the respective respondents, are dismissed as meritless.” 25. The Hon'ble Apex Court in State of Punjab v. Rakesh Kumar16, at paragraph Nos.13, 14 and 15 it is held that: “13....we note that Section 80 of the NDPS Act, clearly lays down that application of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act is not barred, and provisions of the NDPS Act can be applicable in addition to that of the provisions of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act. The statute further clarifies that the provisions of the NDPS Act are not in derogation of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. This Court in Union of India v. Sanjeev V. Deshpande,, has held that: "35. essentially the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 deals with various operations of manufacture, sale, purchase, etc. of drugs generally whereas Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 deals with a more specific class of drugs and, therefore, a special law on the subject. Further, the provisions of the Act operate in addition to the provisions of the 1940 Act." 14. The aforesaid decision in Sanjeev V. Deshpande case [Union of India v. Sanjeev V. Deshpande, (2014) 13 SCC 1: (2014) 5 SCC (Cri) 496] further clarifies that, the NDPS Act, should not be read in exclusion to the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940. Additionally, it is the prerogative of the State to prosecute the offender in accordance with law. In the present case, since the action of the respondent-accused amounted to a prima facie violation of Section 8 of the NDPS Act, they were charged under Section 22 of the NDPS Act. 15. In light of the above observations, we find that the decision rendered by the High Court holding that the respondent-accused 16 (2019) 2 SCC 466 19 must be tried under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 instead of the NDPS Act, as they were found in possession of the "manufactured drugs", does not hold good in law.” 26. The Hon’ble Apex Court in State of Haryana v. Dinesh Kumar17, at paragraph Nos.20, 21, 23 & 27 held as under: “20. Mr Patwalia referred to certain decisions of the Allahabad High Court, the Punjab High Court and the Madras High Court which apparently supports his submissions. Of the said decisions, the one in which the meaning of the two expressions “arrest” and “custody” have been considered in detail is that of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Roshan Beevi case [1984 Cri LJ 134 (Mad)]. The said decision was, however, rendered in the context of Sections 107 and 108 of the Customs Act, 1962. Sections 107 and 108 of the Customs Act authorise a Customs Officer empowered in that behalf to require a person to attend before him and produce or deliver documents relevant to the enquiry or to summon such person whose attendance is considered necessary for giving evidence or production of a document in connection with any enquiry being undertaken by such officer under the Act. In such context the Full Bench of the Madras High Court returned a finding that “custody” and “arrest” are not synonymous terms and observed that it is true that in every arrest there is a custody but not vice versa. A custody may amount to “arrest” in certain cases, but not in all cases. It is in the aforesaid circumstances that the Full Bench came to the conclusion that a person who is taken by the Customs Officer either for the purpose of enquiry or interrogation or investigation cannot be held to have come into the custody and detention of the Customs Officer and he cannot be deemed to have been arrested from the moment he was taken into custody. 21. In coming to the aforesaid conclusion, the Full Bench had occasion to consider in detail the meaning of the expression “arrest”. Reference was made to the definition of arrest in various legal dictionaries and Halsbury's Laws of England as also Corpus Juris Secundum. In para 16 of the judgment it was observed as follows : (Cri LJ p. 142) “16. From the various definitions which we have extracted above, it is clear that the word ‘arrest’, when used in its ordinary and natural 17 (2008) 3 SCC 222 20 sense, means the apprehension or restraint or the deprivation of one's personal liberty. The question whether the person is under arrest or not, depends not on the legality of the arrest, but on whether he has been deprived of his personal liberty to go where he pleases. When used in the legal sense in the procedure connected with criminal offences, an arrest consists in the taking into custody of another person under authority empowered by law, for the purpose of holding or detaining him to answer a criminal charge or of preventing the commission of a criminal offence. The essential elements to constitute an arrest in the above sense are that there must be an intent to arrest under the authority, accompanied by a seizure or detention of the person in the manner known to law, which is so understood by the person arrested. In this connection, a debatable question that arises for our consideration is whether the mere taking into custody of a person by an authority empowered to arrest would amount to ‘arrest’ of that person and whether the terms ‘arrest’ and ‘custody’ are synonymous.” 23. We are unable to appreciate the views of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court and reiterate the decision of this Court in Niranjan Singh case [(1980) 2 SCC 559 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 508 : AIR 1980 SC 785] . In our view, the law relating to the concept of “arrest” or “custody” has been correctly stated in Niranjan Singh case [(1980) 2 SCC 559 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 508 : AIR 1980 SC 785] . Paras 7, 8 and the relevant portion of para 9 of the decision in the said case state as follows : (SCC pp. 562-63) “7. When is a person in custody, within the meaning of Section 439 CrPC? When he is in duress either because he is held by the investigating agency or other police or allied authority or is under the control of the court having been remanded by judicial order, or having offered himself to the court's jurisdiction and submitted to its orders by physical presence. No lexical dexterity nor precedential profusion is needed to come to the realistic conclusion that he who is under the control of the court or is in the physical hold of an officer with coercive power is in custody for the purpose of Section 439. This word is of elastic semantics but its core meaning is that the law has taken control of the person. The equivocatory quibblings and hide-and-seek niceties sometimes heard in court that the police have taken a man into informal custody but not arrested him, have detained him for interrogation but not taken him into formal custody and other like terminological dubieties are unfair evasions of the straightforwardness of the law. We need not dilate on this shady facet here because we are satisfied that the accused did physically submit before the Sessions Judge and the jurisdiction to grant bail thus arose. 8. Custody, in the context of Section 439, (we are not, be it noted, dealing with anticipatory bail under Section 438) is physical control or at least physical presence of the accused in court coupled with submission to the jurisdiction and orders of the court. 21 9. He can be in custody not merely when the police arrests him, produces him before a Magistrate and gets a remand to judicial or other custody. He can be stated to be in judicial custody when he surrenders before the court and submits to its directions.” 27. The interpretation of “arrest” and “custody” rendered by the Full Bench in Roshan Beevi case [1984 Cri LJ 134 (Mad)] may be relevant in the context of Sections 107 and 108 of the Customs Act where summons in respect of an enquiry may amount to “custody” but not to “arrest”, but such custody could subsequently materialise into arrest. The position is different as far as proceedings in the court are concerned in relation to enquiry into offences under the Penal Code and other criminal enactments. In the latter set of cases, in order to obtain the benefit of bail an accused has to surrender to the custody of the court or the police authorities before he can be granted the benefit thereunder. In Vol. 11 of the 4th Edn. of Halsbury's Laws of England the term “arrest” has been defined in Para 99 in the following terms: “99. Meaning of arrest.—Arrest consists in the seizure or touching of a person's body with a view to his restraint; words may, however, amount to an arrest if, in the circumstances of the case, they are calculated to bring, and do bring, to a person's notice that he is under compulsion and he thereafter submits to the compulsion.”” 27. Upon careful consideration of the record, it is found that the allegations against the Petitioner are grave and pertain to the seizure of a commercial quantity of psychotropic substance, namely 207.20 kgs of Nordazepam, from the premises of M/s Averx Drugs Private Limited. The Petitioner was apprehended inside the drier room of the factory, and the prosecution has alleged that he not only acted as a driver but also invested Rs.2,00,000/‑ in the illicit activity. In view of Section 37 of ‘the NDPS Act.,’ the statutory embargo on grant of bail in cases involving commercial quantity is absolute unless the Court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the accused is not guilty and that he is not likely to commit any offence while 22 on bail. The material placed on record, including the Panchanama and chemical analysis report, prima facie establishes the Petitioner’s nexus with the offence. The plea of innocence and mere presence at the premises cannot be accepted at this stage, as the circumstances strongly suggest active participation in the conspiracy. 28. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rajesh supra and Mohit Aggarwal supra has categorically held that mere filing of the chargesheet, prolonged custody, or absence of recovery from personal possession are not persuasive grounds for bail under Section 37 of ‘the NDPS Act.’ The stringent twin conditions must be satisfied, and in the instant case, the prosecution has demonstrated substantial probable cause to believe that the Petitioner is involved in the offence. The argument that he is only a driver, or a peripheral participant is belied by the allegation of financial investment and his presence in the manufacturing area, which cannot be brushed aside as casual or incidental. 29. Lastly, while the Court is not unmindful of the personal circumstances of the Petitioner, including his daughter’s medical condition and his role as the sole breadwinner, such considerations, though sympathetic, cannot override the statutory mandate under Section 37 of ‘the NDPS Act.’ The Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajay Kumar Singh supra and Mohd. Nawaz Khan supra has emphasized that in cases involving commercial quantity of narcotics, liberal 23 approach in granting bail is uncalled for, given the seriousness of the offence and its deleterious impact on society. The Petitioner has failed to demonstrate reasonable grounds to believe that he is not guilty of the offence alleged, nor has he satisfied the Court that he would not commit any offence while on bail. 30. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is not inclined to enlarge the Petitioner/Accused No.6 on bail at this juncture. Accordingly, the Criminal Petition is liable to be dismissed. 31. In the result, the Criminal Petition is dismissed. As a sequel, Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending, shall stand closed. _________________________ DR. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J Date:10.07.2026 PRA Whether the order is : Speaking Yes/No / Reasoned Yes/No Reportable Yes/No / Non-Reportable Yes/No 24 THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 4772 of 2026 Date: 10.07.2026 PRA