[2026:RJ-JP:8065] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 64/2011 Guman Singh S/o Late Shri Raghunath Singh, R/o Suliyawas, at present Village Barod, Police Station Khandhar, District Sawaimadhopur. ----Petitioner Versus 1. State Of Rajasthan through Public Prosecutor. 2. Laxminarayan son of Lal Chand, aged 56 years, R/o Swami Ki Dhani, Suliyawas, Police Station, Dantaramgarh, Sikar. 3. Baksa Ram S/o Nanu Ram, R/o Bad Ka Chaaranwas, Police Station Dantaramgarh, Sikar. 4. Durga Ram S/o Padma Ram, R/o Khatiwas, Police Station Dantaramgarh, Sikar. 5. Dedraj S/o Chanda, R/o Bidoli, Police Station, Sadar, Sikar. 6. Bhagirath Singh S/o Lichman Singh, R/o Suliyawas, Police Station Dantaramgarh, District Sikar. ----Respondent For Petitioner(s) : Ms. Harshita Sharma on behalf of Dr. Mahesh Sharma For Respondent(s) : Mr. Rishi Raj Singh Rathore, PP HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEET PUROHIT Order 20/02/2026 1. Present Criminal Misc. Petition has been filed challenging order dated 10.06.2009 passed by learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dantaramgarh, Sikar, whereby the negative Final Report submitted by investigating agency was accepted, as well as order dated 11.01.2010, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge No. 2, Sikar, dismissing the revision petition filed against order dated 10.06.2009. [2026:RJ-JP:8065] (2 of 7) [CRLMP-64/2011] 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that FIR No. 09/2009 dated 17.01.2009 was registered at the instance of petitioner against accused-respondent No. 2, Laxmi Narayan, alleging that a forged agreement to sell dated 19.12.1994 had been executed by the accused with respect to petitioner's share in his ancestral property. It was alleged that on the strength of said forged agreement to sell, respondent no. 2 instituted a civil suit. Said agreement to sell, according to petitioner, was prepared with a dishonest intention to grab his land. 3. It was contended that investigating agency, without properly examining allegations of forgery and without conducting a thorough investigation, submitted a negative Final Report. Thereafter, learned trial Court, vide its order dated 10.06.2009, accepted the same while allegedly ignoring material available on record.. 4. Aggrieved thereby, petitioner preferred a revision petition, which was dismissed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, vide order dated 11.01.2010. 5. Learned counsel for the petitioner argued that both Courts below have committed errors of law in passing impugned orders dated 10.06.2009 and 11.01.2010 and that the same run contrary to the allegations contained in FIR as well as the material available on record. 6. It was further submitted that the negative Final Report was submitted merely on the ground that a civil suit pertaining to said agreement to sell dated 19.12.1994 was pending, without independently examining allegations of forgery in preparation of said document. [2026:RJ-JP:8065] (3 of 7) [CRLMP-64/2011] 7. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor submitted that the FIR in question was nothing but a counter-blast to earlier proceedings initiated against petitioner. 8. Learned Public Prosecutor pointed out that FIR No. 192/2008 dated 25.09.2008 had already been lodged by respondent Laxmi Narayan alleging that despite executing an agreement to sell and receiving full consideration, petitioner had executed another agreement to sell with an intent to cheat and defraud him (Laxmi Narayan). It is stated that upon investigation in respect of said FIR, a challan was filed against petitioner on 30.01.2009; he was arrested and later released on bail. In the said case, cognizance was taken on 22.04.2009 and charges were framed on 18.07.2009. 9. Learned Public Prosecutor argued that the FIR in question was lodged merely as a counterblast to FIR filed by respondent no. 2, and that investigating agency, after due inquiry, has rightly submitted a negative Final Report. 10. Learned Public Prosecutor further contended that scope of interference of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in such matters is extremely limited, and in absence of any perversity or illegality in impugned orders, interference of this Court is not warranted. 11. Heard counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 12. Undisputed factual matrix of present case reveals that FIR in question was lodged on 07.01.2009 alleging forgery in respect of agreement to sell purportedly executed in the year 1994. Prior thereto, respondent Laxmi Narayan had already lodged FIR No. [2026:RJ-JP:8065] (4 of 7) [CRLMP-64/2011] 192/2008 on 25.09.2008 against petitioner, in respect of which challan was filed on 30.01.2009, cognizance was taken on 22.04.2009 and charges were framed on 18.07.2009. This sequence of events lends considerable support to the submission that FIR in question was nothing but a counter-blast to the FIR lodged by respondent Laxmi Narayan. Investigating agency, upon thorough investigation and after taking note of the fact that a civil suit for specific performance of agreement dated 19.12.1994 is pending adjudication, has submitted negative Final Report. 13. Learned Trial Court has also considered all the said facts and, while accepting Final Report vide order dated 10.06.2009, recorded that agreement to sell dated 19.12.1994 is the subject matter of a pending civil suit and concurred with the conclusions drawn in the Final Report. 14. This Court has also examined order dated 11.01.2010 passed by Revisional Court, wherein learned Revisional Court has affirmed order dated 10.06.2009 and recorded a categorical finding that petitioner has failed to establish any perversity, illegality, or material irregularity in said order so as to warrant interference by way of revisional jurisdiction. 15. This Court further finds that present petition, though filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C., is essentially in the nature of a second revision petition, which is barred under section 397(3) Cr.P.C. The latter stipulates that once a party has preferred a revision petition before either the High Court or the Sessions Judge, the same party cannot re-agitate the same matter before the other Court. While this Court is mindful that the inherent powers of the High Court preserved under section 482 are expansive and not [2026:RJ-JP:8065] (5 of 7) [CRLMP-64/2011] restricted by the provisions of section 397(3), it is settled law that such inherent jurisdiction cannot be invoked as a backdoor to circumvent an express statutory prohibition. Judicial discipline dictates that procedural ingenuity cannot be permitted to override the legislative intent of finality embodied in Section 397(3). 16. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in the case of Raj Kapoor v. State (Delhi Administration), (1980) 1 SCC 43, observed: - “The first question is as to whether the inherent power of the High Court under section 482 stands repelled when the revisional power under section 397 overlaps. The opening words of section 482 contradict this contention because nothing in the Code, not even section 397 can affect the amplitude of the inherent power preserved in so many terms by the language of section 482. Even so, a general principle pervades this branch of law; when a specific provision is made easy resort to inherent power is not right except under compelling circumstances. Not that there is absence of jurisdiction but that inherent power should not invade areas set apart for specific power under the same Code.” 17. Similarly, in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1, it was held as follows: - “Thus, the scope, ambit and range of section 561-A (which is now section 482) is quite different from the powers conferred by the present Code under the provisions of section 397. It may be that in some cases there may be overlapping but such cases would be few and far between. It is well settled that the inherent powers under section 482 of the present Code can be exercised only when no other remedy is available to the litigant and not where a specific remedy is provided by the statute. Further, the power being an extraordinary one, it has to be exercised sparingly. If these considerations are kept in mind, there will be no inconsistency between sections 482 and 397(2) of the present Code.” 18. This point was precisely articulated in the case of Shyamrani wd/o Wasudeo Prasad Gaur v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 1990 SCC OnLine Bom 242, where the Bombay High Court held: [2026:RJ-JP:8065] (6 of 7) [CRLMP-64/2011] “29. Conclusion is, therefore, inevitable that an application or petition under section 482 simpliciter or section 482 read with Article 227 or Article 227 simpliciter does lie but its exercise is restricted to rare and exceptional cases. In exercise of those powers care ought to be taken to see that bar of section 397(3) is not circumvented by shift and contrivance and therefore not the form but the substance must be the deciding factor.” 19. A co-ordinate Bench of this Court in a recent judgment dated 10.02.2026 passed in S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition No.2676/2024 (Jai Kishan Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.) has held as under:- "4. It is a settled tenet of procedural law that courts must look beyond form to substance. The true nature of a proceeding is to be determined by the essence of the relief claimed and not by the nomenclatural device adopted by the litigant. Judicial scrutiny cannot be thwarted by semantic innovation. Where the legislative scheme imposes an embargo, the same cannot be diluted by procedural ingenuity. 5. Section 397(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure enacts a clear prohibition against entertaining a second revision at the behest of the same party. The object underlying this statutory restraint is to ensure finality in adjudication, to maintain procedural discipline, and to prevent multiplicity of challenges that would otherwise impede the expeditious administration of criminal justice. 6. This Court is not unmindful of the amplitude of its inherent and supervisory jurisdiction, which may be invoked to rectify patent illegality, jurisdictional transgression, or manifest miscarriage of justice. However, such extraordinary powers are not to be employed as a substitute for revisional remedies already exhausted. Their exercise is reserved for rare and compelling situations where palpable injustice stares at the face of the record." 20. Applying these principles to the present case, this Court is of the considered view that petitioner has failed to demonstrate any jurisdictional error, perversity, or material irregularity in the concurrent findings of learned Courts below. Impugned orders [2026:RJ-JP:8065] (7 of 7) [CRLMP-64/2011] reflect due application of mind and a reasoned adjudication; therefore, the same do not call for interference by this Court. 21. In view of the statutory bar against a second revision and in absence of any manifest illegality or miscarriage of justice, no ground for interference under section 482 Cr.P.C. is made out. 22. Consequently, present petition, being procedurally untenable and devoid of merit, is dismissed. All consequential directions shall follow in accordance with law. (SANJEET PUROHIT),J 11-Praveen-Jatin