2026:HHC:103 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA CWP No. 17844 of 2025 Reserved on: 15.12.2025 Date of Decision: 1.1.2026 Sanjay Kumar ...Petitioner. Versus State of H.P. and others ...Respondents. Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No. For the Petitioner : Mr. Shekhar Badola, Advocate. For the Respondents/State : Nemo. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The petitioner has filed the present petition to quash and set aside the order dated 4.9.2024 and issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to release the petitioner on parole. 2. It has been asserted that the petitioner was convicted and sentenced by the learned Special Judge, Fast Track Court, POCSO, Mandi, HP. He filed an appeal, which was registered as 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:103 Criminal Appeal No. 208 of 2022, and is pending before this Court. The petitioner has undergone six years, one month and 21 days of sentence. His conduct in the Jail was described as good. The petitioner applied for parole on 6.12.2023 under the Himachal Pradesh Good Conduct Prisoners (Temporary Release) Act, 1968 (Prisoners Act) and the Rules framed thereunder. His application was rejected on 4.9.2024. The order is mechanical and contrary to the settled principle of law. Hence, the petition for quashing of the order and seeking a direction to the respondents to release the petitioner on parole. 3. Mr Shekhar Badola, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner has undergone more than six years of imprisonment. His application for parole was rejected without any reason. Therefore, he prayed that the present petition be allowed and the petitioner be released on bail. 4. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 5. A perusal of the writ petition shows that the order of rejection was passed on 4.9.2024, and the present petition was filed on 14.11.2025 after the lapse of more than one year from the 3 2026:HHC:103 date of rejection of the application. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley, (2024) 15 SCC 215, that a person who sleeps over his right for a considerable time cannot be granted extraordinary relief by the writ Courts. It was observed. “9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that the writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in other words, the writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly, or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber, ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court, time and again, has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or laches is one of the factors that should be borne in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away, and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action. 10. The discretion to be exercised would be with care and caution. If the delay which has occasioned in approaching the writ court is explained, which would appeal to the conscience of the court, in such circumstances, it cannot be gainsaid by the contesting party that for all times to come the delay is not to be condoned. There may be myriad circumstances that give rise to the invoking of the extraordinary jurisdiction, and it all depends on the facts and circumstances of each case, same cannot be described 4 2026:HHC:103 in a straitjacket formula with mathematical precision. The ultimate discretion to be exercised by the writ court depends upon the facts that it has to travel or the terrain in which the facts have travelled. 11. For filing a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether, within a reasonable time same has been invoked, and even submitting memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances, on the ground of delay and laches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and laches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, inasmuch as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such an indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. 12. This Court in Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B., (2009) 1 SCC 768 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 119 has held to the following effect: (SCC p. 784, paras 56-58) “56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can be no waiver of a fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court takes into account certain factors, and one of such considerations is delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well settled that the power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for refusing 5 2026:HHC:103 reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the petitioner is guilty of delay and laches. 57. If the petitioner wants to invoke the jurisdiction of a writ court, he should come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai, (1964) 15 STC 450: 1964 SCC OnLine SC 10 : (1964) 6 SCR 261: AIR 1964 SC 1006, Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 117: AIR 1967 SC 1450 and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India, (1992) 3 SCC 136 ). This principle applies even in the case of an infringement of fundamental rights (vide Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, (1969) 1 SCC 110 : (1970) 25 STC 289, Durga Prashad v. Controller of Imports and Exports, (1969) 1 SCC 185 and Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 84). 58. There is no upper limit, and there is no lower limit as to when a person can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided on the basis of facts before the court, depending on and varying from case to case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the remedy claimed are, and when and how the delay arose.” 13. It is apposite to take note of the dicta laid down by this Court in Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan, (2006) 4 SCC 322: 2006 SCC (L&S) 791 whereunder it has been held that the High Court may refuse to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction if there is negligence or omissions on the part of the applicant to assert his right. 6 2026:HHC:103 It has been further held thereunder: (SCC pp. 325-26, paras 6-9) “6. Delay or laches is one of the factors that is to be borne in mind by the High Court when they exercise their discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. In an appropriate case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if there is such negligence or omission on the part of the applicant to assert his right as taken in conjunction with the lapse of time and other circumstances, causing prejudice to the opposite party. Even where a fundamental right is involved, the matter is still within the discretion of the Court, as pointed out in Durga Prashad v. Controller of Imports and Exports, (1969) 1 SCC 185. Of course, the discretion has to be exercised judicially and reasonably. 7. What was stated in this regard by Sir Barnes Peacock in Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, (1874) LR 5 PC 221: 22 WR 492 (LR PC at p. 239) was approved by this Court in Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial Court, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 117: AIR 1967 SC 1450 and Maharashtra SRTC v. Balwant Regular Motor Service, 1968 SCC OnLine SC 54 : (1969) 1 SCR 808: AIR 1969 SC 329. Sir Barnes had stated: (Lindsay Petroleum Co. v. Prosper Armstrong Hurd, (1874) LR 5 PC 221: 22 WR 492], LR pp. 239-40) ‘Now, the doctrine of laches in courts of equity is not an arbitrary or a technical doctrine. Where it would be practically unjust to give a remedy either because the party has, by his conduct done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it, or where by his conduct and neglect he has though perhaps not waiving that remedy, yet put the other party in a situation in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the 7 2026:HHC:103 remedy were afterwards to be asserted, in either of these cases, lapse of time and delay are most material. But in every case, if an argument against relief, which otherwise would be just, is founded upon mere delay, that delay, of course, not amounting to a bar by any statute of limitation, the validity of that defence must be tried upon principles substantially equitable. Two circumstances always important in such cases are the length of the delay and the nature of the acts done during the interval, which might affect either party and cause a balance of justice or injustice in taking the one course or the other, so far as it relates to the remedy.’ 8. It would be appropriate to note certain decisions of this Court in which this aspect has been dealt with in relation to Article 32 of the Constitution. It is apparent that what has been stated as regards that article would apply, a fortiori, to Article 226. It was observed in Rabindranath Bose v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 84, that no relief can be given to the petitioner who, without any reasonable explanation, approaches this Court under Article 32 after inordinate delay. It was stated that though Article 32 is itself a guaranteed right, it does not follow from this that it was the intention of the Constitution-makers that this Court should disregard all principles and grant relief in petitions filed after inordinate delay. 9. It was stated in State of M.P. v. Nandlal Jaiswal, (1986) 4 SCC 566, that the High Court, in exercise of its discretion, does not ordinarily assist the tardy and the indolent or the acquiescent and the lethargic. If there is an inordinate delay on the part of the petitioner and such delay is not satisfactorily explained, the High Court may decline to intervene 8 2026:HHC:103 and grant relief in the exercise of its writ jurisdiction. It was stated that this rule is premised on a number of factors. The High Court does not ordinarily permit a belated resort to the extraordinary remedy because it is likely to cause confusion and public inconvenience and bring, in its train, new injustices, and if writ jurisdiction is exercised after unreasonable delay, it may have the effect of inflicting not only hardship and inconvenience but also injustice on third parties. It was pointed out that when writ jurisdiction is invoked, unexplained delay coupled with the creation of third-party rights in the meantime is an important factor which also weighs with the High Court in deciding whether or not to exercise such jurisdiction.” 14. Reiterating the aspect of delay and laches would disentitle the discretionary relief being granted, this Court in Chennai Metropolitan Water Supply & Sewerage Board v. T.T. Murali Babu, (2014) 4 SCC 108 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 38 has held: (SCC p. 117, para 16) “16. Thus, the doctrine of delay and laches should not be lightly brushed aside. A writ court is required to weigh the explanation offered and the acceptability of the same. The court should bear in mind that it is exercising an extraordinary and equitable jurisdiction. As a constitutional court, it has a duty to protect the rights of the citizens, but simultaneously it is to keep itself alive to the primary principle that when an aggrieved person, without adequate reason, approaches the court at his own leisure or pleasure, the court would be under legal obligation to scrutinise whether the lis at a belated stage should be entertained or not. Be it noted, delay comes in the way of equity. In certain circumstances, delay and laches may not be fatal, but in most circumstances, inordinate delay would 9 2026:HHC:103 only invite disaster for the litigant who knocks at the doors of the court. Delay reflects inactivity and inaction on the part of a litigant — a litigant who has forgotten the basic norms, namely, “procrastination is the greatest thief of time,” and second, law does not permit one to sleep and rise like a phoenix. Delay does bring in hazard and causes injury to the lis.” 6. In the present case, no explanation has been provided for approaching the Court after a lapse of more than one year from the rejection of the application for parole and the petitioner is not entitled to any relief from the Writ Court. 7. In view of the above, the present petition is dismissed, so also the pending miscellaneous application(s), if any. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 1st January, 2026 (Chander)