[2026:RJ-JP:14839] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No. 75/2026 Manoj Kumar S/o Shri Lilaram, Aged About 35 Years, R/o Kherki Veerbhan, Police Station Kotputli, District Kotputli-Behror. At Present Accused Confined In District Jail Kotputli-Behror, Rajasthan. ----Petitioner Versus State Of Rajasthan, Through PP ----Respondent For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Bhrigu Sharma, Ms. Samraddhi Sharma, Mr. Ritik Yadav For Respondent(s) : Mr. Vijay Singh Yadav, P.P. HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE GANESH RAM MEENA Order 09/04/2026 1. The instant bail application has been filed under Section 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 on behalf of accused-petitioner in connection with FIR No. 441/2025 registered at Police Station Kotputali, District Kotputali-Behror for offence under Sections 8, 21, 22, 29 of the N.D.P.S. Act 1985. 2. As per the facts on record, the Constable of CID (Crime), Jaipur, informed that Manoj Kumar Jat (petitioner) is selling illegal narcotic capsules at a grocery shop located in Transport Nagar, Kotputli and there is every possibility that he is in possession of a large quantity of narcotic capsules, and if, he is searched without wasting time, a huge quantity of narcotic capsules can be recovered. On the said information, one Constable [2026:RJ-JP:14839] (2 of 16) [CRLMB-75/2026] was sent with appropriate instructions for report under Section 42 of the NDPS Act. Thereafter, the SHO, along with other Police Personnel and other necessary equipment, reached near grocery shop of the accused-petitioner. A person was found sitting inside the shop; and when the S.H.O. went to him and asked the name and address, he told him that his name is Manoj Kumar; and after introducing to him, the Police party disclosed the information which they had received. The police party then approached the persons in the neighborhood and requested them to act as independent witnesses to the search and proceedings; however, no one agreed and therefore no independent witness could be found and search was made in the presence of the Police personnel, who consented. The Police team also gave a notice under Section 50 of the NDPS Act to the accused-petitioner, informing him about his legal right to get himself and the shop in possession, searched in the presence of Magistrate or Gazetted Officer and the accused-petitioner consented in writing to get himself and the shop, searched by the Police personnel. The shop in possession of the accused-petitioner was searched; and a bag was seen beside the refrigerator, kept in the shop and when it was opened and checked, then many strips of capsules, named as PROXYCO-SPAS, were found in the plastic bag. When these were checked, the capsules were found to contain Tramadol Salt which is a notified drugs under the NDPS Act. When accused-petitioner was asked about the other capsules, he told that there were other capsules in the warehouse located at the backside of the shop. Then the Police team along with accused -petitioner reached the [2026:RJ-JP:14839] (3 of 16) [CRLMB-75/2026] warehouse built in the basement of the backside of the shop where two cardboard cartoons were found containing Narcotic Drug Capsules. In the search a total of 48576 capsules were found in possession of the accused-petitioner, containing Tramadol Salt, and after adhering to the procedure given under the Act, samples were taken and send to the FSL report. The alleged contraband recovered from the possession of the accused-petitioner is much above the commercial quantity, as notified. On an inquiry, the accused-petitioner stated that he is selling these drugs on the instruction of Dr. Avinash, to whom these drugs belong. 3. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that the accused-petitioner is neither the owner nor lawful occupier of the alleged property from where the contraband is stated to have been recovered. He further submits that the alleged premises is a disputed property, accessible to several persons and cannot be said to be exclusive possession of the accused-petitioner. Learned counsel further submits that no notice under Section 47 and 48 of the NDPS Act was served to the petitioner. He further submits that there is a violation of Sections 50 and 42 of the NDPS Act in making search and seizure of the alleged contraband. Learned counsel also submits that neither the petitioner nor his family members were informed about the grounds of his arrest, as is required under the law. The learned counsel for the petitioner, in this regard, has referred the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Apext Court in case of Vihaan Kumar V/s State of Haryana and Anr. reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 269 and in case of Pankaj [2026:RJ-JP:14839] (4 of 16) [CRLMB-75/2026] Bansal V/s Union of India and Ors. reported in (2024) 7 SCC 576. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that accused-petitioner is in custody since 08.09.2025 and Police, after completion of the investigation, has submitted charge-sheet in the matter and trial of the case may take considerable time to conclude, therefore, the accused-petitioner may be released on bail. 4. Learned Public Prosecutor vehemently opposed the bail application and submits that the alleged contraband i.e. capsules containing the Tramadol Salt, which is a Narcotic Drug, is much more than the commercial quantity. The evidence collected during investigation is sufficient for the conviction of the accused- petitioner and it cannot be said that there is even a little bit chance to say that the accused-petitioner is not guilty and therefore, in view of the provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act, the accused-petitioner does not deserves to be released on bail. 5. Considered the submissions made by the counsel for the accused-petitioner as well learned Public Prosecutor. 6. As far as the recovery of contraband, i.e. 48576 capsules containing Tramadol Salt, which is a Narcotic Capsule, is concerned, the quantity of contraband recovered from the premises said to have been in possession of the accuse-petitioner, is much more than the commercial quantity and therefore, the provisions of Section 37 of the NDPS Act are attracted in this case. [2026:RJ-JP:14839] (5 of 16) [CRLMB-75/2026] 7. It is the submissions on behalf of the petitioner that petitioner has no control and possession over the premises from which the alleged contraband is said to have been recovered. 8. The Police team on having information that the accused-petitioner is selling the capsules which contain Narcotic Drugs and on that information Police team made a search of the shop where the petitioner was sitting, and during search of the shop and the warehouse attached to it, the alleged contraband was recovered. The accused-petitioner himself has stated that he is selling the said capsules, containing Narcotic Drug, on the instruction of the Dr. Avinash. 9. During investigation, The police recorded the statements of Ramesh Chand, Khyaliram and Sahiram, wherein it has come out that the premises, including the shop and the warehouse, were given on rent to the present accused-petitioner by Ramesh Chand. 10. In view of the version of the witnesses Ramesh Chand, Khyaliram and Sahiram, at this stage, it cannot be said that the premises, from which the alleged contraband has been recovered, is not in the possession of the accused-petitioner. While making search, the petitioner was found sitting in the shop, which also shows that the petitioner was having the control over the shop. It is the settled principle of law that while considering the bail application of an accused, wherein the commercial quantity of contraband is involved, then the Court is required to record its satisfaction, as required under Section 37 of the NDPS Act. [2026:RJ-JP:14839] (6 of 16) [CRLMB-75/2026] 11. This Court in case of Shakti Gurjar Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. (S.B. Criminal Misc. Bail Application No.13814/2023) decided on 30.07.2024 has observed as under:- "22. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Narcotics Control Bureau Vs. Mohit Agarwal (Criminal Appeal Nos.1001-1002 of 2022) decided on 19.07.2022 after taking into consideration the provisions of section 37 of the Act of 1985 has observed in paras 11, 12, 13 and 14 as under:- “11. It is evident from a plain reading of the non- obstante clause inserted in sub-section (1) and the conditions imposed in sub-section (2) of Section 37 that there are certain restrictions placed on the power of the Court when granting bail to a person accused of having committed an offence under the NDPS Act. Not only are the limitations imposed under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to be kept in mind, the restrictions placed under clause (b) of sub- section (1) of Section 37 are also to be factored in. The conditions imposed in sub- section (1) of Section 37 is that (i) the Public Prosecutor ought to be given an opportunity to oppose the application moved by an accused Criminal Appeal Nos. ………… of 2022 @ Petitions for Special Leave to Appeal (Criminal) No. 6128-6129 OF 2021 person for release and (ii) if such an application is opposed, then the Court must be satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the person accused is not guilty of such an offence. Additionally, the Court must be satisfied that the accused person is unlikely to commit any offence while on bail. 12. The expression “reasonable grounds” has come up for discussion in several rulings of this Court. In “Collector of Customs, New Delhi v. Ahmadalieva Nodira” a decision rendered by a Three Judges Bench of this Court, it has been held thus:- “7. The limitations on granting of bail come in only when the question of granting bail arises on merits. Apart from the grant of opportunity to the Public Prosecutor, the other twin conditions which really have relevance so far as the present accused-respondent is concerned, are: the [2026:RJ-JP:14839] (7 of 16) [CRLMB-75/2026] satisfaction of the court that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. The conditions are cumulative and not alternative. The satisfaction contemplated regarding the accused being not guilty has to be based on reasonable grounds. The expression “reasonable grounds” means something more than prima facie grounds. It contemplates substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The reasonable belief contemplated in the provision requires existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence.” [emphasis added] 13. The expression “reasonable ground” came up for discussion in “State of Kerala and others Vs. Rajesh and others” and this Court has observed as below: “20. The expression “reasonable grounds” means something more than prima facie grounds. It contemplates substantial probable causes for believing that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. The reasonable belief contemplated in the provision requires existence of such facts and circumstances as are sufficient in themselves to justify satisfaction that the accused is not guilty of the alleged offence. In the case on hand, the High Court seems to have completely overlooked the underlying object of Section 37 that in addition to the limitations provided under the CrPC, or any other law for the time being in force, regulating the grant of bail, its liberal approach in the matter of bail under the NDPS Act is indeed uncalled for.” [emphasis added] 14. To sum up, the expression “reasonable grounds” used in clause (b) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 37 would mean credible, plausible and grounds for the Court to believe that the accused person is not guilty of the alleged offence. For arriving at any such conclusion, such facts and circumstances must exist in a case that can persuade the Court to believe that the accused person would not have committed such an offence. Dove-tailed with the aforesaid satisfaction is [2026:RJ-JP:14839] (8 of 16) [CRLMB-75/2026] an additional consideration that the accused person is unlikely to commit any offence while on bail.” 23. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Mohd. Muslim @ Hussain Vs. State (NCT of Delhi), reported in (1980) 1 SCC 81 has observed as under:- “18. The conditions which courts have to be cognizant of are that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is “not guilty of such offence” and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. What is meant by “not guilty” when all the evidence is not before the court? It can only be a 18 As per the counter-affidavit dated 21.02.2023 filed by the respondent-state before this court. prima facie determination. That places the court’s discretion within a very narrow margin. Given the mandate of the general law on bails (Sections 436, 437 and 439, CrPC) which classify offences based on their gravity, and instruct that certain serious crimes have to be dealt with differently while considering bail applications, the additional condition that the court should be satisfied that the accused (who is in law presumed to be innocent) is not guilty, has to be interpreted reasonably. Further the classification of offences under Special Acts (NDPS Act, etc.), which apply over and above the ordinary bail conditions required to be assessed by courts, require that the court records its satisfaction that the accused might not be guilty of the offence and that upon release, they are not likely to commit any offence. These two conditions have the effect of overshadowing other conditions. In cases where bail is sought, the court assesses the material on record such as the nature of the offence, likelihood of the accused co-operating with the investigation, not fleeing from justice: even in serious offences like murder, kidnapping, rape, etc. On the other hand, the court in these cases under such special Acts, have to address itself principally on two facts: likely guilt of the accused and the likelihood of them not committing any offence upon release. This court has generally upheld such conditions on the ground that liberty of such citizens have to - in cases when accused of offences enacted under special laws – be balanced against the public interest. “ [2026:RJ-JP:14839] (9 of 16) [CRLMB-75/2026] 24. The recent view of the Hon’ble Apex Court and other Courts after having due consideration to the provisions of section 37 of the Act of 1985 is that while granting bail to a person accused of an offence punishable for the offence involving commercial quantity, the Court should record its satisfaction that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. 25. The counsel appearing for the accused petitioner has referred the judgment of Ranjitsingh Brahmajeetsing Sharma (supra) relating to a case for offence under the provisions of Maharashtra Control of Organised Crime Act, 1999, wherein there is a similar section like section 37 of the Act of 1985. In that case, the Hon’ble Apex Court granted bail. 26. The Hon’ble Apex Court in the case Mohammed Anis Vs. Union of India & Ors., reported in 1994 Supp(1) SCC 145 has observed as under:- “Apex Court has been conferred extraordinary powers by Article 142(1) of the Constitution so that it can do complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it. The question regarding the width and amplitude of this Court's power under Article 142(1) came up for consideration before this Court in Delhi Judicial Service Assn., Delhi v. State of Gujarat and again before the Constitution Bench in Union Carbide Corpn. v. Union of India. In the first case this Court observed that the power conferred by Article 142 (1) coupled with the plenary powers under Articles 32 and 136 empowers the Court to pass such orders as it deems necessary to do complete justice to the cause or matter brought before it. This power to do complete justice is entirely of different level and of a different quality which cannot be limited or restricted by provisions contained in statutory law. No enactment made by the Central or State Legislature can limit or restrict the Court's powers under Article 142(1) though while exercising it the Court may have regard to statutory provisions (See paragraphs 50 and 51 of the judgment). In the second case this Court clarified that the expression “cause or matter” must be construed in a wide sense to effectuate the purpose of conferment of power. This power has been conferred on the Apex Court only and the exercise of that power is not dependent or conditioned by any statutory provision. The [2026:RJ-JP:14839] (10 of 16) [CRLMB-75/2026] constitutional plenitude of the powers of the Apex Court is to ensure due and proper administration of justice and is intended to be co-extensive in each case with the needs of justice of a given case and to meeting any exigency. Very wide powers have been conferred on this Court for due and proper administration of justice and whenever the Court sees that the demand of justice warrants exercise of such powers, it will reach out to ensure that justice is done by resorting to this extraordinary power conferred to meet precisely such a situation. True it is, that the power must be exercised sparingly for furthering the ends of justice but it cannot be said that its exercise is conditioned by any statutory provision. Any such view would defeat the very purpose and object of conferment of this extraordinary power. In the Union Carbide case this Court observed as under: (SCC p.634, para 83) “It is necessary to set at rest certain misconceptions in the arguments touching the scope of the powers of this Court under Article 142(1) of the Constitution.... The proposition that a provision in any ordinary law irrespective of the importance of the public policy on which it is founded, operates to limit the powers of the Apex Court under Article 142(1) is unsound and erroneous.” Proceeding further, the Court observed: (SCC p.635, para 83) “The power under Article 142 is at an entirely different level and of a different quality. Prohibitions or limitations on provisions contained in ordinary laws cannot, ipso facto, act as prohibitions or limitations on the constitutional powers under Article 142.” That is so for the obvious reason that statutory provisions cannot override constitutional provisions and Article 142(1) being a constitutional power cannot be limited or conditioned by any statutory provision.” 27. This Court has to go by the provisions of statutory law because any order of the Court without considering the provisions of the law in force or contrary to the same is said to be per-incurrium and this Court would like to restrain itself from passing such order. 28. In the present case there is recovery of contraband weighing more than the commercial quantity as notified and also there are five other criminal cases pending [2026:RJ-JP:14839] (11 of 16) [CRLMB-75/2026] against the petitioner. There are no reasons for satisfaction of this Court so as to believe that the accused petitioner is not guilty of offences under the provisions of the Act of 1985 and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail as he is already facing five other criminal cases. 29. Drug abuse has taken its toll in almost all the districts of Rajasthan. The addicts primarily belong to youth age. The high rate of drug consumption is leading to issues like illegal trade, drug trafficking, and smuggling. The problem of drug addiction has a significant bearing on drug trafficking which has become a significant challenge for governments and social reformers. The NCB reports that the main internal factor for drug trafficking in India is the illicit cultivation of opium, poppy and cannabis. Also, the diversion from licit opium sources to illegal opium production is a major concern. In the trends of 2020, Rajasthan is among the 3 major states, along with Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, from where the opium is trafficked to other parts of the country." 12. In view of the evidence collected during investigation and the search and seizure of the alleged contraband, which is much above the commercial quantity, it cannot be said that the accused-petitioner is not guilty. 13. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that there is contravention of the provisions of Section 47, 48 and 50 of the NDPS Act in making search and seizure. Whether merely there is contravention or not, this can be taken care of and adjudicated upon after recording the evidence of the relevant witnesses. The Co-ordinate Bench of Principal Seat at Jodhpur in case of Vijay Meena vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. (S.B. Criminal Writ Petition No.770/2026) decided on 10.04.2026 in para Nos.4 to 6 has dealt with such alleged discrepancies and legality of search and seizure. “4. Upon a considered evaluation of the submissions advanced and the material placed on record, this Court [2026:RJ-JP:14839] (12 of 16) [CRLMB-75/2026] is of the view that the substratum of the petitioner’s challenge essentially rests upon disputation of the prosecution narrative, particularly with regard to the authenticity and credibility of the seizure and arrest memos, as well as the alleged sequence of events culminating in his implication. 4.1 It is trite that the criminal justice process unfolds in a well-defined procedural continuum, commencing from investigation, followed by submission of the police report under Section 173 Cr.P.C., taking of cognizance by the competent court, framing of charges, recording of prosecution evidence, and thereafter affording the accused an opportunity to enter upon defence. The stage of adjudication of rival factual claims and appreciation of evidence is thus statutorily reserved for trial. 4.2 The petitioner, in essence, seeks pre-trial adjudication of disputed questions of fact by inviting this Court to test the veracity of the prosecution case, particularly on the premise that the recovery is fabricated and that he was unlawfully detained prior to the alleged seizure. Such contentions, being intrinsically evidentiary in nature, necessarily require a full-fledged trial wherein the prosecution evidence is subjected to cross-examination and the defence is afforded an opportunity to substantiate its version. 4.3 The contention of the petitioner regarding discrepancies in the timing and preparation of memos, as well as the plea of false implication, constitute matters squarely falling within the domain of trial appreciation. These aspects pertain to the credibility, trustworthiness, and evidentiary value of the documents prepared during investigation, which cannot be conclusively adjudicated in writ jurisdiction without a detailed evidentiary inquiry. 4.4 It is further observed that, as per the prosecution case, a substantial quantity of contraband (ganja) has been recovered, and there is no categorical material on record at this stage to conclusively establish that the recovery was pre-planned, foisted, or fabricated. The alleged inconsistencies highlighted by the petitioner, at best, raise triable issues requiring adjudication by the trial court upon appreciation of evidence. 4.5 This Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that entering into an evaluative exercise regarding the correctness of the recovery memo, arrest memo, or the [2026:RJ-JP:14839] (13 of 16) [CRLMB-75/2026] sequence of events, at this interlocutory stage, would amount to pre-empting the trial and rendering findings on disputed factual issues an exercise which is neither permissible nor desirable in writ jurisdiction. In my considered view, such an approach would mean conducting a mini trial before the actual trial. 4.6 Judicial propriety further mandates that where the trial is already underway, higher courts ought to refrain from recording definitive findings on factual controversies which are sub judice before the trial court. Any such interference would not only disrupt the procedural sanctity of trial but may also prejudice either of the parties. 5. The legal position governing the stage-wise consideration of defence material stands authoritatively settled by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Rajasthan v. Swarn Singh @ Baba, CRLA No.856/2024 arising of SLP (Criminal) No.346/2021 decided on 12.02.2024 wherein it has been unequivocally held that the right of the accused to rely upon material in support of his defence does not ordinarily arise at the pre-trial or charge stage, and such entitlement crystallizes only during the stage of defence evidence. The Court, relying upon the dictum in State of Orissa v. Debendra Nath Padhi, (2025) 1 SCC 568 emphasized that the necessity or desirability of documents must be assessed with reference to the stage of proceedings, and that permitting the accused to invoke defence material prematurely would be contrary to the statutory scheme of criminal trial. 5.1 Applying the aforesaid principle to the present case, the petitioner’s attempt to impeach the prosecution case on the basis of alleged discrepancies and defence material at this stage is clearly premature and legally untenable. The petitioner is, however, at liberty to raise all such contentions before the trial court at the appropriate stage, in accordance with law. 6. Accordingly, while leaving all the issues raised by the petitioner particularly concerning the legality of recovery, authenticity of memos, and alleged false implication; open to be agitated at the appropriate stage during trial, this Court refrains from expressing any opinion on the merits thereof. The petitioner shall be at liberty to produce all relevant material before the trial Court for the purpose of its scrutiny at appropriate [2026:RJ-JP:14839] (14 of 16) [CRLMB-75/2026] stage, in accordance with law, and the trial court is expected to adjudicate the same uninfluenced by any observations made herein.” 14. Learned counsel for the petitioner also agitated the issue that since the ground of arrest of the accused-petitioner was neither disclosed to the petitioner nor his family members. The Hon'ble Apex Court in cases of Vihaan Kumar (Supra) and Pankaj Bansal (Supra), has observed that the detention of the petitioner is illegal and he deserves to be released. 15. In the present case, as per the facts on record, the petitioner was found sitting in a shop, and during the search of the said shop as well as the warehouse attached to it, which is stated to be in his possession, a huge quantity of alleged contraband, i.e. 48576 capsules containing Tramadol salt (a narcotic drug), was recovered. 16 It was well within the knowledge of the present accused-petitioner, as regards the search and seizure, meaning thereby, the accused-petitioner is well aware about the seizure of the alleged contraband which is more than the commercial quantity and he knows that he is being arrested for founding himself in the possession of the said contraband. The search and seizure memo have also been prepared in his presence. The petitioner was also served notice under Section 50 of the NDPS Act, and the notice given under Section 50 of the NDPS Act, the petitioner has given a written consent of the search of the shop. On notice under Section 52 of the NDPS Act also, the petitioner in his own handwriting has stated that he has been made known about the grounds of arrest and has also stated that information [2026:RJ-JP:14839] (15 of 16) [CRLMB-75/2026] of his arrest be also given to his brother, Hawa Singh, on Mobile No. 8001493493. 17. Aforesaid facts prima facie speak that the petitioner has already been informed about the grounds of his arrest. 18. Learned counsel for the petitioner referred the judgments passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Vihaan Kumar (Supra) and Pankaj Bansal (Supra) referring paras 8, 9, 10, 11, 16, 17. The said judgments pertain to the case registered under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 (for short, 'PMLA Act'). Normally in case of PMLA Act, an accused may not be known to the complete facts and background of that matter and, therefore, in such like matters, a person, who is to be arrested, has to be informed about the grounds of arrest emerging from the details of the case. But in the present case, the search and seizure were made in the presence of the accused-petitioner after he was made well aware of all the facts and further he himself gave a written consent that he has been informed about the grounds of his arrest. 19. The observation made in cases of Vihaan Kumar (Supra) and Pankaj Bansal (Supra) have no bearing on this case. 20. Learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that co-accused Avinash and Ritik Chauhan have already enlarged on bail. 21. As far as the co-accused, Avinash is concerned, some capsules were recovered from his possession and the Court while granting the bail to him, has observed that he is a registered [2026:RJ-JP:14839] (16 of 16) [CRLMB-75/2026] medical practitioner and can retain certain number of medicines containing the Tramadol Salt, in view of the order dated 08.05.2024 of the Food Safety and Drug Controller. Another Co- ordinate Bench of this Court while granting the bail to co-accused Ritik Chauhan has observed that he has been implicated as an accused on the basis of the information of the present accused- petitioner, Manoj Kumar, and nothing is said to have been recovered from his possession. 22. Taking into consideration the over all facts and circumstances of the present case, the accused-petitioner cannot be said to be in any manner at par with the case of the other co- accused for the reason that a huge quantity of contraband has been recovered from the premises in possession of the present petitioner while he was sitting in that premises. 23. In view of the discussion made above and taking into consideration the fact that the huge quantity of alleged contraband has been recovered from the possession of the accused-petitioner, this Court is not inclined to enlarge the accused-petitioner on bail. 24. Accordingly, the present bail application filed by the petitioner is dismissed. (GANESH RAM MEENA),J SHRUTI SHARMA /28