[2026:RJ-JP:9472] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 18745/2025 Kuldeep Choudhary S/o Shri Bajrang Lal Choudhary, Aged About 28 Years, Resident Of Village Bansera Post Bansera Tehsil Todaraisingh District Tonk. ----Petitioner Versus 1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Its Secretary, Department Of Education, Secretariat, Jaipur. 2. The Director (Elementary Education), And Panchayat Raj (Elementary Education) Directorate Rajasthan, Bikaner. 3. The District Education Officer, (Head Office), Elementary Education, Block No. 7, Shiksha Sankul, J.l.n. Marg, Jaipur. 4. The District Elementary Education Officer, Headquarter Elementary Education, Ajmer. ----Respondents For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Mirza Faisal Baig For Respondent(s) : Mr. S.S. Naruka, AAG with Mr. Jitendra K. Takar HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK KUMAR JAIN Order 05/03/2026 1. The instant writ petition is filed by the petitioner with following prayer:- "(i) The impugned letter dated 19.11.2025 may kindly be quashed and set aside; (ii) Issue direction to the respondents not to terminate/discharge from the service of the petitioner from the post of Teacher (level-I) General Education under PH-low vision category; (iii) Any other relief as this Hon'ble Court may deem fit and proper be also passed in favour of the petitioner." [2026:RJ-JP:9472] (2 of 7) [CW-18745/2025] 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is having benchmark disability in low vision category and same was assessed as 60% permanent disability. He further submits that pursuant to order dated 02.12.2025 passed by this Court, the petitioner has appearing before the Medical Board, JLN Hospital, Ajmer and the Medical Board has assessed the disability to be more than 40%. He further submits that now again SOG (now Dy. SP, Beawar) has directed the petitioner to appear in police investigation in a compliant filed against the petitioner. 3. Learned Additional Advocate General has opposed the contentions of learned counsel for the petitioner and he submits that the State has authority to re-assess the benchmark disability as claimed by the petitioner. He further submits that if the Department has re-assessed the benchmark disability then the Department will proceed accordingly but the petitioner cannot restrict the right of the Department for re-assessment. 4. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material placed on record. 5. This Court has considered bunch of petitions with identical relief and while deciding the writ petition along with other connected matters on 27.01.2026 in Ramprakash Kharlwa Vs. The Director, Elementary Education, Rajasthan, Bikaner and Ors. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.15370/2025) and other connected matters, this Court has observed as under:- "61. The State Government or the recruiting agency may direct anyone, whether an employee who secured a job on the basis of a disability certificate or a candidate who appeared to claim a reservation quota under the RPwD Act, 2016, to appear before any designated authority to assess or reassess the disability of such person. [2026:RJ-JP:9472] (3 of 7) [CW-18745/2025] 62. Thus, the writ petitions are disposed of in following manner:- (i) The petitioner(s) have no right to challenge the assessment or reassessment order issued by the State Government or the respondent(s) for reassessment of benchmark disability. No person is entitled to be considered for appointment on seat reserved for persons with benchmark disabilities, unless his/her benchmark disability is assessed as per Chapter-X of the RPwD Act, 2016. (ii) The respondent(s) are free to assess or reassess the benchmark disability of the petitioner(s) in accordance with the provisions of the RPwD Act, 2016, and such assessment shall be made in accordance with the guidelines framed by the Government of India in exercise of powers under Section 56 of the RPWD Act, 2016. (iii) Any certificate issued by any Medical Board or Medical Officer, not designated as a certifying authority under Section 57 of the RPwD Act, is invalid and illegal, and the same cannot be relied upon for availing any benefit under the RPwD Act, 2016 or the rules made thereunder. (iv) The respondent(s) including recruiting agencies are directed to ensure that the certification process conforms to the standards as prescribed by the Government of India under the RPwD Act, 2016 and the rules made thereunder. (v) The State Government is also under an obligation to notify the designated certifying authorities along with their jurisdiction for issuance of certificates under Section 2 (r), 2(s) or 2(t) to declare a person as having a disability or a benchmark disability, or person with high support needs. (vi) After assessment or reassessment of in service candidate(s), if the respondent(s) find that the candidate does not have a benchmark disability as required under the Act of 2016, then they are free to take any action as discussed herein-above. (vii) If a candidate appears in a recruitment process on the basis of benchmark disability, then the recruiting agency is duty-bound to assess or reassess his benchmark disability through a designated certifying authority as notified under Section 57 of the RPwD Act, 2016, and such assessment has to be made strictly on [2026:RJ-JP:9472] (4 of 7) [CW-18745/2025] the basis of guidelines issued by the Government of India under Section 56 of the RPwD Act, 2016. (viii) The petitioner(s) are not entitled to any protection under the law but any action against them shall be taken or intiated only after re-assessment of their benchmark disability under the directions of the respondent(s) by following the procedure as prescribed under Chapter X of the RPWD Act, 2016." 6. While considering several judgments, this Court has observed that the State Government is under a constitutional obligation in providing equal protection, as provided under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, and the State instrumentality are bound to follow the doctrine of reasonable accommodation while considering the case of any individual who is declared as a person with disabilities under the RPwD Act, 2016. At the same time, the State Government is also duty-bound to prevent misuse of the provision of the RPwD Act, 2016 by any individual, with aim to usurp the employment opportunities meant for persons with benchmark disabilities. 7. This Court has also observed that if benchmark disability of particular individual is assessed at the instance of the Department then he cannot be asked to appear again and again to re-assess the benchmark disability. This Court is of the opinion that the State Government is under the constitutional mandate to implement the law in letter and spirit and the duty lies upon it to balance the equity from the conduct adopted by the State Government. 8. This Court has also considered the fact that a person with benchmark disabilities is again and again asked to appear his/her disabilities only to satisfy the complainant who has filed a complaint alleging fake and false certificate procured by the [2026:RJ-JP:9472] (5 of 7) [CW-18745/2025] petitioner. At one point of time, the inquiry has to be in accordance with settled proposition of law and if a certificate, to establish benchmark disability, obtained after following provision as prescribed under the RPwD Act, 2016 that too at the instance of the respondents, then if any criminal complaint is made then the petitioner has a right to approach this Court under Section 528 of the BNSS for quashing the notice or the proceeding instituted against the petitioner but staying the police action is not permissible under the civil writ. 9. The question whether writ proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is a civil proceeding or a criminal proceeding is considered by Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in case of S.A.L. Narayan Row And Anr. vs Ishwarlal Bhagwandas And Anr. : AIR 1965 SC 1818, wherein Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- “12. By a petition for writ under Article 226 of the Constitution, extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court to issue high prerogative writs granting relief in special cases to persons aggrieved by the exercise of authority statutory to otherwise by public officer or authorities is invoked. This jurisdiction is undoubtedly special and exclusive, but on that account the nature of the proceeding in which it is exercised is not altered. Where a revenue authority seeks to levy tax or threatens action in purported exercise of powers conferred by an Act relating to revenue, the primary impact of such an act or threat is on the civil rights of the party aggrieved and when relief is claimed in that behalf it is a civil proceeding, even if relief is claimed not in a suit but by resort to the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court to issue writs. 13. It is not easy to attribute to the expression "revenue proceeding" any precise connotation, [2026:RJ-JP:9472] (6 of 7) [CW-18745/2025] and in interpreting articles 132(1) and 133 it would be difficult to project the somewhat anomalous provision contained in Section 226 of the Government of India Act, 1935, under which for historical reasons, it was enacted that unless otherwise provided by the appropriate legislature, no High Court shall have any act ordered or done in the collection thereof according to the usage and practice of the country or the law for the time being in force. This section barred the High Court from exercising original jurisdiction in matters concerning revenue. There was no such bar against subordinate courts, nor against the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by the High Court in matters concerning revenue instituted in subordinate courts. No provision has been made in the constitution similar to Section 226 of the Government of India Act, and there is no reason to think that it was intended to deprive the High Court of its power' to certify cases concerning revenue, by enacting that the High Court may certify a case in a civil proceeding. No ground is suggested for acceptance that while removing the ban against the High Court s original jurisdiction in matters concerning revenue, the Constitution imposed another ban against the exercise of power to certify cases decided by the High Court in the appellate as well as original jurisdiction when the cases concerned revenue.” 10. Aforesaid judgment is followed by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in case of M/s Nagpur Cable Operators’ Association vs. Commissioner of Police, Nagpur : AIR 1996 Bombay 180 (DB). The Division Bench has observed as under:- “25. The question arises that though the present writ petition is of the nature of civil proceedings, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition as Criminal Writ Petition and in this view of the matter, after holding that the present Criminal Writ Petition is not properly styled and maintainable as such, whether this Criminal Writ [2026:RJ-JP:9472] (7 of 7) [CW-18745/2025] Petition should be rejected at its threshold or not. The procedure is always handmaid of justice and not its master and because of the mistake committed by the counsel in filing the present criminal writ petition, the litigant should not be allowed to suffer and in our view, interest of justice would be met if the petitioner is permitted to convert this criminal writ petition as civil writ petition. Necessary amendment should be carried out by the petitioner within two weeks from today and in case the amendment is carried out within two weeks the Registry is directed to register this writ petition as Civil Writ Petition and place it before the appropriate Bench for consideration. Order accordingly.” 11. Considering the legal position and the grievance of the petitioner placed on record with additional document as Annexure A/6 wherein the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Circle Masuda District Beawar has initiated an inquiry about the certificate issued in favour of the petitioner. The Annexure A/7 indicate that the petitioner has replied to the notice. If the petitioner is aggrieved from any of the action taken by police or SOG then he may prefer either a miscellaneous petition under Section 528 of BNSS or a criminal writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India but herein restraining police from proceeding in matter of investigation or `inquiry relating to criminal matter is not possible. 12. In view of discussion made hereinabove, the instant writ petition is disposed in light of judgment in case of Ramprakash Kharlwa Vs. The Director, Elementary Education, Rajasthan, Bikaner and Ors. (supra). 13. Misc. application, if any, also stands disposed. (ASHOK KUMAR JAIN),J MR/57