JUDGMENT : EASWARAN S., J. Defendants 1 to 3 in a suit for damages, have come up with the present appeal aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the first appellate court in reversing the dismissal of the suit by the Addl. Sub Court-II, Kozhikode. 2. The brief facts necessary for the disposal of the appeal are as follows: On 17.02.2010 near Tagore Centenary Hall, Kozhikode, the first plaintiff was stopped by the driver working under the first defendant. The attempt was to collect fine for traffic offences. The aforesaid act was questioned by the first plaintiff. The matter was not precipitated there. On 26.02.2010, third defendant and another Assistant Sub- Inspector of Police came to the residence of the first plaintiff and at that time he was not available in the house. The police officials informed the third plaintiff (mother) that they want the first plaintiff and his vehicle at the police station immediately. On enquiry, the first plaintiff came to know that on 21.02.2010, the first defendant registered an FIR against the first plaintiff for alleged offence punishable under Section 176 of the Indian Penal Code based on a complaint by the Civil Police Officer, Suresh Babu. The first plaintiff approached the Commissioner of Police and higher officers and informed them about the misuse of power by the first defendant. Later the first defendant submitted a final report in the aforesaid crime and the court had taken cognizance of the final report and the case was numbered as CC No.491/2010 before the Judicial First Class Magistrate's Court-IV, Kozhikode. Later the prosecution withdrew the case. On 02.03.2010 at 12.45 p.m., a team of police officials from the Nadakkavu Police Station under the leadership of defendants 1 to 3 came to the first plaintiff's residence and enquired about the first plaintiff. On the same day evening at 07.00 p.m. the defendant Nos. 1 to 3 with a police force, including women police constables and a mobile crane, came to the residence of the plaintiffs and seized a car bearing registration No.KL-16/9 to the police station. When the first defendant demanded the key of the car, the second plaintiff demanded a receipt. The first defendant was outraged by the request of the second plaintiff demanding receipt, and he manhandled and assaulted the second plaintiff. When the first defendant demanded the key of the car, the second plaintiff demanded a receipt. The first defendant was outraged by the request of the second plaintiff demanding receipt, and he manhandled and assaulted the second plaintiff. Defendants 2 and 3 caught hold of the second plaintiff enabling the first defendant to assault and abuse him. On witnessing this incident, the third plaintiff fainted and fell down and thereafter, the second plaintiff was not even permitted to take her to the hospital, but was permitted only after the keys of the car were handed over to the first defendant. The plaintiff nos. 2 and 3 were hospitalized and later the first plaintiff approached the Judicial First Class Magistrate's Court-IV, Kozhikode with CMP No.1495/2010 under Section 451 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for release of the vehicle from the interim custody. The petition was allowed, but the first defendant refused to release the vehicle. Later CMP No.1676/2010 was filed for production of vehicle before the court and on 25.03.2010, the first plaintiff went to the police station for release of the vehicle, but the same was not done and later, it was released through the court. The defendants 1 to 3 entered appearance and contested the suit, contending that the suit is barred by Section 64 of the Kerala Police Act, 1960 inasmuch as the suit has been filed beyond the period of limitation prescribed under the said Act. It was further contended that the Police Authorities had genuinely entertained a belief that the vehicle was involved in an offence, especially since it was not registered within the vicinity of Kozhikode District and the apprehension of the vehicle was genuinely done. It was further contended that the first defendant or anyone else under him had not acted beyond the powers and therefore the allegations against them were misconceived. On behalf of the plaintiffs, Exts.A1 to A48 (a) documents were marked and PW1 to PW7 were examined. On behalf of the defendants, Ext.B1 to B4(a) documents were marked and DW1 was examined. Exts.X1 to X7(b) are the third party exhibits. The trial court firstly framed the following issues for consideration: “1. Whether the suit is maintainable? 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to realise damages from the defendants as claimed for? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a mandatory injunction as prayed for? 4. Exts.X1 to X7(b) are the third party exhibits. The trial court firstly framed the following issues for consideration: “1. Whether the suit is maintainable? 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to realise damages from the defendants as claimed for? 3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for a mandatory injunction as prayed for? 4. Reliefs and Costs?” But, on consideration of the material facts and law set out in the pleadings, it recast the issues as follows: “1. Is the seizure of the vehicle bearing No.KL.16/9 was done by the defendants in good faith and are they protected under Section 64 (1) of the Kerala Police Act, 1960 ? 2. Is the seizure of the vehicle done by the defendants was in pursuance of any authority conferred on them by any law for the time being in force? 3. Is the suit is barred under the law of limitation provided under Section 64 (3) of the Kerala Police Act, 1960 ? 4. Did the defendants cause any loss, damage or hardship to the plaintiffs? 5. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled to get compensation from the defendants for the loss sustained? 6. Did the defendants illegally seized the documents relating to the vehicle bearing No.KL.16/9? 7. Whether the 1st plaintiff is entitled for a decree of mandatory injunction? 8. Reliefs and costs?” On appreciation of oral and documentary evidence, the trial court concluded that the suit is barred by limitation under Section 64ofKerala Police Act, 1960. As regards the physical assault and the resultant injury, the trial court concluded that since Exts.X6 to X7 were not proved by examining the doctors who issued the same, the same cannot be accepted in evidence. Accordingly, the suit was dismissed. Aggrieved the plaintiffs preferred AS No.98/2018. The first appellate court on reappreciation of evidence, concluded that Exts.X6 & X7 were summoned by the defendants themselves and therefore they cannot raise an objection that the signatories to Exts.X6 & X7 must be examined by the plaintiffs to prove the same. As regards the initiation of the criminal prosecution against the first plaintiff, the first appellate court found that there was no occasion to seize the vehicle for an offence under Section 176 of the IPC. Therefore, with the material evidence on record, the first appellate court found that the plaintiffs have clearly demonstrated the misuse of the power by the defendants 1 to 3. Therefore, with the material evidence on record, the first appellate court found that the plaintiffs have clearly demonstrated the misuse of the power by the defendants 1 to 3. Accordingly, on a material assessment of the records, it came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs are entitled to succeed and accordingly reversed the findings of the trial court, decreed the suit in part and granted compensation on the basis of a reasonable assessment at Rs.5,00,000/- with 6% interest from the date of suit till realization and that the defendants 1 to 4 are jointly and severally held liable for the amount. Aggrieved, defendant 1 to 3 alone have come up in the present appeal. 3. Heard Sri. P.A.Harish, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants and Sri. S.Shyam Padman, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents/plaintiffs, assisted by Smt. Laya Mary Joseph. 4. Sri. P.A.Harish, the learned counsel appearing for the appellants primarily contended that no notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure was issued to the defendants. It was further submitted that the suit was filed on 17.5.2013, whereas the alleged incident occurred on 2.3.2010. He further pointed out that in terms of Section 64 (3) of the Kerala Police Act, 1960 , the suit ought to have been filed within six months from the date of incident. He further pointed out that no notice has been issued under (4). Moreover, when criminal proceedings have been initiated in respect of the same cause of action, the suit for the same cause of action is barred in terms of the proviso to . He reiterated the stand that Exts.X6 and X7, which are the medical records, have not been proved through the doctor who examined the plaintiffs 2 and 3. He further contented that in terms of Article 72 of the Limitation Act, 1963 , a suit for compensation based on an illegal seizure of a movable should be filed within one year from the date of the alleged seizure. He further pointed out that Exts.X6 and X7 would show that the plaintiffs have miserably failed to prove their case against the defendants since the allegations of an assault and manhandling by the first defendant have been disproved by the contents of the documents itself. 5. Per Contra, Sri. He further pointed out that Exts.X6 and X7 would show that the plaintiffs have miserably failed to prove their case against the defendants since the allegations of an assault and manhandling by the first defendant have been disproved by the contents of the documents itself. 5. Per Contra, Sri. Shyam Padman, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the plaintiffs submitted that the appeal itself is not maintainable inasmuch as the fourth defendant State, which has been found to be vicariously liable for the acts committed by the defendants 1 to 3 had not chosen to file an appeal. He further pointed out that when a suit for alleged commission of tort is filed within the period of limitation as provided under the Limitation Act, 1963 , the right to sue cannot be circumscribed by operation of sub-section (3) of Section 64 . In other words, according to the learned Senior Counsel, in order to apply , the alleged act must be committed in pursuance to any official duty. Since the alleged misconduct or the assault has been committed by the appellants 1 to 3, not in pursuance to their official duty, the application of is not attracted in the present case. In support of his contention, relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in State of A.P. v. Challa Ramakrishna Reddy and Others [ (2000) 5 SCC 712 ] P.K.Pradhan v. State of Sikkim , represented by the Central Bureau of Investigation [ (2001) 6 SCC 704 ] ; Prithipal Singh and Ors. v. State of Punjab and Ors. [ (2012) 1 SCC 10 ] and this Court in Pradeep K. v. State of Kerala and Another [2015 KHC 274] & Edison v. State of Kerala [2006 KHC 187]; Abdul Asees v. State of Kerala [ 2010 (4) KLT 261 ] and The State of Andhra Pradesh v. N.Venugopal and Others [AIR 1964 SC 33] 6. I have considered the rival submissions raised across the bar, perused the judgments rendered by the courts below and also the records of the case. 7. Before proceeding further, this Court must notice the fact that this appeal has not been yet admitted. However, based on an undertaking given by the learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 3, the decree of the first appellate court has not been put to execution. 7. Before proceeding further, this Court must notice the fact that this appeal has not been yet admitted. However, based on an undertaking given by the learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 3, the decree of the first appellate court has not been put to execution. In the present circumstances, the endeavour of this Court is only to see as to whether any substantial question of law arises for consideration in the appeal so as to warrant a detailed consideration of the matter. No doubt, the findings of the courts below are divergent in nature. Merely because, the findings rendered by the first appellate court is divergent from that of the trial court, admission of the appeal is not automatic. 8. Be that as it may, this Court does not propose to delve further on the question as to why the appeal was not admitted till date on the substantial questions as sought to be raised by the learned counsel for the appellants. But instead, it has given an anxious consideration as to whether, the questions now raised qualify themselves as substantial questions of law. 9. In Mujeeb K.P. v. Micheale Fathima [2025 KLT OnLine 2088] , this Court had occasion to examine what constitutes a substantial question of law. Merely because the appellants had sought to raise certain questions which according to them are germane to the facts of the case, that by itself will not qualify as a substantial question unless otherwise it appears to this Court that the questions are necessarily of public importance. 10. The attempt made by the appellants before this Court must be judged in the above context and also the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in various decisions. 11. What is now canvassed before this Court is that the suit itself is barred by limitation. The argument of Sri. P.A Harish is that, the suit must be filed within a period of six months from the date of incident under sub-Section (3) of Section 64 of the Kerala Police Act, 1960 . However, it must be remembered that, going by the law of Limitation, the period prescribed for initiating a civil action claiming damages for a tortious act is three years from the date of the alleged incident. The period provided under a Central Statute cannot be obliterated by a State enactment prescribing a lesser period of limitation. However, it must be remembered that, going by the law of Limitation, the period prescribed for initiating a civil action claiming damages for a tortious act is three years from the date of the alleged incident. The period provided under a Central Statute cannot be obliterated by a State enactment prescribing a lesser period of limitation. Hence, the contention to the contrary is liable to be rejected. 12. As regards the further plea that the suit for compensation for damages, for seizure of a vehicle must be filed within a period of one year and that the present suit is beyond the period of one year as provided under Article 72, this is of the considered view that the present suit is for damages on account of a tortious act committed by the appellants. Admittedly the period for filing the suit is three years. Incidentally, the claim for damages is not on account of the illegal seizure of the vehicle, though the said act is also alleged to be a cause of action. Therefore, when a suit encompassing a relief governed by a lesser period of limitation is filed and is covered by a larger period of limitation, it cannot be said that the suit is barred by limitation by application of an article which provides for a lesser period of limitation. 13. It must be further noticed that the suit is not filed for claiming compensation on account of an alleged seizure of the vehicle, but a series of incidences which led to the seizure of the vehicle and also the alleged assault on the plaintiffs by the defendants 1 to 3. 14. Equally so, this Court does not find any merit in the argument that notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure had not been given to the third appellant. The records indicate that the notice under was issued by registered post. Therefore, applying the presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, it must be held that the notice is properly served. Therefore, this Court is inclined to hold that the plea based on non-service of notice under is untenable. 15. The records indicate that the notice under was issued by registered post. Therefore, applying the presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, it must be held that the notice is properly served. Therefore, this Court is inclined to hold that the plea based on non-service of notice under is untenable. 15. Coming to the plea that no separate notice under sub- section (4) of Section 64 of the Kerala Police Act, 1960has been issued, this Court finds that once a notice under Section 80of the CPC is issued, no separate notice under sub-Section (4) of is required to be issued. Therefore, the contention to the contrary is rejected. 16. Now what remains to be considered is as to whether the plaintiffs have been successful in proving the alleged assault by the appellants. The records would indicate that certain unsavoury incidents took place which led to the seizure of vehicle on 2.3.2010 and the presence of plaintiffs in the Nadakkavu police station. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellants that based on Exts.X6 and X7, no injury is made and therefore the alleged assault is not proved, cannot be sustained. The presence of plaintiffs 1 to 3 at the Nadakavu Police Station on the fatal day is proved beyond doubt. Even from the version of the defendants, it is evident that the third plaintiff fainted on the said day and DW1 offered to take her to the hospital. The records indicate that the discomfort complained by plaintiffs 1 and 2 were allegedly due to the assault committed by the defendants. They were advised for follow-up actions. 17. In these circumstances, the Court cannot insist on a strict proof regarding the alleged assault and will have to go by preponderance of probabilities especially in civil proceedings. Further, this Court cannot remain oblivious of the fact that, a departmental enquiry was conducted by the officials of the same Government and the appellants were found guilty of the charges levelled against them and recommended under Ext.A15 enquiry report of action. Though the learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the penalty imposed against them has been dropped on appeal by the appellants, the fact remains that the findings in Ext.A15 enquiry report stands unimpeached. Though the learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the penalty imposed against them has been dropped on appeal by the appellants, the fact remains that the findings in Ext.A15 enquiry report stands unimpeached. If that be so, the argument raised by the appellants that the medical records do not indicate an alleged assault by the appellants 1 to 3 cannot be accepted. 18. But as regards the contention that the proviso to Section 64 of the Kerala Police Act, 1960operates as a bar for instituting a civil proceedings, especially when a criminal action against the appellants 1 to 3 has been initiated by the plaintiffs, this Court must notice the fact that what is intended to be prohibited under the proviso to Section 64is prosecution for any act in pursuance to the official duty of the police officers. The alleged assault on the plaintiffs 1 to 3 in the present case cannot be considered as one done in pursuance to the official duty at any rate. 19. It is beyond cavil that for an offence under Section 176of the IPC, the presence of the seizure of vehicle is an absolute requirement. Since appellants had not been able to substantiate as to why the seizure of the vehicle was necessitated on 02.03.2010, the entire argument built upon the defence under the proviso to Section 64 of the Kerala Police Act, 1960must fail. 20. Lastly, this Court is required to consider as to whether the first appellate court was justified in fixing the compensation as has now been done. In this context, this Court finds considerable force in the argument of the learned Senior Counsel of the respondents that going by the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Abdul Asees (supra) and also the decision of Single Bench in Edison (supra), fixation of the compensation has to be done on the basis of a reasonable assessment. Once it is shown that the first appellate court has exercised its discretion by fixing the compensation on the basis of a reasonable assumption, it is not open for the High Court exercising its powers under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure to overturn the said findings, unless it finds that the said fixation is unreasonable or disproportionate. Once it is shown that the first appellate court has exercised its discretion by fixing the compensation on the basis of a reasonable assumption, it is not open for the High Court exercising its powers under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure to overturn the said findings, unless it finds that the said fixation is unreasonable or disproportionate. It does not appear to this Court that the fixation of compensation in the present case is in any way unreasonable or disproportionate. Hence, the contention as regards the fixation must necessarily fail. On a cumulative assessment of the facts involved in this case, this Court is not persuaded to hold that, any substantial question of law arises for consideration in the present appeal. Accordingly, the appeal fails and it is dismissed. No costs.