1 2026:CGHC:2131-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 5 of 2026 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Secretary, Department Of Panchayat And Rural Development, Mahanadi Bhavan, Mantralaya Naya Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Development Commissioner Vikas Bhavan, Civil Lines, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh 3 - Chief Engineer Rural Engineering Services, Development Commissioner Office, Civil Lines, Raipur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh 4 - Superintendent Engineer Chhattisgarh Rural Road Development Agency, Project Division Durg, District Durg Chhattisgarh ... Appellants versus Chote Lal Dahire S/o Late N. L. Dahire Aged About 60 Years R/o Ayodhya Nagar, Ring Road No.2, P.O. Mangla, Tahsil And District Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Appellants : Mr. Prasun Bhaduri, Deputy Advocate General Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri R avindra Kumar Agrawal, Judge Order on Board VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Digitally signed by VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Date: 2026.01.15 10:56:17 +0530 2 Per Ramesh Sinha, C.J. 14/01/2026 1. Heard Mr. Prasun Bhaduri, learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the appellants on I.A. No. 2, which is an application for condonation of delay of 340 days in preferring the instant appeal. 2. The appellants have filed this writ appeal against an order dated 06.11.2024, passed by the Hon’ble Single Judge, in WPS No. 1166/2017 (Chhote Lal Dahire v. State of Chhattisgarh and others), by which the learned Single Judge has allowed the writ petition filed by the writ petitioner. 3. Learned Deputy Advocate General appearing for the appellants/ State submits that the present writ appeal has been preferred by the appellants/State against the order dated 06.11.2024, passed in WPS No. 1166 of 2017, by the Hon’ble Single Bench of this Court. He would further submit that after passing of the order dated 06.11.2024, in WPS No. 1166 of 2017, the competent authority, vide letter dated 05.04.2025 sought opinion from the office of the Advocate General with respect to the order passed by this Hon’ble Court. Thereafter the legal opinion was furnished by the State Counsel on 26.05.2025, and in accordance with the said opinion, the authority further proceeded and issued a letter dated 07.11.2025 assigned to the Law Officer for preparation of 3 the appeal on 19.11.2025. After collecting the relevant materials and earlier service record of the petitioner, the present appeal has been filed on 29.11.2025. He further submits that the State while discharging administrative functions, are required to follow various procedural formalities, including inter-departmental correspondence, obtaining legal opinion and collecting relevant documents as advised by the State Counsel. Due to these mandatory administrative processes, the delay has occurred, which is bona fide and unintentional. He also submits that the appellants have a strong case on merits, therefore, the delay if not condoned, would result in grave miscarriage of justice. 4. It has been further contended that the State, after obtaining necessary documents and information with respect to the case, some delay was occurred due to fulfillment of various departmental formalities and working of the Government machinery, because the State Government is a multi functioning body, hence, at times the fulfillment of departmental formalities takes unexpected long time. Therefore, in some cases the State is prevented from filing the case within the prescribed period of limitation, which is bona fide and not deliberate. The instant appeal is, therefore, being filed after a delay of 340 days from the prescribed period of limitation. Reliance has been placed upon the judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of “State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and others” (1996) 3 SCC 4 132, to buttress his submissions. As such, the learned State counsel prays that the delay of 340 days in preferring the petition may be condoned. 5. On a pointed query being made to the learned for the appellants as to why they have approached this Court against the impugned order dated 06.11.2024, after an inordinate delay of 340 days, he has not offered any plausible explanation or any cogent reason for delay in filing the writ appeal. 6. The question for determination before this Court, is whether the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1908 (i.e. Act 9 of 1908 i.e. the old Limitation Act) would apply to an application for condonation of delay. 7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of “Union of India and others v. Tarsem Singh” (2008) 8 SCC 652 summarized the settled principles in the following manner:- “7. To summarise, normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches (where remedy is sought by filing a writ petition) or limitation (where remedy is sought by an application to the Administrative Tribunal). One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long 5 delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. But there is an exception to the exception. If the grievance is in respect of any order or administrative decision which related to or affected several others also, and if the reopening of the issue would affect the settled rights of third parties, then the claim will not be entertained. For example, if the issue relates to payment or re fixation of pay or pension, relief may be granted in spite of delay as it does not affect the rights of third parties. But if the claim involved issues relating to seniority or promotion,etc.., affecting others, delay would render the claim stale and doctrine of laches/limitation will be applied. Insofar as the consequential relief of recovery of arrears for a past period is concerned, the principles relating to recurring/successive wrongs will apply. As a consequence, the High Courts will restrict the consequential relief relating to arrears normally to a period of three years prior to the date of filing of the writ petition.” 8. The Supreme Court in the matter of “C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining and others” (2008) 10 SCC 115, having found that the employee suddenly brought up a challenge to the order of termination of his services after 20 years and claimed all 6 consequential benefits, held that the relief sought for was inadmissible. The legal position in this regard was laid out in the following terms:- “10. Every representation of the Government for relief, may not be applied on merits. Representations relating to matters which have become stale or barred by limitation, can be rejected on that ground alone, without examining the merits of the claim. In regard to representations unrelated to the Department, the reply may be only to inform that the matter did not concern the Department or to inform the appropriate Department. Representations with incomplete particulars may be replied by seeking relevant particulars. The replies to such representations, cannot furnish a fresh cause of action or revive a stale or dead claim. 11. When a decision is issued by a court/tribunal to consider or deal with the representation, usually the directee (person directed) examines the matter on merits,being under the impression that failure to do so may amount to disobedience. When an order is passed considering and rejecting the claim or representation, in compliance with direction of the court or tribunal, such an order does not revive the stale claim, nor amount to some kind of “acknowledgement of a 7 jural relationship” to give rise to a fresh cause of action. 12. When a government abandons service to take alternative employment or to attend to personal affairs, and does not bother to send any letter seeking leave or letter of resignation or letter of voluntary retirement, and the records do not show that he is treated as being in service, he cannot after two decades, represent that he should be taken back to duty. Nor can such employee be treated as having continued in service, thereby deeming the entire period as qualifying service for the purpose of pension. That will be a travesty of justice. 13. Where an employee unauthorisedly absents himself and suddenly appears after 20 years and demands that he should be taken back and approaches the court, the department naturally will not or may not have any record relating to the employee at that distance of time. In such cases, when the employer fails to produce the records of the enquiry and the order of dismissal/removal, court cannot draw an adverse inference against the employer for not producing records, nor direct reinstatement with back wages for 20 years, ignoring the cessation of service or the lucrative alternative employment of the employee. Misplaced sympathy in such matters will 8 encourage discipline, lead to unjust enrichment of the employee at fault and result in drain of public exchequer. Many a time there is also no application of mind as to the extent of financial burden, as a result of a routine order for back wages.” 9. In the light of the principles of law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforementioned judgments (supra), and upon due consideration of the grounds urged in I.A. No. 2, we find that the delay of 340 days in preferring the writ appeal has not been satisfactorily explained with any cogent or plausible reason. The appellants have failed to demonstrate sufficient cause so as to justify condonation of such delay. Therefore, no ground is made out to exercise our discretion in favour of the appellants for condoning the delay. 10. Consequently, I.A. No. 2 seeking condonation of delay is hereby rejected. As a natural corollary thereto, the writ appeal also stands dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice ved