ORDER : G. Girish, J. The judgment dated 29.09.2020 of the Sessions Court, Thalassery, in Crl.A No.89/2016, remanding C.C No.392/2014 to the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Koothuparamba, for fresh disposal, is under challenge in this revision petition filed at the instance of the accused/appellant in the said case. 2. The prosecution case is that the accused entrapped and killed a wild boar which entered into his landed property, and made use of its meat for consumption as food. The offence was detected by the Flying Squad Range Officer, Thalassery, and his team pursuant to a search conducted at the residence of the petitioner/accused on 19.04.2012. It is stated that, in the aforesaid search, 2 Kg of meat kept in a sack and 3 Kg of cooked meat found in a pressure cooker, were recovered in addition to the utensils used for entrapping and killing the wild boar. It is the further case of the prosecution that the remnants of the carcass of the wild boar were recovered from a pit in the property of the petitioner/accused. Thus, the petitioner/accused is alleged to have committed the offence under Section 9 r/w Section 51 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 . 3. The learned Magistrate framed charges against the petitioner under the aforesaid Sections after recording the preliminary evidence let in by the prosecution through the oral testimonies of PW1 and PW2, and the documents marked as Exts.P1 and P2. After the recall and further examination of PW1 and PW2, three more witnesses were examined from the part of the prosecution as PW3 to PW5, and six other documents were marked as Exts.P3 to P8. Five material objects were identified as MO1 to MO5. From the part of the petitioner/accused, three witnesses were examined as DW1 to DW3, and five documents were marked as Exts.D1 to D5. After evaluation of the aforesaid evidence, the learned Magistrate found the petitioner guilty of commission of the offence under Section 9 r/w Section 51 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 and convicted him thereunder. He was accordingly sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for three years and fine Rs.10,000/- with a default clause of rigorous imprisonment for six months. 4. The petitioner challenged the aforesaid verdict of the learned Magistrate in appeal before the Sessions Court, Thalassery. He was accordingly sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for three years and fine Rs.10,000/- with a default clause of rigorous imprisonment for six months. 4. The petitioner challenged the aforesaid verdict of the learned Magistrate in appeal before the Sessions Court, Thalassery. After embarking upon a re-appraisal of the whole evidence, the learned Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that the Trial Court wrongly relied on Ext.D2 postmortem certificate, which was not admitted in evidence through DW1, the Veterinary Surgeon, who was said to have conducted the postmortem of the wild boar. It was thus observed by the Appellate Court in the impugned judgment that the Trial Court erroneously acted upon Ext.D2 in proof of the cause of death of the said animal in spite of the fact that a mere statement about the cause of death in the aforesaid document will not amount to proof of the cause of death. The learned Sessions Judge further observed in the impugned judgment that the Trial Court wrongly relied on Ext.P7 confession statement, which was not properly proved through PW4, the Range Officer, who was said to have recorded the said statement. The other procedural anomalies committed by the Trial Court in not segregating the portions of statements in chief examination and cross-examination of PW4, and the mistakes committed in the marking of Exts.P2 and P5 documents are also mentioned in the impugned judgment of the learned Sessions Judge. Finally, the learned Sessions Judge acceded to the request of the learned Public Prosecutor, to remand back the case to the Trial Court for setting right the above material infirmities in the evidence adduced so that the prosecution will be benefited by adopting such a course. Aggrieved by the aforesaid direction of the Appellate Court, the petitioner/accused is here before this Court with this revision petition. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, and the learned Special Government Pleader for the Forest Department. 6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid direction of the Appellate Court, the petitioner/accused is here before this Court with this revision petition. 5. Heard the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, and the learned Special Government Pleader for the Forest Department. 6. It is obvious from the impugned judgments of the courts below that the Trial Court has resorted to the conviction and sentence for the commission of offence under Section 9 r/w Section 51 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 , notwithstanding the fact that the prosecution did not succeed in establishing that the meat said to have been recovered from the residence of the petitioner, and the remnants of the carcass recovered from the property of the petitioner, were that of a wild boar. This aspect is writ large from the fact that the prosecution did not care to bring on record the postmortem certificate of the killed animal and to examine the Veterinary Surgeon, who conducted the postmortem, as a witness from their part. Though the Veterinary Surgeon concerned was examined from the part of the accused/petitioner as DW1, the contents of the postmortem certificate which was marked as Ext.D2 were not brought out through that witness. Still, the Trial Court relied on the above postmortem certificate and came to the conclusion that the petitioner/accused had killed the wild boar, the carcass of which was subjected to postmortem by DW1. It is also pertinent to note that, nothing was brought out before the Trial Court to show that the meat said to have been recovered from the residence of the petitioner, was that of a wild boar. On the other hand, the evidence adduced by the petitioner/accused through the oral testimony of DW3, and the documents marked as Exts.D1 and D3 clearly revealed that DW3, the owner of a licenced pig farm, had sold four kilograms of pig meat to the petitioner on 19.04.2012, the day when the team of Forest Officers recovered pig meat from the residence of the petitioner. Thus, it is apparent that, in the case on hand, the petitioner was able to bring out sufficient evidence before the Trial Court to show that the meat recovered from his residence, was the one which he had purchased from a licenced pig farm, for the purpose of consumption as food. Thus, it is apparent that, in the case on hand, the petitioner was able to bring out sufficient evidence before the Trial Court to show that the meat recovered from his residence, was the one which he had purchased from a licenced pig farm, for the purpose of consumption as food. The above aspect assumes much significance in view of the failure of the prosecution to adduce the necessary evidence to show that the pig meat and remnants of the carcass said to have been recovered from the residential property of the petitioner, were that of a wild boar, which he is alleged to have entrapped and killed. 7. The confession said to have been made by the petitioner vide Ext.P7 statement to PW4, is the other evidence relied on by the Trial Court, to arrive at the finding that the petitioner had entrapped and killed a wild boar, and used its meat for consumption as food. But, the aforesaid confession statement was also not proved before the Trial Court, in accordance with the procedures established by law. PW4, the Range Officer concerned, who is said to have recorded Ext.P7, was not made to depose before the Trial Court about the contents of the above statements said to have been made by the petitioner. Thus, the Trial Court relied on Ext.P7 confession statement in the absence of the contents of the said statement being deposed by PW4. It is after realising the above fatal anomalies in the prosecution evidence, that the learned Sessions Judge acceded to the request of the learned Public Prosecutor to remand back the case to the Trial Court to make good the serious deficiencies, and thereby enable the prosecution to set right the substantial flaws in adducing evidence. 8. Section 386(a) Cr.P.C empowers the Appellate Court to direct that a further enquiry be made or that the accused be re-tried or committed for trial, in an appropriate case, where the appeal is preferred from an order of acquittal. Likewise, Section 386(b) Cr.P.C empowers the Appellate Court to order the re-trial of the accused by a court of competent jurisdiction, in an appropriate case, where the appeal is preferred against the conviction recorded by the Trial Court. Likewise, Section 386(b) Cr.P.C empowers the Appellate Court to order the re-trial of the accused by a court of competent jurisdiction, in an appropriate case, where the appeal is preferred against the conviction recorded by the Trial Court. In the first instance mentioned above, the further enquiry or re-trial could be canvassed by the prosecution or the de facto complainant if they are aggrieved by the procedural irregularities committed by the Trial Court leading to the acquittal of the accused. In the second instance mentioned above, a re-trial could be canvassed by the accused if he is aggrieved by the procedural irregularities of the Trial Court and the denial of affording sufficient opportunities to him to defend the case during the course of trial, leading to his conviction. In the present case, none of the above two contingencies had arisen. It is an irony to note that the prosecution has sought the remand of the case to the Trial Court in an appeal preferred by the accused aggrieved by the conviction and sentence resorted to by the Trial Court in a case where there existed no legally admissible evidence to connect the accused with the offence. Thus, it is apparent that the remand of the case to the Trial Court is sought for by the prosecution to fill up the lacuna in the prosecution case and to try whether the serious infirmities in the earlier trial could be set right by resorting to remedial measures. Such a course is a procedure alien to law, and, if permitted, it would definitely amount to curtailing the lawful rights of the accused. The principle of law in this regard has been laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Mohd. Hussain @ Julfikar Ali v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) [ (2012) 9 SCC 408 ] . The relevant paragraph in the judgment rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the aforesaid case is extracted hereunder:- “ 41. The appellate court hearing a criminal appeal from a judgment of conviction has power to order the retrial of the accused under Section 386 of the Code. That is clear from the bare language of Section 386(b). Though such power exists, it should not be exercised in a routine manner. The appellate court hearing a criminal appeal from a judgment of conviction has power to order the retrial of the accused under Section 386 of the Code. That is clear from the bare language of Section 386(b). Though such power exists, it should not be exercised in a routine manner. A de novo trial or retrial of the accused should be ordered by the appellate court in exceptional and rare cases and only when in the opinion of the appellate court such course becomes indispensable to avert failure of justice. Surely this power cannot be used to allow the prosecution to improve upon its case or fill up the lacuna. A retrial is not the second trial; it is continuation of the same trial and same prosecution. The guiding factor for retrial must always be demand of justice. Obviously, the exercise of power of retrial under Section 386(b) of the Code, will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case for which no straitjacket formula can be formulated but the appeal court must closely keep in view that while protecting the right of an accused to fair trial and due process, the people who seek protection of law do not lose hope in legal system and the interests of the society are not altogether overlooked.” 9. As far as the present case is concerned, a re-trial cannot be ordered to afford a second innings to the prosecution to try whether the evidence which they failed to bring out at the earlier instance, could be brought out by resorting to a second trial under the guise of a re-trial. Such a course, if permitted, would definitely infringe the lawful rights of the petitioner/accused not to be prosecuted for a second time after having faced a previous trial wherein the prosecution could not bring out any legally acceptable evidence to connect him with the offence alleged. Therefore, the impugned judgments rendered by the Trial Court and the Appellate Court, are liable to be set aside. In the result, the revision petition stands allowed as follows: (i) The judgment rendered by the Trial Court convicting and sentencing the petitioner for the commission of offence under Section 9 r/w Section 51 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 , and the judgment rendered by the Appellate Court remanding the case for fresh trial, are hereby set aside. In the result, the revision petition stands allowed as follows: (i) The judgment rendered by the Trial Court convicting and sentencing the petitioner for the commission of offence under Section 9 r/w Section 51 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 , and the judgment rendered by the Appellate Court remanding the case for fresh trial, are hereby set aside. (ii) The petitioner/accused is acquitted of the aforesaid offence.