JUDGMENT : RAVINDRA V. GHUGE, J. INDEX Sr. No. Particulars A Preface B Summary of the Pleadings and averments of the State C Summary of the Pleadings and averments of the Land Owner (Respondent No.1/ Company) D Summary of the Pleadings and averments of Respondent No.2 (Deceased, through LRs 2.1, 2.3 to 2.12) E Summary of the Pleadings and averments of Respondent No.8 (Thane Municipal Corporation) F Summary of the Oral and Written submissions on behalf of the State by Senior Advocate, Mr. Dwarkadas (i) Submissions on Godrej & Boyce (supra) and Rohan Nahar (supra) and rejoinder submissions. G Summary of the submissions of the learned Advocate, Mr. Balsara on behalf of Respondent No.1 (Land Owner) H Summary of the comments of Respondent No.1 on the Petitioner’s rejoinder. I Summary of the submissions of the learned Advocate, Mr. Karl Tamboly on behalf of Respondent Nos.2.1, 2.3 to 2.12 J Compilations of Judgments relied upon by Respondent Nos. 2.1, 2.3 to 2.12 K Summary of the submissions of Senior Advocate, Mr. R.S. Apte on behalf of the Thane Municipal Corporation L Our Analysis and Discussion (i) Issues framed by the MRT and its conclusions (ii) Consideration of the facts before us, in the light of the law laid down in GODREJ & BOYCE (iii) Crucial factors (iv) Subsequent Events Relevant for Writ Petition No.10024 of 2023 (v) Our Final Conclusions and Order in Writ Petition No. 3205 of 2018 (vi) Order in Writ Petition No.10024 of 2023 M Article X – Copy of the Notice dated 29.08.1975 N ANNEXURES TO THIS JUDGMENT W.R.T WRIT PETITION NO. 3205 OF 2018 (A) Petitioner’s note in respect of the Sanjay Gandhi National Park Division (Tendered by Mr. Janak Dwarkadas) (B) Written Notes of arguments on the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Godrej and Boyce (supra) and Rohan Nahar (supra) (Tendered by Mr. Janak Dwarkadas) (C) Written notes of arguments on behalf of Respondent No.1 (Tendered by Mr. Chirag Balsara) (D) Modification/ Additions made by Respondent No.1 (Tendered by Mr. Chirag Balsara) (E) The Petitioner’s note in rejoinder to Respondent No.1’s arguments (Tendered by Mr. Janak Dwarkadas) (F) Submissions on behalf of Respondent No.1 to the Petitioner’s rejoinder (Tendered by Mr. Chirag Balsara) (G) Submissions on behalf of Respondent Nos.2.1, 2.3 to 2.12 (Tendered by Mr. Karl Tamboly) O ANNEXURES IN WRIT PETITION NO. Chirag Balsara) (E) The Petitioner’s note in rejoinder to Respondent No.1’s arguments (Tendered by Mr. Janak Dwarkadas) (F) Submissions on behalf of Respondent No.1 to the Petitioner’s rejoinder (Tendered by Mr. Chirag Balsara) (G) Submissions on behalf of Respondent Nos.2.1, 2.3 to 2.12 (Tendered by Mr. Karl Tamboly) O ANNEXURES IN WRIT PETITION NO. 10024 OF 2023 (H) Short note on behalf of the Petitioners (Tendered by Mr. Chirag Balsara) (I) Note on behalf of Respondent Nos.2 to 5 (Tendered by Mr. R. S. Apte) (J) Submissions of the Respondent Corporation (Tendered by Mr. Mandar Limaye) PREFACE 1. Rule in both the Writ Petitions. Rule made returnable forthwith and heard finally by the consent of the parties. This Court has not granted any interim relief in the First Writ Petition No. 3205 of 2018. 2. The First Petition (Writ Petition No.3205 of 2018) is filed by the Petitioner State, was listed before the Single Judge Bench, as per Chapter XVII, Rule 18 (1) of the Bombay High Court Appellate Side Rules, 1960. By an order dated 4 th January, 2024, passed by the Hon’ble the Chief Justice, on request of the parties, Writ Petition No.3205 of 2018 has been clubbed with Writ Petition No.10024 of 2023 and placed before the Division Bench. 3. The learned Senior Advocates and the Advocates for the respective sides, canvassed their oral submissions in marathon hearings for long hours, held on 21 st November 2025, 28 th November 2025, 4 th December 2025, 9 th December 2025, 10 th December 2025, 15 th December 2025, 16 th December 2025 and 17 th December, 2025. They also placed their extensive written notes of submissions on record along with case law. Finally, these matters were closed for Judgment on 17 th December, 2025 just before the Christmas vacation. 4. They also placed their extensive written notes of submissions on record along with case law. Finally, these matters were closed for Judgment on 17 th December, 2025 just before the Christmas vacation. 4. In the First Petition (Writ Petition No.3205 of 2018) filed by the Petitioner, State of Maharashtra, through the Chief Conservator of Forests & Director, Sanjay Gandhi National Park, (for the sake of brevity, herein after referred to as the State), the State has put forth the following Prayers : (a) That the order dated 30 June 2017 passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal dismissing the Petitioner’s Appeal No.165 of 2005 be set aside entirely and the order dated 27 Dec 2004 passed by the SDO Thane (Private Forests) in case No 53/99 in respect of part of Gat No.59A/1 Manpada, Thane District admeasuring about 59 A, be set aside and the entire 193 A of Gat No.59A/1 Manapada, Thane be declared as being finally acquired private forest having status of deemed reserved forest. (b) Pending the hearing and final disposal of this Petition, the order dated 30 June 2017 passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal dismissing the Petitioner’s Appeal No.165 of 2005 be set aside entirely and the order dated 27 Dec., 2004 passed by the SDO Thane (Private Forests) in case No 53/99 in respect of part of gat number 59A/1 Manpada, Thane District admeasuring about 59 Acres, be stayed. 5. In the Second Petition filed by the Petitioners/Company (for the sake of brevity, herein after referred to as the Company/Land owner/Respondent no.1), the Company has put forth the following Prayers : (b) This Hon’ble High Court be pleased issue a Writ of Mandamus or any other appropriate Writ, Order or Direction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, ordering and directing the Respondents to issue / allot the said TDR/DRC against park reservation No.4 (said reservation) area admeasuring 404721.02 sq. mtrs. which has been acquired vide registered Deed of Transfer dated 24th May, 2019 registered under Serial No. TNN5-8450-2019 to the Petitioner No.1 within a period of 2 weeks from the date of order or such other time as this Hon’ble High Court may deem fit and proper. mtrs. which has been acquired vide registered Deed of Transfer dated 24th May, 2019 registered under Serial No. TNN5-8450-2019 to the Petitioner No.1 within a period of 2 weeks from the date of order or such other time as this Hon’ble High Court may deem fit and proper. (c) pending the hearing and final disposal of this Petition, this Hon’ble High Court be pleased to pass an order of temporary injunction restraining the Respondents from in any manner whatsoever dealing with the said Property (defined at paragraph 18 of the Petition) and utilizing the same for the purpose of the said Reservation (defined at paragraph 18 of the Petition). 6. It is quite apparent that the decision in the first Petition would directly impact the decision in the second Petition. All the learned Counsel also submit that the verdict in the first Petition would decide the fate of the second, keeping in view that the second Petition is filed for seeking directions, based on the decision of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, which is impugned in the First Petition. Hence, we are dealing with the first Petition, first. 7. The learned Advocates have tendered their extensive written notes of submissions. According to them, they have covered all the points and issues that need consideration by this Court, in the light of the law pronounced by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgments cited. It is urged that all these submissions be considered for the proper adjudication of the dispute, especially the challenge posed by the State to the impugned judgment and order of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal (herein after referred to as the MRT). 8. We do not wish to enlarge the size of the Judgment by reproducing the entire written notes of submissions of the parties, which we have read, thread-bare. The notice at issue, dated 29.08.1975, is annexed to this Petition and marked Article ‘X’. We have drawn a summary of their written notes (verbatim) and their entire compilation of written notes of submissions/arguments are annexed after the end of this judgment, as per a separate index. WRIT PETITION NO. 3205 OF 2018 PARTIES IN THE WP 9. In this Petition, the State has prayed that the order dated 30 th June, 2017 passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal (MRT) dismissing the Petitioner’s Appeal No.165 of 2005, be set aside entirely. WRIT PETITION NO. 3205 OF 2018 PARTIES IN THE WP 9. In this Petition, the State has prayed that the order dated 30 th June, 2017 passed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal (MRT) dismissing the Petitioner’s Appeal No.165 of 2005, be set aside entirely. So also, the order dated 27 th December, 2004 passed by the SDO Thane (Private Forests) in Case No.53/99, in respect of part of Gat No.59A/1 Manpada, Thane District admeasuring about 59 A, be set aside and the entire 193 A of Gat No.59A/1 Manapada, Thane, be declared as being an acquired private forest having the status of a deemed reserved forest. 10. Before we turn to the Oral and written submissions of the learned Senior Advocates, Mr. Dwarkadas and Mr. Apte, and the learned Advocates, Mr. Balsara and. Mr Tamboly and all the other parties, it would be appropriate to consider the pleadings and averments of the parties. PLEADINGS AND AVERMENTS OF THE STATE (Summarised from the WP records) 11. The State has pleaded in Writ Petition No.3205 of 2018, as under : (a) Land Acquisition was sought in Gut No.59/A/1 situated at Manpada, Chitalsar, Thane, for an area of 203 acres, 8 gunthas and 8 annas owned by M/s. D. Dahyabhai and Company Private Limited, Respondent No.1 (The land owner). (b) It was found that although 217 acres, 8 gunthas and 8 annas from Survey No.59/A/1 in village Manpada was originally intended to be acquired about 14 acres has been sold to various entities, viz. Tata Power Company, Tolani Bros, Fuel Injection Company etc., much prior to 30 th August, 1975, which was the appointed day under the Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as MEFA’). Notice under S.35(3) of the earlier Forest Act, 1927, had not been issued. (c) Calculations of the area of land available with the land owner, was only 197 acres, 07 gunthas and 4 annas, which was available for acquisition. The land owner had conceded that 168 acres, 15 gunthas and 04 annas was forest land and actual possession was handed over to the Maharashtra Forest Department. (d) Notice under Section 35(3) of the 1927 Act, was issued on 29 th August, 1975 and the land owner received the notice on 4 th September, 1975. The land owner had conceded that 168 acres, 15 gunthas and 04 annas was forest land and actual possession was handed over to the Maharashtra Forest Department. (d) Notice under Section 35(3) of the 1927 Act, was issued on 29 th August, 1975 and the land owner received the notice on 4 th September, 1975. The land owner did not raise any dispute about the forest character of the land in its letter dated 4 th September, 1975. (e) The land owner issued letters dated 5 th July, 1979 and 28 th August, 1979, requesting the State Government to exempt 24 acres and 32 gunthas from Gut No.59/A/1 of its holding from acquisition and offered an alternate land of 25 acres and 32 gunthas from Gut No.59/2 and 59/16, Manpada. (f) The land owner canvassed that he had spent substantial amount in developing 24 acres and 32 gunthas for converting the same for horticulture use and have constructed two Wells and three farm houses, which is denied by the State. (g) The land owner proposed, that 24 acres and 32 gunthas be excluded from acquisition. It would surrender alternate area of 24 acres and 32 gunthas from its other property in Survey Nos.59/2, 59/3 and 59/16 that were contiguous to the large portion of land under acquisition. (h) On 3 rd August, 980, the Deputy Collector (SDO), after conducting an inquiry, passed an order accepting the proposal of the land owner. (i) On 15 th October, 1982, the Appeal preferred by the State Government was allowed by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal (MRT) and the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer was quashed and set aside. The inquiry was remanded to the Sub-Divisional Officer. (j) On 13 th December, 2004, Respondent No.2, Narayan Ganu Tangdi (now deceased and represented by LRs.) moved an Intervention Application before the Sub-Divisional Officer claiming to be interested in area admeasuring 7 hectares and 38 R out of the total area of about 193 acres in Survey No.59/1, which was also under acquisition. Respondent No.2 claimed to be the agricultural tenant of the land owner. (k) The State opposed the application filed by Respondent No.2 in its reply dated 18 th December, 2004, contending that the inquiry was remanded only for consideration of the issue of about 24 acres in respect of which, the land owner had offered alternate land. Respondent No.2 claimed to be the agricultural tenant of the land owner. (k) The State opposed the application filed by Respondent No.2 in its reply dated 18 th December, 2004, contending that the inquiry was remanded only for consideration of the issue of about 24 acres in respect of which, the land owner had offered alternate land. (l) The Sub-Divisional Officer closed the inquiry for passing final order after the hearing on 20 th December, 2004. However, the said officer was subsequently transferred from his post. (m) By letter dated 5 th March, 2005, the succeeding presiding officer addressed a letter to the Deputy Conservator of Forests, Sanjay Gandhi National Park, requiring the attendance of the representatives of the Forest Department at the hearing to be held on 17 th March, 2005. The body of the letter clearly mentioned Case No.53/99. (n) On 27 th March, 2005, an order was submitted to the office of Deputy Conservator of Forests (DCF), Sanjay Gandhi National Park (SGNP), which indicated that Case No.53/99 under Section 6 of the Act of 1975, had been decided by the Sub-Divisional Officer by an order dated 24 th December, 2004, by which, 24 acres from Survey No.59/1 had been held to be not a Forest. The Application of Respondent No.2 was allowed and he was held to be in possession of 7 hectares and 38 R of land, not being Forest within the said Survey No.59/1. (o) An area of 17 acres and 19 gunthas relating to village settlement (Konkanipada) was also excluded from the Forest Area, though this area was never at issue, as is contended by the State Government. (p) An Appeal was filed on 15 th April, 2005, bearing Forest Appeal No.165 of 2005. There was a delay of 45 days for preferring the Appeal. In a hearing in January 2013, the MRT was apprised by one of the Respondents that the Appeal was not filed within limitation. (q) The MRT, after taking note of circumstances in which the appeal was filed on 15 th April, 2005, dismissed the same on the basis of the Judgment of the High Court, holding that the Tribunal did not have the authority to condone the delay. (r) The said order of dismissal was set aside by the High Court and the matter was remanded to the Tribunal for considering the issue of condonation of delay. (r) The said order of dismissal was set aside by the High Court and the matter was remanded to the Tribunal for considering the issue of condonation of delay. The said delay was condoned by the MRT. (s) In the interregnum, the other Respondents impleaded themselves as parties to the appeal claiming to have an interest with the First Respondent in the land under acquisition. (t) The Appeal No.165 of 2005 was heard by the MRT and dismissed by an order dated 30 th June, 2017. By the same order, the Appeal filed by the land owner (Respondent No.1) was allowed. In effect, the MRT released 193 acres of Forest Land from acquisition. (u) The Petitioner/State, filed Writ Petition No.3203 of 2018 on 22 nd January, 2018, on the following grounds : (i) The land owner had sought an inquiry under Section 6 of the MPFA in respect of only 24 acres and 32 gunthas in Gut No.59/A/1, Manpada. The landlord had never claimed any inquiry for the entire land of 193 acres with the contention that it was not a forest or a private forest. It was never open to the Sub-Divisional Officer to expand the scope of the inquiry under Section 6 of the MPFA by including 193 acres. (ii) The impugned order of the MRT amounts to illegally expanding the scope of inquiry. (iii) The impugned order misinterpreted the MRT order of 15 th October, 1982 by expanding the scope of inquiry to 193 acres instead of 24 acres and 32 gunthas. (iv) Both the Subordinate Fora, viz. The Sub- Divisional Officer and the MRT, have exceeded their jurisdiction. (v) The reasoning of the MRT in the impugned order on why the land in question was not private forest, is highly convoluted, patently illegal, grossly contrary to law and totally unsustainable. (vi) The impugned order is wholly erroneous, which states that the per-condition for any land to be private forest is a notice under Section 35(3) of the 1927 Act, and its service upon the land owner. (vii) The impugned order is in complete ignorance of the definition of forest under Section 2(c)(i) to (vi) which is the basic concept of forest and is included in the definition of private forest in Section 2(f) of the MPFA. (vii) The impugned order is in complete ignorance of the definition of forest under Section 2(c)(i) to (vi) which is the basic concept of forest and is included in the definition of private forest in Section 2(f) of the MPFA. (viii) The impugned order ignores the fact that Section 2(f) of the MPFA is inclusive of forest which is not the property of Government and includes categories of land mentioned in (i) to (vi) of Section 2(f), hence 2(f)(iii) is neither the exclusive provision nor the sole criterion for determining if land was or was not forest or private forest. (ix) The MRT has ignored the Full Bench decision of this Court in Janu Chandra Waghmare V/s.State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 Bom 119 . (x) The MRT has exceeded its jurisdiction in extrapolating a ratio in Godrej and Boyce Mfg. Company Limited V/s. State of Maharashtra, 2014 (3) SCC 430 and failed to follow the law laid down in Godrej and Boyce Mfg. Company Limited (Supra). (xi) In Godrej and Boyce Mfg. Company Limited (Supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court overruled Chintamani G. Velkar V/s State of Maharashtra, (2000) 3 SCC 143 , on a limited point that though actual service of notice issued under Section 35(3) of the 1927 Act, was required, it did not prescribe that the notice should be served before30.08.1975. (xii) The MRT misinterpreted Godrej and Boyce Mfg. Company Limited (Supra), to conclude that the notice should be actual served before 30 th August, 1975. (xiii) Notice issued should be in close proximity to the commencement of the act to be treated as ‘live’ notice to be acted upon. (xiv) The notice was issued in close proximity to 30 th August, 1975 and was served on 4 th September, 1975, therefore, was a ‘live’ or ‘pipeline’ notice. (xv) The reliance by MRT on Dr. Arjun Sitaram Nitanwar V/s. Tahasildar Distrct Thane & Ors., 2015 (6) Mh.LJ Page 634 [Coram : Abhay S. Oka (as His Lordship then was) and A.S. Gadkari, JJ], was misplaced. This Court held that unless it is proved that notice under Section 35(3) is served on the owners, land which is subject matter of notice will not become private forest under Section 2(f)(iii) of the 1975 Act and will not vest in the State Government under Section 3(i) of the 1975 Act. This Court held that unless it is proved that notice under Section 35(3) is served on the owners, land which is subject matter of notice will not become private forest under Section 2(f)(iii) of the 1975 Act and will not vest in the State Government under Section 3(i) of the 1975 Act. So also, reliance placed on Ozone Land Agro Private Limited V/s. State of Maharashtra & Ors., (2016) 1 Mh.LJ Page 483, is misplaced. In both these cases, the notices were stayed having been issued several years prior to 30 th August, 1975 and in both these cases, the notices were never served on the land owners. (xvi) The notice in this case was issued on 29 th August, 1975 and was actually served on 4 th July, 1975. Hence, the issue of non-service of notice would never arise. (xvii) Section 7(c)(e) of the Maharashtra General Clauses Act, 1904 clearly states that the repeal, wholly or partially, of any enactment does not affect any proceeding or liability under the Repealed Act. (xviii) The MRT has erroneously concluded that because the notice was served on 4 th September, 1975, after repeal of the 1927 Act, and was not served before 30 th August, 1975, it was not a notice issued at all. (xix) The MRT strangely recorded that no notice was either issued or served on the land owner and was drawn in the name of the Dahyabhai and Co. when the name of the owner on 7/12 extract is of D. Dahyabhai and Company Private Limited. (xx) D. Dahyabhai and Company Private Limited sought inquiry under Section 6 of the MPFA and never took a plea that they were misled by the notice or the land to be acquired was not theirs and some other land was the real focus of acquisition. (xxi) The observation in Paragraph No.18 of the impugned order was most incongruous, inasmuch as, the forest department would never have issued any notification under Section 35(1) of the 1927 Act, as Section 35 had already been repealed by Section 24 of the 1975 Act. (xxi) The observation in Paragraph No.18 of the impugned order was most incongruous, inasmuch as, the forest department would never have issued any notification under Section 35(1) of the 1927 Act, as Section 35 had already been repealed by Section 24 of the 1975 Act. (xxii) The MRT has failed to appreciate the difference between Chapter V of the 1927 Act, which was intended to regulate use of forest which was not the property of the Government, and the MPFA, 1975 which was to divest private persons of ownership over all private forest and vest such ownership, without encumbrance, in the Government. (xxiii) The MRT has overlooked the entries in the 7/12 extracts for Gut No.59/A/1, Manpada, which clearly mentions that the land was under forest and grass land, both of which fall within the definition of forest. This case is covered by T.N. Godavarman Thirumalapad V/s. Union of India, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 3924. (v) Regarding findings on the case of Respondent No.2 (Narayan G. Tangadi), the State has contended as under : (i) The 7/12 extracts pertaining to Survey No.59/1 as in August 1975, do not show any part of the land in this survey number under cultivation, either by Narayan or by any other person. To the contrary, the relevant extract clearly shows that the land consisted of Palmyra Trees and Stone Quarry. (ii) Even the owner of the land never contended that any part of the land was under cultivation by any other person as a tenant. Narayan admitted in the proceedings before the Tahasildar that he did not have any receipts in respect of his tenancy from D. Dahyabhai and Company Private Limited. (iii) As per Section 22-A of the MPFA, 1975, the land used as a Stone Quarry is not liable to be restored. (iv) The Application under BTAL Act, 1948 was made under Section 70-B. The Government/ Forest Department/Sanjay Gandhi National Park, was not made a party. The Application for declaration of tenancy was made in 1991, 16 years after the property had vested completely in the Government. (v) There was no evidence that Narayan was paying rent to the land owner. There is no explanation why the Application was made clearly after 40 years, post the tillers day. The Application for declaration of tenancy was made in 1991, 16 years after the property had vested completely in the Government. (v) There was no evidence that Narayan was paying rent to the land owner. There is no explanation why the Application was made clearly after 40 years, post the tillers day. (vi) By order dated 18 th January, 1991, in RTS Revision No.54/1988, the Sub-Divisional Officer, Thane had cancelled the Mutation Entry No.525 dated 25 th January, 1984 of village Chitalsar Manpada. (vii) Narayan was aware that the said land was being claimed by the Forest Department to be a part of the National Park. (viii) The order of the Tahsildar declaring Narayan to be a tenant, indicates that the owner D. Dahyabhai and Company got the land released for acquisition. This is completely erroneous because the owner did not get a single inch of land released from acquisition. (ix) The land owner had admitted that the entire land in Gut No.59A/1 was forest land, but only raised a plea not to take possession of 24 acres with a promise to surrender an equivalent alternate land. (x) 168 acres have already been acquired and the possession thereof is with the Sanjay Gandhi National Park. (xi) The orchards and paddy cultivation is not indicated anywhere. (xii) The order of the Tahsildar was ex-parte and is not binding upon the State. (w) Regarding Respondent Nos.3, 4 and 5, the State submits that these Respondents claim to be in possession of some portion of land which is within the area of 24 acres and 32 gunthas in Gut No.59A/1, Manpada, which they claim to have purchased from D. Dahyabhai and Company Private Limited in 1980. (x) The land owner is aware of the acquisition proceedings and the inquiry under Section 6 of the MPFA, 1975. (y) By the impugned order, an area of 17 acres and 19 gunthas from Survey No.59/1 has been excluded from the area of forest in the village settlement Konkanipada. There is no application by any person made under Section 6 of the MPFA, 1975, claiming exclusion. (z) No person representing the village settlement, either appeared or advanced any submissions supporting such a claim. (aa) The State had not been heard whatsoever on the aspect of whether the area of 17 acres and 19 gunthas could be legitimately excluded from the forest area. (z) No person representing the village settlement, either appeared or advanced any submissions supporting such a claim. (aa) The State had not been heard whatsoever on the aspect of whether the area of 17 acres and 19 gunthas could be legitimately excluded from the forest area. (bb) The portion of the impugned order relating to exclusion of 17 acres and 19 gunthas of the area of the village settlement, is completely illegal and invalid. (cc) Pursuant to the orders of the High Court in Writ Petition No.305 of 2025, proceeding for eviction of the encroachers from the village settlement are underway. (dd) With regard to Respondent Nos.6 and 7, they claim to have purchased 19 gunthas of land in Gut No.59A/1 from Smt. Kusum Vasant Salkar and three other of her family. (ee) The predecessors in interest of Respondent Nos. 6 and 7, viz., the Salkar family could, therefore, have no better title than their tranferors. (ff) In 1982, several years after the land vested in the Government, it was found that one Smt. Laxmi Vasant Salkar had constructed a hut on a part of the forest in Survey No.59/1, village Manpada and, therefore, she was prosecuted under the Indian Forest Act and was declared guilty. The said Laxmi Vasant Salkar filed a Criminal Revision Application No.133 of 1987 before the Sessions Court at Thane. (gg) Laxmi Salkar was acquitted after the Revisional Court held that the notification/other official document showing that Survey No.59/1, Manpada was a reserved forest, had not been produced in evidence before the Trial Court and, therefore, it was not proved that the land upon which Laxmi Salkar constructed a hut, was a forest. Hence, she was acquitted by Judgment and order dated16 th April, 1988. (hh) In 1996, Laxmi Salkar filed Regular Civil Suit No.229 of 1996 before the Civil Judge Senior Division Thane, against the original land owner D. Dahyabhai and Company Private Limited. She claimed to be owner by adverse possession of the area of 19 and half gunthas on Survey No.59/1, village Manpada. The forest department was not made a party to the Suit knowing that the State Government was claiming the said land as acquired private forest. In May, 1977, the Suit was decreed ex-parte. (ii) The Suit was uncontested by the land owner and the State Government was deliberately not made a party to the Suit. The forest department was not made a party to the Suit knowing that the State Government was claiming the said land as acquired private forest. In May, 1977, the Suit was decreed ex-parte. (ii) The Suit was uncontested by the land owner and the State Government was deliberately not made a party to the Suit. Secondly, the decree in question was obtained in a purely private action between the plaintiff and the defendant. Thirdly, there is no determination of the status of the land as forest or otherwise in the said Suit. Even if there had been such determination, the same was not binding upon the Petitioner/State Government as the status could only have been determined in an inquiry under Section 6 of the MPFA, 1975. (jj) An NGO, Bombay Environmental Action Group filed a PIL No.17 of 2002 in the High Court at Mumbai complaining that the land revenue records in the State of Maharashtra had been updated to show all acquired private forest lands as Government Forest. The High Court passed an interim order directing the State Government to issue immediate order to all revenue officials to make the necessary Mutation entries in the revenue records. (kk) Pursuant to the interim orders, the State Government issued a circular dated 22 nd February, 2005 in connection with correction of revenue records. (ll) PIL No.17 of 2002 was concluded by an order dated22 nd June, 2005, by which the interim orders directing correction of the revenue records, were confirmed and the State was directed to complete the task on or before 31 st May, 2006. (mm) Consequently, in respect of Survey No.59/1 village Manpada, the concerned revenue officials made the requisite changes indicating the name of Government of Maharashtra as Kabjedar in the 7/12 extracts and the tenure of land as Government Forest. (nn) As regards the land holding of Salkar family, viz., vendors to Respondent Nos.6 and 7, their names were shown in the ‘other rights’ column by Mutation Entry No.729. (oo) The Salkar family felt aggrieved and made an application to the Sub-Divisional Officer Thane, for reversal of M.E.729. The application was rejected by order dated 31 st December, 2007. (nn) As regards the land holding of Salkar family, viz., vendors to Respondent Nos.6 and 7, their names were shown in the ‘other rights’ column by Mutation Entry No.729. (oo) The Salkar family felt aggrieved and made an application to the Sub-Divisional Officer Thane, for reversal of M.E.729. The application was rejected by order dated 31 st December, 2007. Salkar family filed an appeal to the Deputy Collector (Appeals), Thane, who reasoned that the circular issued by the Government dated 22 nd February, 2005, itself directed correction in the revenue records in those matters where, there were no legal proceedings pending and as Forest Appeal No.165 of 2005 was pending in respect of Gut No.59A/1 village Manpada, the revenue record should not have been changed. Accordingly, by order dated 5 th August, 2008, the Deputy Collector directed that the Mutation Entry No.729 be reversed and the names of Salkar family members be shown as Kabjedar and that of the Government be shown in the other rights column. (pp) The State is presently in possession of 168 acres of prime forest situated at Gut No.59A/1, Manpada Thane, as part of the Sanjay Gandhi National Part Division. The effect of the impugned order is to release the same from acquisition into private ownership. Manpada Thane is a highly sought after locality for residential and commercial construction activity. The pristine forest in this area will be completely destroyed by construction activity. This will be irreversible with long term adverse effects on the environment and health. If the impugned order is set aside, the forest will be in the Care and Protection of the Forest Department (Sanjay Gandhi National Park Division). PLEADINGS AND AVERMENTS OF THE LAND OWNER/RESPONDENT NO.1 (Summarised from the WP records) 12. Respondent No.1, the actual land owner namely D. Dahyabhai and Company Private Limited (in short, the land owner/Company) filed its affidavit in reply, in which it has been specifically pleaded as under : (a) It is denied that the notice dated 29 th August, 1975 with respect to land Gut No.59/1 (Part) situated at Manpada, Chitalsar Thane, admeasuring 204 acres, 8 gunthas and 8 annas was legal and valid. (b) No opportunity of hearing was granted to the actual owner of the property to respond to the impugned notice. (b) No opportunity of hearing was granted to the actual owner of the property to respond to the impugned notice. (c) The impugned notice was not signed by the Deputy Conservator of Forest or any other authorised person being authority of the Forest Department. It was signed by the Forest guard (Van Rakshak) Mr N J Joshi. (d) The Forest Department, while issuing the impugned notice, was well aware that the notice could not be served upon the land owner during the period of subsistence of Section 35 of the Indian Forest Act. (e) The Forest Department has mentioned incorrect description of a large suit property only with the intention of grabbing the suit land. (f) The Forest Department failed and neglected to exclude Konkanipada village settlement which was in existence way before the impugned notice was issued, from the large suit property. (g) The Forest Department ignored the fact that a portion of approximately 14 acres of the large suit property was conveyed and transferred by the land owner in favour of Tata Hydro Electric Supply Company Limited and others and the concerned purchasers had already procured necessary non-agricultural permissions and carried out constructions and development thereon. (h) The Forest Department ignored the fact that certain portion of the large suit property was used for paddy cultivation, orchards and the balance portion was utilized for Wells, Industries, Slums, Structures and godowns. (i) The Forest Department also ignored the fact that the substantial portion of the large suit property was used for a stones quarry after obtaining all the requisite permissions from the concerned departments. (j) The State amendment carried out by the Indian Forest (Bombay Amendment) Act 1955 makes it abundantly clear that a notice issued under Section 35(3) shall be served on the owner of such forest in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It is an admitted fact that the notice was never issued in accordance with Section 35(5) nor the same was published in the manner prescribed therein. (k) The land owner placed reliance upon Godrej &Boyce (Supra), to contend that a service of notice issued under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act, has to be (served) on the land owner. (l) The large suit property does not constitute private forest under Section 2(f) of the MPFA. (k) The land owner placed reliance upon Godrej &Boyce (Supra), to contend that a service of notice issued under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act, has to be (served) on the land owner. (l) The large suit property does not constitute private forest under Section 2(f) of the MPFA. (m) The land owner executed two registered deeds of conveyance, both dated 6 th July, 1960 and purchased the suit land through the Court Receiver of the Bombay High Court and several other properties as are described in the deeds of the conveyance. The Court Receiver of the Bombay High Court specified the usage of the property while executing the deeds and also specified that portion of the large suit land was under cultivation. (n) Over a passage of time, the land owner issued several deeds and documents and sold, transferred and conveyed the area admeasuring 14 acres to Tata Hydro Electric Supply Company Limited, Tolani Bros, Eastern Machinery and Trading Company, Adarsh Industries and Fuel Injection Limited. The balance land admeasuring 193 acres, 7 gunthas and 4 annas was in the possession and ownership of the land owner, Respondent No.1. (o) The large suit property was forming a part of Thane Industrial Complex out of Bombay, Panvel Regional Plan of 1970 and large suit property was divided into residential, recreational, industrial and green zone. The said plan was sanctioned before the appointed date of MPFA land owner had started various activities permissible under the regional plan. (p) The land owner gave lease hold rights to various mining firms for mining stones and operating quarry activities like M/s. Ashok Quarries, M/s. Amar Quarries, M/s. Patel Quarries and M/s. Bootheld Quarries, Rupit Quarries. (q) The Collector, Thane District issued NA permissions to the above lessees for various portions of the suit property. The copies of the NA permissions as well as the renewals and extensions, are at Exhibit-C. (r) From perusal of the revenue records, NA permissions and survey reports of the Forest Department indicate that the large suit property was used for non-forest activities on the appointed day. (s) The 7/12 extract-village from the year 1955 to 1981 show cultivation of paddy, bellary vegetables, fruit garden, Shenda (Palmyra) and Stone Quarries. (t) The President of India granted assent to the MPFA on 25 th August, 1975 and the same was published in the gazette on29 th August, 1975. (s) The 7/12 extract-village from the year 1955 to 1981 show cultivation of paddy, bellary vegetables, fruit garden, Shenda (Palmyra) and Stone Quarries. (t) The President of India granted assent to the MPFA on 25 th August, 1975 and the same was published in the gazette on29 th August, 1975. (u) The impugned notice was not issued in the name of the land owner M/s. D. Dahyabhai and Company Private Limited and the notice was sent through post. (v) Since the notice was issued in the wrong name, it has to be treated as ‘no notice’ issued to the land owner. (w) The large suit property does not fall within the purview of the private forest under Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA. (x) The Forest Department issued another notice on4 th September, 1975 demanding possession of the large suit land and the same was served through hand delivery on the same day. After receipt of the notice dated 4 th September, 1975, the land owner filed Writ Petition No.1026 of 1975 before the Bombay High Court. (y) In Janu Chandra Waghmare (Supra), the High Court of Bombay had upheld the constitutional validity of MPFA and further opined that the aggrieved parties may explore the opportunities under Section 6 of the MPFA. (z) The Forest Department started initiating criminal action against the owners and occupants of the land and embroiled them in litigation under MPFA and also threatened to block the road in existence which was an access to the suit property. The blockage of the road would have stalled industrial and warehousing activities of the Respondent in the properties adjacent to the suit property. (aa) With a view to buy peace and to put an end to the litigation, the land owner issued a letter dated 5 th July, 1979, addressed to the Minister for Forest, Mantralaya and a letter dated 28 th August, 1979, addressed to the Secretary, Revenue and Forest Department, proposing without prejudice, that several parcels of the large suit property admeasuring 24 acres and 32 gunthas which were scattered pieces of land, be released from the purview of the notice dated 29 th August, 1975 and further offered equivalent area from other adjacent properties bearing Gut Nos.59/2, 59/3 and 59/16. (bb) The Assistance Secretary, Revenue Forest Department, by letter dated 31 st December, 1979, directed the land owner to approach the Collector Thane under Section 6 of the MPFA for getting the area excluded from acquisition. It is denied that the land owner had conceded that an area of 168A, 15G and 4a was forest land. (cc) The land owner submitted the proposal for settlement to the Deputy Collector Thane, without prejudice to its rights in Writ Petition No.1026 of 1995 and prayed that necessary inquiry may be held under Section 6 of the MPFA. (dd) The Deputy Collector (Private Forest) Thane, personally inspected the site of larger suit property and verified the horticultural activities, Wells and farmhouses constructed over the larger suit property and also verified the permissions obtained by Respondent No.1/land owner for the same. The Forest Department also prepared plan of the larger suit property showing status of larger suit property and users thereof. (ee) In pursuance of the settlement proposal submitted by Respondent No.1/land owner, the Deputy Collector (Private Forest) Thane, passed an order dated 3 rd June, 1980. The Forest Department rejected the proposal submitted by Respondent No.1/land owner and, therefore, the said proposal submitted at the relevant time considering the relevant peculiar circumstances with an objective of buying peace, cannot be used as tool against Respondent No.1/land owner. The said offer no more stands valid and Respondent No.1/land owner has got every right to deal with and dispose of the suit property. It is also pertinent to note that Respondent No.1/land owner had submitted settlement proposal without prejudice and Respondent No.1/land owner had always denied the claim of the Forest Department that the larger suit property or any portion thereof is a forest within the meaning of Section 2(c)(i) of MPFA. (ff) Respondent No.1/land owner withdrew the Writ Petition No.1026 of 1975 in the light of order passed by the Deputy Collector Private Forest on 3 rd June, 1980. (gg) Being aggrieved by the above order passed by the Deputy Collector, Thane in pursuance of the settlement proposal submitted by Respondent No.1/land owner, the State of Maharashtra filed an appeal before MRT, Bombay bearing Rev/forest appeal no.9 of 1981. The bench of MRT by their order dated 15 th October, 1982 set aside the order passed by Deputy Collector Private Forest dated3 rd June, 1980 and remanded the matter for fresh inquiry. The bench of MRT by their order dated 15 th October, 1982 set aside the order passed by Deputy Collector Private Forest dated3 rd June, 1980 and remanded the matter for fresh inquiry. (hh) In the meanwhile Thane Municipal Corporation was established in the year 1982 and village Manpada was included in its territorial jurisdiction. In due course, development plan for Thane Municipal Corporation was published and sanctioned wherein certain portions of the larger suit property were reserved for various public purposes such as DP Road, HCMTR (Thane City Metro), Thane Municipal Transportation, Park, Garden etc. The balance portion of larger suit property formed part of commercial zone, godown zone, industrial zone and residential zone as per the development plan for the time being in force. The Forest Department never ever objected the development plan for the larger suit property and permissible use and reservations for public purposes. (ii) Remand Case No.53 of 1999 was filed before the Deputy Collector (Private Forest), Thane Division at Thane. The Deputy Collector (Private Forest) has specifically observed that, the Forest Department in their arguments, has not denied the presence of such area admeasuring 24A-32G to be under godowns, cultivation for horticulture and road etc. The Forest Department has not denied the presence of fruit gardens. The Forest Department has heavily relied on the notice alone to declare the entire area as Private Forest. The Revenue record shows that, on certain portions of lands out of Gut No.59/1, cultivation was conducted prior to 30 th August, 1975 or prior to the date of issuance of notice. The 7/12 extract, i.e. the village form no.7 and 12 also show existence of certain industries in the said Survey No.59/1, such as the fuel injection company, much prior to the date of issuance of notice. Tata Hydro Electric Power Supply Company Limited started a sub transmission station in Gut No.59/1, much prior to the commencement of the Private Forest Act, 1975, i.e., since 1970. The village revenue record also shows that an area admeasuring 19 gunthas was also in possession of Tolani Bros Private Limited and had an industrial shed over the land. Tata Hydro Electric Power Supply Company Limited started a sub transmission station in Gut No.59/1, much prior to the commencement of the Private Forest Act, 1975, i.e., since 1970. The village revenue record also shows that an area admeasuring 19 gunthas was also in possession of Tolani Bros Private Limited and had an industrial shed over the land. Then area of 1 acre and 39 gunthas land was transferred to Eastern Machinery and Trading Company prior to the date of issue of notice and area of 2A-0G was transferred to Adarsh Industries out of the area of 207 acres, 30 gunthas and 9 annas as being the Gut No.59/1 part. (jj) It is, thus, abundantly clear that, the Forest Department failed to prove presence of forest over the larger suit property or any portion thereof. It has merely relied on the notice sent under Section 35(3) of Indian Forest Act and it is also clear that the impugned notice under Section 35(3) was issued without conducting any preliminary survey or inquiry. (kk) Deputy Collector (Private Forest), Thane Division at Thane, passed an order in Remand Case No.53 of 1999 and thereby declared 132 acres and 32 gunthas as private forest and balance area was exempted under Section 3(2) of MPFA. (ll) Being aggrieved by the order of the Deputy Collector (Private Forest), Thane Division, in Remand Case No.53 of 1999, the Petitioner State had filed Appeal No.165 of 2005 before the MRT and Respondent No.1/land owner had filed an Appeal No.229 of 2009. (mm) The Member, MRT heard both the Appeals and delivered a common order on 30 th June, 2017 and dismissed Forest Appeal No.165 of 2005 and allowed Forest Appeal No.229 of 2009. He declared that the larger suit property is not private forest land as contemplated under Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA and, therefore, excluded entirely from the acquisition under the MPFA. (nn) The Revenue Department has accordingly carried out a necessary mutation entry by mutating the name of Respondent No.1/land owner in the record of rights of the suit property and same was subsequently confirmed by the Sub-divisional Officer Thane in Revision No.182 of 2018. (oo) Portions of the suit property are reserved for 40 meter DP Road (5500 sq. mtrs.), 20 meter DP Road (5000 sq. mtrs.), 30 meter H.C.M.T.R. (7600 sq. mtrs.). (oo) Portions of the suit property are reserved for 40 meter DP Road (5500 sq. mtrs.), 20 meter DP Road (5000 sq. mtrs.), 30 meter H.C.M.T.R. (7600 sq. mtrs.). The Thane Municipal Corporation had issued letter dated 2nd November, 2017 to Respondent No.1/land owner, calling upon it to handover the vacant possession of certain reserved portion of the suit property since the same was required for developing infrastructure. Since the said reserved portion out of the suit property are reserved for public purposes, Respondent No.1/land owner had no other alternative, but to handover the possession of the said portion of the suit property to the Thane Municipal Corporation. (pp) Respondent No.1/land owner had accordingly made requisite application to the Thane Municipal Corporation on or about 30 th June, 2018 under Development Control Rules and Regulations of 1994. After the said application was made, the Thane Municipal Corporation had verified the title of Respondent No.1/land owner with respect to the said portion of the suit property. The Thane Municipal Corporation and its panel Advocate had verified the order passed by the MRT and also relied on the opinion of Advocate General, Government of Maharashtra and advised to proceed with the TDR proposal. (qq) The Thane Municipal Corporation also published a public notice in ‘Punya Nagari’ Local Newspaper on 21 st November, 2018 in respect of the said reserved portion inviting objections from the public at large. (rr) Respondent No.1/land owner had accordingly signed and executed a Registered Deed of Transfer dated 25 th April, 2019 thereby assigning, transferring and conveying DP Road and HCMTR reservation portions in favour of the Thane Municipal Corporation. (ss) Respondent No.1/land owner has handed over vacant and peaceful possession of the reserved portion of the suit property (reserved for DP road and HCMTR) with a view to enable the Thane Municipal Corporation to implement the development plan. (tt) Apart from above mentioned reserved portion, certain portions of the suit property admeasuring 404721.02 sq. mtrs. equivalent to approximately 100 acres, is reserved for ‘Park’ under the Development Plan for City of Thane. The aforesaid portion of 100 acres is hereinafter referred to as the ‘Park Reservation Property’. (tt) Apart from above mentioned reserved portion, certain portions of the suit property admeasuring 404721.02 sq. mtrs. equivalent to approximately 100 acres, is reserved for ‘Park’ under the Development Plan for City of Thane. The aforesaid portion of 100 acres is hereinafter referred to as the ‘Park Reservation Property’. Respondent No.1/land owner had issued notice dated 23 rd October, 2017 under the provisions of Section 127 of the MRTP Act to the Thane Municipal Corporation to acquire the said Park Reservation Property since the Thane Municipal Corporation had failed to acquire the Park Reservation Property within stipulated time limit. (uu) After receipt of the said notice issued by Respondent No.1/land owner, the Thane Municipal Corporation (TMC), had taken opinions from various legal luminaries and thereafter agreed to acquire the said Park Reservation Property in accordance with the provisions of MRTP Act. (vv) A public notice was published on 3 rd May, 2019 in the local newspaper Punyanagari in respect of Park Reservation Property inviting objections from public at large. (ww) Respondent No.1/land owner had accordingly signed and executed a Registered Deed of Transfer dated 24 th May, 2019 thereby assigning, transferring and conveying Park Reservation Property in favour of the Thane Municipal Corporation. ADDITIONAL AFFIDAVIT BY THE LAND OWNER 13. Respondent No.1/land owner has filed an additional affidavit in reply and has averred as under : (a) After filing of the Affidavit in Reply dated25 th November, 2019, it came to know about two affidavits filed on behalf of the Petitioner in the present proceedings. The first affidavit seems to be of Shri. R. B. Kumbhar, Divisional Forest Officer, Wildlife-II, Yeoor dated 1 st July, 2019 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘First Affidavit’) and the second affidavit is also of said Shri. R.B. Kumbhar, dated 11 th December, 2019 (hereinafter referred to as the said ‘Second Affidavit’). Vide said first and second affidavits, the Petitioner has attempted to make certain improvements in its case as spelt out in the Writ Petition, so also has attempted to mislead this Hon’ble Court and/or distort the facts. (b) Respondent No.1/land owner has denied that the area of land bearing Survey No.59A, admeasuring 193 acres, village Chitalsar, Manpada (viz. Vide said first and second affidavits, the Petitioner has attempted to make certain improvements in its case as spelt out in the Writ Petition, so also has attempted to mislead this Hon’ble Court and/or distort the facts. (b) Respondent No.1/land owner has denied that the area of land bearing Survey No.59A, admeasuring 193 acres, village Chitalsar, Manpada (viz. suit property) is falling within Sanjay Gandhi National Park Division (SGNP) and that it is included in village Form-1A maintained by SGNP as required by the Forest Manual and, therefore, is forest within the meaning of the word as enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of T N. Godavarman V/s. Union of India (Writ Petition No.202 of 1995). The reference of the said judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court and/or the reliance placed thereupon is nothing, but, frivolous and a malafide attempt on the part of the Petitioner to mislead this Hon’ble Court. (c) In the same way, the reference to the case of Wildlife Conservation Trust V/s. Union of India (Writ Petition No.337 of 1995) of the Hon’ble Supreme Court given in the said paragraph, is also irrelevant, unnecessary and wholly misplaced. Respondent No.1/ land owner mentioned that Revenue and Forest Department of the State of Maharashtra viz. Petitioner published a notification in Maharashtra Gazette dated 16 th January, 1996, whereby area of SGNP was specified and defined. In said notification names of villages included in SGNP are specified. In the said names, the name of village Chitalsar, Manpada is not at all mentioned. Thus, none of the properties of village Chitalsar, Manpada (within whose limits admittedly the suit property is situated), are included within the limits of SGNP. (d) Respondent No.1/land owner submits that the very notice purportedly dated 29 th August, 1975 under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 (IFA) issued in respect of suit property, is null and void for the reasons elaborately stated in affidavit dated 25 th November, 2019, filed by the Respondent No.1/ land owner. The said notice was served upon the affiliate concern on 4 th September, 1975, i.e., after the appointed date (30 th August, 1975) on which date Section 35 of the IFA, 1927 was repealed as provided under Maharashtra Private Forest Act 1975 (MPFA). Thus, there was no question of said larger land (suit property), falling within the purview of MPFA. The said notice was served upon the affiliate concern on 4 th September, 1975, i.e., after the appointed date (30 th August, 1975) on which date Section 35 of the IFA, 1927 was repealed as provided under Maharashtra Private Forest Act 1975 (MPFA). Thus, there was no question of said larger land (suit property), falling within the purview of MPFA. Respondent No.1/ land owner also states that as on 30 th August 1975, on the said larger land (suit property), there was no presence of Forest as defined under Section 2(c)(i) of the MPFA and hence, it could not fall in the definition of private forest as defined in Section 2(f) of the MPFA. (e) In fact, various non-forest activities such as Industrial user, warehousing, Quarry activities, Horticulture Activities, Agricultural activities, Cultivation by way of production of herbs, vegetables etc. were going on. In 1970, the said larger land (suit property) was included as forming a part of Thane Industrial Complex out of Bombay Panvel Regional Plan of 1970 and thereby it was divided into residential, recreational, Industrial Zones etc. (f) Respondent No.1/land owner stated that the notice under Section 35(3) was required to be served on the actual owner in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for the Service of summons and was also required to be published in the manner prescribed by the rules. It is admitted fact that the impugned notice was never issued/served in the manner provided under Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. It was never published as prescribed by the rules. The impugned notice was admittedly served on 4 th September, 1975, i.e., after the repeal of Section 35 of IFA 1975 and, therefore, the impugned notice was null and void-ab-initio. (g) The notice was never acted upon and no further steps such as giving opportunity of hearing, passing of any order, issuance of notification under Section 35(1) of IFA, 1927, were initiated and could have been initiated since Section 35 stood repealed as provided under MPFA. The physical possession of the suit property continued to be with Respondent No.1/land owner. This fact is evident from the letter of the Petitioner dated 23 rd January, 1986. The physical possession of the suit property continued to be with Respondent No.1/land owner. This fact is evident from the letter of the Petitioner dated 23 rd January, 1986. (h) It is pertinent to note that above Judgment and order dated 30 th June, 2017 passed by the Hon’ble MRT Court is on the basis of the order passed in the matter of Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. (Supra) by the Hon’ble three Judges Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. (i) Respondent No.1/land owner specifically stated that during the process of preparation of DP Plan of TMC and its approval by the State Government as per order No.TPS/NO.1249/ CR/222/94B-12, dated 28 th April, 1995, Petitioner never raised any objection to the effect that said portions out of suit property are reserved forest and, therefore, said public reservations cannot be imposed on the suit property. (j) It is further pertinent to note that TMC at the relevant time through its Advocate published public notices in Punyanagari local newspaper on 21 st November, 2018 and 3 rd May, 2019 inviting objections from public at large, but the Petitioner did not raise any objection in response to the said public notices. The TMC, after verification of title, got 2 registered deeds of transfer executed on 25 th April, 2019 and 24 th May, 2019. (k) Admittedly, the said reservation affected portion which is totally admeasuring 422821.02 sq. meters, which is equivalent to about 104 acres, is already vested with and in possession of TMC. Admittedly, TMC is a planning authority under MRTP Act and as a planning authority has already acquired the said portion under Section 127 of MRTP Act. (l) Respondent No.1/land owner submits that it is now the statutory obligation of TMC to provide compensation to Respondent No.1 by way of Development Rights Certificate (DRC). Thus, DRC’s issued or to be issued by TMC cannot be ranked defective or illegal just because Petitioner has raised false and frivolous claim on the basis of null and void notice dated 29 th August, 1975 under Section 35(3) of the IFA and which admittedly never acted upon thereafter and could not have been acted upon after the repeal of Section 35(3) of IFA, which stood repealed on30 th August, 1975 as per provisions of MPFA. (m) The Mutation Entry No.1056 has been certified pursuant to and on the basis of said Judgment and order dated 30 th June, 2017 of the Hon’ble MRT Court. The certification of mutation entry has been lawfully effected. The objection of Forest Department raised vide Case No.182 of 2018 has been lawfully rejected by the Sub-Divisional Officer vide order dated 31 st January, 2019. It is pertinent to note that the order dated 31 st January, 2019 has not been challenged by the Petitioner before Higher Authority and has attained finality. (n) The concerned DRC Nos.281, 362 and 363, are issued by TMC in favour of Respondent No.1 and towards acquisition of reservation portions such as 30 meters Road, HCMTR, 20 meters wide DP road, 40 meters wide DP road. Respondent No.1/land owner submits that as aforesaid DRCs are issued in accordance with law, Respondent No.1 is entitled to use, utilize and/or transfer the TDR credit given there under. It is now statutory obligation even of TMC to allow the utilization and/or transfer of TDR credit given under the said three DRCs. (o) It is denied that DRCs are issued on the basis of sub-divisions. Respondent No.1/land owner submits that DRCs are issued under the provisions Appendix-W of the Development Control Regulations of TMC and in lieu of surrendered lands affected by various public reservations. In any case, the said DRCs are not the subject matter of challenge in the present Petition. (p) Respondent No.1/land owner said that the reliance placed on the alleged satellite maps are neither authenticated maps nor could be entertained in a Writ Petition as evidence of fact. Respondent No.1/land owner denies that 193 acres is seen from the satellite data, as well forested. (q) Respondent No.1/land owner submits that reservation affected portion is already handed over to TMC and those are in possession of TMC. (r) Respondent No.1/land owner submits that alleged undertaking taken from the constituted attorney of first Respondent by TMC about getting no objection from Forest Department was obtained by force and by exercising misuse of dominant position. First Respondent vide letters dated 31 st July, 2019 and 26 th December, 2019 raised objections about the validity and legality of the said undertaking. First Respondent vide letters dated 31 st July, 2019 and 26 th December, 2019 raised objections about the validity and legality of the said undertaking. (s) TMC has accepted the said objection and accordingly issued letters dated 31 st December, 2019, 8 th January, 2020 and 15 th January, 2020 to the Chief Conservator, Sanjay Gandhi National Park. (t) It is pertinent to note that even the office of the Petitioner, by its letter dated 17 th January, 2020 accepted the right of TMC to take an appropriate decision about the utilization and transfer of DRC. PLEADINGS AND AVERMENTS OF RESPONDENT NO. 2 (Summarised from the W P records) 14. The legal heirs of the Deceased Respondent No.2 (2.1, 2.3 to 2.12) have filed an affidavit in reply. Their averments can be summarized as under : (a) The Petition filed by the State is misconceived, not maintainable and liable to be dismissed at the threshold with compensatory costs. There are no grounds for interference with the order dated 30 th June, 2017 passed by the MRT. The said order was passed after affording full opportunity of hearing to all the parties concerned and after perusal of the material on record. Respondent No.1/land owner states that the findings recorded in the said order are correct, valid, proper and binding and do not suffer from any perversity. (b) This Petition concerns the land bearing Survey No.59/1 situated at Manpada village in Thane District (Larger Land). Respondent No.1/land owner has been in actual use, occupation and physical possession of a portion of the Larger Land admeasuring 7 Hectors 38 R (equivalent to 18 acres and 18 ghuntas), Gat No.59/1, Chitalsar village, Manpada, Thane District (smaller Land). (c) The Larger Land was owned by one Mr. Shyamaldas Gandhi before Respondent No.1 became its owner. Respondent No.1 purchased the Larger Land from Mr. Shyamaldas Gandhi in or around 1960s through the High Court Receiver. Respondent No.2 has been cultivating the Smaller Land from the time of Mr. Shyamaldas Gandhi, even before the Respondent No.1 became the owner of the said land. (d) In or around 1982, the Forest Department filed Criminal Case No.5227 of 1982 against Respondent No.2 before the Judicial Magistrate First Class (‘JMFC’) under Section 26 of the 1927 Act making false allegation. The said criminal case came to be dismissed vide order dated 30 th September, 1992 passed by the JMFC. (d) In or around 1982, the Forest Department filed Criminal Case No.5227 of 1982 against Respondent No.2 before the Judicial Magistrate First Class (‘JMFC’) under Section 26 of the 1927 Act making false allegation. The said criminal case came to be dismissed vide order dated 30 th September, 1992 passed by the JMFC. The said order dated 30 th September, 1992 was challenged by the Forest Department vide Criminal Appeal No.172 of 1993 before the High Court. This Court, vide order dated 14 th June, 1993 dismissed the said Appeal and observed inter alia that Respondent No.2 was in possession of the Land as a tenant of Respondent No.1/land owner, prior to it being declared as a forest. There was no challenge to the order dated 14 th June, 1993 and consequently the same attained finality. (e) The orders dated 14 th June, 1993 and 23 rd February, 2004 clearly establish the factum of Respondent No.1/land owner’s use, occupation and possession of the Smaller Land and the status of being a tenant under the Bombay Tenancy And Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. (f) Furthermore, the Smaller Land is not in excess of the ceiling area provided by Section 5 of the Maharashtra Agricultural Lands (Ceiling and Holdings) Act, 1961 and therefore, the divesting portion of Section 3(2) of the 1975 Act is not attracted. (g) In or around March 1991, Respondent No.1 attempted to interfere with the possession of Respondent No.2 in respect of the Smaller Land. On 25 th July, 1991, Respondent No.2 filed Application No.16 of 1991 before the Tahsildar, Thane under Section 70-B of the BTAL Act, for a declaration of tenancy in respect of the Smaller Land. The said Application No.16 of 1991 was duly served on Respondent No.1 and after due consideration of the matter and the evidence on record, the Tahsildar declared Respondent No.1/land owner as a tenant vide order dated23 rd February, 2004. (h) Respondent No. 2 intervened in the Case No.53/97/Ch. Manpada before the Sub Divisional Officer, Thane by filing an intervention application. Respondent No.2 expressly stated that he was declared as a tenant in respect of Smaller Land in the proceedings under BTAL Act. Despite this, the Petitioner did not take any steps in respect of the order dated 23 rd February, 2004. Manpada before the Sub Divisional Officer, Thane by filing an intervention application. Respondent No.2 expressly stated that he was declared as a tenant in respect of Smaller Land in the proceedings under BTAL Act. Despite this, the Petitioner did not take any steps in respect of the order dated 23 rd February, 2004. Hence, in so far as the Petitioner is concerned, the said order dated 23 rd February, 2004 has attained finality and is binding upon the Petitioners. (i) After 11 years, in or around 2015, Respondent No.1 filed Tenancy Appeal No.109 of 2015 before the Deputy Collector challenging the order dated 23 rd February, 2004 by which Respondent No.2 was declared as a tenant under the BTAL Act. The Deputy Collector passed an order dated 23 rd February, 2017 condoning the delay of 11 years on the part of Respondent No.1 filing the said appeal. These Respondents thereafter filed Revision Application No.150 of 2017 before the MRT challenging the order dated 23 rd February, 2017 passed by the Deputy Collector. The MRT vide order dated 4 th May, 2017 allowed Revision Application No.150 of 2017 and set aside the order dated 23 rd February, 2017 passed by the Deputy Collector. As a result, Respondent No.1’s Tenancy Appeal No.109 of 2015 was disposed off. (j) On 8 th June, 2017 Respondent No.1 filed Writ Petition No.6351 of 2017 before this Court challenging the order dated 4 th May, 2017 passed by the MRT in Revision Application No.150 of 2017. This Court, vide order dated 23 rd January, 2019 dismissed Writ Petition No.6351 of 2017 and upheld the order dated 4 th May, 2017 passed by the MRT in Revision Application No.150 of 2017. Respondent No.1 thereafter filed Special Leave Petition No.9998 of 2019 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court challenging the order dated 23 rd January, 2019 passed by this Court in Writ Petition No.6351 of 2017. The Hon’ble Supreme Court vide order dated 29 th April, 2019 dismissed SLP No.9998 of 2019. As a result, the order dated 23 rd February, 2004 attained finality and Respondent No.2 status as a tenant under the BTAL Act is established. (k) As on 30 th August, 1975 the Larger Land was within the jurisdiction of the Bombay Metropolitan, Regional Development Authority who had prepared a development plan, wherein, the Larger Land was reserved for industrial purpose. (k) As on 30 th August, 1975 the Larger Land was within the jurisdiction of the Bombay Metropolitan, Regional Development Authority who had prepared a development plan, wherein, the Larger Land was reserved for industrial purpose. Thereafter, the Larger Land which includes the Smaller Land has been within the limits of the Municipal Corporation of Thane and shown for residential use. PLEADINGS AND AVERMENTS OF RESPONDENT NO.8 THANE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION (Summarised from the WP records) 15. Respondent No.8/Thane Municipal Corporation (TMC) has filed an affidavit in reply. It’s averments can be summarized as under : (a) This Petition is filed against order dated 30 th June 2017 passed by MRT, Mumbai in Forest Appeal No.165 of 2005. The Thane Municipal Corporation was not a party to earlier proceedings up to MRT. Respondent No.8/Thane Municipal Corporation had filed an Interim Application No.775 of 2021 for intervention and for impleading it as a Respondent in the present Writ Petition, which came to be allowed by order dated 18 th July, 2022 passed by this Court. (b) The suit property bearing Gut No.59/A/1, is situated at Chitalsar Manpada, within the local limits of TMC. The Development Plan for the city of Thane was sanctioned by the State Government on 4 th October, 1999 which came into force from 22 nd November, 1999. So also, the Government sanctioned the excluded portion on 8 th April, 2003 which came into force from 14 th May, 2003. In the said sanctioned DP, various portions of the suit property came to be reserved for, viz. (a) 20 meter wide DP Road, (b) 40 Meter wide DP Road, (c) 30 meter wide High Capacity Mass Transport Route (HCMTR), (d) TMT reservation, (e) Park reservation nos.4,5,6, (f) Municipal Primary School reservation, (g) Maternity Home Reservation, (h) Municipal purpose reservation no.1, (‘a’ to ‘h’ above are collectively referred to as RESERVATION AFFECTED PORTION). (c) The balance portion of the suit property was shown as reserved for commercial zone, godown zone, industrial zone and residential zone, in the said sanctioned DP. The record does not reveal that during the period from preparation of the said Dev. Plan, till its approval by the State Government, any objection/claim was received by TMC contending that the suit land is a private forest under the Maharashtra Private Forest (Acquisition) Act, 1975 (MPFA). The record does not reveal that during the period from preparation of the said Dev. Plan, till its approval by the State Government, any objection/claim was received by TMC contending that the suit land is a private forest under the Maharashtra Private Forest (Acquisition) Act, 1975 (MPFA). It also does not appear that TMC received any objection for placing aforesaid reservations upon portions of the suit property, as also about inclusion of the balance suit property into the above stated various zones. (d) The Bombay High Court has not granted any interim relief to the Petitioner State, as against the order passed by M.R.T. which is impugned in this Petition. The Entry showing the concerned land to be Maharashtra Government Reserved Forest, came to be deleted from the 7/12 extract of concerned land. (e) The TMC was served with a Purchase Notice dated24 th August, 2017 under Section 127 of The Maharashtra Regional Town Planning Act, 1966 for Park Reservation No.4. If urgent and effective steps for acquiring the reservation portion would not have been taken by TMC, then the said reservation would have lapsed and said reservation affected portion would have become de- reserved as per the applicable provisions of law. In that eventuality, there would have been loss to the City of Thane and the public at large, for whose benefit the said reservations were put up. The TMC, therefore, by agreement, acquired reserved portions of the said land and issued D.R.C. No.362 (Road) for 10500 sq. meters, D.R.C. No.363 (Road) for 7328 sq. meters and D.R.C. No.281 (Reservation) for 15960 sq. meters. (f) The TMC entered into following transfer deeds which have been registered : (i) Deed of Transfer dated 25 th April, 2019 duly registered with the Sub Registrar of Assurances, Thane at serial no.TNN-5-6766-2019, by and between the TMC and Respondent No.1 herein i.e. D. Dahyabhai & company Pvt. Ltd. (vide the said deed, the portion out of the suit property, affected by 20 meter wide D.P. Road, 40 Meter wide DP Road, 30 meter wide HCMTR collectively admeasuring 18100 square meters, was acquired by the TMC). (ii) Deed of Transfer dated 24 th May, 2019 duly registered with the Sub Registrar of Assurances, Thane at serial no.TNN-5-8450-2019, by and between the TMC and Respondent No. 1 herein i.e. D.Dahyabhai & company Pvt Ltd. (vide the said deed, the said park reservation portion admeasuring 404721.02 square meters, equivalent to approximately 100 acres.) (g) In view of the filing of the present Petition, an undertaking was taken from Respondent No.1 to refrain from utilising and/or transferring the aforesaid D.R.C., till receipt of an NOC from the forest department. Respondent No.1, vide its letter dated 26 th December, 2019 raised an objection about the said undertaking and requested to delete the condition of ‘taking NOC’from the Forest Department. Respondent No.1 also requested the TMC to remove the prohibition upon use and transfer of the said DRCs or else to provide monetory compensation of Rs.78,38,30,000/-. (h) In view of the said letter dated 26 th December, 2019, the TMC addressed a letter dated 31 st December, 2019 bearing Ref. No.4548, to the Chief Conservator of Forest, informing him about the objection raised by Respondent No.1 and that if stay from this Court is not obtained, the TMC shall be left with no option, but to remove the prohibition on the use of the TDR under the said DRCs. (i) In the meantime, Respondent no.1 submitted an application through its Architects for securing TDR 10 folds of the land surrendered vide transfer deed dated 24 th May, 2019, by way of DRC. In view of that proposal, the TMC issued the letter dated 8 th January, 2020 bearing Ref. No.2405 to the Chief Conservator of Forests. TMC specifically assured that the Park reservation portion will not be used for any non-forest activity and the said portion shall be maintained by keeping it’s natural greenery intact, as it is. (j) It was also further clarified that the TMC, if requested by the Forest Department/State, shall hand over the said park reservation portion to the Forest Department by seeking permission of the general body. The TMC further clarified that as per the provisions of law, it was obligatory on the part of the TMC to give compensation to the landowner viz. the Company/Respondent No.1 herein. (k) In response to the said letters 31 st December, 2019 and 8 th January, 2020, the TMC did not receive any letter from the Forest Department. The TMC further clarified that as per the provisions of law, it was obligatory on the part of the TMC to give compensation to the landowner viz. the Company/Respondent No.1 herein. (k) In response to the said letters 31 st December, 2019 and 8 th January, 2020, the TMC did not receive any letter from the Forest Department. Hence, TMC issued one more letter dated 15 th January, 2020 to the Chief Conservator of Forest. TMC once again requested the Forest Department to give a written explanation as early as possible. (l) On 15 th January, 2020, the TMC received the letter dated 12 th January, 2020 sent by Chief Conservator of Forest to the Additional Secretary (Forest) and a copy of the said letter was marked to the TMC. Vide the said letter the said Chief Conservator sought guidance and further orders in the matter from the State. (m) On 21 st January, 2020, the TMC received a letter from the office of the Chief Conservator of Forest bearing Ref. No.3447 dated 17 th January, 2020 addressed to ADTP, TMC. Vide the said letter, TMC was instructed to take appropriate action at its level regarding permitting the use and transfer of DRCs. (n) In view of the letter received from the Forest Department, the Thane Municipal Corporation sought guidance from the Urban Development Department vide letter dated 9 th November, 2020 regarding the development of the Park Reservation. On 1 st June, 2021, the Thane Municipal Corporation received a letter from the Additional Principal Chief Conservator Forest regarding cancellation of DRC's and stoppage of procedure for acquisition of reservation. (o) On 7 th June, 2021, the Thane Municipal Corporation has informed these facts to the Additional Principal Chief Conservator Forest. (p) In the meantime, Respondent No.1, D. Dahyabhai &Co. Pvt. Ltd., filed Writ Petition No.6603 of 2023, before the Division Bench of this Court, seeking directions from this Court for permitting the use, utilisation and transfer of said three DRCs. This Respondent, as well as the State Petitioner herein, both appeared in the said Petition, filed their respective replies and vide order dated 24 th April, 2023, the said Petition was closed for pronouncement of Judgment. It is pertinent to note that in the said Petition, the Petitioner herein requested to tag this Petition with the said Petition. (q) Respondent No.1, D. Dahyabhai & Co. It is pertinent to note that in the said Petition, the Petitioner herein requested to tag this Petition with the said Petition. (q) Respondent No.1, D. Dahyabhai & Co. Pvt. Ltd.also filed one more Writ Petition No.10024 of 2023, before the Division Bench of this Court seeking a direction against TMC for issuance of DRC against the said Park Reservation No.4. The said Writ Petition is now being heard. In the said Writ Petition, order dated 5 th September, 2023 was passed. (r) In another dispute between Respondent No.1 herein, M/s. D.Dahyabhai & Co. Pvt. Ltd. and one Mr. Rajadhaksha Sharma and two others, in which this Respondent was also party, the Single Bench of this Court (Coram: Nitin W Sambre, J) was pleased to pass an order dated 25 th November, 2022 in Appeal from Order No.1051 of 2019, directing this Respondent to issue DRC against the said Park Reservation No.4. (s) Thus, so far as the issue regarding permitting the utilisation of the said 3 DRCs is concerned, the same is already sub- judice before this Court. So far as issuance of DRC against Park Reservation No.4, the Single Bench has already passed an order dated 25 th November, 2022, in the said Appeal from Order No.1051 of 2019, directing this Respondent/TMC to allot DRC. Said issue is also now pending before this Division Bench. (t) The Reservation affected portion has now been transferred to the TMC by executing registered instruments. The D.R.C's. have already been issued for the said land affected by reservation for 20 Mt wide D.P. road, 40 Mt wide D.P. road & 30 Mt wide HCMTR reservation,. However, these D.R.Cs. are restrained from transfer & utilization due to the objection raised by the Forest Department. So far as park reservation portion is concerned, a DRC is not yet issued. (u) There is no judicial order prohibiting utilization and/or transfer of aforesaid D.R.C. The D.R.Cs. are freely transferable to any third party as per the provisions of DCR. The Petitioner has prayed for suspension/cancellation of aforesaid D.R.C., however no orders are passed till the date. (v) The Forest Department, by letter at Exhibit-F has instructed the TMC to take appropriate decision in the matter. The result of the present Petition shall directly affect the entitlement of Respondent No.1 to get D.R.C. claimed by it. The Petitioner has prayed for suspension/cancellation of aforesaid D.R.C., however no orders are passed till the date. (v) The Forest Department, by letter at Exhibit-F has instructed the TMC to take appropriate decision in the matter. The result of the present Petition shall directly affect the entitlement of Respondent No.1 to get D.R.C. claimed by it. In view of the above, this Court may kindly issue appropriate directions including in respect of transfer and use of aforesaid three DRCs and about issuance of DRC against the park reservation. CONSIDERATION OF THE ORAL AND WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES 16. Having considered the pleadings and averments of the parties, we are adverting to their oral and written submissions herein after. Their entire written submissions (verbatim) have been annexed after this judgment, as annexures. Herein below is the summary of their oral and written submissions. 17. SUBMISSIONS OF THE SENIOR ADVOCATE MR. DWARKADAS, SPECIAL COUNSEL FOR THE STATE AND HIS REJOINDER ARGUMENTS. (Summarised from the written notes of arguments) 17.1. Whether the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rohan Vijay Nahar and Ors. v/s. State of Maharashtra and Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2366 (‘Rohan Nahar’), would apply to the present Writ Petition No.3205 of 2018 ? 17.2. On 7 th November 2025, a bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court (Coram : Vikram Nath and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ.), delivered its decision in Rohan Vijay Nahar (supra). The Court set aside the Bombay High Court’s decision in Devkumar Gopaldas Aggarwal and Ors. v/s. State of Maharashtra and Ors., 2018 SCC Online 2823 (‘Devkumar Aggarwal’) holding that the High Court was wrong in concluding that the facts of the case in Devkumar Aggarwal (supra) differed from those in Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v/s. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 3 SCC 430 (Godrej & Boyce’). 17.3. The Hon’ble Supreme Court noted that the High Court had framed two issues in Devkumar Aggarwal (supra). The main issue was whether the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Godrej & Boyce (supra) would apply to the facts in Devkumar Aggarwal (supra), and whether subsequent purchasers could rely on Godrej & Boyce (supra) even when their predecessors-in-title had not questioned the application of the Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975 (‘Maharashtra Private Forests Act’) or the actions taken under it (Para 12.1/Page 18 of Rohan Nahar). 17.4. 17.4. In fact, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rohan Nahar (supra) followed the law laid down in Godrej & Boyce (supra), particularly, in paragraph nos.10.2/Page 16, 10.3/Page 16, 10.4/Page 16 and 14.2/Pages 22-23 of Rohan Nahar (supra), and observed as follows : “10.2. Interpreting the expression “a notice has been issued” in Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA, when read with Section 35 of the IFA, the Court held that “issuance” cannot be divorced from service. Given the statutory scheme, a valid notice under Section 35(3) of the IFA necessarily entails service on the owner, an opportunity to file objections, to adduce evidence, and to be heard. Because interim restraints may be imposed under Section 35(4) of the IFA and penal consequences attach under Section 35(7) of the IFA, service is inherent to the process. Section 35(5) of the IFA, requiring service in the CPC manner and publication as prescribed, reinforces this conclusion. 10.3. On this basis, the view in Chintamani Gajanan Velkar (Supra) that a bare, unserved notice sufficed for Section 2)(f)(iii) of the MPFA was found to have overlooked the Bombay/Maharashtra amendments to Section 35 of the IFA and to have proceeded on an erroneous premise regarding the two-hectare exclusion. It was overruled to that extent. 10.4. The Court further clarified that Section 2(f) (iii) of the MPFA saves only “live” or “pipeline” notices, those issued and pursued in reasonable proximity to 30.08.1975. Notices left undecided for years or decades lapse into desuetude. The State is obliged to act within a reasonable time; a notice from 1956–57, never taken to its statutory culmination, cannot be revived to effect vesting on the appointed day. ………….. 14.2. After this categorisation, we are satisfied that there is no legally relevant distinction between the present cases and the decision in Godrej and Boyce (Supra). The ratio in Godrej and Boyce (Supra) turns on service of a notice under Section 35(3) of the IFA, the existence of a live process capable of culminating in a notification under Section 35(1) of the IFA, and strict compliance with the statutory steps that alone can support vesting under Section 3(1) of the MPFA Act on the footing of Section 2(f)(iii). The record before us discloses the same deficiencies that were fatal in Godrej and Boyce (Supra). There is no proof of service of any notice under Section 35(3) of the IFA on the then owners. The record before us discloses the same deficiencies that were fatal in Godrej and Boyce (Supra). There is no proof of service of any notice under Section 35(3) of the IFA on the then owners. There is no final notification under Section 35(1) of the IFA. Possession has remained with private owners throughout. No contemporaneous action was taken under Sections 4, 5, 6 or 7 of the MPFA Act. These features mirror the very elements that led this Court to hold that vesting had not occurred in Godrej and Boyce (Supra)….” SUBMISSIONS ON GODREJ & BOYCE AND ROHAN NAHAR (Part of the written submissions of Sr. Adv. Mr. Dwarkadas) 18. Since the issue in Rohan Nahar (supra) is connected to Godrej & Boyce (supra), it is necessary to first examine Godrej & Boyce (supra). The relevant facts emerging from that judgment are as follows : 18.1. Godrej acquired land in Vikhroli by a registered deed of conveyance dated 30 th July,1948 from Nowroji Pirojsha, who had inherited it from Framjee Cawasjee Banaji, the original perpetual leaseholder under an 1835 Government of Bombay grant. The land was classified as ‘wasteland’ under the original lease, meant to be cultivated. The dispute concerns 133 acres and 38 gunthas from specific survey numbers, referred to as the ‘disputed land’. (Paras 3 - 4/Page 12 of Godrej & Boyce) 18.2. In 1951, the Salsette Estates Act (“Abolition Act”) was passed stating that wastelands granted under a perpetual lessor not cultivated before 14 th August, 1951 would vest in the State and be the property of the State. However, aggrieved by this Act, Godrej filed a suit in the Bombay High Court for seeking a declaration of its ownership and that the Abolition Act had no application to the lands in question. After litigation, a 1962 consent decree declared that except for 31 gunthas, the rest of the land had been cultivated by Godrej before 14 th August, 1951 and therefore, belonged to Godrej. (Paras 5 - 7/Pages 12 - 13 of Godrej & Boyce) 18.3. Development plans for the city of Bombay in 1967 and 1991 designated the disputed land as residential. Godrej received permissions to construct residential buildings and it built four, for staff use. (Paras 5 - 7/Pages 12 - 13 of Godrej & Boyce) 18.3. Development plans for the city of Bombay in 1967 and 1991 designated the disputed land as residential. Godrej received permissions to construct residential buildings and it built four, for staff use. However, on 17 th February, 1976 the Urban Land Ceiling Act (1976) came into force and since the disputed land was in excess of the ceiling limit, Godrej sought exemptions to use excess land for industrial and residential purposes. The State granted the exemption, requiring construction of staff housing. With exemptions and municipal permissions, Godrej built over 40 multi-storeyed residential buildings, a club house, sub-stations, and other facilities, housing thousands of families. (Paras 9 - 11/Page 13 of Godrej &Boyce) 18.4. In May 2006, Godrej received six ‘stop-work’ notices stating that the disputed land was treated as private forest, requiring Central Government approval for construction under the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980. Godrej learned that this action arose from a 2005 Bombay High Court order directing the State to update all land records. Godrej learned that, while updating land records, the State had unilaterally changed the revenue entries to classify the land as private forest. It also found that Notice No. WT/53, issued under Section 35(3) Indian Forest Act, 1927 (‘Indian Forest Act’), had been published in the Bombay Government Gazette of 6th September 1956 regarding the land, but the notice had no date, was never served on Godrej, and was never acted upon by the Government. (Paras 16 & 31 - 33/ Pages 14 & 19 of Godrej &Boyce) 18.5. Aggrieved by this, Godrej filed Writ Petition No.2196 of 2006, seeking a declaration that its Vikhroli land was not forest land and requesting the High Court to invalidate the forest department’s letter, the stop-work notices, and the revenue record mutation. During the case, it emerged that about 170 similar notices were issued in 1956–57 to various entities, including government establishments. (Paras 34 - 35/ Pages 19-20 of Godrej & Boyce) 18.6. The State contended that, based on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Chintamani Velkar (supra), the disputed land had already vested in the State under Section 3 of the Maharashtra Private Forests Act. The High Court dismissed Godrej’s Petitions in 2008, holding that development approvals and planning designations could not override the land’s status as private forest, and that the government inaction did not invalidate earlier notices. The High Court dismissed Godrej’s Petitions in 2008, holding that development approvals and planning designations could not override the land’s status as private forest, and that the government inaction did not invalidate earlier notices. The Court further held that even a Section 35(3) notice issued without a corresponding Gazette notification did not remove the land from the Maharashtra Private Forests Act and such notices could not be deemed abandoned. It concluded that private forest land remains forest despite any development plans or zoning changes. Aggrieved with this decision, Godrej and other Petitioners filed Special Leave Petitions before the Supreme Court. (Paras 36 - 38/Pages 20-21 of Godrej & Boyce) 18.7. However, the Supreme Court allowed all the appeals and set aside the judgment of the Bombay High Court, and delivered the following findings : 18.7.1. Chintamani Velkar was over-ruled which had held that mere issuance of a notice under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forests Act is sufficient and service is not required under Section 2(f)(iii) of the Maharashtra Private Forests Act and held that the word ‘issued’ in Section 2(f)(iii) must include service of the show-cause notice.(Paras 61 - 62/Page 26 of Godrej & Boyce) 18.7.2. The Supreme Court endorsed the Full Bench decision in J. C. Waghmare v/s. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 Bom 119 , which upheld the constitutional validity of the Maharashtra Private Forest Act (Paras 22 - 26/Pages 17-18 of Godrej & Boyce). It held that : (a) Section 2(f)(iii) of the Maharashtra Private Forests Act applies even to land where only a notice had been issued under Section 35 of the Indian Forest Act and the owner’s objections remained unheard when that provision was repealed in 1975, such objections can now be heard under Section 6 of the Maharashtra Private Forests Act. (b) Section 6 provides landowners with the opportunity to file objections and demonstrate that their land should not be classified or declared as forest. 18.7.3. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that Section 2(f)(iii) of the Maharashtra Private Forests Act is in sense a saving clause and is meant to save ‘pipeline notices’. ‘Pipeline notices’ or ‘live notices’ have been defined to mean notices issued in reasonably close proximity to the coming into force of the Maharashtra Private Forests Act and only such ‘live notices’ could be acted upon. (Paras71 – 74/Pages 27-28 of Godrej & Boyce) 18.7.4. ‘Pipeline notices’ or ‘live notices’ have been defined to mean notices issued in reasonably close proximity to the coming into force of the Maharashtra Private Forests Act and only such ‘live notices’ could be acted upon. (Paras71 – 74/Pages 27-28 of Godrej & Boyce) 18.7.4. The Supreme Court held that the notice issued to Godrej could not be considered a ‘pipeline’ notice, since a pipeline period cannot reasonably extend from 1956–1957 all the way to 1975. Therefore, the notice was not valid for the purpose of treating the land as private forest. (Para 49/Page 24 of Godrej & Boyce) 19. In the background of Godrej & Boyce (supra), it would be appropriate to examine the facts of the case in Rohan Nahar (supra). 19.1. The Appellants (batch of 96 civil appeals) were landowners in Maharashtra whose cases share a common factual background with each other, as well as with the facts in Godrej & Boyce (supra). The State claimed that in the early 1960s, notices under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act were issued and published in the Official Gazette, calling upon landowners to show cause why forest-related restrictions should not be imposed. The landowners maintained that these notices were never personally served, no hearings were held, no final notification under Section 35(1) of the Indian Forest Act was issued, and the proceedings remained dormant for decades. (Para 7.1/Page 12 of Rohan Nahar) 19.2. After the Maharashtra Private Forests Act, came into force, the landowners argued that the State did not take possession under Section 5 and that, for decades the lands continued to be treated as private holdings. Transfers were allowed, planning authorities treated these lands as agricultural land or no development zone, and no compensation was paid. The State argued that the 1960s notices under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act read with Section 2(f)(iii) of the Maharashtra Private Forests Act caused automatic vesting of the lands in the State. (Para 7.2/Page 13 of Rohan Nahar) 19.3. However, from around 2001, revenue officers began mutating village records to show lands as affected by forest proceedings. Names of the landowners were replaced with that of the State. The owners alleged these changes were made without notice to them and in violation of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code. The State argued that the entries merely reflected statutory vesting. However, from around 2001, revenue officers began mutating village records to show lands as affected by forest proceedings. Names of the landowners were replaced with that of the State. The owners alleged these changes were made without notice to them and in violation of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code. The State argued that the entries merely reflected statutory vesting. These annotations had collateral effects and Sub-Registrars refused to register documents having regard to departmental instructions. Possession nonetheless remained with the private parties, compensation was never awarded, and many administrative challenges under Maharashtra Land Revenue Code remained unresolved. Landowners, therefore, approached the High Court seeking correction of records, declaratory relief regarding title and vesting and restoration of entries consistent with private title and possession. (Paras 7.3 - 7.4/ Page 13 of Rohan Nahar) 19.4. Before the High Court, landowners challenged the legality of forest-related mutation entries and sought declarations that their lands were not private forests under the Maharashtra Private Forests Act, along with restoration of their names in the revenue records. The Landowners argued that : (i) mere Gazette publication of the notice under Section35(3) of the Indian Forest Act without personal service under Section 35(5) of the Indian Forest Act could not have adverse consequences; (ii) they emphasized that no inquiry or final notification followed after the issuance of the notices under Section 35(3); (iii) that the notices were stale; (iv) that the State never took possession of the lands in question or paid compensation for the same; and (v) the revenue authorities actions violated the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code and natural justice requirements. (Paras 8.1 - 8.2/ Pages 13 - 14 of Rohan Nahar) 19.5. The State responded that issuance of Section 35(3) notices in the 1960s was sufficient for vesting under Section 2(f)(iii) and Section 3 of Maharashtra Private Forests Act and that revenue entries were ministerial reflections of statutory vesting that followed as a matter of law. It also raised objections regarding delay and laches and pointed out to availability of remedies under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code. (Para 8.3/Page 14 of Rohan Nahar) 19.6. The High Court grouped the cases and considered common questions such as : (i) Whether issuance of Section 35(3) notices in these cases, without service of these notice on the landowners, alone was enough? (ii) Whether service and a Section 35(1) notification were mandatory? (Para 8.3/Page 14 of Rohan Nahar) 19.6. The High Court grouped the cases and considered common questions such as : (i) Whether issuance of Section 35(3) notices in these cases, without service of these notice on the landowners, alone was enough? (ii) Whether service and a Section 35(1) notification were mandatory? (iii) Whether dormancy affected vesting, and (iv) Whether the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code procedures had been violated? (Para 8.4/Page 14 of Rohan Nahar) 19.7. The Hon’ble High Court in Devkumar Aggarwal (supra) vide its order dated 27 th September, 2018, disposed off this batch of 96 petitions and held as follows : 19.7.1. That vesting under Section 3 of Maharashtra Private Forests Act occurred automatically on 30 th August 1975, i.e., the appointed day and that entries made in 2002 merely reflected this vesting. (Para 12.2/Page 18 of Rohan Nahar) 19.7.2. It accepted the State’s claim that the Section 35(3) notices were issued and served and that in many cases a Section 35(1) notification was already in force. It relied on Gazette extracts, referred to as the ‘Golden Register’, possession notices, and panchanama. (Para 12.3 of the Rohan Nahar Judgment) 19.7.3. It distinguished Godrej & Boyce (supra) as being fact- specific as in Godrej & Boyce (supra) the owners had an earlier consent decree, long-standing sanctioned development and an evidentiary vacuum on service and follow-through. It also held that requirements of issuance and service were satisfied on the basis of the facts on record. (Paras 12.4 – 12.5/Page 19 of Rohan Nahar) 19.7.4. The principle laid down in Godrej & Boyce (supra) that had made a distinction in ‘stale’ and ‘live’ notices was not considered by the High Court and it was held that the issue in Godrej & Boyce (supra) was fact specific to the facts of that case. It was further held that in any event, the lands in question would come within the primary definition of ‘forest’ under Section 2(c- i) of the Maharashtra Private Forests Act. (Para 12.6/Page 19 of Rohan Nahar). 19.7.5. In several of the cases the High Court found that the challenges were mounted by subsequent purchasers who had acquired the land post 30 th August, 1975, i.e., the appointed day and not by original land owners. (Para 12.6/Page 19 of Rohan Nahar). 19.7.5. In several of the cases the High Court found that the challenges were mounted by subsequent purchasers who had acquired the land post 30 th August, 1975, i.e., the appointed day and not by original land owners. The High Court held that the subsequent purchasers were alleging non service of notices without obtaining affidavits from their predecessors-in-title stating whether the notices were in fact served on them or not. It was further held that the subsequent purchasers made these allegations even though the ‘burden was effectively placed on the petitioners to dislodge official records’. (Paras 12.7 – 12.8/Page 19 of Rohan Nahar) 19.7.6. Except one matter remitted for inquiry, the High Court dismissed all Writ Petitions, charactering several as commercially motivated and not bona fide and cautioning that entraining them would weaken forest protection. (Para 12.12/Page 19 of Rohan Nahar) 19.8. However, in the case of Rohan Nahar (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court overruled Devkumar Aggarwal (supra) and held as under : 19.8.1. That the legal position is settled, i.e., for vesting under Section 3 of the Maharashtra Private Forests Act based on Section 2(f)(iii), the Section 35(3), notice must not only be issued, but, must be served. Service is essential because it allows a right in the owner to object. The Court rejected the High Court’s view that reproducing the text of Section 35(1) ‘beneath’ a show-cause notice amounted to a final notification. It further held that mutation entries cannot perfect an acquisition that lacks statutory predicates and that these entries cannot create title in the State or divest title from the private owner. (Para 13.1/Page 20 of Rohan Nahar) 19.8.2. The Court found critical statutory steps to be missing, viz., (i) No proof that Section 35(3) notices were served, nor any final notification under Section 35(1). (ii) Private owners had remained in continuous possession, as shown by revenue records. (iii) The State had not taken possession under Section5, initiated schemes under Section 4, conducted compensation proceedings under Section 7, or held timely inquiries under S. 6. (iv) The documents relied on by the State, mostly undated or unverified, were unreliable when contrasted with decades of undisputed private possession. (v) In some cases, the State relied on notices sent to non-owners or on lands long converted to industrial use. In another, it could not even assert that a Section 35(3) notice existed. (iv) The documents relied on by the State, mostly undated or unverified, were unreliable when contrasted with decades of undisputed private possession. (v) In some cases, the State relied on notices sent to non-owners or on lands long converted to industrial use. In another, it could not even assert that a Section 35(3) notice existed. (vi) Considering these deficiencies together, made it clear that vesting under Section 3(1) of the Maharashtra Private Forests Act had not been completed (Para 13.2/Page 20 of Rohan Nahar) 19.8.3. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also rejected the High Courts distinctions between original and subsequent purchasers. It was held that compliance with mandatory statutory requirements does not depend on ownership history. Subsequent purchasers cannot be prejudiced by undisclosed proceedings. The revenue records themselves showed continued private ownership, undermining the State’s case. The Supreme Court rejected the High Court’s approach to hold that a subsequent purchaser is in a worst position than the one who developed land would invert the logic of the statute and would reward illegality while penalising restraint.(Para 13.4/Page 21 of Rohan Nahar) 19.8.4. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also refused remand for a Section 6 inquiry, holding that such an exercise decades later would be meaningless and could not cure the lack of mandatory prerequisites. It further held that the High Court misread the Gazette, diluted statutory requirements, and relied on irrelevant material. The judgment therefore could not stand. (Para 13.5/Pages21-22 of the Rohan Nahar Judgment) 19.8.5. And finally it was held that the facts in those 96 appeals which arose from the Bombay High Court Judgment in Devkumar Aggarwal (supra) were indistinguishable in principle from Godrej & Boyce (supra). It was held that the record reflects the same jurisdictional defects viz., (i) non-service of a notice under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act, (ii) absence of a final notification under Section 35(1) of the Indian Forest Act, and (iii) lack of contemporaneous steps under Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the Maharashtra Private Forests Act. 20. It is submitted by Mr. Dwarkadas that, the facts in Godrej & Boyce (supra) and Rohan Nahar (supra), are indistinguishable. In both cases, the Section 35(3) notices were issued in the 1960s, never served on the original owners, and never followed by any further action. 20. It is submitted by Mr. Dwarkadas that, the facts in Godrej & Boyce (supra) and Rohan Nahar (supra), are indistinguishable. In both cases, the Section 35(3) notices were issued in the 1960s, never served on the original owners, and never followed by any further action. As held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Godrej & Boyce (supra), only ‘Pipeline Notices’, viz., those issued in close proximity to the Maharashtra Private Forests Act coming into force, could be acted upon. This principle has not been interfered with in Rohan Nahar (supra). 21. In Godrej & Boyce (supra), it is held that mere issuance of a notice under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act is not enough, the notice also has to be served on the owner of the land. It is important to note that while Rohan Nahar (supra) reaffirmed this principle regarding issuance and service of the notice under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act, it did not hold that such notices must be served before the Maharashtra Private Forests Act came into force on 30 th August, 1975. 22. In the light of the above, it is submitted by the Mr. Dwarkadas that the facts in the present case (Writ Petition No.3205 of 2018) are distinguishable from those in Rohan Nahar (supra), for the following reasons : 22.1. The notice under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act was issued to Respondent No. 1 on 29th August 1975 and served on 4 th September, 1975. This is confirmed in paragraphs 7.11 and 7.12 (Pages 126–127) of Respondent No.1’s Reply in Writ Petition No.3205 of 2018. 22.2. The notice under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act was issued on 29 th August, 1975 and served on 4 th September, 1975 i.e., in close proximity to 30 th August 1975. It is, therefore, submitted that such a notice would be a “live” notice/“pipeline” notice as understood in the decision of Godrej & Boyce (supra). Significantly, in contrast, the notices in Rohan Nahar (supra) were ‘stale’ notices, issued in the 1960s and never served on the landowners. 22.3. In the present case, after taking possession of the subject land, the Forest Department constructed boundary walls, an entry gate, a security cabin, a nature interpretation centre, and other structures for protecting the subject land. Significantly, in contrast, the notices in Rohan Nahar (supra) were ‘stale’ notices, issued in the 1960s and never served on the landowners. 22.3. In the present case, after taking possession of the subject land, the Forest Department constructed boundary walls, an entry gate, a security cabin, a nature interpretation centre, and other structures for protecting the subject land. By contrast, in Rohan Nahar (supra), no action was taken even after issuing notices in the 1960s. 22.4. Furthermore, in the current case, Respondent No. 1 also wrote two letters (dated 5 th July, 1979 and 28 th August, 1979) requesting exemption of 24 acres and 32 gunthas from Gat No.59/A/1, offering substitute land instead. Respondent No.1 stated that considerable amounts had been spent by it in developing horticulture on the land and wells and farmhouses had been built on the subject land. Since the provisions of the Maharashtra Private Forests Act did not allow substitution of land, the State rejected this request. Respondent No.1 then filed a Section 6 application under the Maharashtra Private Forests Act before the Collector (“SDO”). This is a key distinction from Rohan Nahar, where the owners never got a hearing. Here, the original owner himself approached the authorities and participated in the process. 22.5. In the present case, the purpose of issuing a notice under Section 35(3) has been fulfilled (viz. giving a hearing to the owner of the land) in as much as, after the Section 6 application, the following proceedings were held : 22.5.1. The Collector, by order dated 3 rd August, 1980, accepted Respondent No.1’s offer of alternate land. The Petitioner challenged this before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal (“MRT”). 22.5.2. On 15 th October, 1982, the MRT remanded the matter to the SDO for fresh inquiry, holding that the SDO did not have the jurisdiction to allot the 24-acre parcel. 22.5.3. After the remand, the SDO passed a second order on 27 th December, 2004, holding that 138 acres was private forest land vesting in the Government, while 55 acres was not. 22.5.4. Both sides appealed. 22.5.3. After the remand, the SDO passed a second order on 27 th December, 2004, holding that 138 acres was private forest land vesting in the Government, while 55 acres was not. 22.5.4. Both sides appealed. On 15 th June 2017, the MRT dismissed the Forest Department’s appeal and allowed Respondent No.1’s appeal, incorrectly interpreting Godrej & Boyce (supra) to hold that because the notice under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act was not served on or before 30 th August, 1975, it could not be treated as a valid notice at all and held that the subject land is not a ‘private forest’ as contemplated under Section 2(f)(iii) of the Maharashtra Private Forests Act and hence the subject land is excluded entirely from acquisition under the Maharashtra Private Forests Act. 22.6. These facts clearly show that, unlike Rohan Nahar (supra), the original owner in the present case had multiple opportunities to present his case. 22.7. In view of the above, it is submitted that the present case is clearly distinguishable from Rohan Nahar (supra). Further, the issues raised in the present petition did not arise for consideration in Rohan Nahar (supra). 23. SUBMISSIONS OF ADVOCATE MR. BALSARA , ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO.1/LAND OWNER. (Summarised from the written submissions of Adv Balsara) 23.1. Background : (a) The Respondent No.1 is the owner of subject land admeasuring 193 acres 07 guntha 4A. The Indian Forest Act, 1927 (IFA) came to be published in official gazette on 27 th September, 1927. It contained Section 35. Said Section 35 deals with the aspect of protection of forest for special purpose by the State Government by way of publication of notification in the Official Gazette under Section 35 (1). But before that under Section 35 (3), Government is under obligation to issue the notice to the owner through an officer authorised by the State Government, calling upon such owner to show cause within a reasonable period, as to why a notification under Section 35 (1) should not be made? Section 35 (3) mandates calling for objections, giving opportunity of hearing to the owner, passing of an order by the authorised officer, before publication of notification under Section 35 (1). (b) It is pertinent to note that on 14 th August, 1975 a legislation was passed under the name and style as ‘Maharashtra Private Forest (Acquisition) Act, 1975’ (MPFA). Section 35 (3) mandates calling for objections, giving opportunity of hearing to the owner, passing of an order by the authorised officer, before publication of notification under Section 35 (1). (b) It is pertinent to note that on 14 th August, 1975 a legislation was passed under the name and style as ‘Maharashtra Private Forest (Acquisition) Act, 1975’ (MPFA). The President of India gave ascent to MPFA on 25 th August, 1975. MPFA was published in the Maharashtra Government Gazette Part IV on 29 th August, 1975. MPFA, vide clause 2 (a), stipulates that ‘Appointed Day’ means the day on which the said act comes into force. The said date was notified as 30 th August, 1975 vide G.N.R. and F.D. No.PRF1073/40845-F-2 dated 29 th August, 1975 The Section 24 (i) of MPFA (acquisition 1975) is reproduced as below : “On and from the appointed day, sections 34a, 35, 36, 36a, 36b, 36c and 37 of the Forest Act shall stand repealed”. Whereas, it is obvious, on record the MPFA Act (Acquisiton 1975) received assent of the President on 25th August, 1975 published in Gazette on 29th August, 1975. This itself shows that the Forest Department was very much aware that Section 35 is going to get repealed and hence with the malafide intention has issued a notice under section 35(3) on 29th August, 1975 to the wrong person. (c) Admittedly, during the period from 27 th September, 1927 till 29 th August, 1975 (for about 48 years), it was never claimed by the State Government that the subject land is a forest and never issued any notice under Section 35 (3) of IFA to the owner of the subject land calling upon the owner as to why the subject land should not be protected as a forest. In fact, during the said period, the subject land was subjected to lawful transfer by registered instruments, cultivation, horticulture, NA user, quarry purposes, etc. (see Exhibit A, Exhibit B, Exhibit C, Exhibit D of affidavit in reply of Respondent No.1 dated 25 th November, 2019). In fact, during the said period, the subject land was subjected to lawful transfer by registered instruments, cultivation, horticulture, NA user, quarry purposes, etc. (see Exhibit A, Exhibit B, Exhibit C, Exhibit D of affidavit in reply of Respondent No.1 dated 25 th November, 2019). The said documents are at page no.283, i.e., Bombay Panvel Regional Plan of 1970, NA Permission granted by Collector Office Thane dated 14 th May, 1963 at page no.284, NA Permission granted by Collector Office Thane dated 15 th December, 1964 at page no.286, NA Permission granted by Collector Office Thane dated 25 th July, 1973 at page no.287, 7/12 extract for the period from 1956 to 1972-73 at page no.288-289, recording cultivation of rice, existence of structures, horticulture, paddy, etc. upon subject land. (d) It is only after MPFA getting ascent from the President of India, and having realised that Section 35 is repealed, the State Forest Department arbitrarily made a show about issuance of notice allegedly dated 29 th August, 1975 under Section 35 (3) of IFA (impugned notice). In as much as, the notice issued a day prior to the repealing of the provision of section 35 ceased to have effect after the repeal of Section 35. (e) The Petitioner has not submitted any documentary proof about actual issuance of the impugned notice, on the alleged date, i.e., 29 th August, 1975 and service on the actual land owner. (f) In para 3 (d) of the Petition it is stated that the impugned notice was served on 4 th September, 1975. The position of law is that mere issuance of notice is not sufficient, but its service is also important. Issuance cannot be divorced from service of notice. Section 35 (3) of IFA necessarily entails service on the owner and opportunity to file objections, to adduce evidence and to be heard. Section 35 (5) of IFA requires service of such notice as per Civil Procedure Code and publication as prescribed. (g) In Godrej & Boyce (supra), the above stated position of law is laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The service of notice on 4 th September, 1975 after repeal of the provision, was claimed to be served on D Dayabhai & co., though it was obvious that the land owner were M/s. D.Dayabhai and Co. Pvt.ltd. and that D Dayabhai & Co. The service of notice on 4 th September, 1975 after repeal of the provision, was claimed to be served on D Dayabhai & co., though it was obvious that the land owner were M/s. D.Dayabhai and Co. Pvt.ltd. and that D Dayabhai & Co. was an entirely different entity and the real owner of the land was never served with a notice under section 35(3) under Forest Act. (h) In the latest judgment dated 7 th November, 2025 in the case of Rohan Nahar (supra), it is specifically held that the law settled in the case of Godrej & Boyce (supra), is a declaration under Article 141 of the Constitution. Paragraph 10 in case of Rohan Nahar (supra) reads as under: 10. The judgment in Oberoi Constructions Private Limited v. State of Maharashtra (supra) was challenged in this Court and decided by a three Judge Bench on 30 th January, 2014 and has been the prevailing precedent in such matters viz. Godrej & Boyce (supra). This Court gave the following findings : 10.1. This Court held that the mere issuance of a notice under Section 35(3) of the IFA is not, by itself, sufficient to treat land as a “private forest” within Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA. The answer to the principal question was returned in the negative. 10.2. Interpreting the expression “a notice has been issued” in Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA, when read with Section 35 of the IFA, the Court held that “issuance” cannot be divorced from service. Given the statutory scheme, a valid notice under Section 35(3) of the IFA necessarily entails service on the owner, an opportunity to file objections, to adduce evidence, and to be heard. Because interim restraints may be imposed under Section 35(4) of the IFA and penal consequences attach under Section 35(7) of the IFA, service is inherent to the process. Section 35(5) of the IFA, requiring service in the CPC manner and publication as prescribed, reinforces this conclusion. 10.3. On this basis, the view in Chintamani Gajanan Velkar (Supra) that a bare, unserved notice sufficed for Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA was found to have overlooked the Bombay/Maharashtra amendments to Section 35 of the IFA and to have proceeded on an erroneous premise regarding the two- hectare exclusion. It was overruled to that extent. 10.4. 10.3. On this basis, the view in Chintamani Gajanan Velkar (Supra) that a bare, unserved notice sufficed for Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA was found to have overlooked the Bombay/Maharashtra amendments to Section 35 of the IFA and to have proceeded on an erroneous premise regarding the two- hectare exclusion. It was overruled to that extent. 10.4. The Court further clarified that Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA saves only “live” or “pipeline” notices, those issued and pursued in reasonable proximity to 30.08.1975. Notices left undecided for years or decades lapse into desuetude. The State is obliged to act within a reasonable time; a notice from 1956-57, never taken to its statutory culmination, cannot be revived to effect vesting on the appointed day. 10.5. On the definitional plane, the Court reaffirmed that the “means and includes” formulation in Section 2(c-i) of the MPFA does not dilute the primary sense of “forest”. Lands long designated for urban use, developed under sanctioned plans and permissions, and integrated with municipal infrastructure could not, on the admitted facts, be regarded as “forest” either in the primary or extended sense of Section 2(c-i)of the MPFA. 10.6. Recognising the expropriatory character of the MPFA, the Court applied strict construction. Fundamental norms of fairness and good governance preclude unsettling settled civilian and commercial arrangements after prolonged State inaction, particularly where the State itself facilitated and acquiesced in development over decades. 10.7. Even assuming arguendo that the lands were forest, wholesale demolition and dispossession after half a century was neither feasible nor in the public interest on the facts recorded. The equities of third-party purchasers and residents, the State's prolonged acquiescence, and the practical impossibility of “restoration” militated against such a course. 10.8. In consequence, the appeals were allowed, the High Court's judgement was set aside, and actions premised solely on stale notices under Section 35(3) of the IFA were quashed. Also, paragraphs 13 and 14 of the said judgment in the case of Rohan Nahar (supra) are relevant. (i) Cumulative reading of both the judgments, i.e., Godrej & Boyce (supra) and Rohan Nahar (supra), clearly demonstrate that unless a notice is legally served and further steps under Section 35, i.e., issuance of notification, taking over possession, giving hearing and deciding the objection of the owner etc. (i) Cumulative reading of both the judgments, i.e., Godrej & Boyce (supra) and Rohan Nahar (supra), clearly demonstrate that unless a notice is legally served and further steps under Section 35, i.e., issuance of notification, taking over possession, giving hearing and deciding the objection of the owner etc. are effectively taken up, the vesting of land as private forest, in the State Government under Section 3 of MPFA, is not formalised. When in the present case the validity of the proceeding under section 6 of the Act of 1975 and process initiated under it, is vitiated because of the non-service of the notice under section 35(3) of the Act, on the original owner. (j) Admitted position is that Section 35 stood repealed as per Section 24 of MPFA with effect from 30 th August, 1975. Thus after 30 th August, 1975 Section 35 was not in existence and therefore the service of notice under Section 35 after 30 th August, 1975 is of no effect. Petitioner admittedly has not come up with any documentary proof or case that after 30 th August, 1975 they had taken the steps under Section 35 of IFA particularly publication of notification, taking over possession, giving opportunity of hearing to the owner etc. (k) In fact, the State witness has clearly admitted in cross that notification under Section 35(1) 34(a) and 38 of IFA, have not been published (Page Nos.87 and 88 of additional compilation by Respondent No.1). Considering these factual aspects and law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Godrej & Boyce (supra), the MRT vide impugned judgment dated 30 th June, 2017 held that land in dispute is not a private forest and accordingly dismissed the forest Appeal and allowed another Appeal filed by Respondent No.1. (l) Whereas in the matter of Godrej and Boyce (supra), the notices which were issued were not acted upon for a huge period of 27 years and hence the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the notices had became stale and not ‘live’ and in para 56 in clear terms has observed as follows : 56. A notice under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act is intended to give an opportunity to the owner of a forest to show cause why, inter alia, a regulatory or a prohibitory measure be not made in respect of that forest. A notice under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act is intended to give an opportunity to the owner of a forest to show cause why, inter alia, a regulatory or a prohibitory measure be not made in respect of that forest. It is important to note that such a notice pre-supposes the existence of a forest. The owner of the forest is expected to file objections within a reasonable time as specified in the notice and is also given an opportunity to lead evidence in support of the objections. After these basic requirements are met, the owner of the forest is entitled to a hearing on the objections. This entire procedure obviously cannot be followed by the State and the owner of the forest unless the owner is served with the notice. Therefore, service of a notice issued under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act is inherent in the very language used in the provision and the very purpose of the provision. (m) In the present case, the forest department not only issued the notice under section 35(3) to the wrongful person and not to the owner, but, thereafter also in the year 1982, when the Tribunal remanded the matter, the department, after 17 years, i.e., in the year 1999, got the said remanded proceedings numbered as 53/99. This clearly shows the negligence on the part of the Petitioner. 23.2. Whereas : Admittedly, from 2018 till today, the Petitioner failed to obtain any stay to the impugned order of the MRT. The order of MRT has been effected in the revenue record. Substantial portion of land, about 104 acres has been transferred under registered instruments to the planning authority, viz., TMC, for various reservations. These registered instruments of 2019 have not been challenged by any separate legal suit/proceedings or in the present Writ Petition by the Petitioner. The possession of acquired land under registered instrument is handed over to planning authority viz. TMC which is evident from the text of the registered instruments. 23.3 In respect of some of the acquired land, 3 DRCs have been issued. The possession of acquired land under registered instrument is handed over to planning authority viz. TMC which is evident from the text of the registered instruments. 23.3 In respect of some of the acquired land, 3 DRCs have been issued. In respect of land admeasuring 100 acres, acquired for PARK RESERVATION No.4, even though TMC did not issue the DRC, there are already three orders of the Hon’ble High Court dated 22 nd November, 2022, 28 th April, 2025 and 27 th June, 2025 whereby the planning authority TMC is directed to issue DRCs. In the 7/12 extract the concerned reservation affected portion is already mutated in the name of TMC. From the TILR report, it is evident that the acquired portion is situated at the eastern boundary of the Sanjay Gandhi National Park. Even otherwise, the circular dated 16 th January, 1996 of the Government of Maharashtra identifying the boundaries of Sanjay Gandhi National Park is filed on record, i.e., Exhibit-A of additional affidavit of Respondent No.1 page (nos.445 to 447). 23.4 From the said circular, it is evident that the entire village Manpada, where the subject land is situated, is at the eastern boundary of Sanjay Gandhi National Park. Respondent No.1 has already filed another letter dated 23 rd January, 1986 issued by the forest department, to the Deputy Collector Thane (said letter dated 23 rd January, 1986 is annexed as Exhibit-B to the additional affidavit of Respondent No.1 at Page nos.448, 449). In said letter, the Petitioner has admitted that they could not take over the possession of the subject land. 23.5 Thus, in the present matter, the following factors become undisputed facts :- (a) There is no proof that notice was issued prior to appointed date, i.e., 30 th August, 1975 to the Respondent No.1. (b) Notice was served on 4 th September, 1975 (it is not served on the actual owner as required by CPC). (c) There is no service or publication of notice as per CPC. No notification under Section 35(1) came to be published. (d) No opportunity of hearing was given to the Respondent No.1. (e) Possession of subject land was not taken over by the Petitioner as per Section 5 of MPFA. (f) No compensation was paid by the Petitioner to the Respondent No.1. (g) Subject land was otherwise under cultivation, N.A.users, etc. No notification under Section 35(1) came to be published. (d) No opportunity of hearing was given to the Respondent No.1. (e) Possession of subject land was not taken over by the Petitioner as per Section 5 of MPFA. (f) No compensation was paid by the Petitioner to the Respondent No.1. (g) Subject land was otherwise under cultivation, N.A.users, etc. Thus, there is no question of subject land coming within the definition of private forest defined under Section 2 (f) of MPFA. In the circumstances, there is no question of acquisition and vesting of subject land in the state government under Section 3 of MPFA. (h). Whereas the MRT in its order dated 30/6/2017 has clearly observed and recorded in para 17 (part of this paragraph is reproduced below) : 17. In view of above discussion, as the Forest Department has failed to prove that the notice u/s. 35 (3) was ‘served’ on the land owner, Resp. No.1 in Appeal No. 165/2005 who is Appellant in Appeal No. 229/2009, prior to the appointed day, and in fact, it has duly come on record that the said notice was actually served on the land owner on 4th September, 1975, i.e. after the repealing of the provisions of section 35 of the Forests Act, the land in dispute cannot be termed to be a ‘private forest’ as contemplated u/s. 2(f)(iii) of the Act of 1975, inasmuch as the notice issued a day prior to the repealing of the provision of section 35, ceased to have effect after the repeal of the section 35. It is also interesting to point out here that in spite of the knowledge about the proposed repealing of section 35, the Department of Forest right from the coming into force of the Indian Forests Act, 1927 in the year 1927, till 29th August, 1975, i.e. till a day prior to the proposed repealing of the provision of section 35, did not take any move or action so as to protect the so-called ‘forest’ or ‘private forest’ and only a day prior to the appointed day, i.e. 30/8/1975, on 29/8/1975 just ‘issued’ a notice which was not served on the land owner, so as to accord him an opportunity of hearing or representing his case in order to protect his rights.… (i) The facts of present case are covered by two judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Godrej Boyce (supra) case and Rohan Nahar (supra) case. Cumulative reading of both judgments would indicate that a show cause notice granting time for objection cannot be reconciled with the final decision taken without service of notice and without hearing. Mere issuance of notice cannot clothe the State with authority to vest the land. (j) Mere issuance of notice under Section 35(3) of Indian Forest Act does not result in automatic vesting of the subject land under Section 3 of MPFA on the appointed date. Statutory requirement of service on the owner, publication of the notification and inquiry, must be satisfied before vesting of land under Section 3 of MPFA to the State. (k) Whereas, presently, the maximum land in question in the present Petition is owned and possessed by the Thane Municipal Corporation. So also, on the actual site, TMC has constructed 40Mtr DP Road and there is a TMT bus Depot in existence. TMC has reserved and allocated the funds for development of Garden, Maternity Home, Park, school and for other Municipal purposes. Hence, it is obvious that the said land is acquired for the urban usage and the Respondent has been denied any compensation. The TMC is very much aware that the due legal process under the MPFA has not been followed and no compensation has been paid under MPFA. Hence, it is obvious that the said land is acquired for the urban usage and the Respondent has been denied any compensation. The TMC is very much aware that the due legal process under the MPFA has not been followed and no compensation has been paid under MPFA. Hence, now that the land has to be acquired, compensation as per the provisions of “Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013” (RFCTLA), is mandated and the owner shall clearly fall under Section 3 (c) of the said Act so as to be compensated as per RFCTLA read with Section 126 of MRTP Act. 24. The learned Senior Advocate Mr. Balsara has contradicted the submissions of the State and has canvassed a host of grounds, which are summarised as under : [A]. Suppression and Misrepresentation by the Petitioner (Re: Para1.4) : 1. The Petitioner, has deliberately and willfully tried to mislead the Court by suppressing material facts. (a) The Petitioner has consciously stated that the alleged notice was served upon “D.Dayabhai”, while suppressing the crucial fact that : (i) The alleged notice was not served upon the original owner, namely M/s D.Dayabhai and Co. Pvt. Ltd.; (ii) The alleged notice was instead addressed to an incorrect and non-juristic entity, rendering the entire service void ab initio. (b) It is further an admitted position by the Petitioner that the said notice was received on 4 th September 1975, by D Dahyabhai and Co., and after the repeal of the relevant Act. (c) Once the statute itself stood repealed, no proceedings, rights, obligations or consequences could survive, much less be resurrected on the basis of an invalid and belated notice. [B]. Illegal Reliance on Inadmissible Evidence : (a) The Petitioner has heavily relied upon a xerox/photocopy of a registered post receipt, which is : (i) Inadmissible in evidence under the Indian Evidence Act; (ii) Neither primary evidence nor secondary evidence is led in accordance with law; (iii) Rejected during trial itself for want of proof. (b) It is a settled principle of law that mere photocopies do not constitute admissible evidence unless foundational requirements are satisfied. The Petitioner’s reliance on such inadmissible material vitiates the entire case and exposes the mala fide attempt to create a false record. [C]. (b) It is a settled principle of law that mere photocopies do not constitute admissible evidence unless foundational requirements are satisfied. The Petitioner’s reliance on such inadmissible material vitiates the entire case and exposes the mala fide attempt to create a false record. [C]. Testimony of Interested Witness : (a) The Petitioner has relied upon the statement of Shri Pakhre, who is : (i) An employee of the Forest Department; (ii) An interested and partisan witness; (iii) The very person whose conduct has created unnecessary litigation, confusion, and grave hardship to the Respondent. (b) Reliance on such a witness, without independent corroboration, cannot override statutory lapses, legal repeal, and absence of lawful service. [D]. Clear Case of Suppression of Material Facts : (a) The Petitioner has deliberately suppressed the following material facts : (i) That the alleged notice was served on the wrong person; (ii) That the alleged service is sought to be proved only by a xerox copy; (iii) That the notice was admittedly received after repeal of the Act; (iv) That there is no legally valid service upon the lawful owner. (v) That the Petitioner does not have any proof about actual dispatch of notice prior to the appointed day. (b) Such suppression strikes at the very root of the Petitioner’s case and disentitles the Petitioner from any equitable or discretionary relief. [E]. MRTP Act – Lapse of Reservation and Collusive Conduct : (a) Respondent No.1’s land in question falls under the development plan passed and published vide notification dated 1986 approved by the State of Maharashtra in the year 1991 for City of Thane after considering all objections and suggestions as per the statutory provisions of MRTP ACT 1966. This unequivocally establishes that the reference land is situated outside the notified boundary of Sanjay Gandhi National Park (SGNP), and that the Thane Municipal Corporation is the competent planning and implementation authority for the said land. (b) In view of the Development Plan reservation designating the land as a park, the Respondent has at all times refrained from carrying out any non-forest activities and, for the overall welfare and betterment of Thane City, has remained committed to preserving and maintaining its status as a park. (c) A valid notice under Section 127(2) of the MRTP Act was served; the copy of the said notice is enclosed for ready reference. (c) A valid notice under Section 127(2) of the MRTP Act was served; the copy of the said notice is enclosed for ready reference. (d) The Planning Authority failed to take steps within the statutory period. (e) The Respondent respectfully submits that, acknowledging the Petitioner’s contention that a park is an essential amenity for the citizens of Thane and respecting public sentiment and necessity, even though a notice under Section 127(2) of the MRTP Act was served and the reservation had lapsed due to inaction, the Respondent nonetheless accepted Transferable Development Rights (TDR) in lieu of monetary compensation for the development of the park. Accordingly, with the intention of enabling the Thane Municipal Corporation to develop and maintain the park reservation and preserve its natural character, the Respondent accepted the TDR for the overall betterment of the citizens of Thane. (f) The letter dated 8 th January, 2020 (Exh. H, page 120 of Writ Petition No.10024 of 2023) issued by TMC to the forest department clearly established the fact and willingness to Develop the park reservation for which last three paragraphs are reproduced as below : (g) It is further pertinent to note that the Land is acquired by the TMC, 7/12 extract is mutated in the name of TMC and pursuant to the order dated 12 th July, 2023 passed in Special Civil Suit No.35 of 2020, measurement was carried physically whereby the boundaries and lines of the area possessed by D Dayabhai and Company Pvt. Ltd., is earmarked in blue color dotted lines. The copy of the said Measurement is enclosed for ready reference. (h) Further, there are Minutes of the 112 th meeting of Regional Empowered Committee (REC) of the Regional Office, Ministry of Environment, Forest and climate Change, Nagpur, held on 6 th February, 2024 whereby the Agenda of the said Meeting was to discuss diversion of Forest land in favor of MMRDA Thane for construction of Twin Tunnel 2 Lanes, on each side. In the said proposal the petitioners land was also considered and the Forest consented MMRDA to construct the said twin tunnels. The above facts clearly establish that the land is already acquired and possessed by various state Government Authorities and falls outside the boundary of SGNP. [F]. In the said proposal the petitioners land was also considered and the Forest consented MMRDA to construct the said twin tunnels. The above facts clearly establish that the land is already acquired and possessed by various state Government Authorities and falls outside the boundary of SGNP. [F]. Conclusion : -The Petitioner’s case is built on; -Suppression of material facts; -Inadmissible evidence; -Invalid service of notice; -Proceedings post repeal of statute; -Collusive conduct between statutory authorities. -The Petitioner has, therefore, approbated and reprobated, abused the process of law, and is not entitled to any relief whatsoever. 25. COMMENTS OF RESPONDENT NO.1, ON THE PETITIONER’S REJOINDER (Summary of the written notes of arguments of Respondent No.1) (i) The Petitioner is raising a hyper technical issue that Respondent No.1 has taken this stand for the first time after 50 years. Said contention is not correct. Otherwise also, after the judgments in the Godrej & Boyce (supra) and Rohan Nahar (supra), the law is crystallised by the Supreme Court, that notice issued under section 35 (3) of IFA, has to be a valid notice and has to be served on the owner of the land. The burden to prove the validity of the notice is naturally on the Petitioner because Petitioner claims the land with the contention that its notice is valid. The Petitioner could have produced proof of actual issuance and dispatch of the concerned notice by producing the outward register, copy of postal receipt showing date of dispatch of notice, etc. Apart from mention of a number on the notice, there was deliberate failure to produce the outward register by the Forest Department. (ii) The reliance placed on the evidence of the Petitioner’s witness Mr. Pakhare is half hearted. Instead of relying upon what Pakhare has said, Petitioner could have directly produced the document of dispatch showing dispatch of notice prior to appointed day. Non-production of any such document itself demonstrates that Petitioner, till date, has no documentary proof to establish the issuance and dispatch of the notice prior to appointed day. (iii) Read paragraph 13.3, 13.4 and 13.5 of Rohan Nahar (supra), Page 59-60 of Citations filed by R1. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has clearly held that legislation must be construed strictly and Article 300A of the Constitution requires that no person is deprived of the property, save, by authority of law. (iii) Read paragraph 13.3, 13.4 and 13.5 of Rohan Nahar (supra), Page 59-60 of Citations filed by R1. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has clearly held that legislation must be construed strictly and Article 300A of the Constitution requires that no person is deprived of the property, save, by authority of law. When the statute prescribed a manner of doing a thing, it must be done in that manner or not at all. In paragraph 13.5 it is held that after the passage of nearly half a century, exercise of inquiry under Section 6 is largely academic and would not cure the absence of mandatory preconditions of notice served under Section 35 (3) of IFA and lawful progression towards the notification under Section 35 (1) of IFA. (iv) In view of the declaration of law by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above judgment and in the Godrej & Boyce (supra), it becomes the primary duty of the Petitioner to prove beyond doubt, the issuance/dispatch of notice prior to the appointed day regardless whether objection about date of actual issuance is taken at what stage? (v) The Forest Department, in a substantial number of cases, has not taken any action from 1927 till 29 th August, 1975 (Chintamani Velkar and present case). Godrej & Boyce (supra) has in paragraph 69 specifically observed that directions were issued to Collector with a draft copy of the MPFA annexed thereto on 27 th August, 1975 with instructions to take possession. But possession could not be taken over by the Petitioner, which fact is proved from their own letter dated 23 rd January, 1986 (Page 448 of additional affidavit in reply of Respondent No.1). 26. Comments of Respondent No.1 on the submissions of the Petitioner in paragraphs 2.1 to 2.5 of it’s Rejoinder (i) It is incorrect to state that, by virtue of pleadings in Writ Petition No.1026 of 1975, any judicious admissions are given by Respondent No.1 about receipt of notice by Respondent No.1 itself. Refer order dated 27 th December, 2004 of the Deputy Collector passed after remand (Page Nos.73-86 of WP). Page Nos.75-76 of the said order clearly demonstrate that it has been the consistent stand of Respondent No.1 that notice was addressed to a wrong person, viz., D. Dahyabhai & Co. and not to Respondent No.1, which is private limited company who is the actual owner of subject land. Page Nos.75-76 of the said order clearly demonstrate that it has been the consistent stand of Respondent No.1 that notice was addressed to a wrong person, viz., D. Dahyabhai & Co. and not to Respondent No.1, which is private limited company who is the actual owner of subject land. One Chimanlal Shah was examined in that regard, who stated that he is accountant of D. Dahyabhai & Co. which is a different entity. Even the Deputy Collector has accepted this fact, but discarded it by ranking it as a clerical error. (ii) MRT has accepted the fact that notice was addressed to and received by D. Dahyabhai & Co. (Chimanlal Shah, an employee) which is an entirely different entity and held that this shows that the company who was the real owner of the land (Respondent No.1), was never served with the notice under Section 35 (3) of IFA. MRT further held that the Deputy Collector was wrong in branding a fact to be a clerical error, and held that the notice was not served upon the land owner (Respondent No.1) as contemplated by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Godrej & Boyce (supra)judgment. (iii) In spite of the above stated specific conclusion by MRT, the Petitioner in the present WP has not demonstrated through any document that the notice was served on the actual owner, i.e., Respondent No.1. (iv) Respondent No.1 has filed Writ Petition No.1026 of 1975 because it came to know from Chimanlal Shah the Accountant of the said separate entity, viz., D Dahaybhai & Co. that it had received a notice in respect of Respondent No.1’s land and Respondent No.1 was the affected party. (v) Godrej & Boyce (supra) and Rohan Nahar (supra)mandate issuance of a valid notice to the real land owner and in the manner prescribed under CPC, so also its publication. (vi) The Petitioner, neither in the Writ Petition nor in the rejoinder, has demonstrated compliance of these preconditions of valid notice. 27. Comments of Respondent No.1 on the submissions of the Petitioner in paragraphs 3, 4 , 5, 6 and 7 of the Rejoinder : (i) The submissions made in the said paragraph 3.1 and the reliance placed upon the judgment of Supreme Court in Peacock Plywood Case or upon Philson (supra) on evidence, is wholly irrelevant and misleading. 27. Comments of Respondent No.1 on the submissions of the Petitioner in paragraphs 3, 4 , 5, 6 and 7 of the Rejoinder : (i) The submissions made in the said paragraph 3.1 and the reliance placed upon the judgment of Supreme Court in Peacock Plywood Case or upon Philson (supra) on evidence, is wholly irrelevant and misleading. In the Peacock case, the Insurance Company was not allowed to resile from the representation made by it on account of waiver of privilege and in order to advance a beneficial legislation in favour of the beneficiary. In Rohan Nahar’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that MPFA is an ex-proprietary legislation so Peacock case is not applicable to the present case. (ii) Admittedly said letters dated 5 th July, 1979 and 28 th August, 1979 and also the application dated 19 th January, 1980 (Page No.63 of Respondent No.1 compilation), were issued without prejudice to the pending Writ. By filing an appeal against Deputy Collector’s acceptance order dated 3 rd June, 1980 before MRT by the Petitioner, indicates that the offer given by Respondent No.1 was without prejudice. This fact is evident from the whole reading of the MRT order dated 15 th October, 1982 (Page 48-56 of Writ Petition). (iii) From the remand order dated 15 th December, 1982 particularly paragraphs 8, 13, 15, 16, 17 and 22 as well as the operative part, it is evident that the matter was remanded for fresh inquiry in respect of entire land admeasuring 204 acres. Accordingly, the Deputy Collector framed issues (Page No.75 of the Writ Petition). It is only in the Appeal No.165 of 2005 before the MRT, that the Petitioner has taken a stand that the inquiry was restricted to 24 acres and that Respondent No.1 has concealed that 168 acres is forest. (iv) Paragraph 11 of the MRT order demonstrates that a negative finding was given on issue no.1 and accordingly the entire land was held as non-forest. Affirmative finding was given on issue no.2 by holding that proceeding conducted by Deputy Collector stands vitiated because of non-service of notice under Section 35 (3)of IFA upon the real land owner (Respondent No.1). (v) The Petitioner, neither in the WP nor in the rejoinder, has demonstrated that there was valid service upon the true owner and/or the subject land comes within the definition of private forest. (v) The Petitioner, neither in the WP nor in the rejoinder, has demonstrated that there was valid service upon the true owner and/or the subject land comes within the definition of private forest. The Petitioner has not even filed on record the alleged notice dated 29 th August, 1975 (we find the photostat copy at page 277). Without showing a single document from the record and without satisfying the Court about actual issuance and service upon real land owner, i.e., Respondent No.1, an attempt has been made by the Petitioner to create confusion by way of misleading this Court by misinterpreting the binding ratio of Godrej & Boyce (supra) and Rohan Nahar (supra) judgments. (vi) It is incorrect to state that in Writ Petition No.1026 of 1975, Respondent No.1 has admitted on oath that the land was put to non-forest use only to a limited extent. It is not Respondent No.1 who has to prove that the subject land is not forest, but it is for the Petitioner to prove that the subject land comes within the definition of forest. In fact, since 1975 it had been consistent stand of Respondent No.1 that the subject land does not come within the definition of forest. The remand order dated 15 th October, 1982 was to make inquiry in that regard. An inquiry panchnama was carried out by the Petitioner’s own officers in which it is recorded that more than 107 acres of land was under non agricultural user (read page nos.65-67 of compilation of Respondent No.1). (vii) The Petitioner has attempted to misinterpret paragraph 72 of Godrej & Boyce (supra) judgment by contending that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has not used the word served in close proximity and, therefore, for any notice to become a pipeline notice, the requirement is that the issuance should be in close proximity and not service before appointed day. Said interpretation is incorrect because in the earlier paragraphs of the Godrej & Boyce (supra) judgment, the word issued used in Section 2 (f) (iii) of MPFA is interpreted as issued and served and it is specifically held that service is inherent in the word ‘issued’. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, therefore, never intended in paragraph 72 to exclude service. As per Godrej & Boyce (supra) judgment, pipeline notice means issued in close proximity before appointed day and served. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, therefore, never intended in paragraph 72 to exclude service. As per Godrej & Boyce (supra) judgment, pipeline notice means issued in close proximity before appointed day and served. Godrej & Boyce (supra) judgment, therefore, overrules its previous judgment in Chintamani Velkar (supra) to that extent, because in that matter also service was after appointed day. (viii) Petitioner in the rejoinder and/or in the rejoinder argument unnecessarily attempted to point out certain orders passed in PIL No.305 of 1995. On the basis of said orders, Petitioner tried to urge that even the subject land of the present petition being included in SGNP Division, becomes forest land and vest with the State Government. Said argument is misleading. It is respectfully submitted that orders passed in said PIL are passed in different context and not related to the subject land. In any case, subject land, i.e., Survey No.59/1 was not the subject matter of said PIL. Admittedly, Respondent No.1 who is the owner of Survey No.59/1 was not party to the said PIL. In fact, present Petition is a dispute between private land owner and forest department and this dispute has nothing to do with the said PIL or orders passed therein or in any other matter. (ix) The issue involved in the present petition is that whether by merely saying that forest has issued notice dated 29 th August, 1975 under Section 35 (3) of IFA (to the wrong addressee and not to Respondent No.1) whether land of Respondent No.1, which it has purchased from High Court Receiver in 1960, would vest with the State under Section 3 of MPFA and that too without complying with other statutory pre-requisites such as issuance of notification under Section 35 (1) of IFA, giving opportunity of hearing to the owners, etc. For the facts involved in the present matter, relevant judgments are those delivered by the Supreme Court in Godrej & Boyce (supra) case and Rohan Nahar (supra) case. (x) On this backdrop, stating that Government has included the land bearing Survey No.59/1 in SGNP forest division, is a malafide contention and such inclusion, without giving opportunity of hearing to the land owner, viz., Respondent No.1 would be otherwise be violative of fundamental rights of Respondent No.1 under Article 14 of the Constitution. (x) On this backdrop, stating that Government has included the land bearing Survey No.59/1 in SGNP forest division, is a malafide contention and such inclusion, without giving opportunity of hearing to the land owner, viz., Respondent No.1 would be otherwise be violative of fundamental rights of Respondent No.1 under Article 14 of the Constitution. In any case, such alleged inclusion in SGNP division does not amount to automatic vesting of the subject land under Section 3 of MPFA, as well as, such inclusion in SGNP division is violative of Article 300A of the Constitution. (xi) It is otherwise clear from notification dated 16 th January, 1996 (Page Nos.445-447, i.e., Exh.A of Additional Affidavit of Respondent No.1) that Survey No.59/1 is not within the notified area of SGNP. The Petitioner’s own letter dated 23/01/1986 (Page 448 i.e. Exh.D of Additional Affidavit of R1) clearly shows that possession of Survey No.59/1 could not be taken over by Forest Department. There are no document such as Panchnama, Possession receipt, etc. filed on record to demonstrate that Petitioner ever took legal and physical possession of subject land from Respondent No.1. (xii) Admittedly, from 2019, about 104 acres of land out of subject land is in possession of TMC. About 18 acres of land is under cultivation of Respondent No.2. Upon 17 acres 19 gunthas of land, a village settlement by name Kokanipada, came up. Rest of the land is under cultivation of Respondent No.1 and/or under N A user, quarrying operations, horticulture, construction of godown, roads, etc. In the circumstances, it is fanciful to state that subject land admeasuring 193 acres 7 gunthas and 4 annas is within SGNP forest division. The TILR report recently carried out also demonstrate that subject land is not in possession of SGNP or within SGNP forest division. (xiii) The Petitioner’s reliance on Section 144 of CPC whereby principle of restitution is stipulated, is improper, irrelevant and not applicable to the facts involved in the present matter. It is evident that subject land never vested in Forest Department under Section 3 of MPFA because for such vesting all statutory pre conditions mentioned in Section 35 (1), 34 (A), and 38 of IFA have not been complied with. Unless there is a vesting, there is no question of restitution. It is evident that subject land never vested in Forest Department under Section 3 of MPFA because for such vesting all statutory pre conditions mentioned in Section 35 (1), 34 (A), and 38 of IFA have not been complied with. Unless there is a vesting, there is no question of restitution. (xiv) The entire rejoinder including submissions made in paragraphs 4, 5, 6 & 7 of the rejoinder are misleading and a definite attempt to wrongly distinguish binding effect of judicial precedent of Godrej & Boyce (supra) case and Rohan Nahar (supra)cCase on the basis of immaterial facts. (xiii) It will be appropriate to point out paragraph 14.5 and 14.6 of Rohan Nahar (supra) judgment, which are reproduced hereunder : 14.5. When a judgment minimises a binding ratio, ignores missing statutory steps, and seeks to distinguish on immaterial facts, it creates an appearance of a reluctance to accept precedent. Such an approach conveys a major of pettiness that is inconsistent with the detachment that judicial reasoning demands. In our view this is an unfortunate departure from the discipline of stare decisis. 14.6. We accordingly hold that the present appeals are indistinguishable in principle from Godrej and Boyce (Supra). The record discloses the same jurisdictional defects of non-service of a notice under section 35 (3) of IFA, the same absence of a final notification under Section 35 (1) of IFA, and the same want of contemporaneous steps under Section 4,5,6 and 7 of the MPFA Act. In such circumstances the High Court could not consistently with Article 141 of the Constitution avoid the binding ratio by treating immaterial differences as determinative. In our opinion fidelity to binding precedent and to the statutory scheme admits of no other conclusion than that the impugned order must be set aside. 28. Case law relief upon by Respondent No.1, particularly regarding effect of repeal, saving clause, retrospective application of Judgment of Supreme Court. (Summary from the written notes of arguments of Respondent No. 1) (i) C Golakhnath and Others v/s. State of Punjab 1967 SCC (Online) SC 14 (Paragraphs 45, 50, 51, 52) and C.B. Gautam v/s. Union of India 1993 (1) Supreme Court Cases 78 (Paragraphs 43 and 46). These two judgments were cited to demonstrate that judgment interpreting the legal principles or provisions have retrospective effect. These two judgments were cited to demonstrate that judgment interpreting the legal principles or provisions have retrospective effect. Whenever Supreme Court intends to give prospective effect then it is specifically stated so in the concerned judgment. (ii) Godrej & Boyce (supra) and Rohan Nahar (supra), judgments are retrospective in nature. Interpretation of provisions of MPFA, IFA, etc. made therein, has retrospective effect and hence those two judgments are applicable to the facts involved in the present case. (iii) In fact, even the Petitioner in their note have admitted that Godrej & Boyce (supra) and Rohan Nahar (supra) judgments are relevant for the present matter, but Petitioner made incorrect attempt to distinguish them with the present facts. (iv) Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Chintamani Velkar (supra), has also been referred to demonstrate that even in that case, S. 35 (3) notice was dated 29 th August, 1975 but served on 12 th September, 1975, i.e., after repeal of Section 35 of IFA. Thus, said notice was also issued in closed proximity but not served before appointed day. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said case of Chintamani Velkar (supra), held that notice issued under Section 35 (3) would in itself be sufficient if such notice is issued before the appointed day and there is no need for any service of such notice before 30 th August, 1975. Said view of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Chintamani Velkar (supra) is overruled in Godrej & Boyce (supra) (Para 62) by holding that mere issuance of notice is not sufficient, but issuance includes service as well as mandatory compliance of all preconditions of served notice under Section 35 (5) of IFA. Thus, the view taken by Deputy Collector in Chintamani Velkar (supra) case in a sense is upheld and confirmed in Godrej & Boyce (supra) case by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Even in the present matter notice is dated 29 th August, 1975 and served on 4 th September, 1975 (that too on wrong addressee), i.e., after appointed day, viz., 30 th August, 1975. Thus, the judgment of Godrej & Boyce (supra) has to be made applicable to the present facts by holding that notice was served on 4 th September, 1975, i.e., after appointed day and that too on the wrong addressee and hence, is void and not enforceable at law. Thus, the judgment of Godrej & Boyce (supra) has to be made applicable to the present facts by holding that notice was served on 4 th September, 1975, i.e., after appointed day and that too on the wrong addressee and hence, is void and not enforceable at law. (v) In the case of Pernod Richord India Pvt. Ltd. v/s.State of Madhya Pradesh & Anr. 2024 (8) SCC 742 , paragraph 13 states that repealed provision will cease to operate from the date of repeal and the substituted provision will commence to operate from the date of its substitution). (vi) In the case of Hikal Ltd. v/s. Union of India 2025 DGLS (Bom) 2724, the aspect of repeal of enactment and its enforceability after repeal, is discussed at length by referring to the Constitution Bench. Kindly read paragraph 78 of said judgment in which paragraphs 36 to 40 of Constitution Bench judgments are reproduced. (vii) In the case of Kolhapur Cane Sugar Works Ltd.v/s. Union of India (2000) 2 Supreme Court Cases 536, in paragraph 37 it is held that “The position is well known that at common law, the normal effect of repealing a statute or deleting a provision is to obliterate it from the statute-book as completely as if it had never been passed, and the statute must be considered as a law that never existed. To this rule, an exception is engrafted by the provisions of Section 6 (1). If a provision of a statute is unconditionally omitted without a saving clause in favour of pending proceedings, all actions must stop where the omission finds them, and if final relief has not been granted before the omission goes into effect, it cannot be granted afterwards.” In the case of MPFA, Section 24 (2) is a limited saving clause applicable only in respect of land restored under Section 22 (A) of MPFA. Said saving clause is not applicable in respect of Section 2 (f) (iii) where issuance of notice under Section 35 (3) is stipulated. No doubt Godrej Case states that Section 2 (f) (iii) itself in a sense is a saving clause, but same can be made applicable only to those notices issued and served before appointed day). 29. SUBMISSIONS BY ADV. KARL TAMBOLY ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO. 2.1, and 2.3 to 2.12. No doubt Godrej Case states that Section 2 (f) (iii) itself in a sense is a saving clause, but same can be made applicable only to those notices issued and served before appointed day). 29. SUBMISSIONS BY ADV. KARL TAMBOLY ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO. 2.1, and 2.3 to 2.12. (Summary from the written notes of submissions) (1) Declaration of Respondent No. 2’s tenancy under section 70(b) of the Bombay Tenancy Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 has attained finality. (a) Since the year 1960, Respondent No. 2 has been a tenant of Respondent No. 1 and in actual occupation, possession and cultivation of the land admeasuring 18 acres 18 gunthas bearing Gat No. 59/1 at Manpada village, Thane (“Smaller Land”). [Respondent No.2’s LRs Affidavit in Reply dated 11th December2019, pg. 155, paras 3 and 4] (b) On 29 th August 1975, alleged Notice claimed to be issued by the Deputy Conservator of Forests under section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 (“Forest Act”) in respect of the land admeasuring 204 acres, 8 gunthas and 8 annas and bearing Gat No. 59/1 at Manpada village, Thane (“Larger Land”). The Smaller Land forms a part of the Larger Land. Respondent No. 1 has failed to produce any proof of issuance of the alleged notice on 29th August 1975. (c) Criminal Case No.5227 of 1982 was filed by the Maharashtra Forest Department against Respondent No. 2 under section 26 of the Forest Act for the offence of trespassing on forest land, which was dismissed by the Hon’ble Judicial Magistrate Fist Class Thane vide Order dated 30th September 1992. [Exhibit A to Respondent No.2’s LRs Affidavit in Reply dated 11th December 2019, pg. 160 at pg. 168] (d) The said Order records the following admissions made by the Maharashtra Forest Department personnel (viz. PW-1 and PW-4) during their cross-examination as witnesses in the criminal proceedings filed against Respondent No. 2: (e) The Smaller Land was private land of Respondent No. 2 prior to it being declared as a forest in the year1975. [para 10 at Pg 164]. (f) Respondent No. 2 was in possession of the Smaller Land prior to the year 1975. [para 10 at Pg 165] (g) Smaller Land originally belonged to Respondent No. 1 and Respondent No. 2 has been cultivating the said land as a tenant. [para 10 at Pg 164]. (f) Respondent No. 2 was in possession of the Smaller Land prior to the year 1975. [para 10 at Pg 165] (g) Smaller Land originally belonged to Respondent No. 1 and Respondent No. 2 has been cultivating the said land as a tenant. [para 10 at Pg 163] (h) Nothing has come on record to show that the Forest Department has taken possession of the Smaller Land. [para10 at Pg 165]. [Exhibit A to Respondent No.2’s LRs Affidavit in Reply dated 11th December 2019, para 10 at pgs. 164 and 165 and para 13 at pg.166] (i) An admission made by a party in a previous criminal proceeding, is admissible in subsequent civil proceedings. [Seth Ramdayal Jat vs. Laxmi Prasad, (2009) 11 SCC 545 , at paras20 and 21]. (j) The Petitioner’s Criminal Appeal No. 172 of 1993 against the Hon’ble Judicial Magistrate First Class Thane’s Order was dismissed by Judgment dated 14th June 1993 of this Hon’ble Court, which held: 1. Respondent No. 2 is in possession as a tenant of Respondent No.1 prior to the land being declared as forest land. [Pg. No.171]. 2. The construction found on the land is 9 years old and hence no fresh construction or clearing of forest is proved against Respondent No. 2. [Pg No.171] . 3. No appeal was filed by the Petitioner against the Hon’ble High Court’s judgment, and therefore the findings of the Hon’ble High Court in the said judgment have attained finality. [Exhibit B to Respondent No.2’s LRs Affidavit in Reply dated 11th December 2019, pg. 169 at pg. 170] (k) In March 1991, Respondent No.1 attempted to interfere with Respondent No.2’s possession of the Smaller Land, which led Respondent No. 2 to file Application No.16 of 1991 before the Tahsildar ALT Thane under section 70(b) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (“BTAL Act”) for declaration of his tenancy in respect of the Smaller Land.[Respondent No.2’s LRs Affidavit in Reply dated 11th December 2019, pg. 155, para 6 and Exhibit C, at pg. 171] (l) By the Tahsildar’s Order dated 23rd February2004, Respondent No. 2 has been declared as a tenant of the Smaller Land since the year 1960. [Exhibit D to Respondent No.2’s LRs Affidavit in Reply dated 11th December 2019, pg. 174 at pg. 155, para 6 and Exhibit C, at pg. 171] (l) By the Tahsildar’s Order dated 23rd February2004, Respondent No. 2 has been declared as a tenant of the Smaller Land since the year 1960. [Exhibit D to Respondent No.2’s LRs Affidavit in Reply dated 11th December 2019, pg. 174 at pg. 179 (English translation at pg.186)] (m) An Order passed under section 70(b) is appealable under section 74(1)(a) of the BTAL Act and the Petitioner could have challenged the Tahsildar’s Order even though the Petitioner was not a party to those proceedings; yet no appeal was filed by the Petitioner. [Ebrahim Yusuf Lambe vs. Abdul Razak Abdul Rahiman Mulla, AIR 1977 Bom 22 , at para 9; Nookala Setharamaiah vs. Kotaiah Naidum, (1970) 2 SCC 13 , at para 24 and State of Kerala vs. Mohammed Basheer, (2019) 4 SCC 260 , at paras 19 to 20] (n) Respondent No. 1 filed Tenancy Appeal No. 109 of 2015 before the Sub-Divisional Officer challenging the Tahsildar’s Order, and the delay of 11 years in filing the said appeal was condoned by the Sub-Divisional Officer’s Order dated 23rd February 2017. [Exhibit E to Affidavit in Reply dated 11th December 2019 of Respondent No. 2’s LRs, pg. 187 at pg. 195.] (o) By Order dated 4th May 2017, the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal allowed Respondent No. 2’s Revision Application No. 150 of 2017 against the Sub-Divisional Officer’s Order and dismissed Respondent No. 1’s Tenancy Appeal. [Exhibit F to Affidavit in Reply dated 11th December 2019 of Respondent No.2’s LRs, pg. 197 at pg. 207] (p) Respondent No. 1’s Civil Writ Petition No. 6351 of 2017 filed to challenge the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal’s Order, was dismissed by this Hon’ble Court’s Judgment dated 23 rd January 2019. [Exhibit G to Affidavit in Reply dated 11 th December2019 of Respondent No. 2’s LRs, pg. 208 at pg. 225, para 25] (q) Respondent No. 1’s Special Leave Petition (C)No. 9998 of 2017 filed to challenge this Hon’ble High Court’ Judgment, was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s Order dated 29th April 2019. [Exhibit H to Affidavit in Reply dated 11th December 2019 of Respondent No. 2’s LRs, pg. 226] (r) Respondent No.1’s Review Petition No. 366 of2020 filed against the dismissal of its Special Leave Petition, was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s Order dated 6th February 2020. [Exhibit H to Affidavit in Reply dated 11th December 2019 of Respondent No. 2’s LRs, pg. 226] (r) Respondent No.1’s Review Petition No. 366 of2020 filed against the dismissal of its Special Leave Petition, was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s Order dated 6th February 2020. [Page 7 & 8 of List of dates Tendered in Court] (s) The Tahasildar’s Order declaring Respondent No.2 as a tenant of the Smaller Land has therefore attained finality. It therefore stands established that the Respondent No.2 was the tenant in respect of the smaller land, at least since the year 1960. [Ashalata Anand Dabholkar vs. Vrindevati Tukaram Bhaire, (2005) 1 Mah LJ 418, at para 9 and Gulabrao Laxman Kolhe vs. Tahsildar, Writ Petition No.2759 of 2018 dated 24 th July, 2025, at para 8] (t) The Tahsildar’s Order cannot be reopened in collateral proceedings. [Union of India vs. S.P. Sharma, (2014) 6 SCC 351 , at para 76 and Pankaj Bhargava vs. Mohinder Nath, (1991) 1 SCC 556 , at para 20]. Therefore, it is clear that the attempt on the part of the Petitioner to raise factual controversies with respect to the tenancy and possession of Respondent No.2 in respect of the smaller land is in inapposite and impermissible without prejudice to the same, it is submitted that this Hon’ble Court ought not to enter into factual controversies/ disputed questions of facts in exercise of its writ jurisdiction [Gunwant Kaur vs Municipal Committee (1969) 3 SCC 769 ]. (u) The smaller land thus being held by Respondent No.2 as a tenant and lawfully being under his cultivation on 30th August 1975 (the appointed day on which the Private Forest came into force), the same is exempted from being declared as private forest under section 3 (2) of the Private Forest Act, 1975 [State of Kerala vs. Mohammed Basheer, (2019) 4 SCC 260 , para 17 to 21]. (v) Deputy Collector (Private Forests) passed an Order dated 3 rd June, 1980 under Section 6 of the MPFA Act, directing that out of the land bearing Gat No. 59/1 at Manpada: (w) The definition of the term ‘private forest’ under section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA Act must be strictly construed. [Godrej & Boyce Manufacturing Co. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 3 SCC 430 , at para 73] [HPC vs Darius Shapur Chenai 2005 (7) SCC627, para 29]. [Godrej & Boyce Manufacturing Co. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 3 SCC 430 , at para 73] [HPC vs Darius Shapur Chenai 2005 (7) SCC627, para 29]. (x) The Revenue Department mutated Respondent No. 1’s name in respect of the Larger Land in the revenue records under Mutation Entry No. 1056, which was subsequently confirmed by the Sub-Divisional Officer’s Order dated 31 st January, 2019 in the Petitioner’ Revision Application No. 182/2018 which was filed to challenge the said Mutation Entry. [Respondent No. 1’s Additional Affidavit dated 9 th April 2021, Exhibit D at pg. 490 and Exhibit E, pg. 492 at pg. 499] (y) The Sub-Divisional Officer’s said Order dated31 st January 2019 has not been challenged by the Petitioner and has, therefore, attained finality. [Respondent No. 1’s Additional Affidavit dated 9 th April 2021, at pg. 438, para 8] (z) Manpada Village does not fall within boundaries of Sanjay Gandhi National Park: (aa) The Maharashtra Forest Department’s Notification dated 16 th January, 1996 under section 35(4) of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 specifying the boundaries of the Sanjay Gandhi National Park, does not include the Larger Land (which includes the Smaller Land) within the said boundaries. [Exhibit N to Respondent No.1 Affidavit in Reply dated 25 th November 2019, pg. 427. Having not included the Larger land in the aforesaid notification, it is now not open for the Petitioner to contend that the same is a part of SNGP. It is well settled that a party cannot be permitted appropriate and reprobate [Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation. vs. Diamond & Gem Development Corporation Ltd., (2013) 5 SCC 470 para 15 & 16] (bb) Respondent No. 1 has also admitted that the Larger Land (which includes the Smaller Land) does not form part of the Sanjay Gandhi National Park. [Respondent No.1 Affidavit in Reply dated 25 th November, 2019, para 24 at pg. 275] (cc) Respondent No. 2’s name has been mutated in respect of the Smaller Land in the revenue records. (dd) By a common Judgment and Order dated 24 th March, 2008, the Hon’ble Bombay High Court dismissed the Writ Petitions filed by Godrej & Boyce Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (“Godrej”) and others challenging the notices issued by the Forest Department under section 35(3) of the Forest Act. (dd) By a common Judgment and Order dated 24 th March, 2008, the Hon’ble Bombay High Court dismissed the Writ Petitions filed by Godrej & Boyce Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (“Godrej”) and others challenging the notices issued by the Forest Department under section 35(3) of the Forest Act. (ee) In Special Leave Petition (C) No. 11509 of 2008 filed against the Hon’ble High Court’s said Judgment, Respondent No. 2 filed Interim Application No. 18 of 2010 for impleadment therein and Interim Application No. 19 of 2010 praying for a direction that Respondent No. 2’s Smaller Land is non-forest land and should be free to be developed under Development Control Regulations and municipal bye laws. [Exhibit D to Additional Affidavit dated 21st September 2023 of Respondent No. 2’s LRs, pg. 512 at pg. 524.] (ff) By Judgment dated 30 th January 2014, the Hon’ble Supreme Court allowed the appeals filed by Godrej and others against the Hon’ble High Court’s said Judgment and quashed and set aside the impugned notices issued under section 35(3) of the Forest Act. [Exhibit C to Respondent No. 1’s Additional Affidavit dated 9th April 2021, pg. 450 at pgs. 488 and 489, paras 87 to 91] (gg) The Hon’ble Supreme Court’s Order also allowed Respondent No. 2’s impleadment application and consequently the Smaller Land was exempted from being declared as forest land. [Exhibit C to Respondent No. 1’s Additional Affidavit dated 9th April 2021, pg. 450 at pg. 488, para 90] (hh) By Order dated 16 th March 2015, the Sub-Divisional Officer Thane exempted the Smaller Land from reservation as a ‘private forest’ under section 3(2) of the MPFA Act and directed mutation of Respondent No. 2’s name in respect of the Smaller Land in the revenue records. [Exhibit H to Additional Affidavit dated 21st September 2023 of Respondent No. 2’s LRs, pg. 565 at pg. 567] (ii) By Order dated 27 th March, 2015, the District Collector, Thane stayed the said Order of the Thane Sub-Divisional Officer. [Exhibit I to Additional Affidavit of Respondent No.2 LR’s dated 21st September 2023, pg. 568 at pg. 571] (jj) By letter dated 9 th July, 2015, the Divisional Commissioner (Konkan Division) directed the District Collector to vacate the stay on the said Order of the Sub-Divisional Officer. [Exhibit J to Additional Affidavit of Respondent No.2 LR’s dated21st September 2023, pg. 572] 30. 568 at pg. 571] (jj) By letter dated 9 th July, 2015, the Divisional Commissioner (Konkan Division) directed the District Collector to vacate the stay on the said Order of the Sub-Divisional Officer. [Exhibit J to Additional Affidavit of Respondent No.2 LR’s dated21st September 2023, pg. 572] 30. COMPILATION OF JUDGMENTS RELIED UPON BY RESPONDENT NOS.2.1, 2.3 TO 2.12. (Summarised from the written notes of submissions) 31. SUMMARY OF THE WRITTEN NOTES OF SUBMISSIONS TENDERED BY SENIOR ADVOCATE, MR. R S APTE, FOR THE THANE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION [The written submissions on behalf of the Thane Municipal Corporation are in support of it’s common stand in both the Petitions, considering that TMC has acquired 104 acres of land of the Company and has taken possession of the same]. 31.1. The Petitioner submitted the proposal dated 3.07.2018, through its architect for grant of DRC in lieu of the above- mentioned land, as per the provisions under Regulation No. Appendix N.N.1.5 (a) read with Appendix W of the Development Control Regulations, 1994, for grant of T.D.R. to the Thane Municipal Corporation (page No. 90 of the Petition). 31.2. Pursuant to the said proposal Transfer Deed dated 24 th May, 2019 was executed between the Petitioner and the Corporation. Recitals therein clearly indicate that the Petitioner shall be entitled to be awarded Development Rights and/or TDR in accordance with the provisions of the said Development Control Regulations, 1994, and also as per Government Notification dated 29.01.2016 and the amended order dated 02.05.2016 for surrender of the said reserved land (page 99 of the Petition). 31.3. Regulation 4.1.2 of the Notification dated 29 th January, 2016 reads as under: “4.1.2 – DRC shall be issued only after the land is surrendered to the Municipal Corporation free of cost and free from encumbrances, and after levelling the land to the surrounding ground level, and after constructing/erecting a 1.5 m high compound wall/fencing, i.e. brick/stone wall up to 0.60 m above ground level and fencing above that up to the remaining height with a gate, at the cost of the owner and to the satisfaction of the Municipal Commissioner. Provided that, if on certain lands such construction/erection of compound wall/fencing is prohibited or restricted by any regulation, then the quantum of Transferable Development Rights (TDR) shall be reduced as prescribed in the proviso to Clause4.1.1.” It is mandatory for the Petitioner to comply with the above regulation before issuance/ grant of TDR/DRC. 31.4. Regulation 7.1 of the Notification dated 29 th January, 2016 reads as under: “7.1 – The Commissioner, before issuing DRC, shall verify and satisfy himself that the ownership and title of the land proposed for surrender is with the applicant, and get the Record of Rights corrected in the name of the Planning Authority.” It is incumbent upon the Petitioner to get the Record of Rights mutated in the name of the Planning Authority. 31.5. The recitals in the Transfer Deed dated 24 th May, 2019 also indicate that the Petitioner had all along represented that they have clear and marketable title, free from all encumbrances. 31.6. It is to be noted that the Petitioner was aware of the filing of Writ Petition No. 3205 of 2018 by the Forest Department of State of Maharashtra, impugning the order dated 30 th June, 2017 passed by the MRT, Mumbai. This fact can be ascertained from Paragraph No.17 of the present Petition. In view of pendency of the petition NOC of the forest was required form the petitioner. 31.7. By order dated 25 th November, 2022 passed in Appeal from Order No. 1051 of 2019, the order dated 10 th October, 2019 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Thane, was modified, and the Respondent Corporation was directed to allot TDR/DRC in favour of the Petitioners. 31.8. It is to be noted that the Corporation is and was always ready and willing to allot TDR/DRC in favour of the Petitioner, subject to compliance as contemplated under the Development Control Regulations. The Respondents, in their affidavit dated 27 th November, 2025, especially in Paragraph No.19, have clearly averred that the Corporation is ready and willing to grant TDR, and that a letter dated 10 th July, 2025, which is in tune with the Development Control Regulations, has been issued to the Petitioners, thereby directing them to comply with the requisitions raised therein (page 438 of the affidavit in reply filed by the Corporation). 31.9. 31.9. It is to be noted that in response to the letter dated 10 th July, 2025, the Petitioners responded by reply dated 15 th July, 2025, and as per Paragraph No.4 of the said reply, the Petitioners agreed to erect fencing in the form of metal sheets and stated that they would initiate the said work in the near future (page 442, para 4 of the affidavit in reply). Further, by letter dated 6 th October, 2025 issued by the Petitioners in response to the Corporation’s letter dated 10 th July, 2025, the Petitioners have clearly admitted in clause (f) that the work of erecting the compound wall around the park reservation has already been initiated under the supervision of a security guard, which can be verified by the Corporation. Clause (j) of the letter dated 6 th October, 2025 also records that the Petitioners assured that they would erect the compound wall within six months and hand it over to the Thane Municipal Corporation. (Page Nos. 465 and 466 of the Affidavit in reply 27 th November, 2025 of corporation). 31.10. The Forest Department, being an authority entrusted with environmental protection, has raised objections that have placed TMC in a dilemma as to whether Development Rights Certificates (DRC) can be granted against the reservation in question. Further, the Petitioner has failed to comply with several mandatory conditions prescribed under the Unified Development Control and Promotion Regulations, 2020 (UDCPR-2020). These include: 31.11. 1. Measurement of the reserved land by the TILR in the presence of all concerned parties, namely the Forest Department, TMC, and the Petitioner; Mutation and reflection of the reserved land in the name of Thane Municipal Corporation by way of an independent and separate 7/12 extract or Property Card, clearly and unambiguously recording TMC as the owner; and 31.11.2. Handover of vacant, unencumbered physical possession of the reserved land to TMC in terms of Regulation 11.2 of the UDCPR-2020. 31.12. It is submitted that TMC has never been handed over physical possession of the writ land. Consequently, the further process for issuance of the DRC has remained incomplete, along with other mandatory prerequisites under the UDCPR-2020. 31.13. In respect of the compliances sought by the Corporation from the Petitioners in its letter dated 10 th July, 2025, all such compliances are in consonance with the Development Control Regulations and are required to be complied with. 31.14. Consequently, the further process for issuance of the DRC has remained incomplete, along with other mandatory prerequisites under the UDCPR-2020. 31.13. In respect of the compliances sought by the Corporation from the Petitioners in its letter dated 10 th July, 2025, all such compliances are in consonance with the Development Control Regulations and are required to be complied with. 31.14. The Respondent Corporation issued a letter dated 6 th August, 2025 to the Deputy Superintendent of Land Records, thereby requesting measurement of the land under park reservation and handing over the measurement plan to the Corporation (pages450 to 452). 31.15. The Respondent Corporation also issued a letter dated 6 th August, 2025 to the Tahsildar, Thane, thereby requesting him to take steps to change the Record of Rights in favour of the Thane Municipal Corporation (pages 453 to 455). 31.16. In other similar matter, TMC had issued three DRCs to the Petitioner after following due procedure; however, the transfer and utilization of the said DRCs were subsequently prohibited after objections raised by Forest Department. Aggrieved by such prohibition, the Petitioner approached this Hon’ble Court by filing Writ Petition No. 6603 of 2023, which is presently sub-judice. In the said proceedings, this Hon’ble Court, by order dated 15 th December, 2023, observed that considering the complexion of the issue, it would be appropriate to defer the hearing of the present proceedings as a third judge matter until the adjudication of Writ Petition No. 10024 of 2023. Thus, the Forest Department has, from time to time, raised objections to the issuance of the said three DRCs and has also objected to the issuance of any further DRCs. 31.17. Appendix ‘W’ read with Appendix N.N.1.5 (a) spells out the regulations for grant of Transferable Development Rights.Regulation 7 of Appendix ‘W’ reads as under:- “A DRC will be issued only on satisfactory compliance with the conditions prescribed in the Appendix.” 31.18. 31.17. Appendix ‘W’ read with Appendix N.N.1.5 (a) spells out the regulations for grant of Transferable Development Rights.Regulation 7 of Appendix ‘W’ reads as under:- “A DRC will be issued only on satisfactory compliance with the conditions prescribed in the Appendix.” 31.18. Regulation 15 of the Development Control Regulations, 1999, reads as under: “Development Rights will be granted and DRCs issued only after the reserved land is surrendered to the Corporation, where it is the Appropriate Authority, or otherwise to the State Government, as the case may be, free of cost and free from encumbrances, after the owner or lessee has levelled the land to the surrounding ground level and after he has constructed a 1.5 m high compound wall (or at a height stipulated by the Commissioner) with a gate at the cost of the owner, and to the satisfaction of the Commissioner, or the State Government (where the Corporation is not the Appropriate Authority). The cost of any transaction involved shall be borne by the owner or lessee.” 31.19. Regulation 11.2.4(b) of the UDCPR, 2020 is pari materia with Appendix W. It is therefore necessary for the Petitioner to comply with the Development Control Regulations for grant of TDR. Compliance of Law (DCR) in is inherent in an order passed by the Hon’ble Court. 31.20. Clause 11.2.4(b) read as under: “(b) DRC shall be issued only after the land is surrendered to the Authority free of cost and free from encumbrances and after levelling the land to the surrounding ground level and after constructing/erecting a 1.5 m. high compound wall/fencing i.e. brick/stone wall up to 0.60m. above ground level and fencing above that upto remaining height with a gate, at the cost of the owner and to the satisfaction of the Authority.” 31.21. It is clear that the land is required to be surrendered free from all encumbrances. The Petitioner, in the present Writ Petition No. 10024 of 2023, in (paragraphs 10 to 17), has averred in detail about the claim of the Forest Department, which ultimately culminated in Writ Petition No. 3205 of 2018. In these circumstances, the Corporation has rightly demanded submission of an NOC from the Forest Department in order to comply with the requirement under the Development Control Regulations of surrendering the land “free from all encumbrances.” 31.22. It is settled law that one cannot transfer a better title than what one has. In these circumstances, the Corporation has rightly demanded submission of an NOC from the Forest Department in order to comply with the requirement under the Development Control Regulations of surrendering the land “free from all encumbrances.” 31.22. It is settled law that one cannot transfer a better title than what one has. It is thus clear that if the Forest Department succeeds in Writ Petition No. 3205 of 2018, the Petitioner will not have title to the suit lands and will not be entitled to any TDR in lieu thereof. It is pertinent to note that the Petitioner was well aware of the claim of the Forest Department for all these years prior to submitting the proposal dated 3 rd July, 2018 for grant of TDR. The said proposal also states that the Petitioner is entitled to grant of DRC “as per the provisions under Regulation No. Appendix N.1.5 and Appendix W of the DCR, 1994 of TMC, and amendments thereto.” 31.23. It is also pertinent to note that the Corporation was earlier prevented from granting TDR in view of the injunctions granted in two civil suits, namely Special Civil Suit No. 440 of 2019 and Special Civil Suit No. 36 of 2019, till 25 th November, 2022, when the order came to be passed in Appeal from Order No. 1050 of2019. 31.24. The Petitioner, in their communication dated 15 th September, 2020 (Page 168 of Writ Petition No. 10024 of 2023), the relevant portion of which appears at Page 132, reiterated that the TMC is also under a statutory obligation under the MRTP Act, 1966, read with the Development Control Rules and Regulations. 31.25. It is to be noted that the Petitioners, in their letter dated 21 st March, 2023 addressed to the Corporation, have categorically stated that they are entitled to be awarded development rights and TDR in accordance with the provisions of the Development Control Regulations (pages 139–140 of the petition). 31.26. It is also pertinent to note that the Forest Department, in its affidavit in reply dated 4 th January, 2015, has categorically averred that the land in question is deemed reserved forest, vested in the State Government, and is in the possession of the Sanjay Gandhi National Park. 31.27. The Corporation has taken consistent, timely, and necessary steps to comply with Court orders and statutory obligations. OUR ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 32. 31.27. The Corporation has taken consistent, timely, and necessary steps to comply with Court orders and statutory obligations. OUR ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 32. It has to be borne in mind that the first Petition pertains to the jurisdiction of the Single Judge Bench under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The State has invoked the Writ of Certiorari, which is akin to the Revisional jurisdiction of a Court. As such, while we exercise our jurisdiction, which is of a Revisional nature, we ought to keep in mind that, unless the impugned judgment clearly appears to be illegal, perverse, erroneous and unsustainable, it cannot be quashed and set aside. Merely because a different view could be possible, the impugned judgment cannot be branded as perverse and illegal. (Read Syed Yakoob v/s. K.S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477 and Surya Dev Rai V/s. Ram Chander Rai, AIR 2003 SC 3044 ). 33. The impugned Judgment dated 30 th June, 2017 delivered by the MRT, is in the light of an appeal preferred by the State challenging the order dated 27 th December, 2004 passed by the Deputy Collector (Private Forests), Thane Division, in Case No.53 of 1999. The Appeal No.REV/ Forest/165/2005 filed by the State has been dismissed. The Appeal No.REV/Forest/229 of 2009 filed by the Original Landlord, has been allowed. To the extent of the State, we have concurrent findings before us. To the extent of the Original Landlord, the impugned findings of the Deputy Collector have been over-turned. 34. The pleadings, averments and oral submissions of the parties before us, were also advanced before the MRT. The impugned Judgment runs into 29 pages. The submissions of the parties have been considered thread-bare by the MRT and have been dealt with on the basis of the oral and documentary evidence available on record. 35. Since we have extensively heard the learned Advocates for the parties, considered their pleadings and averments and their Written/oral submissions and have also reproduced the salient features from their written submissions, in a summary form, we are not required to repeat them in our conclusions. 36. The dispute that originated 50 years ago was in respect of land Survey No.59/1 at village Manpada in Thane district. In 1975, the Government of Maharashtra proposed to acquire 217 acres and odd, from the entire land under the provisions of the 1975 Act. 36. The dispute that originated 50 years ago was in respect of land Survey No.59/1 at village Manpada in Thane district. In 1975, the Government of Maharashtra proposed to acquire 217 acres and odd, from the entire land under the provisions of the 1975 Act. A notice dated 29 th August, 1975 was said to have been served on 4 th September, 1975. There is no dispute that the said notice was served on D. Dahyabai and Company, which is not the owner of the land. It is equally undisputed that the original land owner is D. Dahyabhai and Company Private Limited and not D. Dahyabhai and Company. Hence, as a matter of fact, based on the records, the non-service of the notice on the original land owner, is apparent and fatal. 37. The impugned notice dated 29 th August 1975, at page number 277 in the petition paper-book of the first Petition, has been signed by Shri N J Joshi (Forest Guard). It has been addressed to D.Dahyabhai and Co. The photostat copy, which is at page 277, is annexed herewith as Article ‘X’. For ready reference, the same is typed and reproduced hereunder :- 38. The above reproduced notice indicates many glaring aspects. Firstly, that it has been signed by a Forest Guard and not by any authorised officer or signatory. Secondly, it has been addressed to D. Dahyabhai and Co. and not to the actual owner of the land, M/s D. Dahyabhai and Co. Pvt. Ltd. Thirdly, the said notice was admittedly received by Mr. Chimanlal Shah, the accountant of D.Dahyabhai and Co. He was not an employee of the land owner. So also, the State has been unable to point out that the notice was published in the State Gazette. 39. It is also undisputed that 14 acres of land was already transferred to different persons much prior to the issuance of the notice dated 29 th August, 1975. A balance of 193 acres was available for acquisition. From this large area of land, the land owner has brought on record the improvement in the land by plantation and construction of residential hutments over an area admeasuring 24 acres, 32 gunthas. A balance of 193 acres was available for acquisition. From this large area of land, the land owner has brought on record the improvement in the land by plantation and construction of residential hutments over an area admeasuring 24 acres, 32 gunthas. The land owner had requested to exclude this area from the proposed acquisition and had also expressed its willingness to hand over an equal area from the adjoining lands bearing Survey Nos.59/2 and 59/3, which belong to the land owner. 40. The Additional Collector/Sub-Divisional Officer initiated an inquiry under Section 6 of the 1975 Act. This inquiry was concluded by an order dated 3 rd June, 1980 and the representation made by the land owner for exchange of land parcels was accepted. The Forest Department challenged the order before the Tribunal on the ground that the proposed alternate land had some encroachments. The Forest Appeal No.9 of 1981, was allowed and the proceedings were remitted for fresh adjudication. However, the Forest Department or the Revenue Department, did not initiate steps for 17 years. In 1999, the said ‘remanded proceeding’ was renumbered as 53/1999. A final order was passed on 27 th December, 2004 by the Deputy Collector (Private Forest), Thane Division. 41. The Forest Department has contended that the notice was issued for acquiring 204A, 8G and 8A at village Manpada. It was alleged that the actual physical possession of area admeasuring 168A, 15G and 4A was with the Forest Department. Some portion was found to have been unsuitable as it was encroached upon. The notice was issued on 29 th August, 1975 and was served upon D. Dahyabhai and Company. The issue before us is as to whether it can be presumed that the notice was rightly served on the original land owner, only because the actual land owner requested the State Government to exempt certain area from acquisition,. 42. We find that such submission of the State is only by way of an attempt to take advantage of the fact that the actual land owner had later on offered alternate land parcels. 42. We find that such submission of the State is only by way of an attempt to take advantage of the fact that the actual land owner had later on offered alternate land parcels. In fact, even the communication dated 23 rd January, 1986 by the Divisional Manager, Sanjay Gandhi National Park, Borivali in response to the Assistant District Collector Thane’s letter dated 10 th January, 1986, indicates that the Forest Department consistently believed that the owner of the suit land was M/s. D. Dahyabhai and Company, when the actual owner is M/s. D. Dahyabhai and Company Private Limited. The Forest Department further averred that Survey Nos.59/2, 59/3 and 59/16, were not covered in the notices issued under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927. 43. Respondent No.2, who claims to be a tenant, made an application for intervention on 13 th October, 2004 claiming to be interested in an area admeasuring 7 hectors 38 R, out of the total 193 acres in Survey No.59/1. Respondent No.2 claimed to be the tenant of the original land owner under the provisions of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (in short the BTAL Act). 44. When the hearing commenced before the Sub- Divisional Officer, it was revealed that Case No.53/1999 filed under Section 6 of the 1975 Act, had been decided by the Sub-Divisional Officer, Thane and 24 acres from Survey No.59/1 were held to be not a forest. The application of Respondent No.2 was allowed and it was held that he was in possession of 7H, 38A, which parcel was not a forest land in Survey No.59/1. An area of 17A and 19G relating to the village settlement (Konkanipada) was also excluded from the Forest Area. 45. Respondent No.2 had produced a copy of one order dated 27 th December, 2004, thereby raising an issue that 17 acres and 19 gunthas out of Survey No.59/1, excluded from the reservation on the premise that the said area of 17A and 19G was a village settlement (Konkanipada). It was alleged that when there was no application made by any person under Section 6 of the Act seeking such exclusion, the Sub-Divisional Officer never called upon the parties before him to take up the said issue of exclusion. 46. It was alleged that when there was no application made by any person under Section 6 of the Act seeking such exclusion, the Sub-Divisional Officer never called upon the parties before him to take up the said issue of exclusion. 46. The original land owner had purchased the land from the Court Receiver on 6 th July, 1960 by virtue of two Deeds of Conveyance. This is an admitted position. Respondent No.2 who claims to be a tenant, was said to be in possession of 18 acres 18 gunthas out of Survey No.59/1 quite prior to the introduction of the Act of 1975. The Court orders in Criminal Case No.5227/1982 and Criminal Appeal No.172/1993, did not record any finding that Respondent No.2 was in possession of 18A and 18G. The order in the Criminal Case No.5227/1982, refers to only 4 acres, whereas the order of the High Court in Criminal Appeal No.172/1993, does not mention any area. 47. The land owner who had appeared before the MRT by filing its Case No.229 of 2009, had stated that the entire land in Gut No.59/1, was a non-forest land on the appointed date, i.e., 30 th August, 1975. We find from the records that it was used for Horticulture, Stone Quarries, Godowns, Residential Units and had various structures thereon. If this be the position, no part of the land bearing Gut No.59/1 could have been declared as Forest/Private Forest Land. 48. Apart from Konkanipada village settlement, the Appellants had adduced evidence to show that the portions of property bearing Gut No.59/1 was used for non-agricultural purposes. Evidence was led to show existence of four stone quarries on the areas shown in the order dated 7 th May, 1963. On the appointed day 30 th August, 1975 the owners and the licensees were carrying on business of stone quarries on the part of the said property. The Collector of Bombay had issued valid permission. Therefore, we find that the Deputy Collector should have exempted that portion of the area in Gut No.59/1, considering it’s actual use as on the appointed day. 49. The other Respondents, who are LRs of the deceased Respondent no. 2, have filed an affidavit in reply contending that the deceased was cultivating the said land admeasuring 7H and 38R out of Gut No.59, Hissa No.1 in village Manpada for the last 60 years. 49. The other Respondents, who are LRs of the deceased Respondent no. 2, have filed an affidavit in reply contending that the deceased was cultivating the said land admeasuring 7H and 38R out of Gut No.59, Hissa No.1 in village Manpada for the last 60 years. They also claimed that the original land owner had purchased this land in 1960 from the Court Receiver, which fact is established. Respondent No.2 was taking crops such as paddy, barley, vegetables etc. Respondent No.2 made an application bearing No.16 of 1991 on 25 th July, 1991 under Section 70(b) of the BTAL Act 1948. The Tahsildar and ALT Thane declared Respondent No.2 a tenant over the area admeasuring 7H and 38R. This conclusion has attained finality. 50. Respondent No.2 had averred that the Assistant Conservator of Forest (Protection) Sanjay Gandhi National Park, tried to evict Respondent No.2 by concluding that he is an encroacher, by an order dated 4 th November, 1999. The said order was carried in appeal by Respondent No.2 and was quashed by an order dated 11 th April, 2005, passed by the Additional Commissioner, Konkan Division . 51. It has been contended by Respondent No.2 that no notice under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 was issued to him. He has been in actual cultivation and physical possession of the said portion of land as an agricultural tenant of Shyamaldas Gandhi and thereafter, of M/s. D. Dahyabhai and Company Private Limited. The fact of tenancy has been established in separate proceedings by an order dated 13 th February, 2004 passed by the Tahsildar in Tenancy Suit No.70(b)/Chi.Manpada/16/91. Hence, the land never vested in the State Government and never became a part of the forest land. We find the said contention to be sustainable from the above facts. ISSUES FRAMED BY MRT AND IT’S CONCLUSIONS 52. After all the parties canvassed a host of grounds, the MRT framed the following issues : (a) Whether the land in dispute can be said to be a ‘Private Forest’ as contemplated under Section 3(f)(iii) of the Act of1975? Answer : In the Negative. (b) Whether the proceeding conducted by the Deputy Collector (Private Forest), Thane Division, Thane was vitiated by the non-service of notice under Section 35(3) of the 1927 Forest Act on or before the appointed day, i.e., 30 th August, 1975? Answer : In the Affirmative. 53. Answer : In the Negative. (b) Whether the proceeding conducted by the Deputy Collector (Private Forest), Thane Division, Thane was vitiated by the non-service of notice under Section 35(3) of the 1927 Forest Act on or before the appointed day, i.e., 30 th August, 1975? Answer : In the Affirmative. 53. The MRT has referred to Section 2(f)(iii) of the 1975 Act, which reads as under : Section 2(f) – ‘Private Forest’ means any forest which is not the property of the Government and includes, - (i) … (ii) … (iii) any land in respect of which a notice has been issued under sub-section (e) of section 35 of the Forest Act, but excluding an area not exceeding two hectares in extent as the Collector may specify in this behalf. 54. Section 35(3) of the 1927 Forest Act, reads as under : “Section 35(3) – No notification shall be made under sub-section (1) nor shall any work be begun under sub-section (2), until after the issue of a notice to the owner of such forest or land calling on him to show cause, within a reasonable period to be specified in such notice, why such notification should not be made or work constructed, as the case may be, and until his objections, if any, and any evidence he may produce in support of the same, have been heard by an officer duly appointed in that behalf and have been considered by the State Government.” 55. We find from the record that the notice dated 29 th August, 1975, has been issued by a Forest Guard, namely Shri N J Joshi. He does not appear to be an authorised signatory. He had no jurisdiction to issue the said notice. It is typed as ‘Jungle Rakshak’ below his signature, which mean a ‘Forest Guard’. Unless, if the authorised officer of the Forest department was then nomenclatured as ‘Forest Guard’ instead of ‘Chief Conservator of Forest’ or the like. 56. After considering the law laid down in Godrej & Boyce (supra), Dr. Arjun Sitaram Nitanwar (supra) and Ozone Land Agro Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the MRT has concluded as under : (a) The notice dated 29 th August, 1975 said to be issued, was served on Dahyabhai and Company, on 4 th September, 1975. (b) The notice was not served on or before the appointed day 30 th August, 1975. Arjun Sitaram Nitanwar (supra) and Ozone Land Agro Pvt. Ltd. (supra), the MRT has concluded as under : (a) The notice dated 29 th August, 1975 said to be issued, was served on Dahyabhai and Company, on 4 th September, 1975. (b) The notice was not served on or before the appointed day 30 th August, 1975. (c) The notice was not served on the actual land owner, i.e., D. Dahyabhai and Company Private Limited. (d) The recipient of the notice Dahyabhai and Company is a distinct entity and is not the actual owner of the land. (e) The notice dated 29 th August, 1975 was never served on the owner as is mandated under Section 35(3) of the 1927 Forest Act, and having been served on an entity which is not the owner of the land, it cannot be construed to have been issued on the owner. (f) Shri. Narayan Ganu Tangadi (now deceased), Respondent No.2 being a tenant prior to 1 st April, 1957, has been declared by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal to be a tenant, which need not be interfered with since the said order has not been challenged by the Forest Department and, as such, the area for which Shri. Narayan Ganu Tangadi has been declared to be a tenant, is deemed to have been purchased by him and, therefore, cannot fall within the purview of ‘Private Forest’. CONSIDERATION OF THE FACTS BEFORE US, IN THE LIGHT OF THE LAW LAID DOWN IN GODREJ & BOYCE 57. We deem it appropriate to advert to the important paragraphs in Godrej & Boyce (supra), since the following legal principles emerge from the said ruling : (a) S. 2(f)(iii) of the Maharashtra Private Forests Act is a ‘savings’ clause; (b) The term ‘saving clause’ has been defined in P.Ramanatha Aiyar’s Advanced law Lexicon, 4 th Edition, as under : “A ‘saving clause’ is ordinarily a restriction in a repealing Act and saves rights, pending proceedings, penalties, etc., from the annihilation which would result from unrestricted repeal.” (c) Section 2(f)(iii) of the Maharashtra Private Forests Act can be interpreted to mean that the saving clause is meant to save ‘pipeline notices’. (d) ‘Pipeline notices’ or ‘live notices’ mean : “…notices issued in reasonably close proximity to the coming in to force of the Private Forests Act which were, “live” and “could be acted upon”. (d) ‘Pipeline notices’ or ‘live notices’ mean : “…notices issued in reasonably close proximity to the coming in to force of the Private Forests Act which were, “live” and “could be acted upon”. (e) The Supreme Court has held that “…Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act is in a sense a saving clause for pipeline notices issued under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act…” (f) Since Section 2(f)(iii) of the Maharashtra Private Forests Act is meant to save notices which have been issued under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act, the notices should be ‘issued’ in a reasonably close proximity of the appointed date under the Maharashtra Private Forests Act. (g) The service of notice as well as proceedings with regard to settling disputes u/s. 6 of the Maharashtra Private Forests Act could be completed after 30 th August 1975. (h) The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in International Ore & Fertilizers (India) P.Ltd. vs. ESI Corporation (1987) 4 SCC 203 , has considered the importance of welfare legislation in the context of the Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 as under : “4. … We agree with the decision of the High Court that while construing a welfare legislation like the Act and the notification issued thereunder a liberal construction should be placed on their provisions so that the purpose of the legislation may be allowed to be achieved rather than frustrated or stultified.….” (i) Paragraph 61 in Godrej and Boyce (supra), reads thus : “…By making reference in Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forest Act to “issue” in Section 35 of the Forest Act, it is clear that the word is dressed in borrowed robes” “…Once that is appreciated (and it was unfortunately overlooked in Chintamani) then it is quite clear that "issued" in Section 2(f) (iii) of the Private Forests Act must include service of the show-cause notice as postulated in Section 35 of the Forest Act.” (j) The Hon’ble Supreme Court has concluded that the word ‘issue’ has to include ‘service of the show cause notice’. (k) We do not find any specific conclusion or the dictum of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that service of the notice has to be effected prior to 30 th August, 1975 in order to be saved under section 2(f)(iii) as a “pipeline notice”. (k) We do not find any specific conclusion or the dictum of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that service of the notice has to be effected prior to 30 th August, 1975 in order to be saved under section 2(f)(iii) as a “pipeline notice”. (l)“By making a reference in Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forest Act to “issue” in section 35 of the Forest Act, it is clear that the word is dressed in borrowed robes…” The above observation of the Hon’ble Supreme Court would mean that the word ‘issue’ has been borrowed from Section 35 of the Indian Forest Act only to ensure that the service is effected so as to make the provisions of Section 35(4) to (7) of the Indian Forest Act effective, lest, the issuance of notice would be an empty formality and farcical. 58. If we compare Section 21 of the Maharashtra Private Forests Act with Section 35 of the Indian Forest Act, it becomes clear to us that Section 35, requires issuance of the service of the notice prior to the issuance of a final notification under Section 35(1). In the Maharashtra Private Forests Act, issuance and service of the notice are steps which are preceded by the publication of the notification. In our view, which is supported by Godrej & Boyce (supra) and Rohan Nahar (supra), the word ‘issued’ under Section 2(F)(iii) cannot be read as ‘issued and served prior to 30 th August, 1975’. This would be contrary, not only to paragraph 72 and 74 of the judgment in Godrej and Boyce, but, also to the provisions of the Maharashtra Private Forests Act, particularly Section 21 thereof. To this extent, we reject the contention of the land owner. CRUCIAL FACTORS 59. In the proceedings before the Deputy Collector, a specific Affidavit was filed in evidence by Mr. Chimanlal Shah on 3 rd December 1999, clearly stating that he is the accountant of D.Dahyabhai & Co. It is a proprietary concern. He received a registered envelop on 4 th September, 1975 containing the notice addressed to D.Dahyabhai & Co. (which is not the owner of the subject land in said notice). The said notice, which we have reproduced herein above, does not even mention the name of the actual land owner, D Dahyabhai and Co. Pvt. Ltd. This undisputable fact has been either ‘glossed’ or over-looked by the Petitioner. 60. (which is not the owner of the subject land in said notice). The said notice, which we have reproduced herein above, does not even mention the name of the actual land owner, D Dahyabhai and Co. Pvt. Ltd. This undisputable fact has been either ‘glossed’ or over-looked by the Petitioner. 60. In our considered view, the present matter is fully covered by the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Godrej & Boyce (supra), which has been followed in Rohan Nahar (supra). In Godrej & Boyce (supra) case the word “issued” is interpreted to include the service on the addressee. Paragraph 72 of Godrej & Boyce (supra) is in respect of pipeline notice meant to be served. However, Paragraph 72 cannot be interpreted to mean only issuance of notice, sufficient to define it as a pipeline notice or a live notice. 61. To make any notice, to be a pipeline or live, in our view, does not mean that the notice has to be served before the appointed day. In Rohan Nahar (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has specifically stated that only upon receipt of notice by the true land owner, that a right to take objection is born. In the case in hands, there is no documentary proof, either about issuance of notice prior to the appointed day or its service upon the true owner. Service is admittedly upon a wrong addressee. This has been a consistent stand of Respondent No.1 before the Deputy Collector in the remand inquiry, as well as before the MRT. 62. The Petitioner’s contention that notice under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act was issued to Respondent No. 1 on 29 th August, 1975 and served on 4 th September, 1975, is fallacious for another reason. We find from the record that this is an incorrect statement. The notice in the present case, was signed by a Van Rakshak. A Van-Rakshak (the signatory to the notice dated 29/08/1975), is a Forest Guard. A Conservator of Forest is Van- Sanrakshak. A Deputy Conservator of Forest is Up-Van Sanrakshak. As such, it is apparent that the impugned notice was signed by a Forest Guard, who has no jurisdiction and authority to issue a notice under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927. A Conservator of Forest is Van- Sanrakshak. A Deputy Conservator of Forest is Up-Van Sanrakshak. As such, it is apparent that the impugned notice was signed by a Forest Guard, who has no jurisdiction and authority to issue a notice under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927. The impugned notice dated 29 th August, 1975 is at Page No.277 in the Petition paper book of the first Petition signed by Shri. N.J. Joshi (Forest Guard), which is addressed to D. Dahyabhai’s Company. Before no authority, has the Petitioner/State produced documentary proof of the notice dated 29 th August, 1975, having been signed by an authorized Competent Officer and issued on 29th August, 1975, which should be reflected from the outward registered. 63. It is in the above backdrop that the actual land owner M/s D. Dahyabhai and Co. Pvt. Ltd. has issued letters dated 5 th July, 1979 and 28 th August, 1979, requesting the State Government to exempt 24 acres and 32 gunthas from Gut No.59/A/1 of its holding from acquisition. It offered an alternate land of 25 acres 32 gunthas from Gut No.59/2 and 59/16, Manpada. It was under fortuitous circumstances that the actual owner offered alternate land in exchange, to the State. This cannot be said to be service of notice as mandated in Godrej Boyce (supra) and Rohan Nahar (supra), so as to create a right for raising objections. When the actual owner was not addressed with a notice, there can be no argument that the actual owner was served or heard. It is only the addressee of a notice, who gets the right to object, only on service of notice. 64. No documentary proof about compliance of Section 5 of MPFA is produced by the forest department. The subject land is not vested in State/Forest under Section 3 of the MPFA on the appointed day 30 th August, 1975, apparently because the notice under Section 35 (3) of IFA was not served on the owner. The Forest Department could not produce any documentary proof to show that alleged notice dated 29 th August, 1975 was actually dispatched/issued from the office of Forest Department. Strict compliance of statutory preconditions, which is necessary for vesting as per Rohan Nahar (Supra) and Godrej & Boyce (Supra), is missing. SUBSEQUENT EVENTS RELEVANT FOR WRIT PETITION NO. 10024 OF 2023 65. Strict compliance of statutory preconditions, which is necessary for vesting as per Rohan Nahar (Supra) and Godrej & Boyce (Supra), is missing. SUBSEQUENT EVENTS RELEVANT FOR WRIT PETITION NO. 10024 OF 2023 65. It is contended by the State that, after taking possession of the subject land, the Forest Department constructed boundary walls, an entry gate, a security cabin, a nature interpretation centre, and other structures for protecting the subject land. By contrast, in Rohan Nahar (supra), no action was taken even after issuing notices in the 1960s. 66. D. Dahyabhai & Co. Pvt. Ltd. and its Director Mr. Nitesh Kothari (Petitioner), have filed Writ Petition no 10024/2023, seeking directions to the Respondent Thane Municipal Corporation to issue DRC in favour of the Petitioners against acquisition of Park Reservation No.4 (said reservation area is admeasuring 404721.02 sq. meters), which has been acquired by the Respondent Corporation under registered Deed of Transfer dated 24 th May, 2019 registered under Serial No.TNN5- 8450-2019 (Exh.E, Page 92-115 of WP). 67. The Respondent Corporation filed it’s reply, admitting the execution of said Transfer Deed, acquisition of the said reservation and having got the possession of the land. Admittedly, there is an order dated 25 th November, 2022 (Exh.F, Page No.116 to 118 of the WP) read with an order dated 7 th December, 2022 (Exh.G, Page No.119 of the WP), which is passed by the Single Judge Bench of the High Court, directing the Respondent Corporation to issue and allot the said DRC. In spite of such an order passed by the High Court, the Respondent Corporation has withheld the issuance of DRC and, hence, this Petition has been filed. 68. The established position is that vide order dated 30 th June, 2017 passed in MRT Appeal No.165 of 2005 and Appeal No.229 of 2009, the MRT has declared the lands under the said reservation and the lands which were subject matter of the notice dated 29 th August, 1975, to be a non-forest land. 69. The Forest Department, has filed the first Writ Petition No.3205 of 2018 against rejection of it’s Appeal No.165 of 2005. There is no interim order against the said order of MRT dated 30 th June, 2017, passed by this Court. 70. The record reveals that the said reservation is sanctioned by the State Government and is a part of the sanctioned D.P. of Thane 1994-1999 (Thane D.P.). There is no interim order against the said order of MRT dated 30 th June, 2017, passed by this Court. 70. The record reveals that the said reservation is sanctioned by the State Government and is a part of the sanctioned D.P. of Thane 1994-1999 (Thane D.P.). Till date, the Forest Department has neither challenged the Thane D.P. nor the introduction of the said reservation. The Forest Department, during the process of acquisition of the land under reservation, has never raised any objection against the Respondent Corporation in introducing the said reservation. 71. The record further reveals that the registered Deed of Transfer dated 24 th May, 2019 is also not challenged. The Deed of Transfer states that the land is acquired and the possession is handed over to the planning authority. (Exh.E, Page Nos.92 to 115, relevant page No.100). The said Deed of Transfer is a registered instrument which ought to have been challenged by filing a suit for cancellation, within the limitation of 3 years, from the date of registration of the said Deed. Admittedly, no such challenge is posed by the Forest Department in any substantive proceeding, which could now be barred by limitation. 72. Three orders are passed by this Court, out of which two orders dated 28 th April, 2025 and 27 th June, 2025 were passed after hearing the State/forest. The Land is acquired, 7/12 extract is mutated in the name of Corporation (Exh.M, Page 469 of Affidavit- in-Reply of Respondent No.2 Corporation). It is only after acquisition of Park Reservation No.4, that the Forest Department woke up from deep slumber and lodged its objection with the Thane Municipal Corporation for allotting TDR to D. Dahyabhai & Co. Pvt. Ltd. The position as it stands today is that, without challenging sanctioned Thane D.P. and without challenging the acquisition of land, the Forest Department is opposing grant of compensation to the land owner. 73. There is no dispute that 100 acres of land is acquired under registered instruments by the planning authority viz. Respondent Corporation for a public purpose under sanctioned D.P. Such D.P. was sanctioned by the State Government itself under the MRTP Act long back in the year 1994. This step of the State Govenment of subjecting the land to reservation for public purposes such as park, road, TMT bus depot, Primary School, HCMTR, etc.has never been objected to by the Forest Department. This step of the State Govenment of subjecting the land to reservation for public purposes such as park, road, TMT bus depot, Primary School, HCMTR, etc.has never been objected to by the Forest Department. 74. It appears from the record that, the land is in possession of the Corporation (Page 100 of WP) from May 2019. Though the Forest department is claiming to be in physical possession, it’s letter dated 23 rd January, 1986 (Page No.448, of the additional affidavit of Respondent No.1 land owner company, in Writ Petition No.3205 of 2018) demonstrates that they could not take possession of the land prior to 1986. There is no documentary proof placed on record to show that the physical possession was taken by the forest department. 75. As per the registered acquisition instrument dated 24 th May, 2019, 100 acres towards park reservation and additional 18100 sq. meter of subject land is also in possession of the Respondent Corporation and on a small portion, a twin tunnel project is being implemented, for which the Forest Department has given it’s NOC. The project is said to be progressing rapidly. 76. It is canvassed before us by the land owner that, from the plain reading of Regulation No.11.2.4 of UDCPR, it is evident that Petitioner/D. Dahyabhai Co. Pvt. Ltd. has achieved all compliances. Respondent TMC vide letter dated 10 th July, 2025, has illegally called upon D Dahyabhai Co Pvt. Ltd. to obtain an NOC from Forest Department despite the fact that the orders of this Court dated 28 th April, 2025 and 27 th June, 2025 do not impose such condition, which were passed after hearing the Forest Department. The letter dated 8 th October, 2025 (Page Nos.483-492 of the Affidavit-in- Reply of the Corporation) from the Conservator of Forest, Sanjay Gandhi National Park indicates an unholy alliance between the TMC and the Forest Department to deprive D. Dahyabhai Co. Pvt. Ltd. from receiving the statutory compensation in violation of Article 300A of Constitution, is the contention. 77. It is further canvassed by the land owner that, as per Regulation No.11.2.4 of UDCPR, construction of the boundary wall is not mandatory. Instead of carrying out such construction, the land owner Company can deposit the cost of construction of compound wall/fencing with the Corporation, provided Corporation issues DRC. 77. It is further canvassed by the land owner that, as per Regulation No.11.2.4 of UDCPR, construction of the boundary wall is not mandatory. Instead of carrying out such construction, the land owner Company can deposit the cost of construction of compound wall/fencing with the Corporation, provided Corporation issues DRC. All other requirements of the Corporation about TILR survey, mutating name of Corporation in 7/12 extract, certification of mutation entry in that regard, are already complied with (Petitioner’s Advocate reply dated 14 th July, 2025 and Petitioner’s letter dated 6 th October, 2025, Page Nos.440-447 and 463-468 of Respondent No.2’s own affidavit dated 27 th November, 2025, in the second WP). 78. It is vehemently contended by the land owner Company that, while acquiring the land and getting the registered instrument executed for acquisition in May 2019, TMC did not find it necessary to seek prior opinion from the Forest Department or TD department of the State Government. Before giving consent for passing the order dated 25 th November, 2022 directing TMC to allot DRC, TMC did not seek any opinion of the State Government. When the order dated 28 th April, 2025 was passed, at that time also TMC did not make any submission that it desired to consult the State Government. Even in the Interim Application filed for seeking modification of the order dated 28 th April, 2025 TMC did not take this stand. It is only after the order dated 27 th June, 2025, that the TMC expressed it’s desire to seek the opinion of the forest department and TDD for implementation of the orders of this Hon’ble Court. We are in agreement that the above stated grievance and contentions of the land owner needs consideration and we record that the TMC cannot take a summersault to deprive the Company of the compensation in the form of DRC. 79. Another aspect needs consideration. The Thane Municipal Corporation, vide its letter dated 8 th January, 2020 (Exh.H, Page Nos.120 to 126 of WP), addressed to the Conservator of Forest, Sanjay Gandhi National Udyan, has clearly stated that it is not going to change the user of the said reservation and in fact will be maintaining it as a park by keeping the natural greenery. The Thane Municipal Corporation, vide its letter dated 8 th January, 2020 (Exh.H, Page Nos.120 to 126 of WP), addressed to the Conservator of Forest, Sanjay Gandhi National Udyan, has clearly stated that it is not going to change the user of the said reservation and in fact will be maintaining it as a park by keeping the natural greenery. The Corporation has also agreed to handover the said reservation, if the forest department makes such a request, by obtaining permission of the General Body. We are informed that, the Forest Department has not responded to the said letter as yet. 80. It is, thus, clear that these two authorities will have to sort out this issue. Nevertheless, this dead lock cannot defer the issuance of DRC to the land owner, which has the character of compensation. We agree with the contention of the land owner Company, that refusing the DRC, would be unjust and unfair and would impinge the constitutional rights of the land owner Company, guaranteed under article 300 A of Constitution. OUR FINAL CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER IN WRIT PETITION NO.3205 OF 2018 81. We are, therefore, of the considered view that the complete answer to the first Petition filed by the Petitioner State, lies in Godrej and Boyce (supra) and Rohan Nahar (supra). 82. In Paragraph Nos. 13.1. 13.2 and 13.5, Rohan Nahar (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has specifically recorded that ‘We are unable to agree with the High Court that the reproduction of a draft text of S.35(1) beneath a S.35(3) show cause in the Gazette amounts to a concluded notification u/s 35(1) of the IFA. A notice that grants time for objections cannot co-exist with a final decision u/s 35(1) without rendering the statutory hearing illusory. Mutation entries are ministerial in nature and cannot perfect an acquisition that lacks the statutory predicates. They neither create title in the State nor divest title from the private owner.’ 83. In Paragraph No.13.2 of Rohan Nahar (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has recorded that, ‘On the facts across these appeals, we find that the essential links in the statutory chain are missing. There is no proof of service of any S.35(3) notice of the IFA on the then owners. There is no final notification u/s 35(1) of the IFA. In Paragraph No.13.2 of Rohan Nahar (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has recorded that, ‘On the facts across these appeals, we find that the essential links in the statutory chain are missing. There is no proof of service of any S.35(3) notice of the IFA on the then owners. There is no final notification u/s 35(1) of the IFA. Actual possession has at all times remained with private owners and this position is reflected in the revenue records that describe them as occupants. No possession was taken u/s 5 of the MPFA Act, no schemes were set in motion u/s 4, no compensation exercise was undertaken u/s 7, and no inquiry u/s 6 was held at a time proximate to the appointed day of 30 th August 1975 ……….. In one instance the State relies on a pipeline notice which was addressed to a person who was not the owner as on 29 th or 30 th August 1975. In another, the land forms part of an industrial estate converted to non-agricultural use long before 1975. ………. These features are wholly inconsistent with a completed vesting u/s3(1) of the MPFA ACT.’ 84. As such, the above findings and conclusions, are virtually tailor-made for the case before us. We summarise the decisive factors before us as follows :- (a) The original land owner had purchased the land from the Court Receiver on 6 th July, 1960 on the basis of two deeds of conveyance. (b) The notice dated 29 th August, 1975 has been signed by an unauthorised person, a Forest Guard N J Joshi. (c) The said notice has been addressed to a stranger namely, D. Dahyabhai and Co. (d) The said notice was never served on the actual owner D. Dahybhai and Co. Pvt. Ltd. (e) That the alleged service is sought to be proved only by a xerox copy on the accountant of D. Dahybhai, Shri Chimanlal Shah. (f) That there is no legally valid service upon the lawful owner. (g) That the Petitioner does not have any proof about actual dispatch of notice prior to appointed day. (h) The land always remained in the possession of the land owner, for almost 6 decades. (i) The Thane Municipal Corporation (TMC) has acquired the land, taken physical possession of the same and has declared reservations for public purposes, public projects on some portions of the land. (h) The land always remained in the possession of the land owner, for almost 6 decades. (i) The Thane Municipal Corporation (TMC) has acquired the land, taken physical possession of the same and has declared reservations for public purposes, public projects on some portions of the land. (j) The TMC has declared that the land covered by greenary will be protected and the green cover would be maintained, in as much as, that, if the Govt desires to take the land for maintaining the greenary, TMC is willing to hand over the same to the Govt. 85. In Paragraph Nos.13.5 and 14.2 in Rohan Nahar (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has further held that : ‘13.5. We are further of the view that a remand for an inquiry u/s 6 of the MPFA Act is neither warranted nor efficacious. Such an inquiry is designed to be contemporaneous with the appointed day so that meaningful evidence on the character of the land can be adduced by both sides. After the passage of nearly half a century (in our case it is 60 years), that exercise would be largely academic and would not cure the absence of mandatory preconditions of a served notice u/s 35(3) of the IFA and lawful progression towards a notification u/s 35(1). the authorities have also adopted a concluded litigating stance on the very matters they would be called upon to decide, which would not inspire confidence in the fairness of any remanded proceeding. ……...’ ‘14.2. After this categorisation, we are satisfied that there is no legally relevant distinction between the present cases and the decision in Godrej and Boyce (Supra). The ratio in Godrej and Boyce (Supra) turns on service of a notice under Section 35(3) of the IFA, the existence of a live process capable of culminating in a notification under Section 35(1) of the IFA, and strict compliance with the statutory steps that alone can support vesting under Section 3(1) of the MPFA Act on the footing of Section 2(f)(iii). The record before us discloses the same deficiencies that were fatal in Godrej and Boyce (Supra). There is no proof of service of any notice under Section 35(3) of the IFA on the then owners. There is no final notification under Section 35(1) of the IFA. Possession has remained with private owners throughout. The record before us discloses the same deficiencies that were fatal in Godrej and Boyce (Supra). There is no proof of service of any notice under Section 35(3) of the IFA on the then owners. There is no final notification under Section 35(1) of the IFA. Possession has remained with private owners throughout. No contemporaneous action was taken under Sections 4, 5, 6 or 7 of the MPFA Act. These features mirror the very elements that led this Court to hold that vesting had not occurred in Godrej and Boyce (Supra)’ 86. We have no doubt from our analysis and conclusions of the relevant factors before us, that the above conclusions in Rohan Nahar (supra) squarely apply to the case before us. We see no purpose in considering a remand of the case for a fresh inquiry to grant the Petitioner an opportunity to lead evidence, after we have concluded that the impugned order deserves no interferance. Moreover, it would serve no object for the reason that the notice dated 29 th August, 1975 was issued by an incompetent/unauthorised person and addressed to a partnership firm which is admittedly not the owner of the land. 87. In view of the above, though we find no fault with the impugned Judgment, we are of the view that the only conclusion drawn by the MRT that, ‘the notice should have been served on or before the appointed day’, is an erroneous observation, though it is of no consequence, since the notice is not proved to have been issued on 29 th August, 1975, admittedly signed by Mr. N J Joshi, who was not an authorised officer and not served upon the actual owner. The contention of the State that because the land owner subsequently reacted to the situation, it would indicate that the notice was served on the owner, is a contention in desperation which is a result of surmises, conjectures and presumptions. Therefore, we disregard the only impression of the MRT that the notice should have been served before the appointed date, as being abstruse. Rest of the impugned order does not deserve to be branded as perverse or illegal. 88. Consequentially, the First Petition No. 3205 of 2018, is dismissed. Rule is discharged. ORDER IN WRIT PETITION NO. 10024 of 2023 89. Rest of the impugned order does not deserve to be branded as perverse or illegal. 88. Consequentially, the First Petition No. 3205 of 2018, is dismissed. Rule is discharged. ORDER IN WRIT PETITION NO. 10024 of 2023 89. Presently, the maximum land in question is around 104 acres which is acquired, owned and possessed by the Thane Municipal Corporation. So also, on the actual site today, Thane Municipal Corporation has constructed 40 mtrs DP road, Thane Municipal Bus Depot and has reserved the land for development of a garden, maternity home, park, school and metro rail, as well as, the twin tunnel which is a public project and is at an advanced stage. TMC has made a statement in it’s pleadings that the Forest cover would be maintained and if the State desires to take over the Forest, TMC us willing to hand over the said land to the State. 90. In view of our analysis, observations and conclusions set out in paragraph nos. 65 to 80 in this judgment, the Second Petition No. 10024 of 2023, is allowed. 91. We direct the Respondent Thane Municipal Corporation to issue/allot the said TDR/DRC, against park reservation No.4 area admeasuring 404721.02 sq. mtrs. which has been acquired vide the Deed of Transfer dated 24 th May, 2019 registered under Serial No. TNN5-8450-2019, to the Petitioner No.1, within a period of 21 working days from the date of the uploading of this Judgment. 92. Rule is made absolute in the above terms. 93. The pending Interim Applications do not survive and stand disposed off. 94. We express gratitude to the learned Senior Advocates, Sarvashri Janak Dwarkadas and R S Apte and the learned Advocates, Sarvashri Chirag Balsara, Karl Tamboly and their associate lawyers, for the immense assistance given to us. ANNEXURE ‘A’ PETITIONERS NOTE IN RESPECT TO THE SANJAY GANDHI NATIONAL PARK DIVISION (1) Without prejudice to any other submissions made in the present proceedings, the Petitioner places this note on a limited aspect, namely, to explain the legal status and scope of the Sanjay Gandhi National Park Division (“SGNP Division”). ANNEXURE ‘A’ PETITIONERS NOTE IN RESPECT TO THE SANJAY GANDHI NATIONAL PARK DIVISION (1) Without prejudice to any other submissions made in the present proceedings, the Petitioner places this note on a limited aspect, namely, to explain the legal status and scope of the Sanjay Gandhi National Park Division (“SGNP Division”). (2) In 1995, Bombay Environmental Action Group (“BEAG”) filed Writ Petition No. 305 of 1995 before this Hon’ble Court (“BEAG Writ Petition”) seeking, inter alia, removal of encroachments from the SGNP Division (which had not yet been finally notified as a National Park), relocation of occupants to non-forest areas, and demolition of unauthorised structures within the SGNP Division. (3) During the hearing of the BEAG Writ Petition, this Hon’ble Court passed an interim order dated 7 May 1997 (“Interim Order”) holding that the SGNP is a protected forest and a National Park under Indian law, containing Vihar and Tulsi lakes which supply drinking water to Mumbai, and representing a rare National Park within an urban metropolis with rich biodiversity. (4) This Hon’ble Court, relying upon the order of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 202 of 1995 (T.N. Godavarman), held that the expression “forest” must be understood in its dictionary sense and includes all lands recorded as forest in Government records, irrespective of ownership. (5) It was further held that the Forest Conservation Act applies to the entire National Park and the SGNP Division. Accordingly, this Court directed strict and time-bound measures, including demarcation of boundaries, prohibition of non-forest activities, cancellation of municipal permissions, and demolition of unauthorised structures. (6) The relevant paragraphs from the Interim Order are reproduced below: 2. The Sanjay Gandhi National Park Division is a protected forest under the Indian Forest Act and has also been notified as a National Park under the provisions of the Wildlife Protection Act. The National-Park Division contains within its boundaries two lakes that provide drinking water to the city of Bombay viz. Vihar and Tulsi Lakes. It is unique in that it is perhaps the only National park in protected forest area within an urban metropolis. A large amount of wildlife as well as important flora and fauna area also to be found within the boundaries of the National Park….. 7. Vihar and Tulsi Lakes. It is unique in that it is perhaps the only National park in protected forest area within an urban metropolis. A large amount of wildlife as well as important flora and fauna area also to be found within the boundaries of the National Park….. 7. On the 12th December, 1996 the Hon’ble Supreme Court had passed an order in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 202 of 1995 that the word ‘forest’ must be understood according to its dictionary meaning. This description covers the statutory recommendations of the Forest Act including “reserved, protected or otherwise” for the purposes of section 2.1 of the Forest Conservation Act. The term ‘forest land’ in section 2 will not only include forest in the dictionary sense but also the area recorded as forests in the Government records irrespective of ownership. This is how it has to be understood for the purposes of section 2 of the Act. The provisions indicated in the Forest Conservation Act for conservation of forests and matters connected therein must clearly apply to all forests irrespective of the ownership or classification thereof. The Supreme court has further held that it would be reasonable to argue that any State Government which had failed to provide the correct position in law so far, would forthwith correct its stance and take necessary remedial measures without any further delay.… 10. Based on the recommendations contained in the report of the Committee we think it necessary to pass the following order do that the committee’s recommendations are given effect to and carried out in a time bound manner: (a) The Deputy Conservator of Forests of the Sanjay Gandhi National Park Division is directed to prepare a map to show the boundaries of the National park Division with reference to the existing roads and send the same to the Municipal Corporation and also to the General Manager, BEST and the General Manager MTNL (West 3) within a period of four weeks from today. The above mentioned statutory authorities are directed not to grant any permission or allow any non forest activity/ies within the boundaries of the said National park Division.… (d) The Deputy Conservator of Forests of the National Park Division is directed to make barriers and getes within a period of eight weeks from today to stop public transport such as taxis, autos from entering the forest area.… (i) The BMC is directed to cancel all sanctions and registrations and permissions granted within the National Park Division after giving 15 days notice of the same. The BMC is directed to give such notices forthwith. All structures having commercial establishments, schools etc. within the National Park Division are to be demolished within one year from today and all building materials are to be confiscated so that the same is not used to re-erect the structures.” [Emphasis supplied] (7) The above findings were reiterated in the final judgment dated 15 September 2003, by which the BEAG Writ Petition was allowed. This Hon’ble Court recorded that the area under the control of the Deputy Conservator of Forests, SGNP Division, admeasured 103.09 sq. km., comprising : (a) 82.23 sq. km. of reserved forest; (b) 20.76 sq. km. of unclassed forest; and (c) 0.10 sq. km. of protected forest. (8) Importantly, in paragraph 28(13) of the said judgment, this Hon’ble Court clarified that: “In case of any dispute regarding boundary of Sanjay Gandhi National Park, the map prepared and survey carried out by the Forest Department, pursuant to the order dated 7th May, 1997 of this Court, shall be final.” (9) This Hon’ble Court has further held that there is no distinction in law between Sanjay Gandhi National Park and Sanjay Gandhi National Park Division. The relevant findings are reproduced below: “194. It was urged by Mr. Oka, Mr. Grover and Mr. Vashi that Sanjay Gandhi National Park and Sanjay Gandhi National Park Division are two independent areas. SGNP cannot be equated with a SGNP Division. The notifications under sub- sections (1) and (2) of section 35 (preliminary notification) and under sub-section (4) of section 35 of the Wild Life (Protection) Act, 1972 (final notification), referred to only National Park and not National Park Division. Several areas which have not been included in National Park (SGNP), therefore, cannot form part and parcel of National Park and the notifications will not apply to those areas. Several areas which have not been included in National Park (SGNP), therefore, cannot form part and parcel of National Park and the notifications will not apply to those areas. It was also submitted that Schedule to both the notifications referred the areas to be included in National Park and the boundaries situated in or around such National Parks. Occupiers of the areas not within SGNP, therefore, would not be affected and no proceedings can be initiated against them. It was submitted that in view of the legal position, though in an order dated 7th May, 1997 the Division Bench of this Court has issued certain directions in respect of occupiers of SGNP Division, they would not apply to the SGNP Division but their application would be limited to occupiers in SGNP. 195. We are unable to accept the submission of the learned Counsel, the map annexed to the petition, though it is captioned as Sanjay Gandhi National Park (SGNP), is really a map of the Sanjay Gandhi National Park Division (SGNP Division). Several orders which have been passed by this Court as well as by the Supreme Court from time to time also refers to SGNP Division. It, therefore, cannot be contended that the application of notification should be made limited to SGNP. 196. It is also pertinent to note at this stage that it does not make any difference whether the area is part of SGNP or SGNP Division. All the land in the Division is " forest" within the meaning of Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975 or the Indian Forest Act, 1927. Once the land is held to be "forest", no relief can be granted to the occupiers as the directions issued in Godavarman would squarely apply to such land. Godavarman goes further and declares that the expression "forest" should not be read in a restrictive manner and it must be understood according to its dictionary meaning which would cover all statutory forests, whether designated as reserved protected or otherwise, and would also include any area recorded as forest in the Government record, irrespective of ownership. In the present case, the case of the State Government is that the area is " forest" and has been recorded as such in the Government record. In the present case, the case of the State Government is that the area is " forest" and has been recorded as such in the Government record. Hence, the ratio laid down in Godavarman will apply.” [Emphasis supplied] (10) It is respectfully submitted that a perusal of the official map prepared by the Forest Department pursuant to the Interim Order clearly shows that Gat No. 59/1 forms part of the SGNP Division. The said map is produced along with this note for ease of reference. (11) The continuing recognition of the SGNP Division as a protected forest area admeasuring approximately 104 sq. km. has also been reaffirmed in subsequent proceedings, including Contempt Petition (Lodging) No. 9237 of 2023, wherein this Hon’ble Court observed: “1. The present Contempt Petition alleges contempt of various orders passed in Writ Petition No. 305 of 1995 for the protection and preservation of the area of Sanjay Gandhi National Park Division admeasuring approximately 104 square kilometers…” (12) In view of the above orders and findings, it is submitted that it is clear that the subject lands fall within the SGNP Division. Consequently, the subject lands are “forest lands” in law, and Gat No. 59/1 indisputably forms part of the SGNP Division. ANNEXURE ‘B’ WRITTEN NOTES OF ARGUMENTS ON THE LAW LAID DOWN BY THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT IN GODREJ &BOYCE (SUPRA) AND ROHAN NAHAR (SUPRA) (1) On 7 th November 2025, a bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court comprising Vikram Nath and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ., delivered its decision in Rohan Vijay Nahar & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2366 (“Rohan Nahar”). The Court set aside the Bombay High Court’s decision in Devkumar Gopaldas Aggarwal and Ors vs State of Maharashtra and Ors, 2018 SCC Online 2823 (“Devkumar Aggarwal”) holding that the High Court was wrong in concluding that the facts of the case in Devkumar Aggarwal differed from those in Godrej & Boyce Mfg. Co. Ltd. v.State of Maharashtra, (2014) 3 SCC 430 (“Godrej & Boyce”). (2) The Hon’ble Supreme Court noted that the High Court had framed two issues in Devkumar Aggarwal. Co. Ltd. v.State of Maharashtra, (2014) 3 SCC 430 (“Godrej & Boyce”). (2) The Hon’ble Supreme Court noted that the High Court had framed two issues in Devkumar Aggarwal. The main issue was whether the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Godrej & Boyce would apply to the facts in Devkumar Aggarwal, and whether subsequent purchasers could rely on Godrej & Boyce even when their predecessors-in-title had not questioned the application of the Maharashtra Private Forests (Acquisition) Act, 1975 (“Maharashtra Private Forests Act”) or the actions taken under it (Para 12.1/Page 18 of Rohan Nahar). (3) In fact, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rohan Nahar relied and also followed the law laid down in Godrej & Boyce. In particular, in paragraphs 10.2/Page 16, 10.3/Page 16, 10.4/Page 16 and 14.2/Pages 22-23 of Rohan Nahar, the Supreme Court observed as follows : “10.2 Interpreting the expression “a notice has been issued” in Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA, when read with Section 35 of the IFA, the Court held that “issuance” cannot be divorced from service. Given the statutory scheme, a valid notice under Section 35(3) of the IFA necessarily entails service on the owner, an opportunity to file objections, to adduce evidence, and to be heard. Because interim restraints may be imposed under Section 35(4) of the IFA and penal consequences attach under Section 35(7) of the IFA, service is inherent to the process. Section 35(5) of the IFA, requiring service in the CPC manner and publication as prescribed, reinforces this conclusion. 10.3 On this basis, the view in Chintamani Gajanan Velkar (Supra) that a bare, unserved notice sufficed for Section 2)(f)(iii) of the MPFA was found to have overlooked the Bombay/Maharashtra amendments to Section 35 of the IFA and to have proceeded on an erroneous premise regarding the two-hectare exclusion. It was overruled to that extent. 10.4 The Court further clarified that Section 2(f) (iii) of the MPFA saves only “live” or “pipeline” notices, those issued and pursued in reasonable proximity to 30.08.1975. Notices left undecided for years or decades lapse into desuetude. The State is obliged to act within a reasonable time; a notice from 1956–57, never taken to its statutory culmination, cannot be revived to effect vesting on the appointed day. Notices left undecided for years or decades lapse into desuetude. The State is obliged to act within a reasonable time; a notice from 1956–57, never taken to its statutory culmination, cannot be revived to effect vesting on the appointed day. 14.2 After this categorisation, we are satisfied that there is no legally relevant distinction between the present cases and the decision in Godrej and Boyce (Supra). The ratio in Godrej and Boyce (Supra) turns on service of a notice under Section 35(3) of the IFA, the existence of a live process capable of culminating in a notification under Section 35(1) of the IFA, and strict compliance with the statutory steps that alone can support vesting under Section 3(1) of the MPFA Act on the footing of Section 2(f)(iii). The record before us discloses the same deficiencies that were fatal in Godrej and Boyce (Supra). There is no proof of service of any notice under Section 35(3) of the IFA on the then owners. There is no final notification under Section 35(1) of the IFA. Possession has remained with private owners throughout. No contemporaneous action was taken under Sections 4, 5, 6 or 7 of the MPFA Act. These features mirror the very elements that led this Court to hold that vesting had not occurred in Godrej and Boyce (Supra)….” FACTS IN THE DECISION OF GODREJ & BOYCE (4) Since the issue in Rohan Nahar is connected to Godrej & Boyce, it is necessary to first examine Godrej & Boyce. The relevant facts from that judgment are as follows: (4.1) Godrej acquired land in Vikhroli by a registered deed of conveyance dated 30 th July 1948 from Nowroji Pirojsha, who had inherited it from Framjee Cawasjee Banaji, the original perpetual leaseholder under an 1835 Government of Bombay grant. The land was classified as “wasteland” under the original lease, meant to be cultivated. The dispute concerns 133 acres and 38 gunthas from specific survey numbers, referred to as the “disputed land.” (Paras 3 - 4/Page 12 of Godrej & Boyce). (4.2) In 1951, the Salsette Estates Act (“Abolition Act”) was passed stating that wastelands granted under a perpetual leaser not cultivated before 14 th August 1951 would vest in the State and be the property of the State. (4.2) In 1951, the Salsette Estates Act (“Abolition Act”) was passed stating that wastelands granted under a perpetual leaser not cultivated before 14 th August 1951 would vest in the State and be the property of the State. However, aggrieved by this Act, Godrej filed a suit in the Bombay High Court for declaration of its ownership and that the Abolition Act had no application to the lands in question. After litigation, a 1962 consent decree declared that except for 31 gunthas, the rest of the land had been cultivated by Godrej before 14 th August 1951 and therefore belonged to Godrej. (Paras 5 -7/Pages 12 - 13 of Godrej & Boyce). (4.3) Development plans for the city of Bombay in 1967 and 1991 designated the disputed land as residential. Godrej received permissions to construct residential buildings and built four for staff use. However, on 17 th February 1976 the Urban Land Ceiling Act (1976) came into force and since the disputed land was in excess of the ceiling limit, Godrej sought exemptions to use excess land for industrial and residential purposes. The State granted the exemption, requiring construction of staff housing. With exemptions and municipal permissions, Godrej built over 40 multi-storeyed residential buildings, a clubhouse, substations, and other facilities, housing thousands of families (Paras 9 - 11/Page 13 of Godrej &Boyce). (4.4) In May 2006, Godrej received six stop-work notices stating that the disputed land was treated as private forest, requiring Central Government approval for construction under the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980. Godrej learned that this action arose from a 2005 Bombay High Court order directing the State to update all land records. Godrej learned that, while updating land records, the State had unilaterally changed the revenue entries to classify the land as private forest. It also found that Notice No. WT/53, issued under Section 35(3) Indian Forest Act, 1927 ( “Indian Forest Act”), had been published in the Bombay Government Gazette of 6 th September 1956 regarding the land, but the notice had no date, was never served on Godrej, and was never acted upon by the Government. It also found that Notice No. WT/53, issued under Section 35(3) Indian Forest Act, 1927 ( “Indian Forest Act”), had been published in the Bombay Government Gazette of 6 th September 1956 regarding the land, but the notice had no date, was never served on Godrej, and was never acted upon by the Government. (Paras 16 & 31 - 33/ Pages 14 & 19 of Godrej &Boyce) (4.5) Aggrieved by this, Godrej filed Writ Petition No. 2196 of 2006 seeking a declaration that its Vikhroli land was not forest land and asking the High Court to invalidate the forest department’s letter, the stop-work notices, and the revenue record mutation. During the case, it emerged that about 170 similar notices were issued in 1956–57 to various entities, including government establishments. (Paras 34 - 35/ Pages 19-20 of Godrej & Boyce) (4.6) The State contended that, based on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Chintamani Gajanan Velkar v. State of Maharashtra (2000) (“Chintamani Velkar”), the disputed land had already vested in the State under Section 3 of the Maharashtra Private Forests Act. The High Court dismissed Godrej’s petitions in 2008, holding that development approvals and planning designations could not override the land’s status as private forest, and that government inaction did not invalidate earlier notices. The Court further held that even a Section 35(3) notice issued without a corresponding Gazette notification did not remove the land from the Maharashtra Private Forests Act and such notices could not be deemed abandoned. It concluded that private forest land remains forest despite any development plans or zoning changes. Aggrieved with this decision, Godrej and other petitioners filed special-leave petitions before the Supreme Cour (Paras 36 - 38/Pages 20-21 of Godrej & Boyce). (4.7) However, the Supreme Court allowed all the appeals and set aside the judgment of the Bombay High Court, and delivered the following findings: (4.7.1) It overruled Chintamani Velkar which had held that mere issuance of a notice under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forests Act is sufficient and service is not required under Section 2(f)(iii) of the Maharashtra Private Forests Act and held that the word “issued” in Section 2(f)(iii) must include service of the show-cause notice (Paras 61 - 62/Page 26 of Godrej & Boyce). (4.7.2) The Supreme Court endorsed the Full Bench decision in J. C. Waghmare vs State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 Bom 119 , which upheld the constitutional validity of the Maharashtra Private Forest Act (Paras 22 - 26/Pages 17-18 of Godrej & Boyce). It held that : (a) Section 2(f)(iii) of the Maharashtra Private Forests Act applies even to land where only a notice had been issued under Section 35 of the Indian Forest Act and the owner’s objections remained unheard when that provision was repealed in 1975, such objections can now be heard under Section 6 of the Maharashtra Private Forests Act. (b) Section 6 provides landowners with the opportunity to file objections and demonstrate that their land should not be classified or declared as forest. (4.7.3) The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that Section 2(f)(iii) of the Maharashtra Private Forests Act is in sense a saving clause and is meant to save “pipeline notices”. “Pipeline notices” or “live notices” have been defined to mean notices issued in reasonably close proximity to the coming into force of the Maharashtra Private Forests Act and only such “live notices” could be acted upon (Paras71 – 74/Pages 27-28 of Godrej & Boyce). (4.7.4) The Supreme Court held that the notice issued to Godrej could not be considered a “pipeline” notice, since a pipeline period cannot reasonably extend from 1956–1957 all the way to 1975. Therefore, the notice was not valid for the purpose of treating the land as private forest (Para 49/Page 24 of Godrej & Boyce). FACTS IN THE DECISION OF ROHAN NAHAR (5) In the background of Godrej & Boyce, it is now essential to examine the facts of the case in Rohan Nahar: (5.1) The Appellants (batch of 96 civil appeals) are landowners in Maharashtra whose cases share a common factual background with each other, as well as with the facts in Godrej & Boyce. The State claims that in the early 1960s, notices under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act were issued and published in the Official Gazette, calling upon landowners to show cause why forest-related restrictions should not be imposed. The landowners maintain that these notices were never personally served, no hearings were held, no final notification under Section 35(1) of the Indian Forest Act was issued, and the proceedings remained dormant for decades (Para 7.1/Page 12 of Rohan Nahar). The landowners maintain that these notices were never personally served, no hearings were held, no final notification under Section 35(1) of the Indian Forest Act was issued, and the proceedings remained dormant for decades (Para 7.1/Page 12 of Rohan Nahar). (5.2) After the Maharashtra Private Forests Act, came into force, the landowners argued that the State did not take possession under Section 5 and that for decades the lands continued to be treated as private holdings. Transfers were allowed, planning authorities treated these lands as agricultural land or no development zone, and no compensation was paid. The State argued that the 1960s notices under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act read with Section 2(f) (iii) of the Maharashtra Private Forests Act caused automatic vesting of the lands in the State(Para 7.2/Page 13 of Rohan Nahar). (5.3) However, from around 2001, revenue officers began mutating village records to show lands as affected by forest proceedings. Names of the landowners were replaced with that of the State. The owners alleged these changes were made without notice to them and in violation of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code. The State argued that the entries merely reflected statutory vesting. These annotations had collateral effects and Sub-Registrars refused to register documents having regard to departmental instructions. Possession nonetheless remained with the private parties, compensation was never awarded, and many administrative challenges under Maharashtra Land Revenue Code remained unresolved. Landowners therefore approached the High Court seeking correction of records, declaratory relief regarding title and vesting and restoration of entries consistent with private title and possession. (Paras 7.3 - 7.4/ Page 13 of Rohan Nahar). (5.4) Before the High Court, landowners challenged the legality of forest-related mutation entries and sought declarations that their lands were not private forests under the Maharashtra Private Forests Act, along with restoration of their names in the revenue records. (Paras 7.3 - 7.4/ Page 13 of Rohan Nahar). (5.4) Before the High Court, landowners challenged the legality of forest-related mutation entries and sought declarations that their lands were not private forests under the Maharashtra Private Forests Act, along with restoration of their names in the revenue records. The Landowners argued that : (i) mere Gazette publication of the notice under Section 35(3)of the Indian Forest Act without personal service under Section 35(5) of the Indian Forest Act could not have adverse consequences; (ii) They emphasized that no inquiry or final notification followed after the issuance of the notices under Section 35(3); (iii) that the notices were stale; (iv) that the State never took possession of the lands in question or paid compensation for the same; and (v) the revenue authorities actions violated the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code and natural justice requirements (Paras 8.1 - 8.2/ Pages 13 - 14 of Rohan Nahar). (5.5) The State responded that issuance of Section 35(3) notices in the 1960s was sufficient for vesting under Section 2(f)(iii) and Section 3 of Maharashtra Private Forests Act and that revenue entries were ministerial reflections of statutory vesting that followed as a matter of law. It also raised objections regarding delay and laches and pointed out to availability of remedies under the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code. (Para 8.3/Page 14 of Rohan Nahar). (5.6) The High Court grouped the cases and considered common questions such as (i) whether issuance of Section 35(3) notices in these cases, without service of these notice on the landowners, alone was enough? (ii) whether service and a Section 35(1) notification were mandatory? (iii) whether dormancy affected vesting, and (iv) whether the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code procedures had been violated (Para 8.4/Page 14 of Rohan Nahar). (5.7) The Hon’ble High Court in Devkumar Aggarwal vide its order dated 27 th September 2018 disposed of this batch of 96 petitions and held as follows: (5.7.1) That vesting under Section 3 of Maharashtra Private Forests Act occurred automatically on 30 th August 1975 i.e., the appointed day and that entries made in 2002 merely reflected this vesting (Para12.2/Page 18 of Rohan Nahar). (5.7.2) It accepted the State’s claim that the Section 35(3) notices were issued and served and that in many cases a Section 35(1) notification was already in force. (5.7.2) It accepted the State’s claim that the Section 35(3) notices were issued and served and that in many cases a Section 35(1) notification was already in force. It relied on Gazette extracts, referred to as the “Golden Register”, possession notices, and panchanama (Para 12.3 of the Rohan Nahar Judgement). (5.7.3) It distinguished Godrej & Boyce as being fact-specific as in Godrej & Boyce the owners had an earlier consent decree, long- standing sanctioned development and an evidentiary vacuum on service and follow-through. It also held that requirements of issuance and service were satisfied on the basis of the facts on record (Paras 12.4 – 12.5/Page 19 of Rohan Nahar). (5.7.4) The principle laid down in Godrej & Boyce that had made a distinction in “stale” and “live” notices was not considered by the High Court and it was held that the issue in Godrej & Boyce was fact specific to the facts of that case. It was further held that in any event, the lands in question would come within the primary definition of “forest” under Section 2(c- i) of the Maharashtra Private Forests Act. (Para 12.6/Page 19 of Rohan Nahar). (5.7.5) In several of the cases the High Court found that the challenges were mounted by subsequent purchasers who had acquired the land post 30 th August 1975 i.e., the appointed day and not by original land owners. The High Court held that the subsequent purchasers were alleging non service of notices without obtaining affidavits from their predecessors -in-title stating whether the notices were in fact served on them or not. It was further held that the subsequent purchasers made these allegations even though the “burden was effectively placed on the petitioners to dislodge official records”. (Paras 12.7 – 12.8/Page 19 of Rohan Nahar). (5.7.6) Except one matter remitted for inquiry, the High Court dismissed all writ petitions, charactering several as commercially motivated and not bona fide and cautioning that entraining them would weaken forest protection. (Para 12.12/Page 19 of Rohan Nahar). (5.8) However, in the case of Rohan Nahar, the Hon’ble Supreme Court overruled Devkumar Aggarwal and held as under: (5.8.1) That the controlling legal position is settled i.e., for vesting under Section 3 of the Maharashtra Private Forests Act based on Section 2(f)(iii), the Section 35(3) notice must not only be issued but must be served. (5.8) However, in the case of Rohan Nahar, the Hon’ble Supreme Court overruled Devkumar Aggarwal and held as under: (5.8.1) That the controlling legal position is settled i.e., for vesting under Section 3 of the Maharashtra Private Forests Act based on Section 2(f)(iii), the Section 35(3) notice must not only be issued but must be served. Service is essential because it triggers the owner’s right to object. The Court rejected the High Court’s view that reproducing the text of Section 35(1) “beneath” a show-cause notice amounted to a final notification. It further held that mutation entries cannot perfect an acquisition that lacks statutory predicates and that these entries cannot create title in the State or divest title from the private owner (Para 13.1/Page 20 of Rohan Nahar). (5.8.2) The Court found critical statutory steps missing viz. (i) no proof that Section 35(3) notices were served, nor any final notification under Section 35(1). (ii) Private owners had remained in continuous possession, as shown by revenue records. (iii) The State had not taken possession under Section 5, initiated schemes under Section 4, conducted compensation proceedings under Section 7, or held timely inquiries under Section6. (iv) The documents relied on by the State, mostly undated or unverified, were unreliable when contrasted with decades of undisputed private possession. (v) In some cases, the State relied on notices sent to non-owners or on lands long converted to industrial use. In another, it could not even assert that a Section 35(3) notice existed. Taken together, these deficiencies made it clear that vesting under Section 3(1) of the Maharashtra Private Forests Act had not been completed (Para 13.2/Page 20 of Rohan Nahar) Note: It may be noted that in Rohan Nahar, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has not reinterpreted the ratio in Godrej & Boyce nor has it distinguished the same. Furthermore, the ratio laid down in Godrej & Boyce in the paragraphs that are being relied up by the Petitioner in WP 3205 of 2018, viz. paragraphs 61 and 71 - 74, has not been disturbed by the judgement delivered in Rohan Nahar. (5.8.3) The Hon’ble Supreme Court also rejected the High Courts distinctions between original and subsequent purchasers. It was held that compliance with mandatory statutory requirements does not depend on ownership history. Subsequent purchasers cannot be prejudiced by undisclosed proceedings. The revenue records themselves showed continued private ownership, undermining the State’s case. (5.8.3) The Hon’ble Supreme Court also rejected the High Courts distinctions between original and subsequent purchasers. It was held that compliance with mandatory statutory requirements does not depend on ownership history. Subsequent purchasers cannot be prejudiced by undisclosed proceedings. The revenue records themselves showed continued private ownership, undermining the State’s case. The Supreme Court rejected the High Court’s approach to hold that a subsequent purchaser is in a worst position than the one who developed land would invert the logic of the statute and would reward illegality while penalising restraint (Para 13.4/Page21 of Rohan Nahar). (5.8.4) The Hon’ble Supreme Court also refused remand for a Section 6 inquiry, holding that such an exercise decades later would be meaningless and could not cure the lack of mandatory prerequisites. It further held that the High Court misread the Gazette, diluted statutory requirements, and relied on irrelevant material. The judgment therefore could not stand. (Para 13.5/Pages21-22 of the Rohan Nahar Judgement). (5.8.5) And finally it was held that the facts in those 96 appeals which arose from the Bombay High Court Judgement in Devkumar Aggarwal were indistinguishable in principle from Godrej & Boyce. It was held that the record reflects the same jurisdictional defects viz. (i) non-service of a notice under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act, (ii) absence of a final notification under Section 35(1) of the Indian Forest Act, and (iii) lack of contemporaneous steps under Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the Maharashtra Private Forests Act. In these circumstances, the High Court could not, consistent with Article 141 of the Constitution, disregard the binding ratio by treating immaterial differences as determinative (Para 14.6/Pages23-24 of Rohan Nahar). DISTINGUISING FEATURES OF THE PRESENT PETITION FROM ROHAN NAHAR (6) It is submitted that, based on the above facts and as correctly held in Rohan Nahar, the facts in Godrej & Boyce and Rohan Nahar are indistinguishable. In both cases, the Section 35(3) notices were issued in the 1960s, never served on the original owners, and never followed by any further action. As held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Godrej & Boyce, only “Pipeline Notices”, viz. those issued in close proximity to the Maharashtra Private Forests Act coming into force, could be acted upon. This principle has not been interfered with in Rohan Nahar. As held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Godrej & Boyce, only “Pipeline Notices”, viz. those issued in close proximity to the Maharashtra Private Forests Act coming into force, could be acted upon. This principle has not been interfered with in Rohan Nahar. (7) Godrej & Boyce held that mere issuance of a notice under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act is not enough, the notice also has to be served on the owner of the land. It is important to note that while Rohan Nahar reaffirmed this principle regarding issuance and service of the notice under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act, it did not hold that such notices must be served before the Maharashtra Private Forests Act came into force on 30 th August1975. (8) In light of the above, it is humbly submitted that the facts in the present case (WP 3205 of 2018) are distinguishable from those in Rohan Nahar for the following reasons: (8.1) The notice under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act was issued to Respondent No. 1 on 29 th August 1975 and served on 4 th September 1975. This is confirmed in Paras 7.11 and 7.12 (Pages 126–127) of Respondent No. 1’s Reply in WP 3205 of 2018. This alone marks a significant factual difference from Rohan Nahar as in the Rohan Nahar the notices were not served at all and in some of the appeals served on non-owners. (8.2) The notice under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act was issued on 29 th August 1975 and served on 4 th September 1975 i.e., in close proximity to 30 th August 1975. It is therefore submitted that such a notice would be a “live” notice/“pipeline” notice as understood in the decision of Godrej & Boyce. Significantly, in contrast, the notices in Rohan Nahar were “stale” notices, issued in the 1960s and never served on the landowners. (8.3) In the present case, after taking possession of the subject land, the Forest Department constructed boundary walls, an entry gate, a security cabin, a nature interpretation centre, and other structures for protecting the subject land. By contrast, in Rohan Nahar, no action was taken even after issuing notices in the 1960s. (8.3) In the present case, after taking possession of the subject land, the Forest Department constructed boundary walls, an entry gate, a security cabin, a nature interpretation centre, and other structures for protecting the subject land. By contrast, in Rohan Nahar, no action was taken even after issuing notices in the 1960s. (8.4) Furthermore, in the current case, Respondent No. 1 also wrote two letters (dated 5 th July 1979 and 28 th August 1975) requesting exemption of 24 acres and 32 gunthas from Gat No. 59/A/1, offering substitute land instead. Respondent No. 1 stated that considerable amounts had been spent by it in developing horticulture on the land and wells and farmhouses had been built on the subject land. Since the provisions of the Maharashtra Private Forests Act did not allow substitution of land, the State rejected this request. Respondent No. 1 then filed a Section 6 application under the Maharashtra Private Forests Act before the Collector (“SDO”). This is a key distinction from Rohan Nahar, where the owners never got a hearing. Here, the original owner himself approached the authorities and participated in the process. (8.5) In the present case, the purpose of issuing a notice under Section 35(3) has been fulfilled (viz. giving a hearing to the owner of the land) in as much as, after the Section 6 application, the following proceedings were held: (8.5.1) The Collector, by order dated 3 rd August 1980, accepted Respondent No. 1’s offer of alternate land. The Petitioner challenged this before the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal (“MRT”). (8.5.2) On 15 th October 1982, the MRT remanded the matter to the SDO for fresh inquiry, holding that the SDO did not have the jurisdiction to allot the 24-acre parcel. (8.5.3) After the remand, the SDO passed a second order on 27 th December 2004, holding that 138 acres was private forest land vesting in the Government, while 55 acres was not. (8.5.4) Both sides appealed. (8.5.3) After the remand, the SDO passed a second order on 27 th December 2004, holding that 138 acres was private forest land vesting in the Government, while 55 acres was not. (8.5.4) Both sides appealed. On 15 th June 2017, the MRT dismissed the Forest Department’s appeal and allowed Respondent No. 1’s appeal, incorrectly interpreting Godrej & Boyce to hold that because the notice under Section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act was not served on or before 30 th August 1975, it could not be treated as a valid notice at all and held that the subject land is not a ‘private forest’ as contemplated under Section 2(f)(iii) of the Maharashtra Private Forests Act and hence the subject land is excluded entirely from acquisition under the Maharashtra Private Forests Act . (8.6) These facts clearly show that, unlike Rohan Nahar, the original owner in the present case had multiple opportunities to present his case. (8.7) In view of the above, it is submitted that the present case is clearly distinguishable from Rohan Nahar. Further, the issues raised in the present petition did not arise for consideration in Rohan Nahar. PART 2 - LIST OF DATES AND EVENTS -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1 (2014) 3 SCC 430 Order: 2 Forms part of the written submissions submitted by Respondent No. 2 as part of his intervention application before the SDO (Part of Exh B to the WP 3205 of 2018 3 2015 (6) Mh.L.J. 634 4 2016 (1) Mh.L.J Pg. 483 5 WP (OS) 2084 of 2013 decided on 26th November 2014 6 (2000) 3 SCC 143 “18. In our view, the proper clue in this behalf is provided by sub-clause (iii) of Section 2(f) itself. It will be noticed that in cases where a final notification has been issued under Section 35(1) the entire notified land would automatically vest in the State on the appointed date, namely, 30-8-1975. But in the case where only notice has been issued as per Section 35(3) before the appointed day, namely, 30-8-1975 — the Maharashtra Legislature thought that the entire property covered by the notice in the State need not vest but it excluded 2 hectares out of the forest land held by the landholder. That was the consideration for not allowing the benefit of an inquiry under Section 35(3) and for not allowing the notification to be issued under Section 35(1) of the 1927 Act. That was the consideration for not allowing the benefit of an inquiry under Section 35(3) and for not allowing the notification to be issued under Section 35(1) of the 1927 Act. 19. In our view, the legislature has not made any discrimination in regard to the matters where notification had been issued under Section 35(1) of the Forest Act, 1927 on the one hand and in cases where notification had not been issued and the matter stood still at the stage of notice under Section 35(3) on the other. In the latter cases, the legislature thought it fit to exclude 2 hectares of the landholder from vesting. If that was done, a notice that was issued under Section 35(3) would itself be sufficient and if such notice was issued before the appointed day i.e. 30-8-1975 the land would vest in the State subject, of course that the Collector has to specify the particular extent of 2 hectares which can be retained by the landholder. There is no need for any service of such notice before 30-8-1975, nor for an inquiry nor for a notification under Section 35(1).” 7 (1987) 4 SCC 203 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- ANNEXURE ‘C’ WRITTEN NOTES ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO.1:- 1. Background:- a. The Respondent No.1 is the owner of subject land admeasuring 193 acres 07 guntha 4A. The Indian Forest Act, 1927 (IFA) came to be published in official gazette on 27/09/1927. It contained Section 35. Said Section 35 deals with the aspect of protection of forest for special purpose by the State Government by way of publication of notification in the Official Gazette under Section 35 (1). But before that under Section 35 (3), Government is under obligation to issue the notice to the owner through an officer authorised by State Government, calling upon such owner to show cause within a reasonable period why notification under Section 35 (1) should not be made? Said Section 35 (3) stipulates calling for objection, giving opportunity of hearing to the owner, passing of order by the authorised officer, before publication of notification under Section 35 (1). b. It is pertinent to note that on 14/08/1975 a legislature was passed under the name and style as Maharashtra Private Forest (Acquisition) Act, 1975 (MPFA). The president of India gave ascent to MPFA on 25/08/1975. MPFA was published in Maharashtra Government Gazette Part IV on 29/08/1975. b. It is pertinent to note that on 14/08/1975 a legislature was passed under the name and style as Maharashtra Private Forest (Acquisition) Act, 1975 (MPFA). The president of India gave ascent to MPFA on 25/08/1975. MPFA was published in Maharashtra Government Gazette Part IV on 29/08/1975. MPFA vide clause 2 (a) stipulates that appointed day means the day on which said act comes into force. Said date was notified as 30/08/1975 vide G.N.R. and F.D. No.PRF1073/40845-F-2 dated 29/08/1975 The section 24 (i)of MPFA (acquisition 1975) is reproduced as below: “On and from the appointed day, sections 34a, 35, 36, 36a, 36b, 36c and 37 of the Forest Act shall stand repealed”.Whereas, it is obvious, on record the MPFA Act (Acquisiton 1975) received assent of the President on 25 th August, 1975 published in Gazette on 29 th August, 1975 . This itself shows that the Forest Department was very much aware that Section 35 is going to get repealed and hence with the malafide intention has issued a notice under section 35(3) on 29 th August, 1975 to the wrong person. c. Admittedly, during the period from 27/09/1927 till29/08/1975 (for about 48 years) it was never claimed by the State Government that subject land is forest and never issued any notice under Section 35 (3) of IFA to the owner of subject land calling upon the owner as to why the subject land should not be protected as forest. In fact, during said period subject land was subjected to lawful transfer by registered instruments, cultivation, horticulture, NA user, quarry purposes, etc. Kindly see Exhibit A, Exhibit B, Exhibit C, Exhibit D of affidavit in reply of the Respondent No.1 dated 25/11/2019. The said documents are at page no.283 i.e. Bombay Panvel Regional Plan of 1970, NA Permission granted by Collector Office Thane dated 14/05/1963 at page no.284, NA Permission granted by Collector Office Thane dated 15/12/1964 at page no.286, NA Permission granted by Collector Office Thane dated 25/07/1973 at page no.287, 7/12 extract for the period from 1956 to 1972-73 at page no.288- 289 recording cultivation of rice, existence of structures, horticulture, paddy, etc. upon subject land. d. It is only after MPFA getting ascent from President and having realised that Section 35 is repealed, State through Forest Department arbitrarily made show about issuance of notice allegedly dated 29/08/1975 under Section 35 (3) of IFA (impugned notice). upon subject land. d. It is only after MPFA getting ascent from President and having realised that Section 35 is repealed, State through Forest Department arbitrarily made show about issuance of notice allegedly dated 29/08/1975 under Section 35 (3) of IFA (impugned notice). In as much as, the notice issued a day prior to the repealing of the provision of section 35 ceased to have effect after the repeal of section 35. e. The Petitioner has not submitted in the present petition any documentary proof about actual issuance of impugned notice on alleged date i.e. 29/08/1975. f. In para 3 (d) of the Petition it is stated that impugned notice was served on 04/09/1975. The position of law is that mere issuance of notice is not sufficient but its service is also important and issuance cannot be divorced from service of notice. Section 35 (3) of IFA necessarily entail service on the owner and opportunity to file objection, to adduce evidence and to be heard. Section 35 (5) of IFA require service of such notice as per Civil Procedure Code and publication as prescribed. In the case of Godrej & Boyce (2014) 3 Supreme Court Case 430, above stated position of law is laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The notice dated 4 th September, 1975 after repeal of the provision was claimed to be issued to D Dayabhai & co. though it was obvious that the land owner were D.Dayabhai co.& pvt.ltd. and that D Dayabhai & Co. was entirely different entity and the real owner of the land was never served with a notice under section 35(3) under Forest Act to D. Dayabhai & Co.pvt.ltd. viz. R1. g. In the latest judgement dated 07/11/2025 in the case of Rohan Vijay Nahar & Ors. V/s. State of Maharashtra it is specifically held that the law settled in the case of Godrej & Boyce is a declaration of law under Article 141 of the Constitution. We will like to draw attention of this Hon’ble Court to paragraph number 10 in case of Rohan Vijay Nahar & Ors.V/s. State of Maharashtra: 10. The judgement in Oberoi Constructions Private Limited v. State of Maharashtra (supra) was challenged in this Court and decided by a three Judge Bench on 30.01.2014 and has been the prevailing precedent in such matters viz. Godrej & Boyce (supra). This Court gave the following findings: 10.1. The judgement in Oberoi Constructions Private Limited v. State of Maharashtra (supra) was challenged in this Court and decided by a three Judge Bench on 30.01.2014 and has been the prevailing precedent in such matters viz. Godrej & Boyce (supra). This Court gave the following findings: 10.1. This Court held that the mere issuance of a notice under Section 35(3) of the IFA is not, by itself, sufficient to treat land as a “private forest” within Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA. The answer to the principal question was returned in the negative. 10.2. Interpreting the expression “a notice has been issued” in Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA, when read with Section 35 of the IFA, the Court held that “issuance” cannot be divorced from service. Given the statutory scheme, a valid notice under Section 35(3) of the IFA necessarily entails service on the owner, an opportunity to file objections, to adduce evidence, and to be heard. Because interim restraints may be imposed under Section 35(4) of the IFA and penal consequences attach under Section 35(7) of the IFA, service is inherent to the process. Section 35(5) of the IFA, requiring service in the CPC manner and publication as prescribed, reinforces this conclusion. 10.3. On this basis, the view in Chintamani Gajanan Velkar (Supra) that a bare, unserved notice sufficed for Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA was found to have overlooked the Bombay/Maharashtra amendments to Section 35 of the IFA and to have proceeded on an erroneous premise regarding the two-hectare exclusion. It was overruled to that extent. 10.4. The Court further clarified that Section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA saves only “live” or “pipeline” notices, those issued and pursued in reasonable proximity to 30.08.1975. Notices left undecided for years or decades lapse into desuetude. The State is obliged to act within a reasonable time; a notice from 1956-57, never taken to its statutory culmination, cannot be revived to effect vesting on the appointed day. 10.5. On the definitional plane, the Court reaffirmed that the “means and includes” formulation in Section 2(c-i) of the MPFA does not dilute the primary sense of “forest”. Lands long designated for urban use, developed under sanctioned plans and permissions, and integrated with municipal infrastructure could not, on the admitted facts, be regarded as “forest” either in the primary or extended sense of Section 2(c-i) of the MPFA. 10.6. Lands long designated for urban use, developed under sanctioned plans and permissions, and integrated with municipal infrastructure could not, on the admitted facts, be regarded as “forest” either in the primary or extended sense of Section 2(c-i) of the MPFA. 10.6. Recognising the expropriatory character of the MPFA, the Court applied strict construction. Fundamental norms of fairness and good governance preclude unsettling settled civilian and commercial arrangements after prolonged State inaction, particularly where the State itself facilitated and acquiesced in development over decades. 10.7. Even assuming arguendo that the lands were forest, wholesale demolition and dispossession after half a century was neither feasible nor in the public interest on the facts recorded. The equities of third- party purchasers and residents, the State's prolonged acquiescence, and the practical impossibility of “restoration” militated against such a course. 10.8. In consequence, the appeals were allowed, the High Court's judgement was set aside, and actions premised solely on stale notices under Section 35(3) of the IFA were quashed. Also Kindly read para no.13 and 14 of the said judgment in the case of Rohan Vijay Nahar. Cumulative reading of both the judgements i.e. Godrej & Boyce and Rohan Nahar clearly demonstrate that unless notice is legally served and further steps under Section 35 i.e. issuance of notification, taking over possession, giving hearing and deciding the objection of the owner etc. are effectively taken up, the vesting of land as private forest in State Government under Section 3 of MPFA cannot happen. When in the present case the validity of the proceeding under section 6 of the Act of 1975 and process initiated under it is vitiated because of the non-service of the notice under section 35(3) of the Act i.e. before the appointed date 30 th August, 1975 to the original owner. h. Admitted position is that Section 35 stood repealed as per Section 24 of MPFA with effect from 30/08/1975. Thus after 30/08/1975 Section 35 was not in existence and therefore the service of notice under Section 35 after 30/08/1975 is of no effect. Petitioner admittedly has not come up with any documentary proof or case that after 30/08/1975 they had taken the steps under Section 35 of IFA particularly publication of notification, taking over possession, giving opportunity of hearing to the owner etc. Petitioner admittedly has not come up with any documentary proof or case that after 30/08/1975 they had taken the steps under Section 35 of IFA particularly publication of notification, taking over possession, giving opportunity of hearing to the owner etc. In fact their witness in cross has clearly admitted that notification under Section 35(1) 34(a) and 38 of IFA have not been published (Page No. 87 and 88 of additional compilation y Respondent No.1) Considering these factual aspects and law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Godrej & Boyce, the MRT vide impugned judgement dated 30/06/2017 Exhibit-E, at Page 87 to 115 held that land in dispute is not a private forest and accordingly dismissed the forest Appeal and allowed another Appeal filed by the Respondent No.1. i. Whereas in the matter of Godrej and Boyce Supra, the notices which were issued were not acted upon for the huge period of 27 years and hence the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the notices had became stale and not live and in para 56 in clear terms has observed as follows: 56. A notice under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act is intended to give an opportunity to the owner of a forest to show cause why, inter alia, a regulatory or a prohibitory measure be not made in respect of that forest. It is important to note that such a notice pre-supposes the existence of a forest. The owner of the forest is expected to file objections within a reasonable time as specified in the notice and is also given an opportunity to lead evidence in support of the objections. After these basic requirements are met, the owner of the forest is entitled to a hearing on the objections. This entire procedure obviously cannot be followed by the State and the owner of the forest unless the owner is served with the notice. Therefore, service of a notice issued under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act is inherent in the very language used in the provision and the very purpose of the provision. This entire procedure obviously cannot be followed by the State and the owner of the forest unless the owner is served with the notice. Therefore, service of a notice issued under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act is inherent in the very language used in the provision and the very purpose of the provision. j. In the present case, the forest department not only issued the notice under section 35(3) after the repeal of the act to the wrongful person and not to the owner but thereafter also in the year 1982, when the Tribunal remanded the matter, the department after 17 years i.e. in the year 1999 got the said remanded proceedings numbered as 53/99. This clearly shows the negligence on the part of Petitioner, which is established as above. 2. Whereas:- A. Admittedly, from 2018 till today Petitioner failed to obtain any stay to the order of MRT. The order of MRT has been effected in the revenue record. Substantial portion of land about 104 acres has been transferred under registered instruments to planning authority viz. TMC for various reservations. These registered instruments of 2019 have not been challenged by any separate legal suit/proceedings or in the present Writ Petition by the Petitioner. The possession of acquired land under registered instrument is handed over to planning authority viz. TMC which is evident from the text of registered instruments. In respect of some of the acquired land, 3 DRCs have been issued. In respect of land admeasuring 100 acres, acquired for park reservation No.4, even though TMC did not issue DRC, there are already three orders of the Hon’ble High Court dated 22/11/2022, 28/04/2025 and 27/06/2025 whereby planning authority TMC is directed to issue DRC. In the 7/12 extract the concerned reservation affected portion is already mutated in the name of TMC. From TILR report it is evident that acquired portion is situated at the eastern boundary of the Sanjay Gandhi National Park. Otherwise also circular dated 16/01/1996 of Government of Maharashtra identifying the boundaries of Sanjay Gandhi National Park is filed on record i.e. Exhibit-A of Additional affidavit of Respondent No.1 page No.445 to 447. From said circular it is evident that the entire village Manpada where the subject land is situate is situated at the eastern boundary of Sanjay Gandhi National Park. From said circular it is evident that the entire village Manpada where the subject land is situate is situated at the eastern boundary of Sanjay Gandhi National Park. Respondent No.1 has already filed another letter dated 23/01/1986 issued by forest department itself to Deputy Collector Thane (said letter dated 23/01/1986 is annexed as Exhibit-B to Additional affidavit of Respondent No.1 at Page No.448, 449) In said letter Petitioner itself has admitted that they could not take over the possession of the subject land. Thus, in the present matter following become undisputed facts. (i) There is no proof that notice was issued prior to appointed date i.e. 30/08/1975 to the Respondent No.1. (ii) Notice was served on 04/09/1975 (it is not served on the actual owner as required by CPC) (iii) There is no service or publication of notice as per CPC. (iv) No opportunity of hearing was given to the Respondent No.1. No notification under Section 35(1)came to be published. (v) Possession of subject land was not taken over by Petitioner as per Sec. 5 of MPFA. (vi) No compensation was paid by Petitioner to the Respondent No.1 (vii) Subject land was otherwise under cultivation, N.A. users, etc. Thus, there is no question of subject land coming within the definition of private forest defined under Section 2 (f) of MPFA. In the circumstances, there is no question of acquisition and vesting of subject land in the state government under Section 3 of MPFA. B. Whereas the MRT in its order dated 30/6/2017 has clearly observed and recorded in para 17 as below of which partially been reproduced:- “17. In view of above discussion, as the Forest Department has failed to prove that the notice u/s. 35 (3) was ‘served’ on the land owner, Resp. No.1 in Appeal No. 165/2005 who is Appellant in Appeal No. 229/2009, prior to the appointed day, and in fact, it has duly come on record that the said notice was actually served on the land owner on 4th September, 1975, i.e. after the repealing of the provisions of section 35 of the Forests Act, the land in dispute cannot be termed to be a ‘private forest’ as contemplated u/s. 2(f)(iii) of the Act of 1975, inasmuch as the notice issued a day prior to the repealing of the provision of section 35, ceased to have effect after the repeal of the section 35. It is also interesting to point out here that in spite of the knowledge about the proposed repealing of section 35, the Department of Forest right from the coming into force of the Indian Forests Act, 1927 in the year 1927, till 29th August, 1975, i.e. till a day prior to the proposed repealing of the provision of section 35, did not take any move or action so as to protect the so- called ‘forest’ or ‘private forest’ and only a day prior to the appointed day, i.e. 30/8/1975, on 29/8/1975 just ‘issued’ a notice which was not served on the land owner, so as to accord him an opportunity of hearing or representing his case in order to protect his rights.…” C. The facts of present case are covered by two judgements of Hon’ble Supreme Court in Godrej Boyce case and Rohan Vijay Nahar case. Cumulative reading of both judgments would indicate that a show cause notice granting time for objection cannot be reconciled with the final decision taken without service of notice and without hearing. Mere issuance of notice cannot clothe the State with authority to vest the land. Mere issuance of notice under Section 35(3) of Indian Forest Act does not result in automatic vesting on the appointed date of the subject land under Section 3 of MPFA. Statutory requirement of service, publication and enquiry must be satisfied before vesting of land under section 3 of MPFA to the State. D. Whereas currently the maximum land in question in the present Petition is owned and possessed by Thane Municipal Corporation also on actual site it has constructed 40Mtr DP Road and there is TMT bus Depot in process, TMC has reserved and allocated the funds for development of Garden, Maternity Home, Park, school and for other Municipal purposes. Hence, it is obvious that the said land is acquired silently for the urban usage and the Respondent has been denied any compensation. The TMC is very much aware that the no due legal process under the MPFA has been followed and no compensation has been paid under MPFA. Hence, it is obvious that the said land is acquired silently for the urban usage and the Respondent has been denied any compensation. The TMC is very much aware that the no due legal process under the MPFA has been followed and no compensation has been paid under MPFA. Hence, now that land has to be acquired in the provisions of “"Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013" (RFCTLA) then owner shall clearly fall under Section 3 (c) of the said Act and needs to be compensated as per RFCTLA read with Section 126 of MRTP Act. Kindly read the present note together with the comments made in red by R1 in the modified dates and events tendered in the court during the course of oral argument by the counsel of R1. E. Whereas in view of these facts, Writ Petition No.3205 of 2018 needs to be rejected as per MRT judgement. ANNEXURE ‘D’ STATE OF MAHARASHTRA VS D DAYABHAI AND CO PVT LTD WP/3205/2018 PART 1 - PARTIES IN THE WP MODIFICATION/ADDITIONS MADE BY R1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE OF BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO. 3205 OF 2018 DISTRICT : THANE Modification/Additions made by R1 with its comments in the list of dates and events submitted by the Petitioner Order: ANNEXURE ‘E’ PETITIONERS’ NOTE IN REJOINDER TO RESPONDENT NO.1’S ARGUMENTS The Petitioner’s rejoinder to the submissions advanced by Respondent No. 1 is set out as follows: ANNEXURE ‘F’ SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO.1 TO PETITIONER’S REJOINDER: A. Suppression and Misrepresentation by the Petitioner (Re: Para1.4) 1. The Petitioner, while relying upon paragraph 1.4 of its Note in rejoinder which read as under: 1.4 Even an office translation (carried out by the Forest Department) of the relevant proration of the cross-examination reads as follows: “A registered post receipt is being submitted (xerox copy) as proof that a notice under section 35(3) regarding the said land was sent to D. Dayabhai by registered post on 29/08/1975, and that D. Dayabhai received the said notice on04/09/1975.” The petitioner has deliberately and wilfully has once again tried to mislead the Hon’ble Court by suppressing material facts, thereby misleading this Hon’ble Court. a. The Petitioner has consciously stated that the alleged notice was served upon “D. Dayabhai”, while suppressing the crucial fact that: i. The alleged notice was not served upon the original owner, namely D. Dayabhai Co. Pvt. Ltd.; ii. The alleged notice was instead addressed to an incorrect and non-juristic entity, rendering the entire service void ab initio. b. It is further an admitted position of the Petitioner itself that the said notice was received only on 4 th September 1975, i.e. after the repeal of the relevant Act. c. Once the statute itself stood repealed, no proceedings, rights, obligations or consequences could survive, much less be resurrected on the basis of an invalid and belated notice. B. Illegal Reliance on Inadmissible Evidence a. The Petitioner has heavily relied upon a xerox/photocopy of a registered post receipt, which is: i. Inadmissible in evidence under the Indian Evidence Act; ii. Neither primary evidence nor proved in accordance with law; iii. Rejected during trial itself for want of proof. b. It is a settled principle of law that mere photocopies do not constitute admissible evidence unless foundational requirements are satisfied. The Petitioner’s reliance on such inadmissible material vitiates the entire case and exposes the mala fide attempt to create a false record. C. Testimony of Interested Witness a. The Petitioner has relied upon the statement of Shri Pakhre, who is: i. An employee of the Forest Department; ii. An interested and partisan witness; iii. The very person whose conduct has created unnecessary litigation, confusion, and grave hardship to the Respondent. b. Reliance on such a witness, without independent corroboration, cannot override statutory lapses, legal repeal, and absence of lawful service. D. Clear Case of Suppression of Material Facts a. The Petitioner has deliberately suppressed the following material facts: i. That the alleged notice was served on the wrong person; ii. That the alleged service is sought to be proved only by a xerox copy; iii. That the notice was admittedly received after repeal of the Act; iv. That there is no legally valid service upon the lawful owner. v. That the Petitioner does not have any proof about actual dispatch of notice prior to appointed day. b. Such suppression strikes at the very root of the Petitioner’s case and disentitles the Petitioner from any equitable or discretionary relief. That there is no legally valid service upon the lawful owner. v. That the Petitioner does not have any proof about actual dispatch of notice prior to appointed day. b. Such suppression strikes at the very root of the Petitioner’s case and disentitles the Petitioner from any equitable or discretionary relief. E. MRTP Act – Lapse of Reservation and Collusive Conduct a. The Respondent no.1’s land in question falls under the development plan passed and published vide notification dated 1986 approved by the State of Maharashtra in the year 1991 for City of Thane after considering all objections and suggestions as per the statutory provisions of MRTP ACT 1966. This unequivocally establishes that the reference land is situated outside the notified boundary of Sanjay Gandhi National Park (SGNP), and that the Thane Municipal Corporation is the competent planning and implementation authority for the said land. b. In view of the Development Plan reservation designating the land as a park, the Respondent has at all times refrained from carrying out any non-forest activities and, for the overall welfare and betterment of Thane City, has remained committed to preserving and maintaining its status as a park. c. A valid notice under Section 127(2) of the MRTP Act was served; the copy of the said notice is enclosed for ready reference. d. The Planning Authority failed to take steps within the statutory period; e. The Respondent respectfully submits that, acknowledging the Petitioner’s contention that a park is an essential amenity for the citizens of Thane and respecting public sentiment and necessity, even though a notice under Section 127(2) of the MRTP Act was served and the reservation had lapsed due to inaction, the Respondent nonetheless accepted Transferable Development Rights (TDR) in lieu of monetary compensation for the development of the park. Accordingly, with the intention of enabling the Thane Municipal Corporation to develop and maintain the park reservation and preserve its natural character, the Respondent accepted the TDR for the overall betterment of the citizens of Thane. Accordingly, with the intention of enabling the Thane Municipal Corporation to develop and maintain the park reservation and preserve its natural character, the Respondent accepted the TDR for the overall betterment of the citizens of Thane. f. The letter dated 8.1.2020 (Exh.H page 120 of WP No.10024/2023) issued by TMC to the forest department clearly established the fact and willingness to Develop the park reservation for which last three paragraphs are reproduced as below: g. It is further pertinent to note that Land is acquired, 7/12 extract is mutated in the name of Corporation and further pursuant to the order dated 12 th July, 2023 passed in Special Civil Suit No 35 of2020, measurement was carried physically whereby the boundary and line possessed by D Dayabhai and Company Pvt Ltd is earmarked in blue dotted linescolor. The copy of the said Measurement is enclosed for ready reference. h. Further, there is a Minutes of 112 th meeting of Regional Empowered Committee (REC) of Regional office, Ministry of Environment, Forest and climate Change, Nagpur, held on 6 th February, 2024 whereby the Agenda of the said Meeting was to discuss diversion of Forest land in favor of MMRDA Thane for construction of Twin Tunnel 2 Lanes each side. In the said proposal the petitioners land was also considered and forest consented MMRDA to construct said twin tunnels on our land. The above facts clearly establish that our land is been already acquired and possessed by various state govt. Authorities and falls outside the boundary of SGNP. F. Conclusion (1) The Petitioner’s case is built on: (2) Suppression of material facts; (3) Inadmissible evidence; (4) Invalid service of notice; (5) Proceedings post repeal of statute; (6) Collusive conduct between statutory authorities. (7) The Petitioner has therefore approbated and reprobated, abused the process of law, and is not entitled to any relief whatsoever. DETAILED COMMENTS ON POINTERS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO.1 TO PETITIONER’S REJOINDER A. R1 comment on submissions of Petitioner in Para 1.1 to 1.15 of Rejoinder : i. The Petitioner’s reply on R1’s contention about no proof of issuance of notice dated 29/08/1975 itself demonstrates that Petitioner is raising hyper technical issue that R1 has taken this stand for the first time after 50 years. Said contention is not correct. Said contention is not correct. Kindly see WP No.1026 of 1975 (Page 297-338 of R1 Affidavit-in- Reply particularly Page 308-309 i.e. grounds and Page 320 i.e. Prayers) filed by R1 after issuance of notice dated 29/08/1975. In said writ petition validity of the notice dated 29/08/1975 was specifically challenged. When validity of the notice itself is challenged, there is no need to put challenge to every aspect of validity such as issuance, service, contents, annexures, etc. It is sufficient if the validity of notice itself is challenged. Otherwise also after the judgements in the Godrej case and Rohan Nahar case it has become absolutely clear that law declared by the Supreme Court indicate that notice issued under section 35 (3) of IFA has to be a valid notice. It is always open to the R1 to use the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Godrej and Rohan Nahar as the Hon’ble Supreme Court has not resorted to prospective overruling. (Please see C. B. Gautam para 43 & 46) and C Golakhnath para 45, 50, 51, 52). The burden to prove the validity of the notice is naturally on the Petitioner because Petitioner claims land with the contention that its notice is valid. R1 need not have to prove or take objection from inception about issuance. If at all according to Petitioner objection about issuance is taken for the first time after 50 years then in rebuttal Petitioner could have produced on record along with its rejoinder, proof about actual issuance and dispatch of the concerned notice prior to appointed day by submitting outward register, copy of postal receipt showing date of dispatch of notice, etc. Apart from mention of a number on the notice, there was deliberate failure to produce the outward register by the Forest Department. Thus Petitioner has failed to produce any such documents even after raising the doubt by R1 about issuance of notice before appointed day. The reliance placed on evidence of the Petitioner’s witness Mr. Pakhare is half hearted. Instead of relying upon what Pakhare has said, Petitioner could have produced directly the document of dispatch showing dispatch of notice prior to appointed day. Non production of any such document itself demonstrates that Petitioner till date has no documentary proof to establish the issuance and dispatch of the notice prior to appointed day. Pakhare is half hearted. Instead of relying upon what Pakhare has said, Petitioner could have produced directly the document of dispatch showing dispatch of notice prior to appointed day. Non production of any such document itself demonstrates that Petitioner till date has no documentary proof to establish the issuance and dispatch of the notice prior to appointed day. Kindly read para 13.3, 13.4 and 13.5 of Rohan Nahar Judgment (Page 59-60 of Citations filed by R1). In said paragraphs Hon’ble Supreme Court has clearly held that ex-proprietary legislation must be construed strictly and Article 300A of the Constitution requires that no person is deprived of the property save by authority of law. When the statute prescribed a manner of doing the thing it must be done in that manner or not at all. In para 13.5 it is held that after the passage of nearly half a century exercise of enquiry under Section 6 is largely academic and would not cure the absence of mandatory pre conditions of served notice under Section 35 (3) of IFA and lawful progression towards the notification under Section 35 (1) of IFA. ii. In view of declaration of law by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the above judgment and in the Godrej Case it becomes primary duty of the Petitioner to prove beyond doubt the issuance/dispatch of notice prior to appointed day regardless whether objection about date of actual issuance is taken at what stage? iii. The Forest Department has in a substantial number of cases not taken any action from 1927 till 29/08/1975 (Chintamani Velkar and present case). Godrej has in para 69 specifically observed that directions were issued to Collector with a draft copy of the MPFA annexed thereto on 27/08/1975 with instructions to take possession. But possession could not be taken over by Petitioner, which fact is proved from their own letter dated 23/01/1986 (Page 448 of additional affidavit in reply of R1). B. R1 comment on submissions of Petitioner in Para 2.1 to 2.5 of Rejoinder : i. It is incorrect to state that by virtue of pleadings in WP No.1026 of 1975 any judicious admissions are given by R1 about receipt of notice by R1 itself. Kindly read order dated 27/12/2004 of Deputy Collector passed after remand (Page 73-86 of WP). B. R1 comment on submissions of Petitioner in Para 2.1 to 2.5 of Rejoinder : i. It is incorrect to state that by virtue of pleadings in WP No.1026 of 1975 any judicious admissions are given by R1 about receipt of notice by R1 itself. Kindly read order dated 27/12/2004 of Deputy Collector passed after remand (Page 73-86 of WP). Particularly Page 75-76 of the said order clearly demonstrate that it has been consistent stand of R1 that notice was addressed to wrong person viz. D. Dahyabhai & Co. And not to R1, which is private limited company who is actual owner of subject land. One Chimanlal Shah was examined in that regard, who stated that he is accountant of D. Dahyabhai & Co. which is different entity. Even Deputy Collector has accepted this fact but discarded it by ranking it as clerical error. Then kindly see impugned common judgment dated 30/06/2017 of MRT (Page 87-115 of WP). Kindly read Page 112-113, para 17. MRT has accepted the fact that notice was addressed to and received by D. Dahyabhai & Co. which is entirely different entity and held that this shows that the company who was real owner of the land (R1) was never served with the notice under Section 35 (3) of IFA. MRT further held that Deputy Collector was wrong in ranking the said mistake to be clerical and further held that notice was not served upon land owner (R1) prior to appointed day as contemplated by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Godrej Judgment. Hence, said notice ceased to exist or ceased to have its effect after repeal. ii. In spite of above stated specific holding by MRT/Petitioner in the present WP had not demonstrated by way of any document that notice was served on actual owner i.e. R1. iii. R1 has filed WP No.1026 of 1975 because it came to know from Chimanlal Shah the Accountant of said separate entity viz. D Dahaybhai & Co. because notice was in respect of R1’s land and R1 was the affected party. Just because R1 has admitted in the said WP that notice dated 29/08/1975 was received by it does not amount to automatic curing of inherent defect in addressing the notice. iv. Godrej and Rohan Nahar both stipulate issuance of valid notice to the real land owner and in the manner prescribed under CPC so also its publication. Just because R1 has admitted in the said WP that notice dated 29/08/1975 was received by it does not amount to automatic curing of inherent defect in addressing the notice. iv. Godrej and Rohan Nahar both stipulate issuance of valid notice to the real land owner and in the manner prescribed under CPC so also its publication. v. The Petitioner neither in the WP nor in the rejoinder demonstrated compliance of these pre conditions of valid notice. C. R1 comment on submissions of Petitioner in Para 3, 4 , 5, 6 & 7 of Rejoinder : i. The submissions made in the said para 3.1 and the reliance placed upon the judgment of Supreme Court in peacock Plywood Case or upon Philson on evidence is wholly irrelevant and misleading. It was Petitioner who in first place suppressed the fact that said letters were issued without prejudice and now stating that those letters are no longer without prejudice because they waived their without prejudice privilege. There is no question in the present matter of Petitioner waiving any privilege because it was R1 who issued the letters without prejudice. In peacock case the Insurance Company was not allowed to resile from the representation made by it on account of waiver of privilege and in order to advance a beneficial legislation in favour of the beneficiary. In Nahar’s case the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that MPFA is an ex-proprietary legislation so Peacock case is not applicable to the present case. ii. Kindly appreciate that admittedly said letters dated 05/07/1979 and 28/08/1979 so also the application dated 19/01/1980 (Page 63 of R1 compilation) all were issued without prejudice to the pending writ. By filing appeal against Deputy Collector’s acceptance order dated 03/06/1980 before MRT by the Petitioner, Petitioner itself rejected the without prejudice offer given by R1. This fact is evident from the whole reading of MRT order dated 15/10/1982 (Page 48-56 of WP). iii. From said remand order dated 15/12/1982 particularly para 8, 13, 15, 16, 17 and 22 as well as the operative part it is evident that matter was remanded for fresh enquiry in respect of entire land admeasuring 204 acres. Accordingly, Deputy Collector framed issues (Page 75 of WP). The Petitioner never raised objection about framing of said issues before Deputy Collector; in fact, Petitioner participated in the trial upon said issues by leading evidence. Accordingly, Deputy Collector framed issues (Page 75 of WP). The Petitioner never raised objection about framing of said issues before Deputy Collector; in fact, Petitioner participated in the trial upon said issues by leading evidence. It is only in the appeal no.165 of 2005 before MRT Petitioner has taken stand that enquiry was restricted to 24 acres and R1 has concealed that 168 acres is forest. From para 8, Page 108 of WP of the MRT order it is evident that MRT discarded contention of Forest Department that enquiry was restricted to only 24 acres. In para 10 of MRT order, MRT framed specific questions for determination on the basis of rival contentions of parties. Those issues/questions are as under:- 1. Whether the land in dispute can be said to be private forest as contemplated under Section 2 (f) (iii) of MPFA? 2. Whether the proceedings conducted by Deputy Collector was vitiated by the non service of notice on or before appointed day? 3. What order? iv. Para 11 of the MRT order demonstrate that negative findings was given on issue no.1 and accordingly the entire land was held as non forest. Affirmative finding was given on issue no.2 by holding that proceeding conducted by Deputy Collector stands vitiated because of non service of notice under Section 35 (3) of IFA upon the real land owner (R1). v. The Petitioner neither in the WP nor in the rejoinder has demonstrated that there was valid service upon true owner and/or the subject land comes within the definition of private forest. The Petitioner has not even filed on record the alleged notice dated 29/08/1975. Without showing a single document from the record and without satisfying the Hon’ble Court about actual issuance and service upon real land owner i.e. R1, attempt has been made by Petitioner to create confusion by way of misleading this Hon’ble Court by misinterpreting the binding ratio of Godrej and Rohan Nahar judgments by pointing out immaterial facts and without demonstrating strict compliance of statutory pre conditions for vesting the land in the Forest Department. vi. It is incorrect to state that in WP No.1026/1975 R1 has admitted on oath that the land was put to non forest use only to a limited extent. vi. It is incorrect to state that in WP No.1026/1975 R1 has admitted on oath that the land was put to non forest use only to a limited extent. It is not R1 who has to prove that subject land is not forest but it is for the Petitioner to prove that subject land comes within the definition of forest. In fact, since 1975 it had been consistent stand of R1 that subject land does not come within the definition of forest. The remand order dated 15/10/1982 was to make enquiry in that regard. In enquiry panchanama was carried out by the Petitioner’s own officers in which it is recorded that more than 107 acres of land was under non agricultural user. Kindly read page 65-67 of compilation of R1. In para 4.8 misleading reference of village form -1A maintained by SGNP Division is given but same is neither produced on record nor from form-1A it could be construed as land is vested in State under Section 3 of MPFA. vii. The Petitioner has attempted to misinterpret para 72 of Godrej Judgement by contending that Supreme Court has not used the word served in close proximity and therefore for any notice to become pipeline notice what is required is only issuance in close proximity and not service before appointed day. Said interpretation is incorrect because in the earlier paragraphs of the Godrej Judgement the word issued used in Section 2 (f) (iii) of MPFA is interpreted as issued and served and it is specifically held that service is inherent in the word ‘issued’. Supreme Court therefore never intended in para 72 to exclude service. As per Godrej Judgement pipeline notice means issued and served in the close proximity before appointed day. Godrej Judgement therefore overrules its previous judgement in Chintamani Velkar to that extent because in that matter also service was after appointed day. viii. It is incorrect to say that in view of Godrej Judgement notices issued in closed proximity but served after repeal are saved by Section 2 (f) (iii) of MPFA. ix. Petitioner in the rejoinder and/or in the rejoinder argument unnecessarily attempted to point out certain orders passed in PIL No.305 of 1995. On the basis of said orders, Petitioner tried to urge that even the subject land of the present petition being included in SGNP Division, becomes forest land and vest with the State Government. ix. Petitioner in the rejoinder and/or in the rejoinder argument unnecessarily attempted to point out certain orders passed in PIL No.305 of 1995. On the basis of said orders, Petitioner tried to urge that even the subject land of the present petition being included in SGNP Division, becomes forest land and vest with the State Government. Said argument is misleading. It is respectfully submitted that orders passed in said PIL are passed in different context and not related to the subject land. In any case subject land i.e. Survey No.59/1 was not the subject matter of said PIL. Admittedly, R1 who is the owner of Survey No.59/1 was not party to the said PIL. In fact, present petition is a dispute between private land owner and forest department and this dispute has nothing to do with the said PIL or orders passed therein or in any other matter. The issue involved in the present petition is that whether by merely saying that forest has issued notice dated 29/08/1975 under Section 35 (3) of IFA (to the wrong addressee and not to R1) whether land of R1, which it has purchased from High Court Receiver in 1960, would vest with the State under Section 3 of MPFA and that too without complying with other statutory pre requisites such as issuance of notification under Section 35 (1) of IFA, giving opportunity of hearing to the owners, etc. For the facts involved in the present matter relevant judgments are the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in Godrej Case and Rohan Nahar Case. Petitioner by citing irrelevant orders passed in the PIL, is trying to create confusion. Rohan Nahar Case clearly helds that for vesting of land in the State strict compliance is mandatory and even one missing statutory step would amount to “not vesting” the land in the State. On this backdrop, at this point of time, stating that Government has included the land bearing Survey No.59/1 in SGNP forest division is malafide contention and such inclusion without giving opportunity of hearing to the land owner viz. R1 would be otherwise violative of fundamental rights of the R1 under Article 14 of the Constitution. On this backdrop, at this point of time, stating that Government has included the land bearing Survey No.59/1 in SGNP forest division is malafide contention and such inclusion without giving opportunity of hearing to the land owner viz. R1 would be otherwise violative of fundamental rights of the R1 under Article 14 of the Constitution. In any case such alleged inclusion in SGNP division does not amount to automatic vesting of the subject land under Section 3 of MPFA as well as such inclusion in SGNP division is violative of Article 300A of the Constitution. It is otherwise clear from notification dated 16/01/1996 (Page 445-447 i.e. Exh.A of Additional Affidavit of R1) that Survey No.59/1 is not within the notified area of SGNP. Petitioner’s own letter dated 23/01/1986 (Page 448 i.e. Exh.D of Additional Affidavit of R1) clearly shows that possession of Survey No.59/1 could not be taken over by Forest Department. There are no other documents such as Panchanama, Possession receipt, etc. filed on record to demonstrate that Petitioner ever took legal and physical possession of subject land from R1. Admittedly, from 2019 about 104 acres of land out of subject land is in possession of TMC. About 18 acres of land is under cultivation of R2. Upon 17 acres 19 gunthas of land there is village settlement by name Kokanipada. Rest of the land is under cultivation of R1 and/or under N A user, quarrying operations, horticulture, construction of godown, roads, etc. In the circumstances, it is fanciful to state that subject land admeasuring 193 acres 7 gunthas and 4 annas is within SGNP forest division. The TILR report recently carried out also demonstrate that subject land is not in possession of SGNP or within SGNP forest division. x. Petitioner’s reliance on Section 144 of CPC whereby principle of restitution is stipulated is improper, irrelevant and not applicable to the facts involved in the present matter. It is evident that subject land never vested in Forest Department under Section 3 of MPFA because for such vesting all statutory pre conditions mentioned in Section 35 (1), 34 (A), and 38 of IFA have not been complied with.Unless there is a vesting, there is no question of restitution. xi. It is evident that subject land never vested in Forest Department under Section 3 of MPFA because for such vesting all statutory pre conditions mentioned in Section 35 (1), 34 (A), and 38 of IFA have not been complied with.Unless there is a vesting, there is no question of restitution. xi. The entire rejoinder including submissions made in para 4, 5, 6 & 7 of the rejoinder are misleading and a definite attempt to wrongly distinguish binding effect of judicial precedent of Godrej Case and Nahar Case on the basis of immaterial facts. xii. It will be appropriate to point out para 14.5 & 14.6 of Rohan Nahar Judgment, which are reproduced hereunder: 14.5. When a judgment minimises a binding ratio, ignores missing statutory steps, and seeks to distinguish on immaterial facts, it creates an appearance of a reluctance to accept precedent. Such an approach conveys a major of pettiness that is inconsistent with the detachment that judicial reasoning demands. In our view this is an unfortunate departure from the discipline of stare decisis. 14.6. We accordingly hold that the present appeals are indistinguishable in principle from Godrej and Boyce ( Supra). The record discloses the same jurisdictional defects of non-service of a notice under section 35 (3) of IFA, the same absence of a final notification under Section 35 (1) of IFA, and the same want of contemporaneous steps under Section 4,5,6 and 7 of the MPFA Act. In such circumstances the High Court could not consistently with Article 141 of the Constitution avoid the binding ratio by treating immaterial differences as determinative. In our opinion fidelity to binding precedent and to the statutory scheme admits of no other conclusion than that the impugned order must be set aside. D. Kindly also appreciate other citations filed by R1 particularly regarding effect of repeal, saving clause, retrospective application of judgment of Supreme Court, etc. Submissions in short in that regard are as under: i. 1967 SCC (Online) SC 14 C Golakhnath and Others V/s. State of Punjab (Para 45. 50, 51, 52) and 1993 (1) Supreme Court Cases 78 C.B. Gautam V/s. Union of India (Para 43, 46):-These 2 judgments were cited to demonstrate that judgment interpreting the legal principles or provisions have retrospective effect. Whenever Supreme Court intends to give prospective effect then it is specifically stated so in the concerned judgment. ii. 50, 51, 52) and 1993 (1) Supreme Court Cases 78 C.B. Gautam V/s. Union of India (Para 43, 46):-These 2 judgments were cited to demonstrate that judgment interpreting the legal principles or provisions have retrospective effect. Whenever Supreme Court intends to give prospective effect then it is specifically stated so in the concerned judgment. ii. Godrej and Boyce and Vijay Nahar’s judgments are retrospective in nature. Interpretation of provisions made therein of MPFA, IFA, etc. has retrospective effect and hence those two judgments are applicable to the facts involved in the present case. iii. In fact, even Petitioner in their note have admitted that Godrej and Boyce and Vijay Nahar’s judgments are relevant for the present matter but Petitioner made incorrect attempt to distinguish them with the present facts. iv. Judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Chintamani Gajanan Velkar (2000) 3 Supreme Court Cases 143 has also been referred to demonstrate that even in that case 35 (3) notice was dated 29/08/1975 but served on 12/09/1975 i.e. after repeal of Section 35 of IFA. Thus, said notice was also issued in closed proximity but not served before appointed day. The same therefore did not qualify as a pipeline notice. In that matter Deputy Collector held that subject land did not vest in the State as the notice issued under Section 35 (3) was not served on the land holder before appointed day viz. 30/08/1975. In said matter Deputy Collector held that for the purpose of definition of private forest under Section 2 (f) of MPFA it was necessary that notice be not only issued under Section 35 (3) of IFA but should have also be served on the land holder before the appointed day i.e. 30/08/1975. however, Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said case of Chintamani Velkar held that notice issued under Section 35 (3) would itself is sufficient if such notice is issued before the appointed day and there is no need for any service of such notice before 30/08/1975. Said view of the Supreme Court in Chintamani Velkar is overruled in Godrej and Boyce (Para 62) by holding that mere issuance of notice is not sufficient but issuance include service as well as mandatory compliance of all pre-conditions of served notice under Section 35 (5) of IFA. Said view of the Supreme Court in Chintamani Velkar is overruled in Godrej and Boyce (Para 62) by holding that mere issuance of notice is not sufficient but issuance include service as well as mandatory compliance of all pre-conditions of served notice under Section 35 (5) of IFA. Thus, the view taken by Deputy Collector in Chintamani Velkar’s case in a sense is upheld and confirmed in Godrej Case by the Supreme Court. Even in the present matter notice is dated 29/08/1975 and served on 04/09/1975 (that too on wrong addressee) i.e. after appointed day viz. 30/08/1975. Thus, the judgment of Godrej and Boyce has to be made applicable to the present facts by holding that notice was served on 04/09/1975 i.e. after appointed day and that too on the wrong addressee and hence, is void and not enforceable at law. v. 2024 (8) SCC 742 in the case of Pernod Richord India Pvt. Ltd. V/s. State of Mdyapradesh & Ano.:- Para 13 states that repealed provision will cease to operate from the date of repeal and the substituted provision will commence to operate from the date of its substitution). vi. 2025 DGLS (Bom) 2724 in the case of Hikal Ltd. V/s Union of India:- The aspect of repeal of enactment and its enforceability after repeal is discussed at length by referring to constitution bench. Kindly read Para 78 of said judgment in which Para 36 to 40 of Constitution Bench judgements are reproduced. vii. (2000) 2 Supreme Court Cases 536 in the case of Kolhapur Cane Sugar Works Ltd. V/s. Union of India:- In Para 37 it is held that “The position is well known that at common law, the normal effect of repealing a statute or deleting a provision is to obliterate it from the statute-book as completely as if it had never been passed, and the statute must be considered as a law that never existed. To this rule, an exception is engrafted by the provisions of Section 6 (1). To this rule, an exception is engrafted by the provisions of Section 6 (1). If a provision of a statute is unconditionally omitted without a saving clause in favour of pending proceedings, all actions must stop where the omission finds them, and if final relief has not been granted before the omission goes into effect, it cannot be granted afterwards.” (In the case of MPFA, Section 24 (2) is a limited saving clause applicable only in respect of land restored under Section 22 (A) of MPFA. Said saving clause is not applicable in respect of Section 2 (f) (iii) where issuance of notice under Section 35 (3) is stipulated. No doubt Godrej Case states that Section 2 (f) (iii) itself in a sense is a saving clause but same can be made applicable only to those notices issued and served before appointed day). E. It is respectfully submitted that as demonstrated in the short note and by way of comments in red made by R1 in modified dates and events, R1 has beyond doubt substantiated that in the present matter on appointed day there was no live process in existence and hence, the notice in the present matter of which issuance is doubtful before appointed day and service is admittedly on wrong owner, cannot be ranked as live or pipeline notice, as sought to be contended by the Petitioner. F. Hence, present petition deserves to be dismissed. ANNEXURE ‘G’ SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO. 2.1,2.3 TO2.12' 1. Declaration of Respondent No. 2’s tenancy under section 70(b) of the Bombay Tenancy Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 has attained finality (a) Since the year 1960, Respondent No. 2 has been a tenant of Respondent No. 1 and in actual occupation, possession and cultivation of the land admeasuring 18 acres 18 gunthas bearing Gat No. 59/1 at Manpada village, Thane (“Smaller Land”). [Respondent No.2’s LRs Affidavit in Reply dated 11 th December 2019, pg. 155, paras 3 and 4] (b) On 29 th August 1975, alleged Notice claimed to be issued by the Deputy Conservator of Forests under section 35(3) of the Indian Forest Act, 1927 (“Forest Act”) in respect of the land admeasuring 204 acres, 8 gunthas and 8 annas and bearing Gat No. 59/1 at Manpada village, Thane (“Larger Land”). Note: 1. The Smaller Land forms a part of the Larger Land. 2. Note: 1. The Smaller Land forms a part of the Larger Land. 2. Respondent No. 1 has failed to produce any proof of issuance of the alleged notice on 29 th August 1975 (c) Criminal Case No.5227 of 1982 was filed by the Maharashtra Forest Department against Respondent No. 2 under section 26 of the Forest Act for the offence of trespassing on forest land, which was dismissed by the Hon’ble Judicial Magistrate Fist Class Thane vide Order dated 30 th September 1992. [Exhibit A to Respondent No.2’s LRs Affidavit in Reply dated 11 th December 2019, pg. 160 at pg. 168] Note: i. The said Order records the following admissions made by the Maharashtra Forest Department personnel (viz. PW-1 and PW-4) during their cross-examination as witnesses in the criminal proceedings filed against Respondent No. 2: a. The Smaller Land was private land of Respondent No. 2 prior to it being declared as a forest in the year 1975. [para 10 at Pg 164] b. Respondent No. 2 was in possession of the Smaller Land prior to the year 1975. [para 10 at Pg 165] c. Smaller Land originally belonged to Respondent No. 1 and Respondent No. 2 has been cultivating the said land as a tenant. [para 10 at Pg 163] d. Nothing has come on record to show that the Forest Department has taken possession of the Smaller Land. [para10 at Pg 165] [Exhibit A to Respondent No.2’s LRs Affidavit in Reply dated 11 th December 2019, para 10 at pgs. 164 and 165 and para 13 at pg.166] ii. An admission made by a party in a previous criminal proceeding, is admissible in subsequent civil proceedings. [Seth Ramdayal Jat vs. Laxmi Prasad, (2009) 11 SCC 545 , at paras 20 and 21] (d) The Petitioner’s Criminal Appeal No. 172 of 1993 against the Hon’ble Judicial Magistrate First Class Thane’s Order was dismissed by Judgment dated 14 th June 1993 of this Hon’ble Court, which held: i. Respondent No. 2 is in possession as a tenant of Respondent No.1 prior to the land being declared as forest land.[ Pg No.171] ii. The construction found on the land is 9 years old and hence no fresh construction or clearing of forest is proved against Respondent No. 2. [ Pg No.171] iii. The construction found on the land is 9 years old and hence no fresh construction or clearing of forest is proved against Respondent No. 2. [ Pg No.171] iii. No appeal was filed by the Petitioner against the Hon’ble High Court’s judgment, and therefore the findings of the Hon’ble High Court in the said judgment have attained finality. [Exhibit B to Respondent No.2’s LRs Affidavit in Reply dated 11 th December 2019, pg. 169 at pg. 170] (e) In March 1991, Respondent No.1 attempted to interfere with Respondent No.2’s possession of the Smaller Land, which led Respondent No. 2 to file Application No.16 of 1991 before the Tahsildar ALT Thane under section 70(b) of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 (“BTAL Act”) for declaration of his tenancy in respect of the Smaller Land. [Respondent No.2’s LRs Affidavit in Reply dated 11 th December 2019, pg. 155, para 6 and Exhibit C, at pg. 171] (f) By the Tahsildar’s Order dated 23 rd February 2004, Respondent No. 2 has been declared as a tenant of the Smaller Land since the year 1960. [Exhibit D to Respondent No.2’s LRs Affidavit in Reply dated 11 th December 2019, pg. 174 at pg. 179 (English translation at pg.186)] Note: i. An Order passed under section 70(b) is appealable under section74(1)(a) of the BTAL Act and the Petitioner could have challenged the Tahsildar’s Order even though the Petitioner was not a party to those proceedings; yet no appeal was filed by the Petitioner. [Ebrahim Yusuf Lambe vs. Abdul Razak Abdul Rahiman Mulla, AIR 1977 Bom 22 , at para 9; Nookala Setharamaiah vs. Kotaiah Naidum, (1970) 2 SCC 13 , at para 24 and State of Kerala vs. Mohammed Basheer, (2019) 4 SCC 260 , at paras 19 to 20] ii. Respondent No. 1 filed Tenancy Appeal No. 109 of 2015 before the Sub-Divisional Officer challenging the Tahsildar’s Order, and the delay of 11 years in filing the said appeal was condoned by the Sub-Divisional Officer’s Order dated 23 rd February 2017. [Exhibit E to Affidavit in Reply dated 11 th December 2019 of Respondent No. 2’s LRs, pg. 187 at pg. 195.] iii. By Order dated 4 th May 2017, the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal allowed Respondent No. 2’s Revision Application No. 150 of 2017 against the Sub-Divisional Officer’s Order and dismissed Respondent No. 1’s Tenancy Appeal. [Exhibit E to Affidavit in Reply dated 11 th December 2019 of Respondent No. 2’s LRs, pg. 187 at pg. 195.] iii. By Order dated 4 th May 2017, the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal allowed Respondent No. 2’s Revision Application No. 150 of 2017 against the Sub-Divisional Officer’s Order and dismissed Respondent No. 1’s Tenancy Appeal. [Exhibit F to Affidavit in Reply dated 11 th December 2019 of Respondent No. 2’s LRs, pg.197 at pg. 207] iv. Respondent No. 1’s Civil Writ Petition No. 6351 of 2017 filed to challenge the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal’s Order, was dismissed by this Hon’ble Court’s Judgment dated 23 rd January 2019. [Exhibit G to Affidavit in Reply dated 11 th December 2019 of Respondent No. 2’s LRs, pg. 208 at pg. 225, para 25] v. Respondent No. 1’s Special Leave Petition (C) No. 9998 of 2017 filed to challenge this Hon’ble High Court’ Judgment, was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s Order dated 29 th April 2019. [Exhibit H to Affidavit in Reply dated 11 th December 2019 of Respondent No. 2’s LRs, pg. 226] vi. Respondent No.1’s Review Petition No. 366 of 2020 filed against the dismissal of its Special Leave Petition, was dismissed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s Order dated 6 th February 2020. [Page 7 & 8 of List of dates Tendered in Court] vii. The Tahsildar’s Order declaring Respondent No. 2 as a tenant of the Smaller Land has therefore attained finality. It therefore stands established that the Respondent No.2 was the tenant in respect of the smaller land, at least since the year 1960. [Ashalata Anand Dabholkar vs. Vrindevati Tukaram Bhaire, (2005) 1 Mah LJ 418, at para 9 and Gulabrao Laxman Kolhe vs. Tahsildar, W.P.No. 2759 of 2018 dated 24.07.2025, at para 8] viii. The Tahsildar’s Order cannot be reopened in collateral proceedings. [Union of India vs. S.P. Sharma, (2014) 6 SCC 351 , at para 76 and Pankaj Bhargava vs. Mohinder Nath, (1991) 1 SCC 556 , at para 20]. The Tahsildar’s Order cannot be reopened in collateral proceedings. [Union of India vs. S.P. Sharma, (2014) 6 SCC 351 , at para 76 and Pankaj Bhargava vs. Mohinder Nath, (1991) 1 SCC 556 , at para 20]. Therefore it is clear that the attempt on the part of the Petitioner to raise factual controversies with respect to the tenancy and possession of Respondent No.2 in respect of the smaller land is in inapposite and impermissible without prejudice to the same, it is submitted that this Hon’ble Court ought not to enter into factual controversies/ disputed questions of facts in exercise of its writ jurisdiction [Gunwant Kaur vs Municipal Committee (1969) 3 SCC 769 ] 2. The Larger Land (which includes the Smaller Land) has been exempted under Section 3(2) of the MPFA Act (a) The smaller land thus being held by Respondent No.2 as a tenant and lawfully being under his cultivation on 30 th August 1975 (the appointed day on which the Private Forest came into force), the same is exempted from being declared as private forest under section 3 (2) of the Private Forest Act, 1975 [State of Kerala vs. Mohammed Basheer, (2019) 4 SCC 260 , para 17 to 21] (b) Deputy Collector (Private Forests) passed an Order dated 3 rd June 1980 under section 6 of the MPFA Act, directing that out of the land bearing Gat No. 59/1 at Manpada: i. An area of 168 acres 15 gunthas 4 annas would be vested in the Petitioner as private forest. ii. An area of 24 acres 32 gunthas would be retained by Respondent No.1 and in lieu thereof, an area of 24 acres 32 gunthas out of Respondent No.1’s properties in Survey nos. 59/2, 59/3 and 59/16 would vest in the Petitioner as reserved forest. [Writ Petition, para 3(i) at pg.8] (c) The Petitioner’s appeal against the Deputy Collector’s Order was allowed by Judgment dated 15 th October 1982 of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, which remanded the case back to the Deputy Collector for holding a further inquiry. [Exhibit A to Writ Petition, pg.48 at pg. [Writ Petition, para 3(i) at pg.8] (c) The Petitioner’s appeal against the Deputy Collector’s Order was allowed by Judgment dated 15 th October 1982 of the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal, which remanded the case back to the Deputy Collector for holding a further inquiry. [Exhibit A to Writ Petition, pg.48 at pg. 56] (d) Respondent No. 2 filed an Intervention Application before the Deputy Collector in Remand Case No. 53 of 1999 for being added as a party in the inquiry under section 6 of the MPFA Act on the ground that Respondent No. 2 has been in actual and physical possession of land admeasuring 7 hectares and 37 ares (equivalent to 18 acres and 18 gunthas) out of Gat No. 59/1 as a tenant. The said Intervention Application was opposed by the Petitioner. [Writ Petition, paras 3(m) and 3(n), at pgs.10 and 11, Exhibit B, at pg.57 and Exhibit C, at pg.64] (e) In Remand Case No. 53 of 1999, after hearing the Petitioner and Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 respectively, the Deputy Collector by Order dated 27 th December 2004 held: i. An area of 132 acres and 18 gunthas is declared as private forest under the MPFA Act and the Forest Department shall pay compensation at the specified rate to its owner (viz. Respondent No. 1). ii. An area of 24 acres and 32 gunthas is exempt under section 3(2) of the MPFA Act as it is not a forest / private forest and it should be restored to the original owner or consequent lawful owner. iii. An area of 18 acres and 18 gunthas is exempt as forest/private forest and the said land be restored to the Intervenor (viz. Respondent No. 2) who is a tenant over the said land. [Exhibit D to Writ Petition, pg.73 at pg.86] (f) By Order dated 30 th June 2017, the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal quashed and set aside the Deputy Collector’s said Order and declared that the land bearing Gat No. 59/1 is not a ‘private forest’ under section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA Act and is therefore entirely excluded from acquisition under the MPFA Act and the village records may therefore be corrected. Forest Appeal No. 229 of 2009 filed by the Respondent No. 1 (viz.) against the Deputy Collector’s said Order was allowed and the Petitioner’s Forest Appeal No. 165 of 2005 was dismissed. Forest Appeal No. 229 of 2009 filed by the Respondent No. 1 (viz.) against the Deputy Collector’s said Order was allowed and the Petitioner’s Forest Appeal No. 165 of 2005 was dismissed. [Exhibit E to Writ Petition, pg.87 at pg.115] Note: The definition of the term ‘private forest’ under section 2(f)(iii) of the MPFA Act must be strictly construed. [Godrej & Boyce Manufacturing Co. Ltd. vs. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 3 SCC 430 , at para 73] [HPC vs Darius Shapur Chenai 2005 (7) SCC 627 para 29] (g) The Revenue Department mutated Respondent No. 1’s name in respect of the Larger Land in the revenue records under Mutation Entry No. 1056, which was subsequently confirmed by the Sub-Divisional Officer’s Order dated 31 st January 2019 in the Petitioner’ Revision Application No. 182/2018 which was filed to challenge the said Mutation Entry. [Respondent No. 1’s Additional Affidavit dated 9 th April 2021, Exhibit D at pg. 490 and Exhibit E, pg. 492 at pg. 499] Note: The Sub-Divisional Officer’s said Order dated 31 st January 2019 has not been challenged by the Petitioner and has therefore attained finality. [Respondent No. 1’s Additional Affidavit dated 9 th April 2021, at pg. 438, para 8] 3. Manpada Village does not fall within boundaries of Sanjay Gandhi National Park: (a) The Maharashtra Forest Department’s Notification dated 16 th January1996 under section 35(4) of the Wildlife (Protection) Act, 1972 specifying the boundaries of the Sanjay Gandhi National Park, does not include the Larger Land (which includes the Smaller Land) within the said boundaries. [Exhibit N to Respondent No.1 Affidavit in Reply dated 25 th November 2019, pg. 427. Having not included the Larger land in the aforesaid notification, it is now not open for the Petitioner to contend that the same is a part of SNGP. It is well settled that a party cannot be permitted appropriate and reprobate [Rajasthan State Industrial Development and Investment Corporation. vs. Diamond &Gem Development Corporation Ltd., (2013) 5 SCC 470 para 15 & 16] (b) Respondent No. 1 has also admitted that the Larger Land (which includes the Smaller Land) does not form part of the Sanjay Gandhi National Park. [Respondent No.1 Affidavit in Reply dated 25 th November 2019, para 24 at pg. 275] 4. vs. Diamond &Gem Development Corporation Ltd., (2013) 5 SCC 470 para 15 & 16] (b) Respondent No. 1 has also admitted that the Larger Land (which includes the Smaller Land) does not form part of the Sanjay Gandhi National Park. [Respondent No.1 Affidavit in Reply dated 25 th November 2019, para 24 at pg. 275] 4. Respondent No. 2’s name has been mutated in respect of the Smaller Land in the revenue records (a) By a common Judgment and Order dated 24 th March 2008, the Hon’ble Bombay High Court dismissed the Writ Petitions filed by Godrej & Boyce Manufacturing Co. Ltd. (“Godrej”) and others challenging the notices issued by the Forest Department under section 35(3) of the Forest Act. (b) In Special Leave Petition (C) No. 11509 of 2008 filed against the Hon’ble High Court’s said Judgment, Respondent No. 2 filed Interim Application No. 18 of 2010 for impleadment therein and Interim Application No. 19 of 2010 praying for a direction that Respondent No. 2’s Smaller Land is non-forest land and should be free to be developed under Development Control Regulations and municipal bye laws. [Exhibit D to Additional Affidavit dated 21 st September 2023 of Respondent No. 2’s LRs, pg. 512 at pg. 524.] (c) By Judgment dated 30 th January 2014, the Hon’ble Supreme Court allowed the appeals filed by Godrej and others against the Hon’ble High Court’s said Judgment and quashed and set aside the impugned notices issued under section 35(3) of the Forest Act. [Exhibit C to Respondent No. 1’s Additional Affidavit dated 9 th April 2021, pg. 450 at pgs. 488 and 489, paras 87 to 91] Note: The Hon’ble Supreme Court’s Order also allowed Respondent No. 2’s impleadment application and consequently the Smaller Land was exempted from being declared as forest land. [Exhibit C to Respondent No. 1’s Additional Affidavit dated 9 th April 2021, pg. 450 at pg. 488, para 90] (d) By Order dated 16 th March 2015, the Sub-Divisional Officer Thane exempted the Smaller Land from reservation as a ‘private forest’ under section 3(2) of the MPFA Act and directed mutation of Respondent No. 2’s name in respect of the Smaller Land in the revenue records. [Exhibit H to Additional Affidavit dated 21 st September 2023 of Respondent No. 2’s LRs, pg. 565 at pg. [Exhibit H to Additional Affidavit dated 21 st September 2023 of Respondent No. 2’s LRs, pg. 565 at pg. 567] Note: i. By Order dated 27 th March 2015, the District Collector, Thane stayed the said Order of the Thane Sub-Divisional Officer. [Exhibit I to Additional Affidavit of Respondent No.2 LR’s dated 21 st September 2023, pg. 568 at pg. 571] ii. By letter dated 9 th July 2015, the Divisional Commissioner (Konkan Division) directed the District Collector to vacate the stay on the said Order of the Sub-Divisional Officer. [Exhibit J to Additional Affidavit of Respondent No.2 LR’s dated 21 st September 2023, pg. 572] LIST OF DATES AND EVENTS OF RESPONDENT NO. 2.1, 2.3 TO 2.12 The Respondent No.2.1 to 2.12 are the legal heirs of late Narayan Ganu Tangadi who during his lifetime was cultivating the land admeasuring 7H 38R (equivalent to 18 acres and 18 gunthas) from land bearing Gat No.59/1, Village Chitalsar, Manpada Taluka, District Thane as an agricultural tenant (hereinafter referred to as the ‘said tangadi land’) out of said larger land i.e. land admeasuring 207 acres, 8 gunthas and 8 annas situated in Gat No. 59/A/1, Manpada, Chitalsar, Thane (hereinafter referred to as the ‘said larger land’) which is owned by Respondent No.1 i.e. D. Dahyabhai & Co. Pvt. Ltd. ANNEXURE ‘H’ SHORT NOTE ON BEHALF OF PETITIONERS: MAY IT PLEASE YOUR HONOUR: - 1. D. Dahyabhai & Co. Pvt. Ltd. and its Director Mr. Nitesh Kothari (Petitioner) have filed the present Petition, inter-alia, seeking directions to Respondent No.2 Corporation to issue DRC in favour of Petitioners against acquisition of Park Reservation No.4 (said reservation area is admeasuring 404721.02 sq. meters) which has been acquired by Respondent Corporation under registered Deed of Transfer dated 24/05/2019 registered under serial no.TNN5- 8450-2019 (Exh.E, Page 92-115 of WP). 2. Respondent Corporation filed reply, inter-alia, admitting the execution of said Transfer Deed and acquisition of said reservation. 3. Admittedly, there is an order dated 25/11/2022 (Exh.F, Page No.116 to 118 of WP) read with an order dated 07/12/2022 (Exh.G, Page No.119 of WP) passed by the Single Bench of Hon’ble High Court, inter- alia, directing Respondent Corporation to issue and allot the said DRC. In spite of such an order passed by the Hon’ble Court, Respondent Corporation has arbitrarily withheld the issuance of DRC and hence petition has been filed. 4. In spite of such an order passed by the Hon’ble Court, Respondent Corporation has arbitrarily withheld the issuance of DRC and hence petition has been filed. 4. Forest department has filed Intervention Application, inter-alia, claiming that concerned reservation is affected by the claim of Forest Department which it has raised long back vide notice dated29/08/1975. 5. Admitted position is that vide order dated 30/06/2017 (Exh.A, Page No.35 to 63 of WP) passed in MRT Appeal No.165 of 2005 and Appeal No.229 of 2009, MRT has already declared said reservation and other lands which were subject matter of said notice dated 29/08/1975 as non-forest land. 6. The Forest Department, no doubt has filed Writ Petition No.3205 of 2018 in the Hon’ble High Court against rejection of their Appeal No.165 of 2005 but till date there is no stay sought to the said order of MRT dated 30/06/2017. In said Writ Petition No.3205/2018 Petitioner herein who is Respondent No.1 therein has already submitted written notes, inter-alia, demonstrating the falsity and futility of the contentions of forest department that subject land is forest. Said written notes may kindly be read along with these written notes. 7. The said reservation is sanctioned by the State Government and is forming part of sanctioned D.P. Plan of Thane 1994-1999 (Thane D.P.). 8. Till date Forest Department neither challenged the Thane D.P. nor the act of State Government putting the said reservation. 9. Forest Department during the process of acquisition of said reservation have never raised any objection in respect of Respondent Corporation acquiring the said reservation. Admittedly, concerned registered Deed of Transfer dated 24/05/2019 is also not challenged. Concerned Deed of Transfer clearly state that land is acquired and handed over in possession of planning authority. (Exh.E, Page No.92 to 115 relevant Page No.100 may kindly be read). The said Deed of Transfer being registered instrument ought to have been challenged by way of filing suit for cancellation within 3 years, from the date of registration of the said Deed. Admittedly no such challenge is set up by Forest Department and any such challenge is now barred by limitation. 10. It is only after acquisition of Park Reservation No.4 Forest Department lodged its claim or objection with Thane Municipal Corporation for allotting TDR to D. Dahyabhai & Co. Pvt. Ltd. i.e. Petitioner against said acquisition. Admittedly no such challenge is set up by Forest Department and any such challenge is now barred by limitation. 10. It is only after acquisition of Park Reservation No.4 Forest Department lodged its claim or objection with Thane Municipal Corporation for allotting TDR to D. Dahyabhai & Co. Pvt. Ltd. i.e. Petitioner against said acquisition. The fact needs to be appreciated is that Forest Department without challenging sanctioned Thane D.P . and without challenging the acquisition of land is objecting for granting compensation to the land owner. Said objection has no base under law. 11. Otherwise also Respondent Corporation vide its letter dated 08/01/2020 (Exh.H, Page No.120 to 126 of WP) addressed to Conservator of Forest, Sanjay Gandhi National Udyan clearly stated that they are not going to change the user of the said reservation and in fact are going to maintain it as a park by keeping the natural greenery as it is and shall be doing social foresting there upon . Respondent Corporation has also agreed to handover the said reservation if required by forest department by obtaining permission of General Body. Admittedly, Forest Department has not responded to the said letter either positively or negatively till date . It is thus clear that it is for TMC and forest department to decide between them as to who will hold the said acquired land. Just because they are not deciding between them, issuance of compensation by way of DRC to the petitioner can not be withheld. It would be unjust and unfair and against the constitutional rights of petitioner guaranteed under article 300 A of Constitution. 12. The present petition needs to be allowed because there is no dispute that 100 acres of land is acquired under registered instruments by planning authority viz. Respondent Corporation for the public purpose under sanctioned D.P. Such sanctioned D.P. was sanctioned by State Government (Respondent No.1) itself under MRTP Act long back in the year 1994. Act of the state of subjecting the land under public reservation such as park, road, TMT bus depot, Primary School, HCMTR, etc. has never been objected by Forest Department, by saying that subject land is forest land. The act of acquisition under registered instrument has also not been objected by Forest Department. Forest department is objecting the grant of statutory compensation to the private owner, which objection is frivolous. has never been objected by Forest Department, by saying that subject land is forest land. The act of acquisition under registered instrument has also not been objected by Forest Department. Forest department is objecting the grant of statutory compensation to the private owner, which objection is frivolous. Article 300A needs to be invoked in the present matter to protect the interest of private owner. It cannot be deprived from statutory compensation. Already three orders are passed by this Hon’ble Court out of which two orders dated 28/04/2025 and 27/06/2025 were passed after hearing forest and in the presence of their counsel. Land is acquired, 7/12 extract is mutated in the name of Corporation (Exh.M, Page 469 of Affidavit-in-Reply of Respondent No.2 Corporation). From May 2019, land is in possession of Corporation (Page 100 of WP). Forest department even though is claiming to be in physical possession their own letter dated 23/01/1986 (Page No.448, of additional affidavit of R1 of WP No.3205/2018) demonstrates that they could not take possession of the land prior to 1986. There is no documentary proof placed on record to show that possession was taken by the forest department physically thereafter till date. 13. No documentary proof about compliance of Section 5 of MPFA is produced in this petition or in another Writ Petition No.3205/2018 by the forest department. The subject land is not vested in state/forest under Section 3 of the MPFA on the appointed day because on appointed day i.e. 30/08/1975 admittedly notice under Section 35 (3) of IFA was not served. Even Forest Department could not produce any documentary proof to show that alleged notice dated 29/08/1975 was actually dispatched/issued from the office of Forest Department. Admittedly, Section 35 of IFA stood repealed on and from 30/08/1975. There is no proof on record to demonstrate that there was any live process in existence under Section 35 of IFA on or before appointed day. No notifications under Section 35 (1), 34 (A) or 38 of IFA have been published till date. Strict compliance of statutory pre conditions is not there which is must for vesting as per Rohan Nahar and Godrej judgements of Supreme Court. Subject land continued to be in possession with the Petitioner. As per registered acquisition instrument from 24/05/2019, 100 acres park reservation and additional 18100 sq. Strict compliance of statutory pre conditions is not there which is must for vesting as per Rohan Nahar and Godrej judgements of Supreme Court. Subject land continued to be in possession with the Petitioner. As per registered acquisition instrument from 24/05/2019, 100 acres park reservation and additional 18100 sq. meter of subject land is also in possession of Respondent Corporation and on some portion twin tunnel project is being implemented for which Forest Department has given NOC so what remains is only providing statutory compensation to the Petitioner in the form of DRC as per the provisions of law and as per the said 3 orders of this Hon’ble Court. 14. In order to make show of compliance of orders dated 22/11/2022 and 28/04/2025 Respondent No.2 TMC filed affidavit dated 27/11/2025 in this WP (Page 412-510). Kindly see its annexures such as letter bearing no.1025, dated 10/07/2025 (Exh.F, Page 438- 439 of Affidavit dated 27/11/2025), reply dated 14/07/2025 given thereto by Petitioner through Advocate Sanjay Borkar (Exh.G, Page 440 to 447 of Affidavit dated 27/11/2025), Petitioner’s letter dated 06/102025 (Exh.L, Page 463-468 of Affidavit dated 27/11/2025) coupled with 7/12 Extract (Exh.M, Page 469 of Affidavit dated 27/11/2025), Mutation Entry No.1274 (Exh.M, Page 470-472 of Affidavit dated 27/11/2025), Order of Tahasildar dated 23/09/2025 (Exh.N, Page 473-482 of Affidavit dated 27/11/2025). From the reading of those annexures and from plain reading of Regulation No.11.2.4 of UDCPR it is evident that Petitioner/D Dahyabhai Co. Pvt. Ltd. has complied with all compliances under said regulation. In fact, it is Respondent TMC vide letter dated 10/07/2025 illegally called upon Petitioner/D Dahyabhai Co Pvt. Ltd. to obtain NOC from Forest Department even though orders of this Hon’ble Court dated 28/04/2025 and 27/06/2025 do not put such condition. In fact, those 2 orders were passed after hearing the Forest Department and in the presence of counsel of Forest Department. The Annexure ‘O’ i.e. letter dated 08/10/2025 (Page 483-492 of Affidavit-in- Reply of Respondent No.2 Corporation) of and from Conservator of Forest, Sanjay Gandhi National Park clearly shows how TMC and Forest Department are acting in collusion with each other to deprive Petitioner/D. Dahyabhai Co. Pvt. Ltd. from statutory compensation in violation of Article 300A of Constitution. As per regulation no.11.2.4 of UDCPR construction of boundary wall is not mandatory. Pvt. Ltd. from statutory compensation in violation of Article 300A of Constitution. As per regulation no.11.2.4 of UDCPR construction of boundary wall is not mandatory. Instead of carrying out construction Petitioner can deposit with Corporation cost of construction of compound wall/fencing provided Corporation issues DRC. Petitioner specifically state that it shall deposit the construction cost of fencing with Corporation provided Corporation issues full DRC to the Petitioner as per said regulation. All other requirements of Corporation about TILR survey, mutating name of Corporation in 7/12 extract, certification of mutation entry in that regard, all are already complied with (kindly read Petitioner’s Advocate reply dated 14/07/2025 and Petitioner’s letter dated 06/10/2025, Page 440-447 and 463-468 of Respondent No.2’s own affidavit dated 27/11/2025.) 15. It is pertinent to note that while acquiring the land and getting executed registered instrument for acquisition in may 2019,TMC did not find it necessary to seek prior opinion from Forest Department or TD department of state government . In the same way before giving consent for passing the order dated 25/11/2022 directing TMC to allot DRC, TMC did not seek in advance opinion of state government. When order dated 28/04/2025 was passed, at that time also TMC did not make submission that they need to consult state government. Even in the IA filed for seeking modification to order dated 28/04/2025 TMC did not take up this stand but after order dated 27/06/2025 TMC started taking opinion of forest department and TDD for implementation of orders of this Hon’ble Court. This is evident from their said affidavit and it's annexures. This is contemptuous. This clearly demonstrates collusion between TMC and forest to avoid allotment of DRC and to commit contempt of the orders of this court. 16. The Petitioners have under cover of their letter dated 14/07/2025 addressed to TMC enclosed a copy of the TILR Report. The said letter dated 14/07/2025 has been annexed at page nos.440-447 of the affidavit dated 27/11/2025 filed by TMC and has not enclosed the said report and hence copy of the same is annexed herewith and marked as EXHIBIT A hereto. 17. Hence, present petition needs to be allowed. ANNEXURE ‘I’ NOTE ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO.2 to 5 (TMC) 1. 17. Hence, present petition needs to be allowed. ANNEXURE ‘I’ NOTE ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENT NO.2 to 5 (TMC) 1. The Petitioner submitted the proposal dated 03.07.2018, through its architect for grant of DRC in lieu of the above-mentioned land, as per the provisions under Regulation No. Appendix N.N.1.5 (a) read with Appendix W of the Development Control Regulations, 1994, for grant of T.D.R. to the Thane Municipal Corporation (page No. 90 of the Petition). 2. Pursuant to the said proposal Transfer Deed dated 24.05.2019 was executed between the Petitioner and the Corporation. Recitals therein clearly indicate that the Petitioner shall be entitled to be awarded Development Rights and/or TDR in accordance with the provisions of the said Development Control Regulations, 1994, and also as per Government Notification dated 29.01.2016 and the amended order dated 02.05.2016 for surrender of the said reserved land (page 99 of the Petition). 3. Regulation 4.1.2 of the Notification dated 29.01.2016 reads as under: “4.1.2 – DRC shall be issued only after the land is surrendered to the Municipal Corporation free of cost and free from encumbrances, and after levelling the land to the surrounding ground level, and after constructing/erecting a 1.5 m high compound wall/fencing, i.e. brick/stone wall up to 0.60 m above ground level and fencing above that up to the remaining height with a gate, at the cost of the owner and to the satisfaction of the Municipal Commissioner. Provided that, if on certain lands such construction/erection of compound wall/fencing is prohibited or restricted by any regulation, then the quantum of Transferable Development Rights (TDR) shall be reduced as prescribed in the proviso to Clause4.1.1.” It is mandatory for the Petitioner to comply with the above regulation before issuance/ grant of TDR/DRC. 4. Regulation 7.1 of the Notification dated 29.01.2016 reads as under: “7.1 – The Commissioner, before issuing DRC, shall verify and satisfy himself that the ownership and title of the land proposed for surrender is with the applicant, and get the Record of Rights corrected in the name of the Planning Authority.” It is incumbent upon the Petitioner to get the Record of Rights mutated in the name of the Planning Authority. 5. The recitals in the Transfer Deed dated 24.05.2019 also indicate that the Petitioner had all along represented that they have clear and marketable title, free from all encumbrances (Page 100, Unnumbered Para 1). 6. 5. The recitals in the Transfer Deed dated 24.05.2019 also indicate that the Petitioner had all along represented that they have clear and marketable title, free from all encumbrances (Page 100, Unnumbered Para 1). 6. It is to be noted that the Petitioner was aware of the filing of Writ Petition No. 3205 of 2018 by the Forest Department of State of Maharashtra, impugning the order dated 30.06.2017 passed by the MRT, Mumbai. This fact can be ascertained from paragraph 17 of the present Petition.In view of pendency of the petition NOC of the forest was required form the petitioner. 7. By order dated 25.11.2022 passed in Appeal from Order No. 1051 of 2019, the order dated 10.10.2019 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Thane, was modified, and the Respondent Corporation was directed to allot TDR/DRC in favour of the Petitioners. 8. It is to be noted that the Corporation is and was always ready and willing to allot TDR/DRC in favour of the Petitioner, subject to compliance as contemplated under the Development Control Regulations. The Respondents, in their affidavit dated 27.11.2025, especially in paragraph 19, have clearly averred that the Corporation is ready and willing to grant TDR, and that a letter dated 10.07.2025, which is in tune with the Development Control Regulations, has been issued to the Petitioners, thereby directing them to comply with the requisitions raised therein (page 438 of the affidavit in reply filed by the Corporation). 9. It is to be noted that in response to the letter dated 10.07.2025, the Petitioners responded by reply dated 15.07.2025, and as per paragraph 4 of the said reply, the Petitioners agreed to erect fencing in the form of metal sheets and stated that they would initiate the said work in the near future (page 442, para 4 of the affidavit in reply). Further, by letter dated 06.10.2025 issued by the Petitioners in response to the Corporation’s letter dated 10.07.2025, the Petitioners have clearly admitted in clause (f) that the work of erecting the compound wall around the park reservation has already been initiated under the supervision of a security guard, which can be verified by the Corporation. Clause (j) of the letter dated 06.10.2025 also records that the Petitioners assured that they would erect the compound wall within six months and hand it over to the Thane Municipal Corporation. ( Page no. Clause (j) of the letter dated 06.10.2025 also records that the Petitioners assured that they would erect the compound wall within six months and hand it over to the Thane Municipal Corporation. ( Page no. 465 and 466 of the Affidavit in reply 27.11.2025 of corporation). 10. The Forest Department, being an authority entrusted with environmental protection, has raised objections that have placed TMC in a dilemma as to whether Development Rights Certificates (DRC) can be granted against the reservation in question. Further, the Petitioner has failed to comply with several mandatory conditions prescribed under the Unified Development Control and Promotion Regulations, 2020 (UDCPR-2020). These include : Measurement of the reserved land by the TILR in the presence of all concerned parties, namely the Forest Department, TMC, and the Petitioner; Mutation and reflection of the reserved land in the name of Thane Municipal Corporation by way of an independent and separate 7/12 extract or Property Card, clearly and unambiguously recording TMC as the owner; and Handover of vacant, unencumbered physical possession of the reserved land to TMC in terms of Regulation 11.2 of the UDCPR-2020. It is submitted that TMC has never been handed over physical possession of the writ land. Consequently, the further process for issuance of the DRC has remained incomplete, along with other mandatory prerequisites under the UDCPR-2020. 11. In respect of the compliances sought by the Corporation from the Petitioners in its letter dated 10.07.2025, all such compliances are in consonance with the Development Control Regulations and are required to be complied with. 12. The Respondent Corporation issued a letter dated 06.08.2025 to the Deputy Superintendent of Land Records, thereby requesting measurement of the land under park reservation and handing over the measurement plan to the Corporation (pages 450 to 452). 13. The Respondent Corporation also issued a letter dated 06.08.2025 to the Tahsildar, Thane, thereby requesting him to take steps to change the Record of Rights in favour of the Thane Municipal Corporation (pages 453 to 455). 14. In other similar matter, TMC had issued three DRCs to the Petitioner after following due procedure; however, the transfer and utilization of the said DRCs were subsequently prohibited after objections raised by Forest Department. Aggrieved by such prohibition, the Petitioner approached this Hon’ble Court by filing Writ Petition No. 6603 of 2023, which is presently sub-judice. 14. In other similar matter, TMC had issued three DRCs to the Petitioner after following due procedure; however, the transfer and utilization of the said DRCs were subsequently prohibited after objections raised by Forest Department. Aggrieved by such prohibition, the Petitioner approached this Hon’ble Court by filing Writ Petition No. 6603 of 2023, which is presently sub-judice. In the said proceedings, this Hon’ble Court, by order dated 15.12.2023, observed that considering the complexion of the issue, it would be appropriate to defer the hearing of the present proceedings as a third judge matter until the adjudication of Writ Petition No. 10024 of 2023. Thus, the Forest Department has, from time to time, raised objections to the issuance of the said three DRCs and has also objected to the issuance of any further DRCs. 15. Appendix W read with Appendix N.N.1.5 (a) spells out the regulations for grant of Transferable Development Rights.Regulation 7 of Appendix W reads as under: “A DRC will be issued only on satisfactory compliance with the conditions prescribed in the Appendix.” 16. Regulation 15 of the Development Control Regulations, 1999 reads as under: “Development Rights will be granted and DRCs issued only after the reserved land is surrendered to the Corporation, where it is the Appropriate Authority, or otherwise to the State Government, as the case may be, free of cost and free from encumbrances, after the owner or lessee has levelled the land to the surrounding ground level and after he has constructed a 1.5 m high compound wall (or at a height stipulated by the Commissioner) with a gate at the cost of the owner, and to the satisfaction of the Commissioner, or the State Government (where the Corporation is not the Appropriate Authority). The cost of any transaction involved shall be borne by the owner or lessee.” 17. Regulation 11.2.4(b) of the UDCPR, 2020 is pari materia with Appendix W. It is therefore necessary for the Petitioner to comply with the Development Control Regulations for grant of TDR. Compliance of Law (DCR) in is inherent in an order passed by the Hon’ble Court. 18. Regulation 11.2.4(b) of the UDCPR, 2020 is pari materia with Appendix W. It is therefore necessary for the Petitioner to comply with the Development Control Regulations for grant of TDR. Compliance of Law (DCR) in is inherent in an order passed by the Hon’ble Court. 18. Clause 11.2.4(b) read as under: “(b) DRC shall be issued only after the land is surrendered to the Authority free of cost and free from encumbrances and after levelling the land to the surrounding ground level and after constructing/erecting a 1.5 m. high compound wall/fencing i.e. brick/stone wall up to 0.60m. above ground level and fencing above that upto remaining height with a gate, at the cost of the owner and to the satisfaction of the Authority.” 19. It is clear that the land is required to be surrendered free from all encumbrances. The Petitioner, in the present Writ Petition No. 10024 of 2023, in (paragraphs 10 to 17), has averred in detail about the claim of the Forest Department, which ultimately culminated in Writ Petition No. 3205 of 2018. In these circumstances, the Corporation has rightly demanded submission of an NOC from the Forest Department in order to comply with the requirement under the Development Control Regulations of surrendering the land “free from all encumbrances.” 20. It is settled law that one cannot transfer a better title than what one has. It is thus clear that if the Forest Department succeeds in Writ Petition No. 3205 of 2018, the Petitioner will not have title to the suit lands and will not be entitled to any TDR in lieu thereof. It is pertinent to note that the Petitioner was well aware of the claim of the Forest Department for all these years prior to submitting the proposal dated 03.07.2018 for grant of TDR. The said proposal also states that the Petitioner is entitled to grant of DRC “as per the provisions under Regulation No. Appendix N.1.5 and Appendix W of the DCR, 1994 of TMC, and amendments thereto.” 21. It is also pertinent to note that the Corporation was earlier prevented from granting TDR in view of the injunctions granted in two civil suits, namely Special Civil Suit No. 440 of 2019 and Special Civil Suit No. 36 of 2019, till 25.11.2022, when the order came to be passed in Appeal from Order No. 1050 of 2019. 22. It is also pertinent to note that the Corporation was earlier prevented from granting TDR in view of the injunctions granted in two civil suits, namely Special Civil Suit No. 440 of 2019 and Special Civil Suit No. 36 of 2019, till 25.11.2022, when the order came to be passed in Appeal from Order No. 1050 of 2019. 22. The Petitioner, in their communication dated 15.09.2020 (page 168 of Writ Petition No. 10024 of 2023), the relevant portion of which appears at page 132, reiterated that the TMC is also under a statutory obligation under the MRTP Act, 1966, read with the Development Control Rules and Regulations. 23. It is to be noted that the Petitioners, in their letter dated 21.03.2023 addressed to the Corporation, have categorically stated that they are entitled to be awarded development rights and TDR in accordance with the provisions of the Development Control Regulations (pages 139–140 of the petition). 24. It is also pertinent to note that the Forest Department, in its affidavit in reply dated 04.01.2015, has categorically averred that the land in question is deemed reserved forest, vested in the State Government, and is in the possession of the Sanjay Gandhi National Park. 25. The Corporation has taken consistent, timely, and necessary steps to comply with Court orders and statutory obligations. ANNEXURE ‘J’ SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT CORPORATION 1. The Respondent Corporation submits that although the registered Transfer Deed dated 24.05.2019 was executed in favour of the Petitioners, Writ Petition No. 3205 of 2018 filed by the Forest Department was pending, wherein the Department was also claiming the land as private forest. 2. The Respondent Corporation further submits that during the pendency of the said Writ Petition and before the passing of the interim order dated 28.04.2025, the Corporation was unable to process the TDR proposal as two civil suits were filed against the Petitioners before the then Civil Courts. 3. The details of the said suits are as under: a. Special Civil Suit No. 440 of 2019 filed by Rajyaddyaksh Mahendra Sharam and two others against Petitioner No. 1. b. Special Civil Suit No. 36 of 2019 filed by Oriental Floriculture Private Limited against the Petitioners. 4. The Respondents submit that in both the above-mentioned suits, injunctions were granted, due to which the TDR could not be processed or granted. 5. b. Special Civil Suit No. 36 of 2019 filed by Oriental Floriculture Private Limited against the Petitioners. 4. The Respondents submit that in both the above-mentioned suits, injunctions were granted, due to which the TDR could not be processed or granted. 5. The Respondents further submit that during the pendency of the Forest Department's writ petition, an interim order dated 28.04.2025 was passed in writ Petition No. 10024 of 2023, directing the Corporation to comply with the order dated 25.11.2022 passed in Appeal from Order No. 1051 of 2019. 6. Pursuant to the order dated 28.04.2025 in W.P. No. 10024/2023, the Corporation promptly addressed a letter dated 14.05.2025 to the Additional Chief Secretary (UD) seeking guidance regarding grant of TDR (Exh. A is annexed to the Affidavit in reply dated27.11.2025). 7. The State Government, by communication dated 15.05.2025, clearly informed that TDR cannot be granted due to restrictions under Reg. 11.2.3 (vii) of UDCPR 2020 (Exh. B is annexed to the Affidavit in reply dated 27.11.2025). 8. A coordination meeting was scheduled with UD Department and Forest Department officials on 12.06.2025, communicated through the Corporation's letter dated 10.06.2025 (Exh. C is annexed to the Affidavit in reply dated 27.11.2025). 9. The Corporation filed Interim Application No. 9043/2025 on 25.06.2025, explaining that the subject land falls within a Forest Zone and therefore TDR could not be issued in view of Reg.11.2.3(vii). 10. The said Interim Application was heard and dismissed by the Hon'ble Court on 27.06.2025 (Exh. D is annexed to the Affidavit in reply dated 27.11.2025). 11. The Commissioner again wrote on 10.07.2025 to the Additional Secretary (UD-1), informing about the Court's orders and seeking further guidance on the grant of TDR (Exh. E is annexed to the Affidavit in reply dated 27.11.2025). 12. Meanwhile, the ADTP issued a requisition letter dated 10.07.2025 to the Petitioner, calling for compliance with mandatory conditions under Reg. 11.2.4 of UDCPR (Exh. F is annexed to the Affidavit in reply dated 27.11.2025). 13. The Petitioner replied on 14.07.2025, but failed to comply with the requisitions (Exh. G is annexed to the Affidavit in reply dated27.11.2025). 14. At the Petitioner's request dated 23.07.2025, the Corporation initiated steps for survey and mutation and issued a letter dated 06.08.2025 to DSLR and Tahsildar (Exh. I is annexed to the Affidavit in reply dated 27.11.2025). 15. 13. The Petitioner replied on 14.07.2025, but failed to comply with the requisitions (Exh. G is annexed to the Affidavit in reply dated27.11.2025). 14. At the Petitioner's request dated 23.07.2025, the Corporation initiated steps for survey and mutation and issued a letter dated 06.08.2025 to DSLR and Tahsildar (Exh. I is annexed to the Affidavit in reply dated 27.11.2025). 15. Draft Development Plan (Revised) was submitted by the Commissioner on 03.09.2025 for final sanction (Exh. J is annexed to the Affidavit in reply dated 27.11.2025). 16. Further guidance was sought once again from UD Department on 03.10.2025 (Exh. K is annexed to the Affidavit in reply dated27.11.2025). 17. Petitioner again requested to issuing DRC on 06.10.2025 (Exh. L is annexed to the Affidavit in reply dated 27.11.2025), despite not fulfilling earlier requisitions. 18. The consolidated 7/12 extract submitted by Petitioner includes several names; an independent 7/12 extract /Property card in the name of TMC was a mandatory requirement as per UDCPR Regulation no 11.2.12 (Exh. M is annexed to the Affidavit in reply dated 27.11.2025). 19. Objections raised to mutation entry were rejected on 23.09.2025, confirming Mutation Entry No. 1244 (Exh. N is annexed to the Affidavit in reply dated 27.11.2025). 20. The Deputy Director, SGNP, by letter dated 08.10.2025. stated that the land is in Forest Department's possession and that W.P. No. 3205/2018 is pending (Exh. O is annexed to the Affidavit in reply dated 27.11.2025). 21. The Respondent submits that the Petitioner failed to comply with the essential conditions listed in the letter dated 10.07.2025, including : i. Submission of an independent 7/12 extract /Property card solely in the name of TMC. ii. Non-submission of measurement plan of reserved 2. area. iii. Failure to construct compound wall around reserved area. iv. Non-completion of physical unencumbered possession of reserved area. v. Failure to procure NOC from Forest Department. 22. The requisitions made in the Corporation's letter dated10.07.2025 are fully aligned with UDCPR. 23. TDR cannot be granted unless all conditions are satisfied, which the Petitioner has failed to do (Exh. P is annexed to the Affidavit in reply dated 27.11.2025). 24. The Corporation has taken consistent, timely, and necessary steps to comply with Court orders and statutory obligations. 25. The requisitions made in the Corporation's letter dated10.07.2025 are fully aligned with UDCPR. 23. TDR cannot be granted unless all conditions are satisfied, which the Petitioner has failed to do (Exh. P is annexed to the Affidavit in reply dated 27.11.2025). 24. The Corporation has taken consistent, timely, and necessary steps to comply with Court orders and statutory obligations. 25. The Respondent submits that the only reason TDR could not be issued is due to: Statutory restrictions under UDCPR, Claims of the Forest Department, and non-compliance by the Petitioner with mandatory requirements. 26. Therefore, the Corporation submits that appropriate orders in accordance with law may be passed.