- 1 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5204 CRL.P No. 17126 of 2025 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 30TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA CRIMINAL PETITION NO. 17126 OF 2025 BETWEEN: RAJANNA D @ RAJU S/O DAS, AGED ABOUT 37 YEARS, R/AT H. NO 2353/2, 1ST CROSS, KAILASAPURAM, MANDI MOHALLA, MYSURU - 570 001. …PETITIONER (BY SRI. KRISHNAMOORTHY D, ADVOCATE) AND: 1. STATE BY VIDYARANYAPURAM POLICE STATION, MYSURU DISTRICT - 570 008. REP/BY SPP, HIGH COURT BUILDING, BANGALORE - 560 001. 2. SMT. SOWMYA, W/O RAMU AGED ABOUT 38 YEARS, RES/AT NO. 1136, 2ND CROSS, C BLOCK, MAHADEVAPURA, MYSURU - 570 008. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI. B.N. JAGADEESHA, ADDL. SPP FOR R1) Digitally signed by SANJEEVINI J KARISHETTY Location: High Court of Karnataka - 2 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5204 CRL.P No. 17126 of 2025 THIS CRL.P IS FILED U/S.482(FILED U/S.528 BNSS) OF CR.P.C PRAYING TO SET ASIDE/QUASH THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 14.10.2025 IN SPL.C.NO.72/2024 PASSED BY THE LEARNED ADDL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, FTSC I MYSURU AGAINST THE PETITIONER HEREIN. THIS PETITION, COMING ON FOR ADMISSION, THIS DAY, ORDER WAS MADE THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA ORAL ORDER Heard Sri. Krishnamoorthy D., learned counsel appearing for the petitioner and Sri. B.N. Jagadeesha, learned Additional Special Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent No.1. 2. The petitioner is before this Court calling in question an order dated 14.10.2025, which cancels the bail that was granted to the petitioner on the score that the petitioner has threatened the victim and the family members when he was out. Copious evidence is placed before the concerned Court for filing an application seeking cancellation of bail. The concerned Court has by a detailed order rendering cogent reasons cancelled the bail of the petitioner. The offence is horrendous - 3 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5204 CRL.P No. 17126 of 2025 and heinous. The Apex Court in a plethora of judgments has held that threatening of witnesses, tampering of evidence, subversion of trial or attempt to hamper the investigation, are all grounds for cancellation of bail. It becomes apposite to notice a few: 2.1. In the case of X3 v. STATE OF BIHAR1, the Apex Court holds that if releasing the accused would have an adverse impact on the trial due to possibility of witnesses being threatened, the bail granted can be cancelled. The Apex Court observes as follows: “…. …. …. 20. At the outset, we may like to note that the allegations attributed to respondent No. 2 shake the conscience of the Court. Respondent No. 2 being posted as the Officer in-charge of the women's protection home was required to work as a protector of the inmates, but she turned rogue and indulged in sexual exploitation of the helpless and destitute women who had been placed in the said protection home which is an institution created to provide them safety and security. 21. Thus, it is clearly a case, wherein the person put in the role of a saviour has turned into a devil. 22. Not only are the allegations attributed to respondent No. 2-accused are grave and reprehensible in nature, in addition thereto, the fact remains that releasing respondent No. 2 on bail is 1 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1490 - 4 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5204 CRL.P No. 17126 of 2025 bound to have an adverse effect on trial because there would be an imminent possibility of the witnesses being threatened. 23. Recently, this Court in the case of Shabeen Ahmad v. The State of Uttar Pradesh [(2025) 4 SCC 172] while placing reliance upon the case of Ajwar v. Waseem [(2024) 10 SCC 768] cancelled the bail granted to the accused in a dowry death case observing as follows: “18…. A superficial application of bail parameters not only undermines the gravity of the offence itself but also risks weakening public faith in the judiciary's resolve to combat the menace of dowry deaths. It is this very perception of justice, both within and outside the courtroom, that courts must safeguard, lest we risk normalizing a crime that continues to claim numerous innocent lives. These observations regarding grant of bail in grievous crimes were thoroughly dealt with by this Court in Ajwar v. Waseem in the following paras: “26. While considering as to whether bail ought to be granted in a matter involving a serious criminal offence, the Court must consider relevant factors like the nature of the accusations made against the accused, the manner in which the crime is alleged to have been committed, the gravity of the offence, the role attributed to the accused, the criminal antecedents of the accused, the probability of tampering of the witnesses and repeating the offence, if the accused are released on bail, the likelihood of the accused being unavailable in the event bail is granted, the possibility of obstructing the proceedings and evading the courts of justice and the overall desirability of releasing the accused on bail. [Refer: Chaman Lal v. State of U.P. [Chaman Lal v. State of U.P., [(2004) 7 SCC 525]; Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, [(2004) 7 SCC 528]; Masroor v. State of U.P., [(2009) 14 SCC 286]; Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, [(2010) 14 SCC 496]; Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P., [(2014) 16 SCC 508]; Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi), [(2018) 12 SCC 129]; Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, [(2020) 2 SCC 118]. 27. It is equally well settled that bail once granted, ought not to be cancelled in a mechanical manner. However, an unreasoned or perverse - 5 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5204 CRL.P No. 17126 of 2025 order of bail is always open to interference by the superior court. If there are serious allegations against the accused, even if he has not misused the bail granted to him, such an order can be cancelled by the same Court that has granted the bail. Bail can also be revoked by a superior court if it transpires that the courts below have ignored the relevant material available on record or not looked into the gravity of the offence or the impact on the society resulting in such an order. In P v. State of M.P., [(2022) 15 SCC 211] decided by a three-Judge Bench of this Court [authored by one of us (Hima Kohli, J.)] has spelt out the considerations that must weigh with the Court for interfering in an order granting bail to an accused under Section 439(1) CrPC in the following words: (SCC p. 224, para 24) “24. As can be discerned from the above decisions, for cancelling bail once granted, the court must consider whether any supervening circumstances have arisen or the conduct of the accused post grant of bail demonstrates that it is no longer conducive to a fair trial to permit him to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during trial [Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349]. To put it differently, in ordinary circumstances, this Court would be loathe to interfere with an order passed by the court below granting bail but if such an order is found to be illegal or perverse or premised on material that is irrelevant, then such an order is susceptible to scrutiny and interference by the appellate court.” Considerations for setting aside bail orders 28. The considerations that weigh with the appellate court for setting aside the bail order on an application being moved by the aggrieved party include any supervening circumstances that may have occurred after granting relief to the accused, the conduct of the accused while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to procrastinate, resulting in delaying the trial, any instance of threats being extended to the witnesses while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to tamper with the evidence in any manner. We may add that this list is only illustrative and not exhaustive. However, the court must be cautious that at the stage of granting bail, only a prima facie case needs to be examined and detailed reasons relating to the merits of the case that may cause prejudice to the accused, ought to be avoided. Suffice it is to state that the bail order should reveal the factors that have been considered by the Court for granting relief to the accused.” (Emphasis Supplied) - 6 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5204 CRL.P No. 17126 of 2025 24. It is trite that bail once granted should not be cancelled ordinarily, but where the facts are so grave that they shake the conscience of the Court; and where the release of the accused on bail would have an adverse impact on the society, the Courts are not powerless and are expected to exercise jurisdiction conferred by law to cancel such bail orders so as to subserve the ends of justice. The present one is precisely a case of such nature. 25. We may note that the impugned order could have been quashed on the solitary ground of non-compliance of Section 15A(3) of the SC/ST Act which mandates that notice to a victim is essential before a prayer for bail is being considered, in a case where the offence/s under the SC/ST Act have been applied. 26. On going through the memo of appeal filed by the respondent-accused in the High Court, we find that the appellant-victim was not impleaded as a party respondent therein and hence, did not have the benefit of right of hearing as warranted by Section 15A(3) of the SC/ST Act. 27. Furthermore, keeping in view the principles laid down by this Court in Shabeen Ahmad (supra), we are of the firm opinion that the present case is an exceptional one, wherein the grant of bail by the High Court to respondent No. 2-accused by a cryptic order dated 18th January, 2024 has resulted into travesty of justice. Grant of bail to the person accused of such grave offences without assigning reasons shakes the conscience of the Court and would have an adverse impact on the society. Furthermore, the release of the accused on bail would adversely impact the trial as there would be high chances of the material witnesses being threatened and influenced. Our conclusions are fortified by the fact that respondent No. 2-accused has been reinstated to the position of Superintendent of another protection home which speaks volumes about her clout and influence with the administration.” (Emphasis supplied) - 7 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5204 CRL.P No. 17126 of 2025 2.2. In STATE OF KARNATAKA v. SRI DARSHAN2, the Apex Court while discussing the difference between annulment of bail orders and cancellation of bail, observes as follows: “…. …. …. 18. Let us now examine the jurisprudence on when bail may be annulled or cancelled. Two distinct categories have emerged in this regard: (A) Annulment of Bail due to legal infirmity in the order; and (B) Cancellation of Bail, i.e., revocation of bail due to post-grant misconduct or supervening circumstances. …. …. …. (B) Cancellation of bail 18.10. As per Halsbury's Laws of England, the grant of bail does not set the accused at liberty in the absolute sense but merely shifts custody from the State to the sureties. Consequently, cancellation of bail entails an assessment of whether the accused has abused the liberty so conferred. 18.11. In Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana (supra), this Court delineated broad, though not exhaustive, grounds justifying cancellation of bail, including: • Interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of justice; • Evasion of justice; • Abuse of the concession of bail; • Likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice. 18.12. In Abdul Basit v. Abdul Kadir Choudhary [(2014) 10 SCC 754] , this Court elaborated the circumstances in which bail granted under Section 439(2) Cr. P.C. may be cancelled, including where the accused: 2 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1702 - 8 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5204 CRL.P No. 17126 of 2025 • engages in similar criminal activity post-bail; • interferes with or obstructs the investigation; • tampers with evidence or influences witnesses; • intimidates or threatens witnesses; • attempts to abscond or evade judicial process; • becomes unavailable or goes underground; • violates the conditions imposed or evades the control of sureties. 18.13. In Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar (supra), Justice D.Y. Chandrachud explained: “An appellate court is empowered to set aside a bail order if it is found to be based on a misapplication of legal principles or where relevant considerations have been ignored. On the other hand, cancellation of bail typically arises from post-bail conduct or supervening circumstances.” 18.14. Finally, in Deepak Yadav v. State of U.P.[ Criminal Appeal No. 861 of 2022 (@ SLP (Crl.) No. 9655 of 2021) dated 20.05.2022], this Court reaffirmed that bail already granted should not be cancelled in a routine or mechanical manner. Only cogent and overwhelming circumstances, which threaten the fairness of the trial or the interest of justice, would warrant such interference. 18.15. Thus, it is clear that while cancellation of bail is a serious matter involving deprivation of personal liberty, the law does permit annulment of a bail order that is unjustified, legally untenable, or passed without due regard to material considerations. The distinction between annulment of bail orders due to perversity and cancellation for post-bail misconduct must be clearly understood and applied, ensuring a careful, calibrated, and constitutionally sound approach to the administration of criminal justice. 19. At this juncture, it is apposite to refer to the decision of this Bench in Pinki v. State of Uttar Pradesh [2025 INSC 482], wherein, the bail granted to the accused therein was cancelled, after a detailed consideration of the facts - 9 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5204 CRL.P No. 17126 of 2025 and the gravity of the offence, namely, child trafficking as well as the legal principles. The Court underscored that while personal liberty is a cherished constitutional value, it is not absolute. Liberty must yield where it poses a threat to the collective interest of society. No individual can claim a liberty that endangers the life or liberty of others, as the rational collective cannot tolerate anti-social or anti-collective conduct. Emphasizing that bail jurisprudence is inherently fact-specific, the Court reiterated that each bail application must be decided on its own merits, in light of the well settled on its own merits, in light of the well-settled parameters governing grant or denial of bail. The following paragraphs from the judgment are particularly relevant in this context: “i. Broad Principles for Grant of Bail. 53. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, (1978) 1 SCC 240, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of personal liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key factors that should be considered while granting bail, which are extracted as under: - “7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is the vital factor and the nature of the evidence also is pertinent. The punishment to which the party may be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the issue. 8. Another relevant factor is as to whether the course of justice would be thwarted by him who seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be freed for the time being [Patrick Devlin, The Criminal Prosecution in England (Oxford University Press, London 1960) p. 75 — Modern Law Review, Vol. 81, Jan. 1968, p. 54.] 9. Thus the legal principles and practice validate the Court considering the likelihood of the applicant interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not only traditional but rational, in this context, to enquire into the antecedents of a man who is applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record — particularly a record which suggests that he is likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In regard to habituals, it is part of criminological history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further crimes on the members of society. Bail discretion, on the basis of evidence about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore not an exercise in irrelevance.” (Emphasis supplied) - 10 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5204 CRL.P No. 17126 of 2025 54. In Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT, Delhi, (2001) 4 SCC 280, this Court highlighted various aspects that the courts should keep in mind while dealing with an application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as follows: “8. The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be exercised on the basis of well-settled principles having regard to the circumstances of each case and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting the bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character, behaviour, means and standing of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public or State and similar other considerations. It has also to be kept in mind that for the purposes of granting the bail the Legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence” which means the court dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it (sic itself) as to whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. […]” (Emphasis supplied) 55. This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598, speaking through Banerjee, J., emphasised that a court exercising discretion in matters of bail, has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting that bail should not be granted as a matter of course, bereft of cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows: - “3. Grant of bail though being a discretionary order — but, however, calls for exercise of such a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter of course. Order for bail bereft of any cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to record, however, that the grant of bail is dependent upon the contextual facts of the matter being dealt with by the court and facts, however, do always vary from case to case. While placement of the accused in the society, though may be considered but that by itself cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of grant of bail and the same should and ought always to be coupled with other circumstances warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the offence is one of the basic considerations for the grant of bail — more heinous is the crime, the greater is the chance of rejection of the bail, though, however, dependent on the factual matrix of the matter.” (Emphasis supplied) 56. In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan, (2004) 7 SCC 528, this Court held that although it is established that a court considering a bail - 11 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5204 CRL.P No. 17126 of 2025 application cannot undertake a detailed examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of the case, yet the court is required to indicate the prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail. 57. In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar v. Ashis Chatterjee, (2010) 14 SCC 496, this Court observed that where a High Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, rendering it illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the circumstances under which an order granting bail may be set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have guided the Court's decision to grant bail have also been detailed as under: “9. […] It is trite that this Court does not, normally, interfere with an order passed by the High Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused. However, it is equally incumbent upon the High Court to exercise its discretion judiciously, cautiously and strictly in compliance with the basic principles laid down in a plethora of decisions of this Court on the point. It is well settled that, among other circumstances, the factors to be borne in mind while considering an application for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie or reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the punishment in the event of conviction; (iv) danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if released on bail; (v) character, behaviour, means, position and standing of the accused; (vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii) reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of justice being thwarted by grant of bail.” (Emphasis supplied) 58. In Bhoopendra Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2021) 17 SCC 220, this Court made observations with respect to the exercise of appellate power to determine whether bail has been granted for valid reasons as distinguished from an application for cancellation of bail i.e. this Court distinguished between setting aside a perverse order granting bail vis-à-vis cancellation of bail on the ground that the accused has misconducted himself or because of some new facts requiring such - 12 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5204 CRL.P No. 17126 of 2025 cancellation. Quoting Mahipal v. Rajesh Kumar, (2020) 2 SCC 118, this Court observed as under: - “16. The considerations that guide the power of an appellate court in assessing the correctness of an order granting bail stand on a different footing from an assessment of an application for the cancellation of bail. The correctness of an order granting bail is tested on the anvil of whether there was an improper or arbitrary exercise of the discretion in the grant of bail. The test is whether the order granting bail is perverse, illegal or unjustified. On the other hand, an application for cancellation of bail is generally examined on the anvil of the existence of supervening circumstances or violations of the conditions of bail by a person to whom bail has been granted. […]” (Emphasis supplied) 59. One of the judgments of this Court on the aspect of application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar, (2022) 4 SCC 497, wherein a three-Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned and casual order [Pappu Kumar v. State of Bihar, (2021) SCC OnLine Pat 2856 and Pappu Singh v. State of Bihar, (2021) SCC OnLine Pat 2857] of the High Court granting bail to the accused, observed as follows: - “35. While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at the same time while considering an application for bail courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of the accusations against an accused and the facts that have a bearing in the case, particularly, when the accusations may not be false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are supported by adequate material brought on record so as to enable a court to arrive at a prima facie conclusion. While considering an application for grant of bail a prima facie conclusion must be supported by reasons and must be arrived at after having regard to the vital facts of the case brought on record. Due consideration must be given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any, and the nature of punishment that would follow a conviction vis-à-vis the offence(s) alleged against an accused.” (Emphasis supplied) 60. In Manoj Kumar Khokhar v. State of Rajasthan, (2022) 3 SCC 501, Her Ladyship B.V. Nagarathna, J, speaking for the Bench observed as under: “37. Ultimately, the court considering an application for bail has to exercise discretion in a judicious manner and in accordance with the settled principles of law having regard to the crime alleged to be committed by - 13 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5204 CRL.P No. 17126 of 2025 the accused on the one hand and ensuring purity of the trial of the case on the other. 38. Thus, while elaborate reasons may not be assigned for grant of bail or an extensive discussion of the merits of the case may not be undertaken by the court considering a bail application, an order dehors reasoning or bereft of the relevant reasons cannot result in grant of bail. In such a case the prosecution or the informant has a right to assail the order before a higher forum. As noted in Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.) [Gurcharan Singh v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1978) 1 SCC 118 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 41 : 1978 Cri LJ 129], when bail has been granted to an accused, the State may, if new circumstances have arisen following the grant of such bail, approach the High Court seeking cancellation of bail under Section 439(2) CrPC. However, if no new circumstances have cropped up since the grant of bail, the State may prefer an appeal against the order granting bail, on the ground that the same is perverse or illegal or has been arrived at by ignoring material aspects which establish a prima facie case against the accused.” (Emphasis supplied) 61. We have referred to the above authorities solely for the purpose of reiterating two conceptual principles, namely, factors that are to be taken into consideration while exercising power of admitting an accused to bail when offences are of serious nature, and the distinction between cancellation of bail because of supervening circumstances and exercise of jurisdiction in nullifying an order granting bail in an appeal when the bail order is assailed on the ground that the same is perverse or based on irrelevant considerations or founded on non- consideration of the factors which are relevant. 62. We are absolutely conscious that liberty of a person should not be lightly dealt with, for deprivation of liberty of a person has immense impact on the mind of a person. Incarceration creates a concavity in the personality of an individual. Sometimes it causes a sense of vacuum. Needless to emphasise, the sacrosanctity of liberty is paramount in a civilised society. However, in a democratic body polity which is wedded to the rule of law an individual is expected to grow within the social restrictions sanctioned by law. The individual liberty is restricted by larger social interest and its deprivation must have due sanction of law. In an orderly society an individual is expected to live with dignity having respect for law and also giving due respect to others’ rights. It is a well- accepted principle that the concept of liberty is not in the realm of absolutism but is a restricted one. The cry of the collective for justice, its desire for peace and harmony and - 14 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5204 CRL.P No. 17126 of 2025 its necessity for security cannot be allowed to be trivialised. The life of an individual living in a society governed by the rule of law has to be regulated and such regulations which are the source in law subserve the social balance and function as a significant instrument for protection of human rights and security of the collective. This is because, fundamentally, laws are made for their obedience so that every member of the society lives peacefully in a society to achieve his individual as well as social interest. That is why Edmond Burke while discussing about liberty opined, “it is regulated freedom”. 63. It is also to be kept in mind that individual liberty cannot be accentuated to such an extent or elevated to such a high pedestal which would bring in anarchy or disorder in the society. The prospect of greater justice requires that law and order should prevail in a civilised milieu. True it is, there can be no arithmetical formula for fixing the parameters in precise exactitude but the adjudication should express not only application of mind but also exercise of jurisdiction on accepted and established norms. Law and order in a society protect the established precepts and see to it that contagious crimes do not become epidemic. In an organised society the concept of liberty basically requires citizens to be responsible and not to disturb the tranquility and safety which every well-meaning person desires. Not for nothing J. Oerter stated: “Personal liberty is the right to act without interference within the limits of the law.” 64. Thus analysed, it is clear that though liberty is a greatly cherished value in the life of an individual, it is a controlled and restricted one and no element in the society can act in a manner by consequence of which the life or liberty of others is jeopardised, for the rational collective does not countenance an anti-social or anti-collective act. [See: Ash Mohammad v. Shiv Raj Singh, (2012) 9 SCC 446]. H. CONCLUSION 67. Considering the serious nature of the crime and the modus operandi adopted by the accused persons we are of the view that the High Court should not have exercised its discretion in favour of the accused persons. We are sorry to say but the High Court dealt with all the bail applications in a very callous manner. The outcome of this callous approach on the part of the High Court has - 15 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5204 CRL.P No. 17126 of 2025 ultimately paved way for many accused persons to abscond and thereby put the trial in jeopardy. … … 72. Modern political scientist and philosopher, also favours certain limitation on liberty, for safeguarding the societal interest and professes the proportionality between the liberty and restriction, thus laying down exception for the personal liberty, in following words: “Men are qualified for civil liberty in exact proportion to their disposition to put moral chains upon their own appetites, in proportion as their love to justice is above their rapacity, in proportion as their soundness and sobriety of understanding is above their vanity and presumption, in proportion as they are more disposed to listen to the counsels of the wise and good, in preference to the flattery of knaves. Society cannot exist, unless a controlling power upon will and appetite be placed somewhere; and the less of it there is within, the more there must be without. It is ordained in the eternal constitution of things, that men of intemperate minds cannot be free. Their passions forge their fetters.” (Emphasis supplied) 73. Thus, certain restrictions or limitations, on the exercise of personal liberty, by the State or other such human agency, are necessary elements, in the interest of liberty of a well-ordered society or societal interest. 74. This Court has also held that unlimited and unqualified liberty cannot be said to be in favour of societal interest. In Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569, this Court observed: “Liberty cannot stand alone but must be paired with companion virtue i.e. virtue and morality, liberty and law, liberty and justice, liberty and common good, liberty and responsibility which are concomitants for orderly progress and social stability. Man being a rationale individual has to live in harmony with equal rights of others and more differently for the attainment of antithetic desires. This intertwined network is difficult to delineate within defined spheres of conduct within which freedom of action may be confined. Therefore, liberty would not always be an absolute licence but must arm itself within the confines of law. In other words, there can be no liberty without social restraint. Liberty, therefore, as a social conception is a right to be assured to all members of a society. Unless restraint is enforced on and accepted by all members of the society, the liberty of some must involve the oppression of others. If liberty be regarded a social order, the problem of establishing - 16 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5204 CRL.P No. 17126 of 2025 liberty must be a problem of organising restraint which society controls over the individual. Therefore, liberty of each citizen is borne of and must be subordinated to the liberty of the greatest number, in other words common happiness as an end of the society, lest lawlessness and anarchy will tamper social weal and harmony and powerful courses or forces would be at work to undermine social welfare and order. Thus the essence of civil liberty is to keep alive the freedom of the individual subject to the limitation of social control which could be adjusted according to the needs of the dynamic social evolution.” (Emphasis supplied) 75. In Gudikanti Narasimhulu (supra) this Court observed thus:— “After all, personal liberty of an accused or convict is fundamental, suffering lawful eclipse only in terms of ‘procedure established by law’. The last four words of Art. 21 are the life of that human right. The doctrine of Police Power constitutionally validates punitive processes for the maintenance of public order, security of the State, national integrity and the interest of the public generally. Even so, having regard to the solemn issue involved, deprivation of personal freedom, ephemeral or enduring, must be founded on the most serious considerations relevant to the welfare objectives of society, specified in the Constitution.” (Emphasis supplied) 76. In no circumstances, the High Court could have released Santosh Sao, Jagveer Baranwal & Manish Jain respectively on bail. 77. In such circumstances referred to above, we are of the view that we should set aside all the orders passed by the High Court granting bail to the accused persons and they should be asked to surrender before the trial court. 78. The final word: The true test to ascertain whether discretion has been judiciously exercised or not is to see whether the court has been able to strike a balance between the personal liberty of the accused and the interest of the State, in other words, the societal interests. Each bail application should be decided in the facts and circumstances of the case having regard to the various factors germane to the well settled principles of grant or refusal of bail. In the words of Philip Stanhope, “Judgment is not upon all occasions required, but discretion always is”. 79. In the result all these appeals succeed and are allowed. The impugned orders of bail passed by the High Court are hereby set aside.” - 17 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5204 CRL.P No. 17126 of 2025 20. In the present case, the High Court, by the impugned order, enlarged the respondents on bail, primarily relying on a set of factual and legal findings. However, a closer examination of these findings reveals serious infirmities that warranting interference. We shall discuss the same in detail.” (Emphasis supplied) 2.3. Later, the Apex Court in the case of PHIRERAM v. STATE OF U.P.3, while holding that a witness protection scheme is not an alternative for cancellation of bail, summarizes the principles governing cancellation of bail and observes as follows: “…. …. …. Principles governing Cancellation of Bail 54. The law on cancellation of bail is well settled through a plethora of decisions of this Court. 55. In P v. State of M.P., (2022) 15 SCC 211 this Court held that the grant of bail is always conditional and may be subject to cancellation, if after the grant of the same there is any supervening circumstances that impedes fair trial. “23. In a recent decision of a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Imran v. Mohd. Bhava [Imran v. Mohd. Bhava, (2022) 13 SCC 70] it has been held as follows: “20. Indeed, it is a well-established principle that once bail has been granted it would require overwhelming circumstances for its cancellation. However, this Court in its judgment in Vipan Kumar Dhir v. State of Punjab [Vipan Kumar Dhir v. State of Punjab, (2021) 15 SCC 518] has also 3 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1915 - 18 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5204 CRL.P No. 17126 of 2025 reiterated, that while conventionally, certain supervening circumstances impeding fair trial must develop after granting bail to an accused, for its cancellation by a superior court, bail, can also be revoked by a superior court, when the previous court granting bail has ignored relevant material available on record, gravity of the offence or its societal impact. It was thus observed: ‘9. … Conventionally, there can be supervening circumstances which may develop post the grant of bail and are non-conducive to fair trial, making it necessary to cancel the bail. This Court in Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana [Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 237] observed that: “4. Rejection of bail in a non-bailable case at the initial stage and the cancellation of bail so granted, have to be considered and dealt with on different basis. Very cogent and overwhelming circumstances are necessary for an order directing the cancellation of the bail, already granted. Generally speaking, the grounds for cancellation of bail, broadly (illustrative and not exhaustive) are : interference or attempt to interfere with the due course of administration of justice or evasion or attempt to evade the due course of justice or abuse of the concession granted to the accused in any manner. The satisfaction of the court, on the basis of material placed on the record of the possibility of the accused absconding is yet another reason justifying the cancellation of bail. However, bail once granted should not be cancelled in a mechanical manner without considering whether any supervening circumstances have rendered it no longer conducive to a fair trial to allow the accused to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during the trial.” 10. These principles have been reiterated time and again, more recently by a three-Judge Bench of this Court in X v. State of Telangana [X v. State of Telangana, (2018) 16 SCC 511 : (2020) 1 SCC (Cri) 902]. 11. In addition to the caveat illustrated in the cited decision(s), bail can also be revoked where the court has considered irrelevant factors or has ignored relevant material available on record which renders the order granting bail legally untenable. The gravity of the offence, conduct of the accused and societal impact of an undue indulgence by Court when the investigation is at the threshold, are also amongst a few situations, where a Superior Court can interfere in an order of bail to prevent the miscarriage of justice and to bolster the administration of criminal justice system…’ xxx xxx xxx 23. Thus, while considering cancellation of bail already granted by a lower court, would indeed require significant scrutiny at the instance of superior court, however, bail when - 19 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5204 CRL.P No. 17126 of 2025 granted can always be revoked if the relevant material on record, gravity of the offence or its societal impact have not been considered by the lower court. In such instances, where bail is granted in a mechanical manner, the order granting bail is liable to be set aside. Moreover, the decisions cited hereinabove, enumerate certain basic principles which must be borne in mind when deciding upon an application for grant of bail. Thus, while each case has its own unique factual matrix, which assumes a significant role in determination of bail matters, grant of bail must also be exercised by having regard to the abovementioned well-settled principles.” 24. As can be discerned from the above decisions, for cancelling bail once granted, the court must consider whether any supervening circumstances have arisen or the conduct of the accused post grant of bail demonstrates that it is no longer conducive to a fair trial to permit him to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail during trial [Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 237]. To put it differently, in ordinary circumstances, this Court would be loathe to interfere with an order passed by the court below granting bail but if such an order is found to be illegal or perverse or premised on material that is irrelevant, then such an order is susceptible to scrutiny and interference by the appellate court.” (Emphasis supplied) 56. This Court then summed up the principles or circumstance governing the cancellation of bail as under:— “25. Some of the circumstances where bail granted to the accused under Section 439(1) CrPC can be cancelled are enumerated below: (a) If he misuses his liberty by indulging in similar/other criminal activity; (b) If he interferes with the course of investigation; (c) If he attempts to tamper with the evidence; (d) If he attempts to influence/threaten the witnesses; (e) If he evades or attempts to evade court proceedings; - 20 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5204 CRL.P No. 17126 of 2025 (f) If he indulges in activities which would hamper smooth investigation; (g) If he is likely to flee from the country; (h) If he attempts to make himself scarce by going underground and/or becoming unavailable to the investigating agency; (i) If he attempts to place himself beyond the reach of his surety. (j) If any facts may emerge after the grant of bail which are considered unconducive to a fair trial. We may clarify that the aforesaid list is only illustrative in nature and not exhaustive.” (Emphasis supplied) 57. The governing principle is that if the accused tampers with evidence, threatens witnesses, or attempts to subvert the trial, the indulgence of bail is to be withdrawn. It is a recognition that liberty is conditional, not absolute, and subject always to the larger interest of ensuring a fair trial. Considerations for cancellation of bail must always be on the basis of the well settled principles as discussed aforesaid. There cannot be any extraneous considerations involved that are unknown to the law of bails. 58. At the same time, emphasis has to be laid that cancellation of bail occupies a distinct space in the criminal justice machinery. Cancellation intervenes at the stage of violation, to prevent recurrence. In State through Delhi Administration v. Sanjay Gandhi, (1978) 2 SCC 411, this Court underscored that tampering with witnesses constitutes a cogent ground for cancellation, for the “opportunity of being on bail cannot be permitted to be abused for the purpose of thwarting the course of justice.” Similarly, in Raghubir Singh v. State of Bihar, (1986) 4 SCC 481, it was reiterated that intimidation of witnesses is sufficient to revoke the liberty granted. It must be guided by the lodestar of preventing interference with witnesses that “strikes at the root of the rule of law.” 59. Thus, the considerations that must weigh with the court for setting aside the bail order on an - 21 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5204 CRL.P No. 17126 of 2025 application being moved by the aggrieved party include any supervening circumstances that might have occurred after granting relief to the accused, the conduct of the accused while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to procrastinate, resulting in delaying the trial, any instance of threats being extended to the witnesses while on bail, any attempt on the part of the accused to tamper with the evidence in any manner etc.” (Emphasis supplied) If the law laid down by the Apex Court in the afore-quoted judgments is pitted to the order passed by the concerned Court cancelling the bail granted to the petitioner, it would not warrant any interference as the bail is cancelled on the score that the petitioner has threatened the witnesses. 3. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that direction be issued for conclusion of the trial, as the evidence of the victim is already over. 4. The concerned Court shall endeavour to conclude the proceedings, in accordance with law, within the statutory limit prescribed under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. - 22 - HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5204 CRL.P No. 17126 of 2025 5. In light of the aforesaid reasons, the petition stands disposed. Ordered accordingly. Sd/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE JY List No.: 1 Sl No.: 11