JUDGMENT : GOPINATH P., J. 1.The petitioners are before this Court challenging Ext.P13 order of the 3 rd respondent confirming the sale of certain property mortgaged by the petitioners for availing financial assistance from the 6 th Respondent (the Bank), and also Ext.P20 order of the 1 st respondent confirming Ext.P13 order and rejecting an appeal filed by the petitioners. The essential facts to be noted for an effective adjudication of this Writ Petition are as follows: 2. The petitioners availed of two separate loans from the 6 th respondent Bank in the year 2013. According to the petitioners, for reasons beyond their control, the loans could not be serviced after 2014. The Bank initiated proceedings (as A.R.C Nos. 150 & 151/2014) under Section 69 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as 'the 1969 Act') and obtained two separate awards determining the liability of the petitioners. Both these awards (Exts. P1 & P2) are dated 19.11.2014. The petitioners alleged that they never received a summons in the arbitration proceedings and challenged the awards by filing Revision Petition Nos. 33 & 34 of 2024 before the Kerala Co-operative Tribunal, Thiruvananthapuram. The Revision Petitions were filed nearly 10 years after the awards. The Tribunal, while considering the Revision Petitions, found that the petitioners received summons in both the cases filed by the 6 th respondent Bank and failed to appear before the Arbitrator. The Tribunal found no reason to entertain the Revision Petitions owing to the inordinate delay. The common order of the Tribunal is on record as Ext.P9. The petitioners challenged the award in ARC No. 150 of 2014 and Ext. P9 common order by filing W.P (C) No.33019/2024. In the meantime, the properties were put up for sale and were purchased by the 8 th respondent. The 8 th respondent filed W.P (C) No.39576/2024 complaining of inordinate delay in confirming the auction sale and registration of the sale deed in favour of the 8 th respondent. Much after the filing of W.P (C) No.33019/2024 (by the petitioners) and W.P (C) No.39576/2024 (by the auction purchaser), the petitioners filed another Writ Petition numbered as W.P (C) No.26659/2025, challenging the award in ARC No. 151 of 2014 and Ext. P9 common order. 3. The two Writ Petitions filed by the petitioners and the Writ Petition filed by the 8 th respondent were heard together. W.P (C) Nos. P9 common order. 3. The two Writ Petitions filed by the petitioners and the Writ Petition filed by the 8 th respondent were heard together. W.P (C) Nos. 33019/2024 and W.P (C) No.26659/2025 filed by the petitioners were dismissed, finding that the Writ Petitions filed by the petitioners smack of calculated delay, and the maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt squarely applies to the conduct of the petitioners. It was held that the petitioners were not only sleeping over their rights, but were doing so, being fully aware of the consequences of their actions. This Court also disposed of W.P (C) No.39576/2024 filed by the 8 th respondent (auction purchaser), directing respondents 1 to 3 therein to complete the process of sale, register the sale deed and deliver the possession of the property to the 8 th respondent (auction purchaser). Ext.P12 is the common judgment in W.P (C) No.33019/2024 and connected cases. The petitioners sought a review of Ext.P12 judgment. However, by Ext.P14 common order dated 21.10.2025, the Review Petitions were dismissed. While dismissing Review Petitions, this court also found that at the close of the hearing of the Writ Petitions, the court had specifically asked the petitioners herein (review petitioners in Ext.P14) whether they are willing to pay off the amounts remitted by the auction purchaser and to get the sale set aside on payment. It was recorded that the writ petitioners herein submitted that they are not in a position to pay the amounts to have the sale set aside. This court also found that the contention that the sale was conducted without following the procedure cannot be raised at the stage of the Review Petition, as no challenge was raised against the sale in either of the Writ Petitions filed earlier by the petitioners, as W.P (C) No.33019/2024 and W.P (C) No.26659/2025. It was also found that the sale was not even challenged at the stage of execution. Accordingly, the Review Petitions were dismissed. 4. In the meanwhile by Ext.P13 order dated 30.08.2025, the auction sale was confirmed. The petitioners approached this court challenging Ext.P13 order by filing W.P (C) No.39367/2025. It was also found that the sale was not even challenged at the stage of execution. Accordingly, the Review Petitions were dismissed. 4. In the meanwhile by Ext.P13 order dated 30.08.2025, the auction sale was confirmed. The petitioners approached this court challenging Ext.P13 order by filing W.P (C) No.39367/2025. By Ext.P15 judgment dated 23.10.2025, this court disposed of that writ petition, permitting the writ petitioners to challenge Ext.P13 by filing an appeal before the Government in terms of the provisions contained in Section 83 (1) (j) of the 1969 Act and further directed that the status quo shall be maintained till the disposal of the appeal. The 8 th respondent challenged the judgment of this court in W.P (C) No.39367/2025 by filing WA No.2742/2025. By Ext.P17 judgment, the Division Bench found that this court ought not to have directed maintenance of the status quo when the remedy of appeal was available against Ext.P13 and such relief ought to have been granted (if at all) by the Appellate Authority. The Division Bench also directed that the question of maintainability of an appeal against Ext.P13 order shall be considered by the Appellate Authority. The Division Bench therefore vacated the order of status quo and further directed the parties to appear for a hearing before the Appellate Authority on the date fixed in Ext.P17. The Appellate Authority by Ext.P20 order dismissed the appeal filed by the petitioners. The petitioners are now before this court challenging inter alia Exts.P13 & P20 orders and for other incidental reliefs. 5. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would submit that the sale of the mortgaged properties in favour of the 8 th respondent was vitiated. He submits that there are several infirmities in the conduct of the sale, particularly in the matter of remittance of earnest money deposit and the balance of the sale consideration. It is submitted that properties which would fetch nearly Rupees Three Crores were sold for a paltry sum of Rupees Seventy-five lakh. It is submitted that one of the items of property should have been sold first, and it was not necessary to sell both the items of property that had been mortgaged to recover the amounts due to the 6 th respondent Bank. It is submitted that one of the items of property should have been sold first, and it was not necessary to sell both the items of property that had been mortgaged to recover the amounts due to the 6 th respondent Bank. It is submitted that the Appellate Authority failed to consider the contentions raised, and though it was found that the appeal was maintainable, proceeded to confirm Ext.P13 order without appreciating the contentions raised by the writ petitioners. It is submitted that in such circumstances Ext.P20 order is liable to be set aside and the petitioners are entitled to the reliefs sought for in the Writ Petition. He also submits that Ext.P11 application dated 05.11.2024, submitted before the 4 th respondent and Ext.P21 application dated 29.7.2024 (which was not accepted by the 4 th respondent), seeking to set aside the sale, must be considered and disposed of by the 4 th respondent. The learned counsel placed reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Om Sakthi Sekar v. Sukumar , 2026 SCC OnLine SC 368, to contend that where the sale is vitiated by factors such as improper valuation, the sale has to be interfered with. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioners would also submit that the Writ Appeals filed against Ext.P12 judgment and the Writ Appeals filed against Ext.P14 order in the Review Petitions were permitted to be withdrawn, reserving the liberty of the petitioners to raise all contentions in the present Writ Petition. It is submitted that in such circumstances, the petitioners are entitled to raise all contentions in the present Writ Petition. 6. Though notice was ordered by this court in the Writ Petition on 02.03.2026, no steps were taken to serve notice on respondents 6 and 7. The learned Government Pleader accepted notice for respondents 1 to 4. Notice to the 5 th respondent (sale officer) was dispensed with. Adv. Daisy A. Philipose accepted notice on behalf of 8 th respondent. 7. The 8 th respondent has filed a counter affidavit narrating the circumstances leading to the sale. It is contended that the sale was conducted strictly in accordance with the law. It is pointed out that Ext.P11 application dated 05.11.2024 is not an application for setting aside the sale. Daisy A. Philipose accepted notice on behalf of 8 th respondent. 7. The 8 th respondent has filed a counter affidavit narrating the circumstances leading to the sale. It is contended that the sale was conducted strictly in accordance with the law. It is pointed out that Ext.P11 application dated 05.11.2024 is not an application for setting aside the sale. It is pointed out that since the sale was conducted in accordance with the law and since the entire sale consideration was deposited by the 8 th respondent, the petitioners are not entitled to any of the reliefs sought for in the Writ Petition. She also submitted that, on account of the inordinate delay in challenging Exts. P1 and P2 awards, the petitioners have waived all their rights to contend that the determination of liability and the proceedings for execution of Exts. P1 and P2 awards should be interfered with. 8. Having heard the learned counsel for the petitioners, the learned Government Pleader for respondents 1 to 4 and the learned counsel appearing for the 8 th respondent, I am of the view that the petitioners are not entitled to any relief in this Writ Petition. 9. Firstly, it must be noted that though W.P (C) No. 33019/2024 and W.P (C) No. 26659/2025 were filed after the sale was conducted on 30.01.2024, no challenge was raised to the sale in those writ petitions. The conduct of the petitioners clearly amounts to an ‘omission to sue’. The fact that the Writ Appeals filed challenging Ext.P12 judgment and the Writ Appeals filed against Ext.P14 order in the review petitions were permitted to be withdrawn, reserving the liberty of the petitioners to raise all contentions in this Writ Petition, does not come to the aid of the petitioners, as the effect of that judgment cannot be that the findings in the common judgment in W.P (C) No.33019/2024 and connected cases (Ext.P12) stand set aside and the petitioners are allowed to initiate fresh proceedings by raising all contentions including contentions raised or not raised in W.P (C) Nos.33019/2024 and W.P (C) No.26659/2025. In other words, the findings in the common judgment in W.P (C) No.33019/2024 and connected cases (Ext.P12) are not wiped out by withdrawing the Writ Appeals filed challenging Ext.P12 judgment and the Writ Appeals filed against Ext.P14 order in the Review Petitions. 10. In other words, the findings in the common judgment in W.P (C) No.33019/2024 and connected cases (Ext.P12) are not wiped out by withdrawing the Writ Appeals filed challenging Ext.P12 judgment and the Writ Appeals filed against Ext.P14 order in the Review Petitions. 10. Even if it were to be held that the principle of ‘omission to sue’ flowing from Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not directly apply to these proceedings, I must hold that this Writ Petition challenging the sale is not maintainable. As already found, W.P (C) No.33019/2024 and W.P (C) No.26659/2025 were filed after the sale was conducted on 30.01.2024 without raising any challenge to the sale proceedings. A Division Bench of this Court in George Dominic v. Kanjirappally Service Co-Operative Bank Ltd. , 2025 SCC OnLine Ker 14691 , referred to State of U.P. v. Nawab Hussain , (1977) 2 SCC 806 and Celir LLP v. Sumati Prasad Bafna , 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3727 and held as follows:- “25. In Celir LLP v. Sumati Prasad Bafna , a Two-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that the fundamental policy of the law is that there must be finality to litigation. Multiplicity of litigation benefits not the litigants whose rights have been determined, but those who seek to delay the enforcement of those rights and prevent them from reaching the rightful beneficiaries of the adjudication. The ‘Henderson Principle’, in the same manner as the principles underlying res judicata, is intended to ensure that grounds of attack or defence in litigation must be taken in one of the same proceedings. A party that avoids doing so does it at its own peril. In deciding as to whether a matter might have been urged in the earlier proceedings, the court must ask itself as to whether it could have been urged. In deciding whether the matter ought to have been urged in the earlier proceedings, the court will have due regard to the ambit of the earlier proceedings and the nexus which the matter bears to the nature of the controversy. In deciding whether the matter ought to have been urged in the earlier proceedings, the court will have due regard to the ambit of the earlier proceedings and the nexus which the matter bears to the nature of the controversy. In holding that a matter ought to have been taken as a ground of attack or defence in the earlier proceedings, the court is indicating that the matter is of such a nature and character and bears such a connection with the controversy in the earlier case that the failure to raise it in that proceeding would debar the party from agitating it in the future. The doctrine itself is based on public policy flowing from the age-old legal maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium, which means that in the interest of the State, there should be an end to litigation and no party ought to be vexed twice in a litigation for one and the same cause. 25.1. In Celir LLP, the Apex Court reiterated that the ‘Henderson Principle’ is a core component of the broader doctrine of abuse of process, aimed at enthusing in the parties a sense of sanctity towards judicial adjudications and determinations. It ensures that litigants are not subjected to repetitive and vexatious legal challenges. At its core, the principle stipulates that all claims and issues that could and should have been raised in an earlier proceeding are barred from being raised in subsequent litigation, except in exceptional circumstances. This rule not only supports the finality of judgments but also underscores the ideals of judicial propriety and fairness. 25.2. At its core, the principle stipulates that all claims and issues that could and should have been raised in an earlier proceeding are barred from being raised in subsequent litigation, except in exceptional circumstances. This rule not only supports the finality of judgments but also underscores the ideals of judicial propriety and fairness. 25.2. In Celir LLP, the Apex Court noticed that there are four situations where, in second proceedings between the same parties, doctrine res judicata as a corollary of the principle of abuse of process may be invoked; (i) cause of action estoppel, where the entirety of a decided cause of action is sought to be relitigated; (ii) issue estoppel or, ‘decided issue estoppel’, where an issue is sought to be relitigated, which has been raised and decided as a fundamental step in arriving at the earlier judicial decision; (iii) extended or constructive res judicata, i.e., ‘unraised issue estoppel’, where an issue is sought to be litigated which could, and should, have been raised in a previous action but was not raised; (iv) a further extension of the aforesaid to points not raised in relation to an issue in the earlier decision, as opposed to issues not raised in relation to the decision itself. As part of the broader rule against abuse of process, the ‘Henderson Principle’ is rooted in the idea of preventing the judicial process from being exploited in any manner that tends to undermine its integrity. This idea of preventing abuse of judicial process is not confined to specific procedure rules, but rather aligned to a broader purport of giving quietus to litigation and finality to judicial decisions. The essence of this rule is that litigation must be conducted in good faith, and parties should not engage in procedural tactics that fragment disputes, prolong litigation, or undermine the outcomes of such litigation. It is not a rigid rule but rather a flexible principle to prevent oppressive, unfair, or detrimental litigation. 25.3. In Celir LLP, the Apex Court held that piecemeal litigation where issues are deliberately fragmented across separate proceedings to gain an unfair advantage is in itself a facet of abuse of process of law and would also fall foul of the ‘Henderson P rinciple’. 25.3. In Celir LLP, the Apex Court held that piecemeal litigation where issues are deliberately fragmented across separate proceedings to gain an unfair advantage is in itself a facet of abuse of process of law and would also fall foul of the ‘Henderson P rinciple’. Merely because one proceeding initiated by a party differs in some aspects from another proceeding or happens to be before a different forum, will not make the subsequent proceeding distinct in nature from the former, if the underlying subject matter or the seminal issues involved remains substantially similar to each other or connected to the earlier subject matter by a certain degree, then such proceeding would tantamount to ‘relitigating’ and the ‘Henderson Principle’ would be applicable. Parties cannot be allowed to exploit procedural loopholes and different fora to revisit the same matters they had deliberately chosen not to pursue earlier. Thus, where a party deliberately withholds certain claims or issues in one proceeding with the intention to raise them in a subsequent litigation disguised as a distinct or separate remedy or proceeding from the initial one, such subsequent litigation will also fall foul of th e ‘Henderson Principle’. Similarly, where a plea or issue was raised in earlier proceedings but later abandoned, it is deemed waived and cannot be relitigated in subsequent proceedings. Allowing such pleas to be resurrected in later cases would not only undermine the finality of judgments but also incentivize strategic behaviour, where parties could withdraw claims in one case with the intention of reintroducing them later. Abandonment signifies acquiescence, barring its reconsideration in subsequent litigation. This ensures that judicial processes are not misused for tactical advantage and that litigants are held accountable for their procedural choices. Parties must litigate diligently and in good faith, presenting their entire case at the earliest opportunity.” (Emphasis is supplied) On an application of the aforesaid principles to the facts of this case, I must hold that the failure of the petitioners to raise any challenge to the sale which took place on 30.01.2024 in W.P (C) No.26659/2025 (filed on 17.07.2024) and W.P (C) No.33019/2024 (filed 0n 13.09.2024) disentitles them from raising any contention in the present writ petition challenging the sale. 11. Further, the facts of this case indicate that the petitioners are not entitled to any relief in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India . 11. Further, the facts of this case indicate that the petitioners are not entitled to any relief in exercise of discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India . While disposing of W.P (C) No.33019/2024 and connected cases, this court held as follows; “7. The judgment debtors are, in my opinion, not entitled to any relief. The maxim vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt squarely applies to the conduct of the judgment debtors. It is not mere sleeping over the rights as contemplated in the maxim, but a case where the judgment debtors with full knowledge of the consequences slept over their rights. The writ petitions smack of calculated delay going by the facts which have been extracted above. In such circumstances, the decisions in Paul (supra) and Changanassery Rubber Marketing Co- operative Society (supra) cannot be applied for granting relief to the judgment debtors. As held in Sarojini Amma (supra), Joseph K.V.(supra) and Gopinathan Nair (supra), the judgment debtors could not even have preferred a revision petition. As such, they are not entitled to revive the cause of action by preferring a writ petition before this Court. In the above circumstances, W.P.(C)Nos.33019 of 2024 and 26659 of 2024 are dismissed. In the light of the dismissal of the above two writ petitions, no further positive orders are required in W.P. (C)No.39576 of 2024, except a direction to respondents 1 to 3 in the said writ petition to complete the process of sale, register the sale deed and deliver possession of the property to the auction purchaser. The above action shall be completed within one month from the date of receipt of a certified copy of this judgment.” The petitioners have slept over their rights for a considerable time and cannot seek to revive the cause of action and reopen proceedings that have concluded by the passage of time. As already indicated, the awards in proceedings under Section 69 of the 1969 Act are dated 19.11.2014. While disposing of the Review Petitions filed seeking review of Ext.P12 judgment, this court observed as follows; “2. After the close of hearing, this Court had asked the counsel for the review petitioners to submit whether the review petitioners are willing to pay off the amounts which have been spent by the auction purchaser and get the sale set aside on payment. After the close of hearing, this Court had asked the counsel for the review petitioners to submit whether the review petitioners are willing to pay off the amounts which have been spent by the auction purchaser and get the sale set aside on payment. The counsel on instructions submits that the review petitioners are not in a position to do so. 3. In the review petitions filed against the judgment in the writ petition filed by the auction purchaser, a ground is taken that the review petitioners were not made parties to the said writ petition. However, the fact remains that the said writ petition was heard along with the application filed by the review petitioners, and arguments were advanced with respect to all the three writ petitions. The other grounds that are taken for seeking the review are that the sale was conducted without following the procedure laid down and was vitiated. The said arguments are not available in the stage of review petition. The prayers in W.P(C).No. 33019 of 2024 were only against the ex- parte award passed by the Arbitrator and the order of the Tribunal. The prayers in W.P(C).No.26659 of 2025 are also only regarding ex-parte award and order of the Tribunal. There is no challenge raised to the sale in either of the writ petitions filed by the review petitioners. Such a ground cannot be raised in the review petition filed against the judgment in the writ petition filed by the auction purchaser. The sale was not challenged even at the stage of the execution and without seeking any remedy available for challenging the sale as vitiated, a challenge cannot be raised in a review petition. No grounds available for review under Order 37 Rule 1 or Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure have been made out.” The petitioners have clearly slept over their rights and did not even avail the opportunity to have the sale set aside on deposit. The petitioners, therefore, have no intention to clear the liability to the Bank, and they have approached this court only with the intention of delaying the proceedings further. Thus, the petitioners are not entitled to any discretionary relief at this point in the exercise of jurisdiction vested in this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India . 12. The petitioners, therefore, have no intention to clear the liability to the Bank, and they have approached this court only with the intention of delaying the proceedings further. Thus, the petitioners are not entitled to any discretionary relief at this point in the exercise of jurisdiction vested in this court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India . 12. The Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, while passing Ext.P13 order confirming the sale in favour of the 8 th respondent, found that the sale was conducted after following due procedure and that the sale could be confirmed in favour of the 8 th respondent. The 1 st respondent, while considering the appeal filed against Ext.P13 order, came to the following conclusions (in Ext.P.20):- The petitioners have not placed on record any material to show that the above factual findings of the 1st respondent are wrong. The findings are not perverse or irrational. Therefore, I find no ground made out to interfere with Ext.P13 order of the Original Authority or with Ext.P20 order of the Appellate Authority. 13. The prayer for a direction to the 4th respondent to consider and pass orders on Exts.P11 and P21 also cannot be sustained at this stage, as the sale has already been confirmed and the 1st respondent has, in appeal, found that there was no irregularity whatsoever in the sale conducted in favour of the 8th respondent. Therefore, no direction can be issued to the 4th respondent to consider and pass orders on Exts.P11 or P21. 14. The contention raised on the ratio of Om Sakthi Sekar (supra) also does not come to the aid of the petitioners. That judgment was rendered in totally different factual circumstances. In Om Sakthi Sekar (supra), while considering a civil appeal filed against the judgment of the High Court of Madras, that had directed re-consideration of the valuation of certain properties in the recovery proceedings, the Supreme Court held as follows:- “14. It is the specific contention of the learned senior counsel for the appellant that once the auction sale was confirmed and the purchaser was a bona fide third-party bidder, the sale ought not to be disturbed except in cases of fraud or material irregularity. Reliance has been placed upon several decisions of this court emphasising the protection ordinarily accorded to confirmed auction sales and the need to maintain certainty in judicial sales. 15 . Reliance has been placed upon several decisions of this court emphasising the protection ordinarily accorded to confirmed auction sales and the need to maintain certainty in judicial sales. 15 . While there can be no quarrel with the settled proposition that the rights of a bona fide auction purchaser deserve due protection and that confirmed court sales should not ordinarily be interfered with, it is equally well established that such protection is not absolute. Where credible issues are raised regarding the adequacy of valuation or the fairness of the process leading to the fixation of the reserve price, the supervisory jurisdiction of the court may be invoked to ensure that the recovery proceedings have been conducted in a manner that secures the best possible value of the property . The objective of recovery proceedings is not merely to complete the sale but to realise the maximum value of the secured asset so as to balance the interests of the creditor and the borrower. In this regard, reference may be made to the decision of this court in Rajiv Kumar Jindal v. BCI Staff Colony Residential Welfare Association, [2023] 238 Comp Cas 227 (SC), wherein, it was observed that the purpose of an auction is to obtain the most remunerative price for the property by affording an opportunity to intending purchasers to participate in a process of competitive bidding, thereby ensuring transparency and fairness in the sale. The court further emphasised that if the process of competitive bidding is curtailed or compromised, the possibility of underbidding or securing an inadequate price cannot be ruled out. In such circumstances, the court is required to exercise its discretion with circumspection so as to safeguard the legitimate interests involved in the sale process. The following paragraphs are apposite:- “…’” 16 . In the present case, the High Court, upon examining the record, was of the view that the question relating to valuation of the property and the fixation of the reserve price warranted closer scrutiny . The following paragraphs are apposite:- “…’” 16 . In the present case, the High Court, upon examining the record, was of the view that the question relating to valuation of the property and the fixation of the reserve price warranted closer scrutiny . Significantly, the High Court has neither set aside the auction sale nor questioned the participation of the auction purchaser; rather, it has confined its direction to a reconsideration of the issue of valuation by the Debts Recovery Tribunal.” Emphasis is supplied In the facts of this case, apart from a bald averment that the properties were sold for a throwaway price, there is no material placed on record to justify the contention. In other words, there is nothing before this Court to come to a conclusion that the ‘question relating to valuation of the property and the fixation of the reserve price warranted closer scrutiny’. 15. For all the aforementioned reasons, the petitioners are also not entitled to a direction that they cannot be proceeded against in terms of Exts.P1 and P2 awards and consequential proceedings taken for the sale of the mortgaged property. The Writ Petition fails and will stand dismissed.