1 2026:CGHC:2312 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 4109 of 2019 1 - Kartar Singh S/o Likhan Singh Aged About 58 Years Occupation - Revenue Inspector At Municipal Corporation, Korba, District Korba Chhattisgarh., ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Nagriya Prasasan Department, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Capital Complex, Atal Nagar, Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh., 2 - Additional Secretary Nagriya Prasasan Avam Vikas Vibhag, Atal Nagar, Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh., 3 - Director Nagriya Prasasan Avam Vikas Vibhag, Atal Nagar, Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh., 4 - Commissioner Municipal Corporation, Korba District Korba Chhattisgarh., 5 - Collector Korba District Korba Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Petitioner(s) : Shri Awadh Tripathi, Advocate. For Respondent/ State : Shri Rahul Tamaskar, GA. For Respondent No.4 : Smt. Swati Agrawal on behalf of Pankaj Agrawal Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Sanjay K. Agrawal , J Order On Board 14/01/2026 : KRISHNA KUMAR BARVE Digitally signed by KRISHNA KUMAR BARVE Date: 2026.01.16 17:31:35 +0530 2 1. The petitioner has called in question the legality, validity and correctness of the order dated 22.2.2019 (Annexure-P/1) by which his termination period from 18.5.2001 to 14.10.2018 has been held as ‘No work No Pay’. 2. The petitioner was convicted by the Special Judge, Raipur vide judgment dated 31.3.1999 for commission of offence under Section 5(1)(d) read with Section 5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and under Section 161 of the IPC and sentenced to undergo RI for 1 year with fine of Rs.1,000/- and to undergo RI for 1 year with fine of Rs.1,000/- respectively with usual default stipulations. Accordingly, the petitioner was terminated from service vide order dated 18.5.2001. This Court, in Cr.A. No.964/1999, vide judgment dated 12.10.2018, set aside his conviction and the petitioner was acquitted of the charges. Consequently, the petitioner was reinstated in service vide order dated 22.2.2019. Thereafter, the petitioner has filed the present writ petition stating that he is entitled for salary for the period form 18.5.2001 to 12.10.2018. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that as the petitioner has been acquitted of all the charges levelled against him, he is entitled for all the consequential benefits. Learned counsel for the petitioner would place reliance on the order passed by this Court in WP(S) No.994/2010 (Shankar Lal Soni Vs. The State of CG & Others) decided on 9.7.2021. 3 4. On the other hand, learned counsel for the Corporation would oppose the submission advanced by learned counsel for the petitioner. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the documents annexed with the writ petition carefully. 6. The issue involved herein is no longer res integra and it stands conclusively determined by their Lordships of the Supreme Court by their judgment first of all in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore v. Superintendent Engineer, Gujarat Electricity Board, Himmatnagar 1 in which their Lordships have considered a case where an employee was dismissed from service on account of his conviction by a criminal court for his involvement in an offence under Section 302/34 of the IPC and subsequently, he was acquitted and as a consequence, reinstated. Their Lordships while considering the issue whether back-wages should be paid to the employee for the period between the date of dismissal and the date of reinstatement held as under: - "The reinstatement of the petitioner into the service has already been ordered by the High Court. The only question is whether he is entitled to back wages. It was his conduct of involving himself in the crime that was taken into account for his not being in service of the respondent. Consequent upon his acquittal, he is entitled to reinstatement for the reason that his service was terminated on the basis of the conviction by operation of proviso to the statutory rules applicable to the situation. The question of back wages would be considered only if the respondents have taken action by way of disciplinary proceedings and the action was found to be unsustainable in law and he 1 (1996) 11 SCC 603 4 was unlawfully prevented from discharging the duties. In that context, his conduct becomes relevant. Each case requires to be considered in its own backdrop. In this case, since the petitioner had involved himself in a crime, though he was later acquitted, he had disabled himself from rendering the service on account of conviction and incarceration in jail. Under these circumstances, the petitioner is not entitled to payment of back wages." 7. Similarly, in the matter of Union of India v. Jaipal Singh2, the principle of law laid down in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra) has been followed with approval. 8. In the matter of Management of Reserve Bank of India, New Delhi v. Bhopal Singh Panchal3, the Supreme Court has considered a provision in the service regulation which provided that an employee, who is absent from duty without any authority, shall not be entitled to any pay and allowance during the period of such absence (similar to F.R. 17) and held as under: - “15. … It is only if such employee is acquitted of all blame and is treated by the competent authority as being on duty during the period of suspension that such employee is entitled to full pay and allowances for the said period. In other words, the Regulations vest the power exclusively in the Bank to treat the period of such suspension on duty or on leave or otherwise. The power thus vested cannot be validly challenged. During this period, the employee renders no work. He is absent for reasons of his own involvement in the misconduct and the Bank is in no way responsible for keeping him away from his duties. The Bank, therefore, cannot be saddled with the liability to pay him his salary and allowances for the period. That will be against the principle of ‘no work, no pay’ and 2 (2004) 1 SCC 121 3 AIR 1994 SC 552 5 positively inequitable to those who have to work and earn their pay. …” 9. In the matter of State Bank of India and another v. Mohammed Abdul Rahim4, the Supreme Court considering the earlier decisions in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra), Jaipal Singh’s case (supra) and Baldev Singh v. Union of India5, held that subsequent acquittal of Government servant though obliterates his conviction, does not operate retrospectively to wipe out the legal consequences of the conviction under the Act, and observed as under: - “11. … During the aforesaid period there was, therefore, a prohibition in law on the appellant Bank from employing him. If the respondent could not have remained employed with the appellant Bank during the said period on account of the provisions of the Act, it is difficult to visualise as to how he would be entitled to payment of salary during that period. His subsequent acquittal though obliterates his conviction, does not operate retrospectively to wipe out the legal consequences of the conviction under the Act. The entitlement of the respondent to back wages has to be judged on the aforesaid basis. His reinstatement, undoubtedly, became due following his acquittal and the same has been granted by the appellant Bank.” 10. Finally, in the matter of Raj Narain v. Union of India and others6, their Lordships have relied upon the decision rendered in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra) and have held that the appellant therein shall be entitled for back wages only from the date of acquittal till the date of his reinstatement. 11. Reverting to the facts of the present case, the petitioner was convicted by the trial Court by a judgment dated 31.3.1999. However, the Appeal 4 (2013) 11 SCC 67 5 (2005) 8 SCC 747 6 (2019) 5 SCC 809 6 preferred by the petitioner before this Court viz CRA No.964/1999 was allowed vide judgment dated 12.10.2018 and conviction and sentence imposed on the petitioner were set aside and the petitioner was acquitted of all the charges. Thereafter, vide order dated 22.2.2019 the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his claim for back wages from the date of his termination to the date of reinstatement has been denied as the said period has been treated by the respondent department as ‘No Work No Pay’ and in light of the aforesaid principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra), Jaipal Singh (supra), Baldev Singh (supra), Mohammed Abdul Rahim (supra) and Raj Narain (supra), subsequent acquittal of the petitioner though obliterates his conviction, but it does not operate retrospectively to wipe out the legal consequences of the conviction, however, the petitioner is be entitled for back wages only from the date of his acquittal i.e. 12/10/2018 till the date of his reinstatement i.e. 22/02/2019 in light of decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Raj Narain (supra). 12. At this stage, before considering the decision rendered by this Court in the matter of Shankar Lal Soni, referred to above, it would be appropriate to notice the decision rendered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Jai Prakash Wadhwa and Others Vs. Lt. Governor, Delhi Admn. And Another {(1997) 11 SCC 174} in which their Lordships have clearly held that the appellants therein were employees of the Municipal Corporation and were not Government servants and, therefore, they cannot invoke the protection of 7 Fundamental Rule 22-C. In the matter of Shankar Lal Soni also, referred to above, he was a Government servant whereas in the present case, the petitioner is not a Government employee, as he was employee of the Municipal Corporation and, therefore, the provisions of the Fundamental Rules are not applicable to him. Furthermore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has rendered the decisions in the matters of Ranchhodji Chaturji Thakore (supra), Jaipal Singh (supra), Baldev Singh (supra), Mohammed Abdul Rahim (supra) and Raj Narain (supra) that subsequent acquittal of the person though obliterates his conviction, but it does not operate retrospectively to wipe out the legal consequences of conviction. As such, the petitioner, by any stretch of imagination, cannot be granted pay and salary for the period during which he remained convicted that too for the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act i.e. for the period 18.5.2001 to 12.10.2018. Accordingly, the decision rendered by this Court in the matter of Shankar Lal Soni, referred to above, is inapplicable in the facts of the present case. 13. In view of the aforesaid, this Writ Petition is allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. Sd/- (Sanjay K. Agrawal) Judge Barve