ORDER : 1. Under challenge in this revision petition is the conviction and sentence rendered against the revision petitioner under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short “N.I. Act”). 2. The revision petitioner is the accused in S.T. No. 1913/1998 on the file of the Judicial First Class Magistrate Court, Mannarkad. 3. The case of the complainant is that the accused borrowed a sum of Rs.50,000/- from him and, in discharge of the said liability, issued a cheque for the said amount in his favour. However, upon presentation, the cheque was dishonoured on the ground of “insufficient funds.” Thereafter, the complainant issued a statutory notice to the accused informing him of the dishonour and demanding payment of the cheque amount. Hence, the accused is alleged to have committed an offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. Though the postal authority intimated the accused regarding the statutory notice issued, the same was returned as “unclaimed.” According to the complainant, even after issuance of the notice, no payment whatsoever was made by the accused, and therefore, he is liable for the offence under of the N.I. Act. 4. During the trial, the complainant was examined as PW1, and another witness was examined on his side as PW2. The documents produced on behalf of the complainant were marked as Exts. P1 to P5. On the side of the defence, DW1 and DW2 were examined, and Exts. D1 and D2 series were marked. 5. On appreciation of the evidence on record, the trial court found the accused guilty of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act and convicted him. The accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of three months and to pay compensation of Rs.50,000/- to the complainant under Section 357(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure . 6. Aggrieved by the said judgment, the accused preferred Crl. A. No. 59 of 2003 before the Sessions Court. The learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court-II), Palakkad, upon hearing the appeal, allowed the same in part. While confirming the conviction recorded by the trial court under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, the appellate court reduced the sentence of imprisonment to one month. A. No. 59 of 2003 before the Sessions Court. The learned Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court-II), Palakkad, upon hearing the appeal, allowed the same in part. While confirming the conviction recorded by the trial court under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, the appellate court reduced the sentence of imprisonment to one month. The accused was further directed to pay a sum of Rs.50,000/- to the complainant as compensation under Section 357(3) of the Cr.P.C. In default of payment of compensation, the accused was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a further period of one month. 7. Heard the learned counsel appearing for both sides and perused the records. 8. The learned counsel for the revision petitioner contended that both the trial court and the appellate court failed to properly appreciate the evidence and arrived at a finding of guilt without due application of mind. It was further urged that the complainant failed to establish the alleged transaction as well as the execution of Ext. P1 cheque. The learned counsel strenuously contended that although the complainant claims to have issued a statutory notice as mandated under the N.I. Act, no such notice was actually received by the accused, and therefore the mandatory procedural requirements for initiating prosecution under Section 138 of the N.I. Act has not been complied with. 9. Per contra, the learned counsel for the first respondent submitted that all necessary formalities for initiating prosecution under Section 138 of the N.I. Act has been duly complied with in this case, and the contrary contentions are unsustainable. It was contended that the notice issued to the accused was returned as “unclaimed” and therefore there is a presumption of service in view of Section 27 of the General Clauses Act . It was further submitted that the complainant had adduced sufficient evidence to prove execution of the cheque, and that no material was produced by the accused to rebut the statutory presumptions available in favour of the complainant under Sections 118 and 139 of the N.I. Act. 10. Before delving into the discussions regarding the rival contentions raised, first of all, it is to be noted that while considering a revision petition, the jurisdiction of a revisional court is limited. 10. Before delving into the discussions regarding the rival contentions raised, first of all, it is to be noted that while considering a revision petition, the jurisdiction of a revisional court is limited. By a series of judicial pronouncements, it is well settled that a court exercising revisional jurisdiction will interfere with the findings of the courts below only when such findings suffer from illegality, impropriety, or perversity. Unless it is shown that the judgment of the trial court or the appellate court is perverse, unreasonable or suffers from non-consideration of relevant material or misreading of evidence, interference in revision is not warranted. The revisional court cannot reappreciate the evidence as an appellate court and substitute its own view merely because another view is possible. 11. In State of Kerala v. Puttumana Illath Jathavedan Namboodiri, AIR 1999 SC 981 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held thus: “In its revisional jurisdiction, the High Court can call for and examine the record of any proceedings for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the correctness, legality or propriety of any finding, sentence or order. In other words, the jurisdiction is one of Supervisory Jurisdiction exercised by the High Court for correcting miscarriage of justice. But the said revisional power cannot be equated with the power of an Appellate Court nor can it be treated even as a second Appellate Jurisdiction. Ordinarily, therefore, it would not be appropriate for the High Court to reappreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the same when the evidence has already been appreciated by the Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in appeal, unless any glaring feature is brought to the notice of the High Court which would otherwise tantamount to gross miscarriage of justice.” 12. Keeping in mind the above and reverting to the case at hand, it is seen that, in order to prove his case, the complainant examined himself as PW1 and filed an affidavit in lieu of chief examination reiterating the averments contained in the complaint. Although PW1 was subjected to cross- examination, nothing was elicited to discredit or disbelieve his testimony. The evidence of PW1 and the documentary evidence pressed into service from his side are sufficient to prove the transaction alleged in this case as well as the execution of Ext.P1 cheque. Although PW1 was subjected to cross- examination, nothing was elicited to discredit or disbelieve his testimony. The evidence of PW1 and the documentary evidence pressed into service from his side are sufficient to prove the transaction alleged in this case as well as the execution of Ext.P1 cheque. Once the execution of the cheque is proved, a presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act would undoubtedly operate in favour of the complainant. Consequently, it is for the accused to rebut the said statutory presumption by adducing cogent and convincing evidence. 13. In the present case, apart from a bare denial, no material whatsoever has been adduced by the accused to displace the presumption operating in favour of the complainant. Notably, no plausible or convincing explanation has been offered by the accused as to how a signed cheque leaf belonging to him came into the possession of the complainant. 14. Although the learned counsel for the revision petitioner raised serious contentions regarding non-service of notice, the impugned judgments of both the trial court and the appellate court disclose ample evidence to show that the factum of issuance of notice was duly intimated to the accused by the postal authorities, but he refused to receive the same, whereupon it was returned as “unclaimed.” When a notice is sent to the correct address of the addressee, there arises a presumption of service. Moreover, the postman who had tendered the notice and given intimation to the accused has also been examined on the side of the complainant. 15. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the statutory notice issued to the accused is liable to be presumed to have been duly served, particularly since there is material to show that it was sent to the correct address and returned with the endorsement “unclaimed.” Consequently, the accused cannot be permitted to contend that the notice was not served on him. Hence, the contention of the learned counsel for the revision petitioner that the mandatory requirements for launching prosecution under Section 138 of the N.I. Act have not been complied with cannot be accepted. 16. Likewise, no material has been placed before this Court to demonstrate that the appreciation of evidence by the courts below or the concurrent findings of conviction suffer from any illegality, impropriety, or perversity warranting interference in revisional jurisdiction. 16. Likewise, no material has been placed before this Court to demonstrate that the appreciation of evidence by the courts below or the concurrent findings of conviction suffer from any illegality, impropriety, or perversity warranting interference in revisional jurisdiction. Upon perusal of the records, this Court finds no reason to interfere with the judgment under challenge. 17. However, considering the nature and year of the transaction, this Court is of the view that some leniency can be shown in the matter of sentence. The substantive sentence of one month of imprisonment imposed by the appellate court deserves to be modified in the interest of justice. 18. In the result, this revision petition is allowed in part. While confirming the concurrent finding that the accused is guilty of the offence punishable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, the sentence imposed upon the revision petitioner/accused is modified. The revision petitioner is sentenced to undergo imprisonment till the rising of the Court and to pay a compensation of Rs.50,000/- to the complainant under Section 357(3) of the Cr.P.C. In default of payment of the compensation, the accused shall undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one month. 19. However, considering the financial and family constraints projected by the learned counsel for the revision petitioner, the revision petitioner is granted three months’ time to pay the compensation amount before the trial court from the date of this order. It is further clarified that if any amount has already been deposited by the revision petitioner before the trial court pursuant to the directions, if any, issued by the appellate court or this Court, the same shall be adjusted towards the compensation amount ordered herein.