JUDGMENT : MURALEE KRISHNA S., J. 1. This intra-court appeal is filed under Section 5(i) of the Kerala High Court Act, 1958 , by the 2 nd respondent, IDBI Bank Ltd., formerly known as Industrial Development Bank of India (hereinafter referred to as ‘Bank’), challenging the judgment dated 12.10.2015 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.26496 of 2005. 2. The facts which led to the filing of the writ petition in brief are as follows: During 1990, the 4 th respondent, M/s.ABN Granites Ltd., represented by its Chairman and Managing Director, submitted an application to the General Manager of the District Industries Centre, Ernakulam, for allotment of land in the Development Areas, Edayar, for the establishment of an industrial unit to manufacture polished granite tiles. Considering the project details submitted along with the application, the General Manager, on the strength of the delegation of powers by the Government to allot the land in Development Areas on hire purchase to the General Managers of the District Industries Centres as per Ext.P2 order dated 10.01.1992, had allotted four acres of land on hire purchase to the 4 th respondent at Edayar. The company had taken the land into its possession and executed Ext.P4 hire purchase agreement on 31.12.1990 as per Ext.P1 Government order dated 05.04.1969, whereby the scheme of the State for the allotment of Government land in Development Areas (DA) on Hire Purchase (HP) for industrial purposes was laid down. 2.1 Later, the 4 th respondent company represented that the land allotted to them is not suitable as a high-tension electricity line crosses through the land. In addition to that, the company requested to enhance the allotment to ten acres, and the land allotted to them is insufficient for the functioning of the unit. Considering the request, an additional six acres of land were allotted to the company, contiguous to the land covered by Ext.P4 hire purchase agreement, by executing Ext.P5 agreement dated 24.03.1992. The land was taken into possession by the 4 th respondent on the same day. Considering the request, an additional six acres of land were allotted to the company, contiguous to the land covered by Ext.P4 hire purchase agreement, by executing Ext.P5 agreement dated 24.03.1992. The land was taken into possession by the 4 th respondent on the same day. 2.2 When the 4 th respondent company produced a detailed building plan proposed to be constructed in the allotted land and sought permission for the same, the General Manager by Ext.P6 order dated 28.10.1992 granted permission for the same and also issued permission to mortgage the superstructure to be build in the allotted land and to hypothecate the machineries to be installed in the building to the appellant, but had never permitted to mortgage the land as he had no authorization for the same. 2.3 When the 4 th respondent company expressed willingness to remit the full cost of the land as envisaged in the hire purchase agreement and requested to issue a certificate to that effect to produce it before the financing bank, the said request was permitted, and the 4 th respondent had remitted an amount of Rs.5,92,614/- towards the cost of the land. While issuing Ext.P7 certificate dated 28.10.1992, evidencing the remittance of the cost of the land, the General Manager specifically mentioned in that certificate that the certificate does not purport to be a guarantee that the patta of the land shall be given to the unit. Though the 4 th respondent produced Ext.P7 certificate before the appellant-Bank to mortgage the land to avail the loan facilities, the bank refused to accept the certificate to create a mortgage on the land. Hence, the 4 th respondent again approached the General Manager for clarification in this regard to produce before the Bank. Considering the request of the 4 th respondent, the General Manager gave Ext.P8 clarification letter dated 06.11.1992. In Ext.P8 clarification letter, the General Manager had not permitted the mortgage of the land, but he had assured to recommend the assignment application to the Government as soon as the unit started production. After remitting the full cost, the 4 th respondent filed an application for the issuance of patta to the land. In Ext.P8 clarification letter, the General Manager had not permitted the mortgage of the land, but he had assured to recommend the assignment application to the Government as soon as the unit started production. After remitting the full cost, the 4 th respondent filed an application for the issuance of patta to the land. But it was not recommended to the Government for the reason that the company has not produced all the required documents, it has not utilised the entire land and constructed the factory building as per the approved project and building plan and that the company has not started production in the unit. The General Manager intimated the above defects to the 4 th respondent and requested to rectify them at the earliest. But the 4 th respondent failed to rectify the defects. Though the 4 th respondent insisted to recommend the application to the Government for the assignment of the land, the General Manager could not recommend the same without the 4 th respondent establishing the unit and rectifying other defects. But the General Manager intimated the fact to the Bank and company, vide Ext.P9 letter dated 09.09.1993, that the application of the 4 th respondent company will be recommended to the Government, provided the unit is established and utilises the land properly. 2.4 On 01.07.1995, the 4 th respondent declared that it had started production in the unit and in order to verify the same, the representatives of the General Manager visited the unit, and at that time, it was found that though the company started a trial run, it had not started commercial production. It was also noticed that buildings were not constructed as per the approved plan. The utilisation of the land was only for five acres, and the balance land was left idle without any improvements or developments, except a compound wall. On enquiry, it was revealed that the remaining land was kept for their future developments. Since the land was not allotted for future development, it was decided to recommend the application for the assignment of five acres of utilised land and the balance after watching the progress of its utilisation. This fact was also informed to the 4 th respondent, vide Ext.P10 letter dated 30.08.1995. In the meantime, the unit was closed, and the company had stopped production. This fact was also informed to the 4 th respondent, vide Ext.P10 letter dated 30.08.1995. In the meantime, the unit was closed, and the company had stopped production. Since the unit was closed, the application for the assignment of five acres of land was also not recommended by the General Manager. As a first step to resume the unutilised land as envisaged in Ext.P1 Land allotment rules, the General Manager issued Ext.P11 show cause notice dated 02.05.1996 to the 4 th respondent at its unit address at Edayar and its registered office at Bangalore. By Ext.P12 order dated 12.08.1996, the unutilised land of five acres was resumed and the resumption order was forwarded to the address of the 4 th respondent company. The 4 th respondent had not raised any objection against the resumption or challenged it in any forum. On resumption, the land with improvements thereon was taken into the possession of the industries department, and arrangements were made with SIDCO to value the improvements as per the provisions of the Land Allotment Rules. The SIDCO valued the improvements available in the resumed land at a cost of Rs.1,93,661/-. Refund of the cost of resumed land was also calculated as per the rules. As per Ext.P13 calculation statement, the total refund entitled by the company was calculated at Rs.4,61,036/-, which includes the cost of the resumed land at Rs.2,67,375/-. 2.5 Later, vide Ext.P14 order dated 01.03.1997, the resumed five acres of land was reallotted to the 6 th respondent-M/s.Paravur Powerloom Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd. for the manufacture of textile goods and the production of cloths. The society had occupied the land, constructed the factory building, installed the plant and machinery and started functioning. An amount of Rs.600 lakhs was invested by the society in this land for the establishment of its powerloom complex. 2.6 While the matter was so, the appellant filed O.A.No.K81 of 1999 before the Debts Recovery Tribunal at Ernakulam (‘the Tribunal’ for short), seeking an order to recover Rs.35,41,14,960.40 with interest at the rate of 17.5% and other costs from the 4 th and 5 th respondents and from the properties hypothecated and mortgaged in favour of the appellant-Bank. In the original application, the appellant impleaded the General Manager and M/s.Paravur Powerloom Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd. as additional respondents. In the original application, the appellant impleaded the General Manager and M/s.Paravur Powerloom Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd. as additional respondents. After impleadment, the General Manager filed a detailed written statement produced as Ext.P17 in the writ petition, narrating the details. The M/s.Paravur Powerloom Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd. had also filed Ext.P18 affidavit before the Tribunal. In the written statement, the General Manager as well as the M/s.Paravur Powerloom Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd. contended that they had not availed any loan facilities from the appellant Bank and had not given any undertaking for the payment of the liabilities created by M/s.ABN Granites Ltd. To that written statement, the appellant-Bank filed Ext.P19 rejoinder seeking a direction to the General Manager to pay the entire cost of the land and the cost of the improvements collected from the society. By Ext.P20 judgment dated 24.01.2001, the Tribunal allowed the original application with costs, directing realisation of an amount of Rs.35,41,14,968.80/- with 17.5% interest jointly and severally from the defendants in the original application. On the strength of the said judgment, the 7 th respondent Recovery Officer, sent Ext.P21 demand notice dated 15.03.2002. On 21.08.2003, by Ext.P22 order, the Recovery Officer appointed a Receiver and the same was intimated to the General Manager. In continuation of the same, the Recovery Officer by Ext.P23 order dated 07.08.2003 attached the movables in the land created by the 4 th respondent company. 2.7 After the attachment of the assets, the 7 th respondent issued Ext.P24 notice for the sale proclamation of the mortgaged immovable properties. On receipt of the sale proclamation notice, the General Manager had filed Ext.P25 objections dated 25.03.2004 against the sale of the land and the assets created by the society on the land. The 6 th respondent society also filed Ext.P26 objection dated 02.04.2004. Since the Recovery Officer initiated action for the sale of the land, including the land on which the society is established, the functions of the society were completely paralysed. The 6 th respondent society also filed Ext.P26 objection dated 02.04.2004. Since the Recovery Officer initiated action for the sale of the land, including the land on which the society is established, the functions of the society were completely paralysed. 2.8 Contending that Ext.P20 judgment passed by the Tribunal has resulted in gross violation of natural justice, loss and damage to the public property and resulted in unemployment and the said order was passed without considering the contentions raised by the Government as well as the society, the writ petitioners i.e., the Government of Kerala and the General Manager, District Industrial Centre, Ernakulam filed the present writ petition, i.e., W.P.(C)No.26496 of 2005, invoking the jurisdiction of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India seeking the following reliefs: i) A declaration that the properties mentioned in A schedule and in item I and II of B schedule in Ext.P15 OA are not legally mortgaged properties in favour of the 2 nd respondent. ii) A declaration that the properties comprised in survey Nos.91/6 part, 91/7B, 91/7C part, 92/3A part, 91/1, 91/1- 1, 91/2, 91/3, 91/4, 91/4-1, 91/5A, 91/5B, 91/6 part, 91/c 7, part, 92/4A part, 98/1A part, 101/7 part and 101/9 part figured in item I and II of B schedule in Ext.P15 OA measuring 10 acres, is not liable to be attached or sold in auction by the 1 st respondent DRT or by the 6 th respondent Recovery Officer attached thereto for realizing any of the debts due to the 2 nd respondent Bank from Respondents 3 and 4; iii) A writ of certiorari or any other writ order or direction quashing that part of Ext.P20 judgment creating charge over the State’s properties and resultant proceedings taken by the 1 st and 6 th respondents to attach and sale the property comprised in survey Nos.91/6 part, 91/7B, 91/7C part, 92/3A part, 91/1, 91/1-1, 91/2, 91/3, 91/4, 91/4-1, 91/5A, 91/5B, 91/6 part, 91/c 7, part, 92/4A part, 98/1A part, 101/7 part and 101/9 part figured in item No.I and II of B schedule and A schedule in Ext.P15 OA pursuant to Ext.P20 judgment. iv) A writ of mandamus to respondent Nos.1 and 6 directing them not to initiate any other steps for attachment or sale of the properties of the State in Sy.Nos.91/6 part, 91/7B, 91/7C part, 92/3A part, 91/1, 91/1-1, 91/2, 91/3, 91/4, 91/4-1, 91/5A, 91/5B, 91/6 part, 91/c 7, part, 92/4A part, 98/1A part, 101/7 part and 101/9 part figured in Item No.1 and 2 of the B schedule in Ext.P15 OA.” 3. On behalf of the appellant, a counter affidavit dated 10.01.2014 was filed in the writ petition, opposing the reliefs sought for and producing therewith Exts.R2(1) and R2(2) documents. 4. After hearing both sides and on appreciation of the materials on record, the learned Single Judge, by the impugned judgment dated 12.10.2015, allowed the writ petition and quashed Ext.P20 judgment and decree passed by the Tribunal. The learned Single Judge directed the Tribunal to reconsider the matter after due notice to the writ petitioners as well as the appellant and also respondents 4 and 5 herein, who are the defendants in the original application before the Tribunal. In the impugned judgment, the learned Single Judge found that while considering the entitlement of the appellant Bank to proceed against the mortgaged property, which was mortgaged in their favour by respondents 4 and 5 herein, it was incumbent upon the Tribunal to first ensure that the property in respect of which respondents 4 and 5 had executed the mortgage in favour of the appellant Bank, was one, on which the respondents 4 and 5 had a mortgageable right, before proceeding to hold in favour of the appellant Bank. Since the said exercise was not done in Ext.P20 judgment, the learned Single Judge set aside the same and directed reconsideration of the issue. Being aggrieved, the appellant Bank has filed the present writ appeal. 5. Though the writ appeal was filed in time, it was returned due to some defects noted by the Registry. The appellant represented the same with a delay of 446 days. On 16.05.2017, when the delay condonation application came up for consideration, the Division Bench of this Court, though not fully satisfied with the reason assigned for the delay, inclined to condone the delay with a condition that the appellant shall pay an amount of Rs.1,000/- to the High Court Legal Service Committee within a period of one week. On 16.05.2017, when the delay condonation application came up for consideration, the Division Bench of this Court, though not fully satisfied with the reason assigned for the delay, inclined to condone the delay with a condition that the appellant shall pay an amount of Rs.1,000/- to the High Court Legal Service Committee within a period of one week. Though the writ appeal was admitted as early as in the year 2017, it was adjourned on several occasions due to various reasons. By the order dated 27.05.2025 in I.A.No.2 of 2025, the descriptions of respondents 4 and 6 were corrected. 6. Heard the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant and the learned Senior Government Pleader. 7. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellant argued that if the Government is aggrieved by Ext.P20 judgment of the Tribunal, the remedy available to the Government was to file an appeal before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal as provided under Section 30 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 , or a review petition before the Debts Recovery Tribunal itself, and not a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India . The learned Single Judge ought not to have considered the writ petition, since the Government has not exhausted the remedy of appeal as provided under of the . By Ext.P2, the Government delegated the powers to do certain acts as provided under Ext.P1 Rules dated 05.04.1969 pertaining to allotment of land in Development Areas on hire purchase for industrial purposes. It is on the strength of Ext.P2 order, the 2 nd respondent allotted the land to the 4 th respondent company by virtue of Exts.P4 and P5 agreements for establishing the industrial unit. As per Clause 10 of Ext.P4 agreement, when all the sums due to the Government are paid, and the Government is satisfied that the plot is maintained properly, the Government shall transfer the complete ownership of the plot to the hirer. As per Clause 9 of Ext.P4, the hirer shall have the right to purchase the said plot at any time by paying the whole amount due to the Government. As per Clause 9 of Ext.P4, the hirer shall have the right to purchase the said plot at any time by paying the whole amount due to the Government. It is believed that the promises made in Exts.P6, P8 letters and Ext.P7 certificate by the 2 nd respondent that the 4 th respondent will be given patta for the land, the Bank accepted the mortgage by deposit of title deed and granted loan to respondents 4 and 5. Therefore, on a later stage, the Government cannot deviate from the promise made by the 2 nd respondent, who was delegated the authority to take decision on the matter. The writ petition was filed after four and a half years of Ext.P20 judgment by the Tribunal. Therefore, the learned Single Judge ought to have dismissed the writ petition on the issue of maintainability as well as on merits. The learned Senior Counsel relied on the judgments of the Apex Court in Hill Properties Limited v. Union Bank of India, (2014) 1 SCC 635 , Syndicate Bank v. Estate Officer and Manager (Recoveries), Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Limited, (2021) 3 SCC 736 and Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley, AIR 2024 SC 2717 in support of his arguments regarding non maintainability of the writ petition on the ground of alternative remedy as well as delay. 8. On the other hand, the learned Senior Government Pleader would submit that, in fact, the Debts Recovery Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain the original application filed by the appellant since the mortgage allegedly executed by the 4 th respondent in favour of the appellant itself is void. The learned Senior Government Pleader vehemently submitted that since public money is involved and the judgment under challenge was one passed with procedural irregularity, the writ petition is maintainable and the delay in filing the same is not material. By pointing out Clauses 9 and 11 of Ext.P1 Rules, the learned Senior Government Pleader argued that the land allotted to the 4 th respondent shall not be alienated or encumbered in any manner without the prior sanction in writing of the Director of Industries and Commerce. By pointing out Clauses 9 and 11 of Ext.P1 Rules, the learned Senior Government Pleader argued that the land allotted to the 4 th respondent shall not be alienated or encumbered in any manner without the prior sanction in writing of the Director of Industries and Commerce. In the instant case, the 2 nd respondent has nowhere stated that the land in question was assigned to the 4 th respondent so as to give an impression to the appellant that the 4 th respondent had a valid title to mortgage the land. By pointing out Rule 11 of Ext.P1 Rules, the learned Senior Government Pleader argued that the Director of Industries and Commerce shall have the power to resume the land if the allottee contravenes any of the provisions of these Rules or the provisions of the agreement executed. Since the 4 th respondent did not utilise the land, five acres of the same were resumed by the Government, and the same is now allotted to the 6 th respondent. From Ext.P6 letter, it is clear that only the superstructure is permitted to be mortgaged to the appellant-Bank. There was no promise made by the 2 nd respondent that a patta will be issued in respect of the subject land to the 4 th respondent. The learned Senior Government Pleader vehemently argued that though the Government has filed a detailed written statement in the original application, the Tribunal even failed to frame an issue pertaining to the title of the 4 th respondent and therefore the impugned Ext.P20 judgment of the Tribunal was rightly interfered with by the learned Single Judge. By pointing out Clause 18 of Ext.P5 agreement, the learned Senior Government Pleader argued that the 4 th respondent is bound by the terms and conditions of the Rules with the additions and amendments thereto, which shall form part of the agreement. By pointing out Ext.P27 proceedings of the Tribunal, the learned Senior Government Pleader argued that the Government was represented in the original application and even then, without considering the written statement filed by the Government, the impugned Ext.P20 judgment was passed by the Tribunal. By pointing out Ext.P27 proceedings of the Tribunal, the learned Senior Government Pleader argued that the Government was represented in the original application and even then, without considering the written statement filed by the Government, the impugned Ext.P20 judgment was passed by the Tribunal. In support of his arguments regarding the maintainability of the writ petition, the learned Senior Government Pleader relied on the judgments of the Apex Court in Official Trustee, West Bengal v. Sachindra Nath Chatterjee, AIR 1969 SC 823 , Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai, 1998 (8) SCC 1 , Central Bank of India v. Prabha Jain,  2025 SCC Online SC 121, Odisha State Financial Corporation v. Vigyan Chemical Industries,  (2025) SCC Online SC 1609, Urban Improvement Trust v. Vidhya Devi,  2024 SCC Online SC 3725 and that of this Court in Manohari R. v. Deputy Tahsildar (Revenue Recovery), Palakkad, 2024 (7) KHC 528 and that of Orissa High Court in Allied Chemical Laboratories, Jagatpur, Cuttack v. Presiding Officer, Debt Recovery, Cuttack, AIR 2005 Ori 32 . 9. Before entering into the rival contentions raised by the learned Senior Counsel as well as the learned Senior Government Pleader, it would be appropriate to go through the principles laid down in the aforementioned judgments relied upon by either side. In Hill Properties Limited [ (2014) 1 SCC 635 ], the Apex Court considered the issue of saleability of a flat mortgaged by the 5 th respondent therein, to whom the flat was allotted, who held a share in the appellant company. The appellant company in that case contended that the 5 th respondent is only a shareholder of the appellant company and hence only permitted to use and occupy one of the flats. The learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature of Bombay ruled in favour of the 5 th respondent in the appeal filed by the appellant, held thus: “12. We are of the view that the right, title, interest over a flat conveyed is a species of property, whether that right has been accrued under the provisions of the articles of association of a company or through the bye-laws of a cooperative society. The people in this country, especially in urban cities and towns are now accustomed to flat culture, especially due to paucity of land. The people in this country, especially in urban cities and towns are now accustomed to flat culture, especially due to paucity of land. Multi-storeyed flats are being constructed and sold by companies registered under the Companies Act as well as the cooperative societies registered under the Registration of Cooperative Societies Acts, etc. Flats are being purchased by people by either becoming members of the cooperative society or shareholders of the company and the flat-owners have an independent right as well as the collective right over the flat complex. A flat-owner's right to dispose of its flat is also well recognised, and one can sell, donate, leave by will or let out or hypothecate his right. These rights are even statutorily recognised by many State Legislatures by enacting Apartment Ownership Acts. Such a legislation exists in the State of Maharashtra as well. 13. Most of the flat-owners purchase the flat by availing of a loan from various banking institutions by mortgaging their rights over the purchased flat. By purchasing the flat, the purchaser, over and above his species of right over the flat, will also have undivided interest in the common areas and facilities, in the percentage as prescribed. Flat-owners will also have the right to use the common areas and facilities in accordance with the purpose for which they are intended. It is too late in the day to contend that flat-owners cannot sell, let, hypothecate or mortgage their flat for availing of loan without permission of the builder, society or the company. So far as a builder is concerned, the flat-owner should pay the price of the flat. So far as the society or company in which the flat-owner is a member, he is bound by the laws or articles of association of the company, but the species of his right over the flat is exclusively that of his. That right is always transferable and heritable. Of course, they will have over the flat if any amount is due to them upon the flat. 14. In Ramesh Himmatlal Shah case [Ramesh Himmatlal Shah v. Harsukh Jadhavji Joshi, (1975) 2 SCC 105 ] this Court has clearly delineated the legal principle which is as follows: (SCC p. 113, para 20) “20. Of course, they will have over the flat if any amount is due to them upon the flat. 14. In Ramesh Himmatlal Shah case [Ramesh Himmatlal Shah v. Harsukh Jadhavji Joshi, (1975) 2 SCC 105 ] this Court has clearly delineated the legal principle which is as follows: (SCC p. 113, para 20) “20. Multi-storeyed ownership flats on cooperative basis in cities and big towns have come to stay because of dire necessity and are in the process of rapid expansion for manifold reasons. Some of these are: ever growing needs of an urban community necessitating its accommodation in proximity to cities and towns, lack of availability of land in urban areas, rise in price of building material, restrictions under various rent legislations, disincentive generated by tax laws and other laws for embarking upon housing construction on individual basis, security of possession depending upon fulfilment of the conditions of membership of a society which are none too irksome. In absence of clear and unambiguous legal provisions to the contrary, it will not be in public interest nor in the interest of commerce to impose a ban on saleability of these flats by a tortuous process of reasoning. The prohibition, if intended by the legislature, must be in express terms. We have failed to find one.” 10. In Syndicate Bank [ (2021) 3 SCC 736 ], the property in question was mortgaged by the company to the appellant Syndicate Bank on the strength of Clause in the agreement entered into between the Government of Andhrapradesh and permission granted by a letter issued by the Director of Industries on behalf of the Government to mortgage the land with the Bank for financial assistance. Refuting the contentions of the respondents therein against the right of the appellant Bank therein to move against the mortgaged property, the Apex Court held thus: “14. The State of Andhra Pradesh in the agreement had permitted the Company to raise loans by mortgaging the property in question. The Director of Industries vide Letter dated 3-8-1972 has specifically permitted mortgage of the allotted land in favour of any scheduled bank. Apiic had, both in its original objections filed before the Debt Recovery Tribunal and the writ petitions filed by it, only claimed that 25 acres of land which it had resumed should not be sold. There was no objection to the sale of 26 acres of land. Apiic had, both in its original objections filed before the Debt Recovery Tribunal and the writ petitions filed by it, only claimed that 25 acres of land which it had resumed should not be sold. There was no objection to the sale of 26 acres of land. The appellant Bank is a scheduled bank. Public money is involved and therefore, we are of the view that the interest of both parties can be met by ordering the repayment of the principal amount along with the reasonable interest to the Bank and the balance amount be paid to Telangana Industrial Infrastructure Ltd”. 11. In Mrinmoy Maity [ AIR 2024 SC 2717 ], while considering the issue of delay in filing the writ petition, the Apex Court held thus: “9. Having heard rival contentions raised and on perusal of the facts obtained in the present case, we are of the considered view that the writ petitioner ought to have been non-suited or in other words the writ petition ought to have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches itself. An applicant who approaches the court belatedly or in other words sleeps over his rights for a considerable period of time, wakes up from his deep slumber ought not to be granted the extraordinary relief by the writ courts. This Court time and again has held that delay defeats equity. Delay or laches is one of the factors which should be borne in mind by the High Court while exercising discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India . In a given case, the High Court may refuse to invoke its extraordinary powers if laxity on the part of the applicant to assert his right has allowed the cause of action to drift away and attempts are made subsequently to rekindle the lapsed cause of action. 11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and laches alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and laches, the High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, inasmuch as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration the delay and laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court.” 12. While coming to the judgments relied by the learned Senior Government Pleader, in Sachindra Nath Chatterjee [ AIR 1969 SC 823 ], the Apex Court on the question of jurisdiction of a court to decide a matter, held thus: “15. From the above discussion it is clear that before a Court can be held to have jurisdiction to decide a particular matter it must not only have jurisdiction to try the suit brought but must also have the authority to pass the orders sought for. It is not sufficient that it has some jurisdiction in relation to the subject-matter of the suit. Its jurisdiction must include the power to hear and decide the questions at issue, the authority to hear and decide the particular controversy that has arisen between the parties. Therefore the fact that Ramfry, J. had jurisdiction to pass certain orders either under the Indian Trust Act, 1882 or under the Official Trustees Act, 1913 or under the Trustees and Mortgages Powers Act, 1866 or under his inherent power is not conclusive of the matter. What is relevant is whether he had the power to grant the relief asked for in the application made by the settlor. That we think is the essence of the matter. What is relevant is whether he had the power to grant the relief asked for in the application made by the settlor. That we think is the essence of the matter. It cannot be disputed that if it is held that the learned judge had competence to pronounce on the issue presented for his decision then the fact that he decided that issue illegally or incorrectly is wholly besides the point. See Ittavirq Mathai v. Varkey Varkey [ (1964) 1 SCR 495 ] . Therefore we have now to see whether the learned judge had jurisdiction to decide the issue presented for his determination. The relief prayed for, as seen earlier, was to permit the settlor to revoke particular clauses in the Trust deed and to authorise him to alter the quantum of interest given to each of the beneficiaries by a deed inter vivos. Had the learned judge jurisdiction to entertain those pleas? 13. In Whirlpool Corporation [ (1998) 8 SCC 1 ] , on the question of jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India , when an alternative statutory remedy is available, the Apex Court held thus: “20. Much water has since flown under the bridge, but there has been no corrosive effect on these decisions which, though old, continue to hold the field with the result that law as to the jurisdiction of the High Court in entertaining a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, in spite of the alternative statutory remedies, is not affected, specially in a case where the authority against whom the writ is filed is shown to have had no jurisdiction or had purported to usurp jurisdiction without any legal foundation. 21. That being so, the High Court was not justified in dismissing the writ petition at the initial stage without examining the contention that the show-cause notice issued to the appellant was wholly without jurisdiction and that the Registrar, in the circumstances of the case, was not justified in acting as the “Tribunal”. 14. In Vidhya Devi [(2024) SCC Online SC 3725] , on the issue of delay in filing the writ petition, the Apex Court held thus: “54. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the writ petition filed before the High Court, despite the significant delay, raised substantial questions regarding the legality of the land acquisition proceedings. 14. In Vidhya Devi [(2024) SCC Online SC 3725] , on the issue of delay in filing the writ petition, the Apex Court held thus: “54. Therefore, we are of the considered view that the writ petition filed before the High Court, despite the significant delay, raised substantial questions regarding the legality of the land acquisition proceedings. The alleged patent illegality in the acquisition process justify the condonation of delay in this exceptional case.” 15. In Prabha Jain [(2025) SCC Online SC 121] , the issue before the Apex Court was pertaining to the jurisdiction of the civil court in view of Section 34 of the SARFAESI Act . In the said judgment, the Apex Court held thus: “15. The plaintiff in her suit has prayed for 3 reliefs: (a) The first relief is in relation to a sale deed executed by Sumer Chand Jain in favour of Parmeshwar Das Prajapati. (b) The second relief is in relation to a mortgage deed executed by Pramod Jain in favour of the Bank. (c) The third relief is for being handed over the possession of the suit property. 16. So far as the first and second reliefs are concerned, they are not in relation to any measures taken by the secured creditor under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act . Rather, they are reliefs in relation to the actions taken prior to the secured creditor stepping into the picture and well prior to the secured creditor invoking the provisions of the SARFAESI Act . 17. Therefore, the Tribunal would have no jurisdiction under Section 17 of the SARFAESI Act to grant the declarations sought in the first and the second reliefs. 18. Further, the SARFAESI Act is enacted essentially to provide a speedy mechanism for recovery of debts by banks and financial institutions. The SARFAESI Act has not been enacted for providing a mechanism for adjudicating upon the validity of documents or to determine questions of title finally. The DRT does not have the jurisdiction to grant a declaration with respect to the mortgage deed or the sale deed as sought by the plaintiff. The jurisdiction to declare a sale deed or a mortgage deed being illegal is vested with the civil court under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure . Therefore, the civil court has the jurisdiction to finally adjudicate upon the first two reliefs. 19. The jurisdiction to declare a sale deed or a mortgage deed being illegal is vested with the civil court under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure . Therefore, the civil court has the jurisdiction to finally adjudicate upon the first two reliefs. 19. In the aforesaid context, we may give few illustrations of the kind of disputes that can crop up. These illustrations would indicate that DRT can never have the jurisdiction to decide such civil disputes of title between a third person and a borrower.” 16. In Vigyan Chemical Industries [(2025) SCC Online SC 1609] , the Apex Court on the point of jurisdiction in view of Section 80 of CPC held thus: “25. As seen from the above judgments, a defect in jurisdiction vitiates the decree and renders it unenforceable. The Civil Procedure Code, though considered to be procedural law, encompasses within it, certain provisions that take away or circumscribe the right to sue, which are deemed to be substantive. One such provision is Section 80 CPC which reads as follows: “ Section 80 - Notice. The Civil Procedure Code, though considered to be procedural law, encompasses within it, certain provisions that take away or circumscribe the right to sue, which are deemed to be substantive. One such provision is Section 80 CPC which reads as follows: “ Section 80 - Notice. (1) Save as otherwise provided in sub- section (2), no suits shall be instituted against the Government (including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir) or against a public officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by such public officer in his official capacity, until the expiration of two months next after notice in writing has been delivered to, or left at the office of (a) in the case of a suit against the Central Government, except where it relates to a railway a Secretary to that Government; (b) in the case of a suit against the Central Government where it relates to railway, the General Manager of that railway; (bb) in the case of a suit against the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Chief Secretary to that Government or any other officer authorized by that Government in this behalf; (c) in the case of a suit against any other State Government, a Secretary to that Government or the Collector of the district; and, in the case of a public officer, delivered to him or left at his office, stating the cause of action, the name, description and place of residence of the plaintiff and the relief which he claims; and the plaint shall contain a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left. (2) A suit to obtain an urgent or immediate relief against the Government (including the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir) or any public officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by such public officer in his official capacity, may be instituted, with the leave of the Court, without serving any notice as required by sub-section (I); but the Court shall not grant relief in the suit, whether interim or otherwise, except after giving to the Government or public officer, as the case may be, a reasonable opportunity of showing cause in respect of the relief prayed for in the suit: Provided that the Court shall, if it is satisfied, after hearing the parties, that no urgent or immediate relief need be granted in the suit, return the plaint for presentation to it after complying with the requirements of sub-section (1). (3) No suit instituted against the Government or against a public officer in respect of any act purporting to be done by such public officer in his official capacity shall be dismissed merely by reason of any error or defect in the notice referred to in sub-section (1), if in such notice (a) the name, description and the residence of the plaintiff had been so given as to enable the appropriate authority or the public officer to identify the person serving the notice and such notice had been delivered or left at the office of the appropriate authority specified in sub-section (1), and (b) the cause of action and the relief claimed by the plaintiff had been substantially indicated.” 25.1. A plain reading of the above provision makes it explicit that no suit can be instituted against the State, an instrumentality of the State, or a public officer acting in his official capacity, without issuance of a notice under Section 80 CPC . It is not to be forgotten that when a notice is to be given, it must also be given on the appropriate party. The object of this section is to ensure that public funds and judicial time are not wasted on unwarranted litigation. The requirement of notice provides the Government an opportunity to examine the claim, reconsider its position, and potentially resolve the dispute out of Court, thereby avoiding unnecessary proceedings. The object of this section is to ensure that public funds and judicial time are not wasted on unwarranted litigation. The requirement of notice provides the Government an opportunity to examine the claim, reconsider its position, and potentially resolve the dispute out of Court, thereby avoiding unnecessary proceedings. There is an express bar on a civil court from entertaining a suit against the government or its instrumentalities, without compliance with the said provision. (2) further provides that notice under (1) may be dispensed with, but only with the leave of the court. This Court has consistently held that the requirement of notice under is mandatory and must be strictly complied with. Failure to do so renders the suit liable to be dismissed at the threshold. The absence of such notice is treated as a formal defect, and the Court is duty bound to reject the plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) , if it discloses non-compliance with . 26. In cases such as the one under consideration, the State, which was not originally a party, could be impleaded and the plaint could be amended by inclusion of pleadings, cause of action and relief against the State. In such cases also, the plaintiff, immediately upon becoming aware of the necessity to implead the State, is duty bound to either issue a notice as contemplated under Section 80 (1) CPC or obtain leave under (2) before an application for impleadment is taken out. Failure to do so will bar the civil court from exercising jurisdiction against the State, and the court will have no option but to dismiss the suit. This is so because when a state government or its instrumentality is impleaded in a pending suit, a new or fresh cause of action is introduced. Similarly, if the amendment sought by the plaintiff introduces a new cause of action within the period of limitation and with the court's leave, a fresh notice under (1) must still be issued. This is so because when a state government or its instrumentality is impleaded in a pending suit, a new or fresh cause of action is introduced. Similarly, if the amendment sought by the plaintiff introduces a new cause of action within the period of limitation and with the court's leave, a fresh notice under (1) must still be issued. This Court in Gangappa Gurupadappa Gugwad Gulbarga v. Rachawwa and Ors., [ AIR 1971 SC 442 : MANU/SC/0351/1970] held in the following terms that it is the duty of the court to reject the plaint if a notice under is not issued: “No doubt it would be open to a court not to decide all the issues which may arise on the pleadings before it if it finds that the plaint on the face of it is barred by any law. If for instance the plaintiff's cause of action is against a Government and the plaint does not show that notice under Section 80 of the CPC claiming relief was served in terms of the said section, it would be the duty of the court to reject the plaint recording an order to that effect with reason for the order. In such a case the court should not embark upon a trial of all the issues involved and such rejection would not preclude the plaintiff from presenting a fresh plaint in respect of the same cause of action.” * * * 45. For the sake of clarity and academic interest, we have elaborately analysed the issues involved in all their facets. However, we are of the considered opinion that the suit itself was not maintainable against the appellant and the provisions of the repealed Act, 1993 were inapplicable to the present case. Consequently, the execution proceedings to realize the principal with exorbitant interest calculated under the repealed Act, 1993 are unsustainable, and the decree cannot be enforced against the appellant. The trial Court, having already passed the decree, could not have entertained an application under Section 21 of the Limitation Act, 1963 , and the post-decree application filed by Respondent No. 1 was, therefore, not maintainable. Nearly four decades have elapsed in protracted litigation, and we are inclined to bring the matter to a quietus. Article 142 of the Constitution empowers this Court to pass any order necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it. Nearly four decades have elapsed in protracted litigation, and we are inclined to bring the matter to a quietus. Article 142 of the Constitution empowers this Court to pass any order necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it. Accordingly, we hold that the appellant (OSFC) is not liable to pay any amount to Respondent No. 1 for the alleged default committed by Respondent No. 2, under the decree. In view of the same, the impugned judgment and orders passed by the Courts below are hereby set aside. 46. It is not in dispute that Respondent No. 1 has already received a total sum of Rs. 2,92,57,559/-, comprising Rs. 58,16,905/- from the encashment of bank guarantees and Rs. 2,34,40,654/- from the attachment of fixed deposits furnished by the appellant. Having held that the suit instituted against the appellant was not maintainable and that the resultant decree is unenforceable in law, we are of the considered view that the appellant is entitled to a refund of the entire amount of Rs. 2,92,57,559/-, received by Respondent No. 1. However, taking into account the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the said amount shall be refunded without any interest. Accordingly, Respondent No. 1 is directed to refund the sum of Rs. 2,92,57,559/- to the appellant, without interest, within a period of three months from the date of this judgment. In the event of failure to refund the aforesaid amount within the stipulated period, the appellant shall be at liberty to initiate appropriate proceedings against Respondent No. 1 for recovery of the same along with simple interest at the rate of 6% per annum in accordance with law, after the expiry of the said three-month period.” 17. This Court in Manohari R. [ 2024 (7) KHC 528 ] considering the point whether a writ petition under Article 226 can be dismissed as not maintainable merely because alternative remedies are available, held thus: “5. The writ petition is dismissed as not maintainable. There is a difference between entertainability and maintainability of a writ petition. Even if alternate remedy is available to the Petitioner, that cannot be a ground to hold the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against an administrative authority as "not maintainable". The writ petition is dismissed as not maintainable. There is a difference between entertainability and maintainability of a writ petition. Even if alternate remedy is available to the Petitioner, that cannot be a ground to hold the writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India against an administrative authority as "not maintainable". The powers under Article 226 of the can be exercised even if there exists an alternate remedy, however, it is in restricted circumstances, within well defined parameters. As a matter of settled judicial practice, the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the is not exercised if there is an alternative efficacious remedy available and in such circumstances, the writ court may decline to "entertain" the writ petition. There is, therefore, a difference between maintainability and entertainability of a writ petition. 6. A review of case law on the subject on this distinction was taken by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M/s. Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. v. Excise and Taxation Officer - cum - Assessing Authority and Others (2023 SCC OnLine SC 95), and it was observed as under: "4. Before answering the questions, we feel the urge to say a few words on the exercise of writ powers conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution having come across certain orders passed by the High Courts holding writ petitions as "not maintainable" merely because the alternative remedy provided by the relevant statutes has not been pursued by the parties desirous of invocation of the writ jurisdiction. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 is plenary in nature. Any limitation on the exercise of such power must be traceable in the Constitution itself. Profitable reference in this regard may be made to Article 329 and ordainments of other similarly worded articles in the Constitution. Article 226 does not, in terms, impose any limitation or restraint on the exercise of power to issue writs. While it is true that exercise of writ powers despite availability of a remedy under the very statute which has been invoked and has given rise to the action impugned in the writ petition ought not to be made in a routine manner, yet, the mere fact that the petitioner before the High Court, in a given case, has not pursued the alternative remedy available to him / it cannot mechanically be construed as a ground for its dismissal. It is axiomatic that the High Courts (bearing in mind the facts of each particular case) have a discretion whether to entertain a writ petition or not. One of the self - imposed restrictions on the exercise of power under Article 226 that has evolved through judicial precedents is that the High Courts should normally not entertain a writ petition, where an effective and efficacious alternative remedy is available. At the same time, it must be remembered that mere availability of an alternative remedy of appeal or revision, which the party invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 has not pursued, would not oust the jurisdiction of the High Court and render a writ petition "not maintainable". In a long line of decisions, this Court has made it clear that availability of an alternative remedy does not operate as an absolute bar to the "maintainability" of a writ petition and that the rule, which requires a party to pursue the alternative remedy provided by a statute, is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. Though elementary, it needs to be restated that "entertainability" and "maintainability" of a writ petition are distinct concepts. The fine but real distinction between the two ought not to be lost sight of. The objection as to "maintainability" goes to the root of the matter and if such objections were found to be of substance, the courts would be rendered incapable of even receiving the lis for adjudication. On the other hand, the question of "entertainability" is entirely within the realm of discretion of the High Courts, writ remedy being discretionary. A writ petition despite being maintainable may not be entertained by a High Court for very many reasons or relief could even be refused to the petitioner, despite setting up a sound legal point, if grant of the claimed relief would not further public interest. Hence, dismissal of a writ petition by a High Court on the ground that the petitioner has not availed the alternative remedy without, however, examining whether an exceptional case has been made out for such entertainment would not be proper." (emphasis supplied) The above dicta is clear. Therefore, the petition filed by the Appellant / Petitioner was maintainable. However, whether the writ petition should be entertained is another question altogether.” 18. Therefore, the petition filed by the Appellant / Petitioner was maintainable. However, whether the writ petition should be entertained is another question altogether.” 18. On the very same issue of availability of alternative remedy, the Orissa High Court in Allied Chemical Laboratories [ AIR 2005 Ori 32 ], held thus: “9. Rule 12(6) of the Rules, 1993, reads thus : “The Tribunal may at any time for sufficient reason order that any particular fact or facts may be proved by affidavit, or that the affidavit of any witness may be read at the hearing, on such conditions as the Tribunal thinks reasonable : Provided that where it appears to the Tribunal that either the applicant or the defendant desires the production of a witness for cross-examination, and that such witness can be produced an order shall not be made authorising the evidence of such witness to be given by affidavit.” 19. From the reading of the judgments relied on by the learned Senior Counsel as well as the learned Senior Government Pleader, the principles that can be discernible are that when an equal and efficacious remedy is available before a statutory forum, a writ petition is maintainable, impugning an action or order only when the order impugned is passed in violation of principles of natural justice or scant disregard to the provisions of law or in procedural violation, a writ court can interfere with the same by exercising extraordinary jurisdiction. So also, as far as delay in approaching the court is concerned, in the case of involvement of public money, a lenient view has to be taken. In the instant case as mentioned hereinabove, when the appellant says that against the impugned Ext.P20 judgment of the Tribunal the Government is having equal and efficacious remedy of appeal as provided under Section 30 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 , and also that the writ petition is highly belated, the Government is contending that the original application itself was not maintainable before the Tribunal and the Tribunal passed the impugned Ext.P20 judgment without following the procedure established by law as well as by violating the principles of natural justice. It is also the contention of the Government that delay is immaterial in the instant case, since public money is involved. 20. It is also the contention of the Government that delay is immaterial in the instant case, since public money is involved. 20. While going through the materials placed on record, we find that the aforementioned contentions raised by the parties are matters that require detailed consideration based on the pleadings put in by either side before the Tribunal. But, from Ext.P20 judgment of the Tribunal, we notice that the said judgment was passed by the Tribunal without considering a detailed written statement filed by the Government before the Tribunal. In fact, Ext.P20 was passed without mentioning anything regarding the contentions taken by the Government. 21. During the course of arguments, it was argued by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant that though the Government of Kerala was arrayed as the 3 rd defendant in the original application, when that original application was taken up for consideration by the Tribunal, there was no representation for the Government. Then the learned Senior Government Pleader sought a short adjournment to address further arguments after perusing the files relating to the original application. On the next posting date, by pointing out Ext.P27 proceedings for the period from 11.08.1999 to 24.01.2001 in the original application, the learned Senior Government Pleader submitted that from the proceedings, it can be seen that the Government was represented by a learned Government Pleader in the original application also. 22. As mentioned above, the Government has filed a detailed written statement marked as Ext.P17 in the original application before the Tribunal. In that written statement, all the contentions which the Government had taken in the writ petition were raised against the original application. But without mentioning single word about the filing of the written statement or the contentions taken by the Government, Ext.P20 judgment was passed by the Tribunal. Therefore, Ext.P20 judgment can only be termed as one passed without following the procedure and in violation of the principles of natural justice. In view of the same, we have no hesitation to hold that impugning Ext.P20 Judgment, a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not barred, even though a remedy under Section 30 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 , is provided against Ext.P20 judgment before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal. 23. In view of the same, we have no hesitation to hold that impugning Ext.P20 Judgment, a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not barred, even though a remedy under Section 30 of the Recovery of Debts and Bankruptcy Act, 1993 , is provided against Ext.P20 judgment before the Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal. 23. While coming to the merits of the contentions raised by the appellant in the present writ appeal, as it can be seen from the materials placed on record, admittedly the property in question was not assigned to the 4 th respondent by the Government. Moreover, a portion of the property that was given to the 4 th respondent for establishing an industrial unit by Exts.P4 and P5 agreements was resumed by the Government for non-utilisation of the same, and it was later handed over to the 6 th respondent for establishing an industrial unit. It is also discernible from the records that though appellant says that it has accepted the mortgage of the property based on Exts.P6 to P8 documents issued by the 2 nd respondent, there is no mention in those documents that the property was assigned to the 4 th respondent. It was the duty of the appellant to verify whether the 4 th respondent was having valid title to mortgage the property to the Bank, before accepting it as security for the loan. From Exts.P1 to P6 documents produced in the writ petition, it is prima facie established by the Government that the right to mortgage was given to the 4 th respondent only in respect of the superstructure and not the land in question. As rightly found by the learned Single Judge, these aspects are not properly considered by the Tribunal. In fact, the written statement and the contentions of the Government were not at all looked into while passing the impugned Ext.P20 judgment. Therefore, we find no illegality in the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge, whereby Ext.P20 judgment was set aside and the matter was remanded back to the Tribunal for reconsideration. 24. Having considered the pleadings and materials on record and the submissions made at the Bar as discussed above, we find no ground to interfere with the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge. In the result, this writ appeal stands dismissed.