ORDER : 1. One of the reliefs sought for in W.P.(C)No.15817 of 2025 is a declaration that the amendment made to Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969 , by the Kerala Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Rules, 2025, by adding Rule 43C , is unconstitutional and against the scheme under which election to the managing committee of a co-operative society is held, and it is arbitrary and bad in law. In the order dated 06.10.2025, the learned Single Judge observed that the challenge made to Rule 43C of the, as amended by the Kerala Co- operative Societies (Amendment) Rules, 2025, involves a question of law which is of public importance, for being heard and determined by a Bench of two Judges, in view of the law laid down by a Larger Bench of this Court in Babu Premarajan v. Superintendent of Police, 2000 (3) KLT 177 . Therefore, by the order dated 06.10.2025, the learned Single Judge adjourned the writ petition for being heard and determined by a Bench of two Judges and directed the Registry to place the matter before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for appropriate orders. When the matter was placed before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice, on the administrative side, it was ordered to be posted before the Division Bench headed by one among us [Anil K. Narendran, J.], by the order dated 28.10.2025. 2. When the matter was placed before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice, on the administrative side, it was ordered to be posted before the Division Bench headed by one among us [Anil K. Narendran, J.], by the order dated 28.10.2025. 2. The petitioner, who is the elected President of the managing committee of the Kerala State Co-operative Agricultural and Rural Development Bank Ltd. (for brevity, ‘the Society’), which is an ‘apex society’ as defined in clause (a) of Section 2 of the Kerala Co-Operative Societies Act, 1969 (for brevity, ‘the KCS Act’), has filed W.P.(C)No.15817 of 2025, invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India , seeking a writ of certiorari to quash Exts.P6 order dated 09.04.2025 of the 2 nd respondent Registrar of Co- operative Societies, whereby the 3 rd respondent Additional Registrar (Credit) in the office of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies is authorised to convene a general body for the consideration of a no-confidence motion dated 04.04.2025 moved by 29 members of the Society; Ext.P7 notice dated 08.04.2025 issued by the 3 rd respondent regarding the general body scheduled to be held on 24.04.2025; and Ext.P8 communication dated 09.04.2025 issued by the 3 rd respondent, addressed to the Managing Director of the Society, to publish/affix Ext.P6 order and Ext.P7 notice in the notice board of the Society and issue copy of the same to the members of the Society by registered post with acknowledgement due; a writ declaring that the delegate of a member society cannot be equated to the status of a member for moving a no-confidence motion, as provided in Ext.P5 notification dated 02.04.2025, i.e., the Kerala Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Rules, 2025, whereby Rule 43C was added after Rule 43B of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969 (for brevity, ‘the KCS Rules’); a writ declaring that the amendment made to the KCS Rules, as per Ext.P5 notification dated 02.04.2025, is unconstitutional and against the scheme under which election to the managing committee of a society is held and it is arbitrary and bad in law. 3. On 11.04.2025, when the writ petition came up for admission, the learned Single Judge admitted the matter on file. The learned Government Pleader took notice for respondents 1 and 2 and also for the 3 rd respondent. Notice by special messenger was ordered to respondents 4 and 5, returnable by 16.04.2025. 4. 3. On 11.04.2025, when the writ petition came up for admission, the learned Single Judge admitted the matter on file. The learned Government Pleader took notice for respondents 1 and 2 and also for the 3 rd respondent. Notice by special messenger was ordered to respondents 4 and 5, returnable by 16.04.2025. 4. On 16.04.2025, when the writ petition came up for consideration, the petitioner was directed to produce the original of Ext.P7 notice, if available. On 22.04.2025, the learned Single Judge passed an interim order to the effect that any further proceedings pursuant to the no-confidence motion scheduled on 24.04.2025 will be after obtaining further orders from this Court. It was also ordered that the entire procedure of no-confidence motion should be videographed and the expenses for videography shall be borne by the petitioner. 5. Along with the writ petition, the petitioner has placed on record Exts.P1 to P8 documents. On 14.04.2025, the petitioner filed I.A.No.1 of 2025 to accept Ext.P9 as additional document. On 21.04.2025, respondents 4 and 5, who are the members of the general body of the Society, who have been elected as delegates from Kilimanoor Primary Agricultural and Rural Development Bank and Karunagappilly Primary Agricultural and Rural Development Bank respectively, filed a counter affidavit, opposing the reliefs sought for in the writ petition, producing therewith Exts.R4(a) to R4(c) documents. On 21.04.2025, the petitioner filed I.A.No.4 of 2025 to accept Ext.P10 as additional document. 6. On 02.05.2025, respondents 4 and 5 filed I.A.No.6 of 2025 seeking an order to modify the interim order dated 22.04.2025, in the light of passing of the no-confidence motion in the general body of the Society held on 24.04.2025, and to direct the 1 st respondent State to appoint an administrative committee in the Society, invoking the powers under sub-section (1) of Section 33 of the KCS Act, so as to avoid stalemate in the administration of the Society. On 02.05.2025, respondents 4 and 5 have also filed an additional counter affidavit dated 01.05.2025. 7. On 05.05.2025, the petitioner filed I.A.No.7 of 2025 seeking an order to amend the writ petition, in order to incorporate additional statement of facts and reliefs, along with I.A.No.8 of 2025 to accept Exts.P11 to P15 as additional documents. On 02.05.2025, respondents 4 and 5 have also filed an additional counter affidavit dated 01.05.2025. 7. On 05.05.2025, the petitioner filed I.A.No.7 of 2025 seeking an order to amend the writ petition, in order to incorporate additional statement of facts and reliefs, along with I.A.No.8 of 2025 to accept Exts.P11 to P15 as additional documents. The additional reliefs sought for, by way of amendment, read thus: “(iii)(a) Issue a writ declaring that the permission granted to the delegate from Kattakkada Primary Co-operative Agricultural and Rural Development Bank and the delegate from Vadakara Primary Co-operative Agricultural and Rural Development Bank is without the sanction of law and therefore, the said votes are required to be excluded; (iii)(b) Issue a writ declaring that allowing the nominated members of the Board of Directors to cast vote in the no- confidence motion is contrary to the specific prohibition contained in sub-sections (2A) and (3) of Section 31 of the KCS Act and their votes are required to be excluded; (iii)(c) Issue a writ declaring that the vote casted by the three elected members in the Board of Directors who are part of the corporate body, in favour of the no-confidence motion, cannot be counted as they are disabled from casting the vote in favour of the no-confidence motion as long as they continue as part of the corporate body.” 8. The additional interim relief sought for, by way of amendment, reads thus: “(ii) Pass an order restraining the respondents from transferring any amounts that are kept as investment by the Kerala State Co-operative Agricultural and Rural Development Bank Ltd. in different branches for Government use, pending disposal of the writ petition.” 9. On 05.05.2025, the 3 rd respondent Additional Registrar (Credit) filed a statement, wherein it is stated that in the general body of the Society held on 24.04.2025 the no-confidence motion was discussed. The voting on the no-confidence motion began at 1.00 p.m. All the delegates who attended the general body participated in the voting by casting their votes. The sealed ballot box was opened and counted. 40 delegates voted in favour of the no-confidence motion and 37 voted against the motion. The voting on the no-confidence motion began at 1.00 p.m. All the delegates who attended the general body participated in the voting by casting their votes. The sealed ballot box was opened and counted. 40 delegates voted in favour of the no-confidence motion and 37 voted against the motion. In the statement filed by the 3 rd respondent, it is stated that the managing committee of the Society lost the confidence and ceased to hold office and deemed to be vacant in terms of sub-rule (12) of Rule 43C of the KCS Rules, and thereby an administrative stalemate occurred in the administration of the Society. If the stalemate prevails in the administration of the Society, the 2 nd respondent Registrar of Co-operative Societies has to invoke the provisions under sub-section (1) of Section 33 of the KCS Act. 10. On 21.05.2025, the learned Single Judge allowed I.A.No.7 of 2025 and the petitioner filed the amended writ petition on 23.05.2025. By the order dated 03.06.2025, the learned Single Judge modified the interim order dated 22.04.2025. It was ordered that, having adopted the no-confidence motion on 24.04.2025, the consequences under Section 33 of the KCS Act may follow. In the said order, it was made clear that the result of the no-confidence motion and further proceedings pursuant to it shall be subject to the final orders in the writ petition. Thereafter, in the order of reference dated 06.10.2025, the learned Single Judge observed that the challenge made to Rule 43C of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969 , as amended by the Kerala Co- operative Societies (Amendment) Rules, 2025, involves a question of law which is of public importance, for being heard and determined by a Bench of two Judges. Accordingly, by the order dated 28.10.2025 of the Hon’ble the Chief Justice, on the administrative side, the writ petition was ordered to be posted before the Division Bench. Based on that order, this ICR[WP(C)] is listed before this Division Bench. 11. On 29.01.2026 and 02.02.2026, we heard detailed arguments of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Advocate General for respondents 1 to 3. On behalf of the petitioner, a written submission dated 02.02.2026 was also filed. 12. Based on that order, this ICR[WP(C)] is listed before this Division Bench. 11. On 29.01.2026 and 02.02.2026, we heard detailed arguments of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Advocate General for respondents 1 to 3. On behalf of the petitioner, a written submission dated 02.02.2026 was also filed. 12. The argument advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner is that Rule 43C of the KCS Rules, added by the Kerala Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Rules, 2025, which provides for motion of no-confidence for removal of managing committee by the general body, in accordance with the procedure laid down therein, does not provide for any safeguard in the arbitrariness of the decision or the declaration that may be made by the person, who is given unguided and unbridled powers in unseating an elected managing committee from office. A managing committee elected to office, following the procedure contemplated under Rule 35A of the KCS Rules, can be removed from office only by following the same democratic procedure, and not by resorting to a shortcut method of moving a no-confidence motion, which is arbitrary and myopic on the face of the procedure. As per Rule 35A of the KCS Rules, the election of the members of the managing committee of a society is conducted by the State Co-operative Election Commission, in the manner detailed therein. The said Rule does not provide for a no- confidence motion against the entire managing committee. Rule 43C of the KCS Rules, added by the Amendment Rules of 2025, has a far-reaching consequence of ousting a democratically elected managing committee from office. A procedure not contemplated under the provisions of the KCS Act cannot be brought into effect by way of a subordinate legislation, i.e., the KCS Rules, for ousting a democratically elected managing committee from office. Therefore, Rule 43C of the KCS Rules is liable to be struck down and declared as unconstitutional, being arbitrary and contrary to democratic principles. 13. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the directions contained in paragraph 52.2. Therefore, Rule 43C of the KCS Rules is liable to be struck down and declared as unconstitutional, being arbitrary and contrary to democratic principles. 13. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the directions contained in paragraph 52.2. of the decision of the Apex Court in Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary v. Gujarat Co-operative Milk Marketing Federation Ltd. (2015) 8 SCC 1 that, in the case of co-operative societies registered under any Central or State law, a motion of no- confidence against an office- bearer shall be moved only after two years of his assumption of office, and that, in case of no- confidence motion once defeated, a fresh motion shall not be introduced within another one year. After referring to the provisions under Section 34A of the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1964, Rule 24A of the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Rules, 1964; Rule 62 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Rules, 1988, made under the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983; Section 74E of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961; Section 73-ID of the Maharashtra Co- operative Societies Act, 1960, Rule 57A of the Maharashtra Co- operative Societies Rules, 1961; and Section 29H of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner pointed out that the provisions under the said Acts/Rules provide for moving a motion of no-confidence against the elected members of the managing committee of a co-operative society and not against the elected managing committee en masse. 14. On the other hand, the learned Advocate General contended that the subject matter under challenge in the writ petition has already been considered by a Division Bench of this Court in Sivadasan Nair K. and another v. State of Kerala and others – judgment dated 14.03.2022 in W.A. No. 159 of 2022 - arising out of the judgment dated 27.01.2022 of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.5 of 2022 - Sivadasan Nair K. and another v. State of Kerala and others, 2022 (2) KHC 58 . The petitioner herein [Shaji Mohan], along with another member of the board of directors of the Kerala State Co-operative Agricultural and Rural Development Bank Ltd. (the Society), filed W.P.(C)No.5 of 2022 challenging the order dated 13.12.2021 of the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, invoking the provisions under sub-section (3) of Section 30 of the KCS Act, nominating an officer under him to call for a special general body of the Society to consider the no-confidence motion and the notice issued by the Managing Director of the Society, based on the decision taken by the Authorised Officer, to convene the special general body on 06.01.2022. Another relief sought for in that writ petition was a declaration that the amendment made to sub-section (1) of Section 33 of the KCS Act, in terms of Act 33 of 1971, to the extent it enables appointment of a new committee or administrator on a no-confidence motion being passed by the general body against the existing managing committee, stands repealed by the application of the doctrine of desuetude. The petitioners have also sought for and a declaration that a no-confidence motion cannot be moved against an elected managing committee of a society. In terms of the interim order dated 05.01.2022 in W.P.(C)No.5 of 2022, the learned Single Judge permitted consideration of the no- confidence motion on 06.01.2022, as proposed, but directed that the motion, if passed, shall not be given effect to without orders from this Court. In the judgment dated 27.01.2022 - Sivadasan Nair K. [ 2022 (2) KHC 58 ] , the learned Single Judge held that sub-section (1) of of the KCS Act empowers the general body of a society to pass a no-confidence motion against the managing committee. The petitioners in W.P.(C)No.5 of 2022, who had taken shelter under the doctrine of desuetude, failed to prove and establish that, though occasions arose, the rule was not applied and that a contrary procedure was adopted. In S. Lakshmanan v. Velliankeri and others, AIR 2002 Ker 325 a Full Bench of this Court noticed the provision in of the KCS Act empowering the general body of a society to move a motion of no-confidence against the managing committee. 15. In S. Lakshmanan v. Velliankeri and others, AIR 2002 Ker 325 a Full Bench of this Court noticed the provision in of the KCS Act empowering the general body of a society to move a motion of no-confidence against the managing committee. 15. The learned Advocate General contended that, in view of the law laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in Pankajaksy and others v. Geroge Mathew and others,  1987 (2) KLT 723 , the rule made under a statute by an authority delegated for the purpose can be challenged only on the ground that it is ultra vires of the Act; or it is opposed to fundamental rights; or it is opposed to other plenary laws. Bearing in mind the principles laid down by the Division Bench in the said decision, the conclusion is irresistible that the petitioner has not made out a valid challenge against Rule 43C of the KCS Rules. 16. The Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 (the KCS Act), was enacted by the State legislature to consolidate, amend and unify the laws relating to co-operative societies in the State of Kerala. Chapter IV of the KCS Act deals with management of co-operative societies. As per sub-section (1) of Section 27 of the said Act, subject to the provisions of the Act, the Rules and the Bye-laws, the final authority of a society shall vest in the general body of the members. As per sub-section (1) of Section 28 , the general body of a society shall constitute a committee, for a period of five years, in accordance with the bye-laws and entrust the management of the affairs of the society to such committee. 17. Section 33 of the KCS Act deals with appointment of new committee or administrator on failure to constitute committee, etc. 17. Section 33 of the KCS Act deals with appointment of new committee or administrator on failure to constitute committee, etc. As per sub-section (1) of, as it stood prior to its amendment by the Kerala Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Act, 1971, where the term of office of a committee has expired and a new committee has not been constituted, or where the Registrar is satisfied (a) that a new committee cannot be constituted before the expiry of the term of office of the existing committee; or (b) that a new committee is prevented from entering upon office, or a new committee fails to enter upon office, on the date on which the term of office of the existing committee expires, the Registrar may, either suo motu or on the application of any member of the society, after consulting the circle co- operative union, appoint (i) a new committee consisting of not more than three members of the society; or (ii) one or more Administrator or Administrators who need not be a member or members of the society, to manage the affairs of the society till a new committee enters upon office. As per the first proviso to sub- section (1) of, before making such an order, the Registrar shall publish a notice on the notice board of the head office of the society inviting objections to the making of the order, within a period specified in the notice, and consider such objections. As per the second proviso to sub-section (1) of, it shall not be necessary to publish such notice in cases where the Registrar is satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable to do so. 18. By the Kerala Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Act, 1971, published in Kerala Gazette Extraordinary No.558 dated 23.12.1971, amendments were made to sub-section (1) of Section 33 of the KCS Act. 18. By the Kerala Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Act, 1971, published in Kerala Gazette Extraordinary No.558 dated 23.12.1971, amendments were made to sub-section (1) of Section 33 of the KCS Act. As per sub-section (1) of, after its amendment by the Amendment Act of 1971, where the term of office of a committee has expired and a new committee has not been constituted, or where a no-confidence motion is passed by the general body against the existing committee or where the existing committee resigns en bloc or where vacancies occur in the committee either by resignation or otherwise and the number of remaining members cannot constitute the quorum for the meeting of the committee, or where the committee fails to hold its regular meeting consecutively for six months or where the Registrar is satisfied that (a) that a new committee cannot be constituted before the expiry of the term of office of the existing committee; or (b) that a new committee is prevented from entering upon office, or a new committee fails to enter upon office, on the date on which the term of office of the existing committee expires, the Registrar may, either suo motu or on the application of any member of the society, after intimating the circle co- operative union, appoint (i) a new committee consisting of not more than three members of the society; or (ii) one or more Administrator or Administrators who need not be a member or members of the society, to manage the affairs of the society till a new committee enters upon office. By the Amendment Act of 1971, after the second proviso, an ‘explanation’ was inserted. As per the ‘explanation’ for the purpose of sub-section (1) of, a tender of resignation by a member of the committee shall have the effect of terminating his membership from the committee. After the said amendment, third proviso to sub-section (1) of was inserted by the Kerala Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Act, 1992; clause (b) of sub-section (1) of was substituted by the Kerala Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Act, 2010; and clause (aa) was inserted in sub- section (1) of by the Kerala Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Act, 2013. 19. After the said amendment, third proviso to sub-section (1) of was inserted by the Kerala Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Act, 1992; clause (b) of sub-section (1) of was substituted by the Kerala Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Act, 2010; and clause (aa) was inserted in sub- section (1) of by the Kerala Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Act, 2013. 19. In S. Lakshmanan [ AIR 2002 Ker 325 ] - judgment dated 09.04.2002 in W.A.Nos.2513 of 1999 and 376 of 2000 - the question referred to a Full Bench of this Court for its decision was as to whether the absence of a specific provision in the KCS Act and the Rules made thereunder will stand in the way of any motion for loss of confidence relating to President of a co-operative society. In the said decision, the Full Bench answered the reference as follows: “In the absence of a specific provision in the KCS Act, the Rules framed thereunder and the bye-laws of a co-operative society, the managing committee has no right to move or consider a motion for loss of confidence in the President, the Vice-President or the Treasurer or any other office bearer of the managing committee elected in accordance with Rule 43 of the KCS Rules.” 20. In paragraph 16 of the decision in S. Lakshmanan [ AIR 2002 Ker 325 ], the Full Bench noticed that the only contingency under which the committee may be removed before the end of its tenure is indicated in sub-section (1) of Section 33 of the KCS Act, which envisages the passing of a no-confidence motion by the general body which results in the wholesale removal of the committee. Barring this provision, there is no other provision by which an elected individual member of the committee can be removed. Paragraph 16 of the said decision reads thus; ‘16. The Committee is elected by following the procedure prescribed under the Act and the Rules and is guaranteed a tenure as prescribed in the bye-laws, by virtue of Rule 39(1). It can only be removed by the procedure prescribed in the Act or the Rules or the Bye-laws. The only contingency under which the Committee may be removed before the end of its tenure is indicated in Section 33 (1) of the Act. It can only be removed by the procedure prescribed in the Act or the Rules or the Bye-laws. The only contingency under which the Committee may be removed before the end of its tenure is indicated in Section 33 (1) of the Act. (1) of the Act envisages the passing of a no-confidence motion by the General Body, which results in the wholesale removal of the committee. Barring this provision, there is no other provision by which an elected individual member of the committee can be removed. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of the appellants that such a drastic power can be read into the Act, even where there are no provisions. The doctrine of ‘casus omissus’ is squarely applicable to the situation. In page 33 of Maxwell’s Interpretation of Statutes, 12 th Edition it is stated as under:- “It is a corollary to the general rule of literal construction that nothing is to be added to or taken from a statute unless there are adequate grounds to justify the inference that the Legislature intended something which it omitted to express. Lord Mersey said: It is a strong thing to read into an Act of Parliament words which are not there, and in the absence of clear necessity it is a wrong to do”......... “We are not entitled”, said Lord Loreburn L.C., “to read into an Act of Parliament unless a clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself”. It is not for the court to supply what is an omission in the statute. The Court must interpret the provision as they are without adding anything. This is one of the basic canons of construction of a statute. See in this connection Maruthi Wires Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. S.T.O. First Circle, Mattancherry [ (2001) 3 SCC 735 ].’ (Underline supplied) 21. After the decision of the Full Bench in S. Lakshmanan [ AIR 2002 Ker 325 ], Section 28AB of the KCS Act was inserted by the Kerala Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Act, 2002, with effect from 04.05.2002, which deals with the election and removal of the President, the Vice-President, etc. After the decision of the Full Bench in S. Lakshmanan [ AIR 2002 Ker 325 ], Section 28AB of the KCS Act was inserted by the Kerala Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Act, 2002, with effect from 04.05.2002, which deals with the election and removal of the President, the Vice-President, etc. As per sub-section (1) of AB , a committee constituted under sub-section (1) of shall elect from themselves a President, a Vice- President, a Treasurer or any other officer by whatever name he is designated, in the manner as may be prescribed. As per sub- section (2) of AB , a committee shall remove from office the President, the Vice-President or the Treasurer or any other officer of the committee if a motion expressing want of confidence in any or all of them is carried with the support of the majority of the members of such committee in accordance with the procedure as may be prescribed. 22. Section 109 of the KCS Act deals with the power to make rules. As per sub-section (1) of, the Government may, for the whole or any part of the State and for any class of societies, after previous publication, by notification in the Gazette, make rules either prospectively or retrospectively to carry out the purposes of the Act. As per sub-section (2) of, in particular and without prejudice to the generality of the forgoing power, such rules may provide for all or any of the matters enumerated in clauses (i) to (xxxviii). Clause (xi) of sub- section (2) of deals with the election of members of the committee by the general body of a society; and clause (xxxviii) deals with any other matter required or allowed by the Act, or be prescribed. 23. In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 109 of the KCS Act, the Government made the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969 (the KCS Rules). Chapter IV of the KCS Rules deals with the management of societies. Rule 43A inserted by SRO No.1185/2003 published in Kerala Gazette Extraordinary No.48 dated 23.12.2003 deals with the removal of the President, the Vice-President, etc., by no-confidence motion. As per Rule 43A , a committee shall remove the President or the Vice-President or the Treasurer or any other officer of the committee from his office by a no-confidence motion in the manner prescribed in clauses (i) to (xii). Rule 43A reads thus: “43A. As per Rule 43A , a committee shall remove the President or the Vice-President or the Treasurer or any other officer of the committee from his office by a no-confidence motion in the manner prescribed in clauses (i) to (xii). Rule 43A reads thus: “43A. Removal of President, Vice-President, etc. by no-confidence motion.- A committee shall remove the President or the Vice- President or the Treasurer or any other officer of the committee from his office by a no-confidence motion in the following manner, namely:- (i) A notice of intention to move a no-confidence motion signed by such number of members as shall constitute not less than one third of the total strength of the committee, together with a copy of the motion which is proposed to be moved, shall be delivered to the Registrar, in person, by any two members signing the notice. (ii) Any officer duly authorised by the Registrar concerned in this behalf, shall arrange for the consideration of the motion in a meeting of the committee to be held at the office of the society on a date appointed by him, which shall not be later than thirty days from the date on which the copy of the motion referred to in clause (i) was delivered to the Registrar. The said officer shall give to the members, not less than fifteen clear days of notice of such meeting and of the time appointed therefore. (iii) The officer authorised under clause (ii) shall preside over the meeting convened under this rule. (iv) A meeting convened for the purpose of considering a motion under this rule shall not, for any reason, be adjourned. (v) No meeting under this rule shall be held if at the time appointed under the foregoing provisions or, within half an hour from such time, such number of members as shall constitute one half of the total strength of the committee are not present. (vi) As soon as the meeting convened has commenced, the officer presiding at the meeting shall read to it the motion for the consideration of which it has been convened and declare the motion to be open for debate. (vii) No debate of any motion under this rule shall be adjourned. (vi) As soon as the meeting convened has commenced, the officer presiding at the meeting shall read to it the motion for the consideration of which it has been convened and declare the motion to be open for debate. (vii) No debate of any motion under this rule shall be adjourned. (viii) The officer presiding over the meeting shall neither speak on the merits of the motion nor be entitled to vote thereon but shall regulate the proceedings of the meeting. (ix) A copy of the minutes of the meeting showing the result of the voting, together with a copy of the motion shall, on termination of the meeting, be forwarded to the Registrar forthwith by the presiding officer of the meeting. (x) If the motion is carried with the support of the majority of the members of the committee and if the President or the Vice- President or the Treasurer or any Officer of the committee, as the case may be, does not resign his office within two days after passing of the motion he shall cease to hold the office of the committee of the society forthwith. (xi) If no meeting could be held for want of quorum as required under clause (v) or if the motion is not carried by such a majority as required under clause (x), no notice of any subsequent motion expressing want of confidence on the same President, Vice- President, the Treasurer or any officer of the committee, shall be allowed within a period of six months from the date of the meeting (xii) No notice of motion under this rule shall be allowed within six months from the date of assumption of office by the President or the Vice-President or the Treasurer or any officer of the committee.” 24. In Manojkumar K.M. and others v. Joint Registrar and another, 2018 (1) KHC 717 the challenge made in W.A.No.176 of 2018, before a Division Bench of this Court, was against the order dated 10.01.2018 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.35 of 2018, whereby the interim relief sought for by the appellants-petitioners was declined, holding that as the Part-time Administrator has already taken charge and as the question whether the general body can remove the existing managing committee by way of a no-confidence motion requires detailed consideration, and cannot be decided at the interlocutory stage, a direction to restore the committee to office cannot be granted. In the writ petition, one of the grounds raised was that the motion of no-confidence was not on the agenda of the general body meeting held on 30.12.2017 and, therefore, it could not have been considered by the general body. Therefore, the course adopted by the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies to supersede the managing committee was impermissible in law. 24.1. In Manojkumar K.M. [ 2018 (1) KHC 717 ] - judgment dated 22.01.2018 in W.A.No.176 of 2018 - the Division Bench noticed that though sub-section (1) of Section 33 of the KCS Act stipulates that an Administrator or Administrators, as the case may be, can be appointed in societies where a no-confidence motion has been passed by the general body against the existing committee, till that date the State of Kerala has not framed rules governing the manner in which the motion of no-confidence has to be moved. Even in respect of office bearers of the managing committee, though section 28AB was incorporated in the KCS Act, with effect from 04.05.2002, to provide for removal of the President, the Vice-President or the Treasurer or any other officer of the committee, in the event of a motion of no-confidence against them being carried, the procedure for moving a motion of no-confidence was prescribed only when Rule 43A was introduced in the KCS Rules, with effect from 23.12.2003, which stipulates that the motion of no confidence shall be signed by such number of members as shall constitute not less than one third of the total strength of the committee. The said rule further stipulates that the notice of motion has to be delivered to the Registrar by any two members signing the notice. The said rule further stipulates that the notice of motion has to be delivered to the Registrar by any two members signing the notice. It is for the officer duly authorised by the Registrar to arrange for consideration of the motion, in a meeting of the committee to be held at the office of the society on a date appointed by him, which shall not be later than thirty days from the date on which the copy of the motion is delivered to the Registrar. The rules also stipulate that the said officer shall give to the members, not less than fifteen clear days of notice of such meeting and of the time appointed therefore. Such a meeting is to be presided over by the officer authorised by the Registrar. It is, inter alia, stipulated that a meeting convened for the purpose of considering a motion under this rule shall not, for any reason, be adjourned. The quorum for such a meeting is also prescribed. However, even though sub-section (1) of of the KCS Act, which provides for the appointment of an Administrator or Administrators, in cases where a no-confidence motion is passed by the general body against the existing committee, was introduced in the said Act way back in 1971, the State of Kerala, till that date, has not framed rules governing the manner in which the no-confidence motion is to be brought before the general body. The various clauses of sub-section (1) of of the said Act have undergone subsequent amendments. 24.2. In Manojkumar K.M.  [ 2018 (1) KHC 717 ], before the Division Bench, it was not in dispute that the motion of no- confidence was not an item on the agenda of the general body meeting held on 30.12.2007. It was, however, contended by the learned Government Pleader as well as the learned counsel for the Part-Time Administrator that the President could have permitted items outside the agenda to be taken up for consideration by the general body. Relying on Notes 1 and 2 in the notice dated 14.12.2017 [Ext.P7], they contended that the President was well within his powers to permit the motion of no-confidence submitted by three members of the society [Annexure R1(a)] being considered by the general body at the meeting held on 30.12.2017. Relying on Notes 1 and 2 in the notice dated 14.12.2017 [Ext.P7], they contended that the President was well within his powers to permit the motion of no-confidence submitted by three members of the society [Annexure R1(a)] being considered by the general body at the meeting held on 30.12.2017. They also contended that the motion of no- confidence was passed as only one member of the society had objected to it. 24.3. In Manojkumar K.M. [ 2018 (1) KHC 717 ], on the materials available, the Division Bench found that the aforesaid contentions cannot be accepted. As held by a Division Bench of this Court in Kodiyathur Panchayat v. District Panchayat Officer, Calicut, 1977 KLT 80 , a resolution passed on a subject not included in the agenda of a meeting would be good only if all the members of the committee are present at the meeting and if all of them waive the formality of notice. Under the general law relating to meetings, no business of an important nature is to be taken up at a meeting of a council or a committee unless notice is given in respect of it to all the concerned members. In other words, notice of meetings should specify the business to be transacted. Even in the matter of a motion of no-confidence against the officers of the managing committee, viz., the President, the Vice-President, the Treasurer, etc., the meeting is to be presided over by the officer authorised by the Registrar. However, the meeting held on 30.12.2017 was presided over by the President of the society. The Division Bench observed that there is a laudable object behind the stipulation in Rule 43A of the KCS Rules that the motion of no-confidence shall be considered at a meeting presided over by an officer nominated by the Registrar and not by the President or any other officer of the managing committee. In the absence of any stipulation regarding the manner and method in which the motion is to be moved and the length of the notice, the Division Bench was not persuaded to accept the submission of the learned Government Pleader and the learned counsel for the Part-time Administrator that in view of the notice dated 14.12.2017 [Ext.P7], the no-confidence motion against the managing committee could have been taken up for consideration on 30.12.2017. 24.4. 24.4. In Manojkumar K.M. [ 2018 (1) KHC 717 ], the Division Bench observed that, by no stretch of imagination, it can be held that a motion of no-confidence can be moved in a general body of a society without it being an item on the agenda of the meeting and without notice to the members of the society. In a given case, where the entirety of the general body is present, even without notice in that regard, a motion of no-confidence against the office bearers of the society can be validly moved and passed. For the reasons stated in paragraphs 18 to 20 of the decision, the Division Bench set aside the impugned order dated 10.01.2018 of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C)No.35 of 2018 and granted a stay of operation and implementation of the order dated 30.12.2017 [Ext.P1] of the Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Kannur, whereby, in exercise of the power conferred under sub-section (1) of Section 33 of the KCS Act, a Part-time Administrator was appointed to manage the affairs of the society. 25. In Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary [ (2015) 8 SCC 1 ], the question that came up for consideration before the Apex Court was as to whether in the absence of a specific provision on removal by no-confidence in the Co-operative Societies Act, the Rules made thereunder, or even the bye-laws of a co-operative society, the Chairperson or an elected office-bearer can be removed by a motion of no-confidence. The appellant in the said case was removed from the office of the Chairperson of the 1 st respondent - Gujarat Co-operative Milk Marketing Federation Ltd., a co- operative society governed by the provisions of the Gujarat Co- operative Societies Act, 1961, by way of a no-confidence motion. The challenge before the Apex Court was against the order dated 10.01.2014 of a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No.6 of 2014 in Civil Application No.13220 of 2013 in Special Civil Application No.16515 of 2013. 25.1. The challenge before the Apex Court was against the order dated 10.01.2014 of a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Letters Patent Appeal No.6 of 2014 in Civil Application No.13220 of 2013 in Special Civil Application No.16515 of 2013. 25.1. In Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary [ (2015) 8 SCC 1 ], the Apex Court noticed that apart from providing for the right to form co-operative societies to be a fundamental right under Article 19 of the Constitution of India and insertion of Article 43B under the directive principles of state policy on promotion of co-operative societies, the 97 th Amendment also introduced a new Part IX-B on co-operative societies. A reference to the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the amendment would give a clear picture as to the need to strengthen the democratic basis and to provide constitutional status to the co-operative societies. As per Article 43B, the State shall endeavour to promote voluntary formation, autonomous functioning, democratic control and professional management of co-operative societies. Thus, one has to see the constitutional aspirations on the concept of co-operative societies after the 97 th Amendment in the, which came into effect on 12.01.2012. The co-operative societies having been conferred a constitutional status by the 97 th Amendment, the whole concept of co-operatives has undergone a major change. In 1993, the local self-government institutions, viz., the panchayats and municipalities, were also given constitutional status under Parts IX and IX-A of the, by the 73 rd and 74 th Amendments. The Statement of Objects and Reasons would show that the Constitution wanted the local bodies to function as vibrant democratic units of self-government. After two decades, co- operative societies were given constitutional status by including them under Part IX-B of the Constitution. The main object of the said amendment was also to ensure their autonomy, democratic functioning and professional management. 25.2. In Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary [ (2015) 8 SCC 1 ], the Apex Court noticed that the National Policy on Co-operatives announced in March 2002 has recognised democracy, equality, equity and solidarity as values of co-operatives. A co-operative society has been declared as a democratic institution. The democratic principles have, all through, been recognised as one of the co-operative principles, though the constitutional affirmation came only in 2012. A co-operative society has been declared as a democratic institution. The democratic principles have, all through, been recognised as one of the co-operative principles, though the constitutional affirmation came only in 2012. The principle of representative democracy is the election of representatives by the people, otherwise eligible to cast their vote, and the people thus elected, constituting the body for the management of an institution. Thus, in the case of co- operative societies, after the amendment in the Constitution, there has to be a board of elected representatives, which may be called the board of directors or the governing body or a managing committee, etc., to which the members entrust the direction and control of the management of the affairs of the society. That representative body selects one among the elected representatives as its Chairman or any other office-bearer, as the case may be. The selection is the act of carefully choosing someone as the most suitable to be the leader or office-bearer. Thus, there is a lot of difference between the election of delegates/representatives to constitute a body and the selection of a person by the body from amongst the elected members to be the leader. It is to be borne in mind that the management and control of the society is entrusted to the representative body, viz., the board of directors and that the Chairperson elected by the board of directors is the Chairperson of the society and not of the board of directors. 25.3. In Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary [ (2015) 8 SCC 1 ], after referring to the law laid down in Bhanumati v. State of U.P. (2010) 12 SCC 1 , Pratap Chandra Mehta v. State Bar Council of M.P. (2011) 9 SCC 573 and Usha Bharti v. State of U.P. (2014) 7 SCC 663 , the Apex Court held that a co- operative society is registered on co-operative principles of democracy, equity, equality and solidarity. Democratic accountability, mutual trust, fairness, impartiality, unity or agreement of feeling among the delegates, co-operativeness, etc., are some of the cardinal dimensions of the co-operative principles. A body built on such principles cannot be led by a captain in whom the co-sailors have no confidence. Democratic accountability, mutual trust, fairness, impartiality, unity or agreement of feeling among the delegates, co-operativeness, etc., are some of the cardinal dimensions of the co-operative principles. A body built on such principles cannot be led by a captain in whom the co-sailors have no confidence. If a person has been selected to an office through a democratic process, and when that person loses the confidence of the representatives who selected him, those representatives should necessarily have a democratic right to remove such an office-bearer in whom they do not have confidence, in case those institutions are viewed under the Constitution/statutes as democratic institutions. 25.4. In Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary [ (2015) 8 SCC 1 ], the Apex Court noticed that in Bhanumati [ (2010) 12 SCC 1 ] Pratap Chandra Mehta [ (2011) 9 SCC 573 ] and Usha Bharti [ (2014) 7 SCC 663 ] , the respective Acts contained a provision regarding no-confidence. The question considered by the Apex Court in Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary [2015) 8 SCC 1] was what would be the situation where there is no express provision regarding no-confidence. The Apex Court held that once a co- operative society is conferred with a constitutional status, it should rise to the constitutional aspirations as a democratic institution. So, it is for the respective legislative bodies to ensure that there is democratic functioning. When the Constitution is eloquent, the laws made thereunder cannot be silent. If the statute is silent or imprecise on the requirements under the Constitution, it is for the court to read the constitutional mandate into the provisions concerned and declare it accordingly. Article 243-ZT of the Constitution requires the laws relating to co-operative societies in force in the States prior to the commencement of the Amendment Act to be in tune with and in terms of the constitutional concept and set-up of co-operative societies. In fact, a period of one year has been provided in the Constitution from the commencement of the Amendment for the required amendment or repeal by the competent legislature or by the competent authority, of laws which are inconsistent with Part IX-B. As a corollary, the Constitution enables the competent legislature or authority to suitably amend the existing provisions in their laws in tune with the constitutional mandate. Thereafter, in case there continues to be silence in the Act or the bye-laws, the court will have to read the constitutional requirements into the existing provisions. It is essentially a process of purposive construction of the available provisions, as held in Pratap Chandra Mehta [ (2011) 9 SCC 573 ]. 25.5. In Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary [ (2015) 8 SCC 1 ], the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, inviting reference to the doctrine of casus omissus, and placing reliance on the Full Bench decision of this Court in S. Lakshmanan v. V. Velliankeri,  AIR 2002 Ker 325 , the decision of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in Veeramachaneni Venkata Narayana v. Registrar of Co- operative Societies,  ILR 1975 A.P. 242 , the decision of the High Court of Bombay in Hindurao Balwant Patil v. Krishnarao Parshuram Patil, AIR 1982 Bom 216 and the decision of the Full Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Jagdev Singh v. Registrar of Co-operative Societies,  AIR 1991 P&H 149 , contended that no such power of removal of the Chairperson by no-confidence can be read into the provisions of the Act, the Rules or the bye-laws. After quoting the relevant paragraphs of the said decisions at paragraphs 38 to 41 (which dealt with the pre-97 th Amendment status of the co-operative societies), the Apex Court held that the amendment providing constitutional status to the societies has brought out radical changes in the concept of co-operative societies. Democratic functioning and autonomy have now become the core constitutional values of a co-operative society. Such societies are to be registered only if they are founded on co-operative principles of democracy, equality, equity and solidarity. Paragraphs 38 to 42 of the decision of the Apex Court read thus; ‘38. Shri Kapil Sibal, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, inviting reference to the doctrine of casus omissus and placing reliance on the Full Bench decision of the High Court of Kerala in S. Lakshmanan v. V. Velliankeri [ AIR 2002 Ker 325 ] and the decisions of the other High Courts submits that no such power of removal of the Chairperson by no confidence can be read into the provisions of the Act, Rules or Bye-laws. To quote from S. Lakshmanan’s case: (AIR p.330, para 16) “16. To quote from S. Lakshmanan’s case: (AIR p.330, para 16) “16. The Committee is elected by following the procedure prescribed under the Act and the Rules and is guaranteed a tenure as prescribed in the Bye-laws, by virtue of Rule 39(1). It can only be removed by the procedure prescribed in the Act or the Rules or the Bye-laws. The only contingency under which the Committee may be removed before the end of its tenure is indicated in Section 33 (1) of the Act. (1) of the Act envisages the passing of a no-confidence motion by the general body, which results in the wholesale removal of the Committee. Barring this provision, there is no other provision by which an elected individual member of the Committee can be removed. We are, therefore, unable to accept the contention of the appellants that such a drastic power can be read into the Act, even where there are no provisions.” 39. In Veeramachaneni Venkata Narayana v. Registrar of Co-operative Societies [ILR 1975 AP 242], at para 10, the view taken by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh is as under: “10. … As sufficient safeguards are provided in the event of an office-bearer of the Committee not conducting himself properly or not discharging his duties as required of him under the provisions of the Act, the Rules and the Bye-laws, the legislature obviously did not intend to provide for the removal of an office-bearer of a committee by way of passing of ‘no-confidence’ motion against him.” 40. In Hindurao Balwant Patil v. Krishnarao Parshuram Patil [ AIR 1982 Bom 216 ], the High Court of Bombay took the view that : (AIR p. 223, para 10) “10. … The Act, Rules and the bye-laws do no confer any right upon the members of the Board of Directors to remove the Chairman and the Vice- Chairman by passing a mere vote of no confidence. Therefore, it will not be proper to confer such a wider power upon the Board of Directors by taking recourse to the doctrine of implied or inherent power.” 41. In Jagdev Singh v. Registrar, Coop. Societies [AIR 1991 P&H 149], the Full Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana held as follows: (AIR p. 159, para 22) “22. Therefore, it will not be proper to confer such a wider power upon the Board of Directors by taking recourse to the doctrine of implied or inherent power.” 41. In Jagdev Singh v. Registrar, Coop. Societies [AIR 1991 P&H 149], the Full Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana held as follows: (AIR p. 159, para 22) “22. … the answer to the question posed in the beginning of the judgment, is that in absence of any provision in the Punjab Cooperative Societies Act, 1961, Rules and the Bye-laws made thereunder (as also in the Haryana Cooperative Societies Act, 1984, Rules and the Bye-laws made thereunder) for moving a no-confidence in the President of a Managing Committee/Chairman of a Board of Directors of a Cooperative Bank, it is not permissible to move such a motion, inasmuch as such a power cannot be inferred nor such a power is inherent in the members of the Managing Committee/Director of the Bank. The office- bearers can only be removed in accordance with Section 27 of the Act, read with Rules 25 and 26 of the Rules. With respect, we are unable to agree with the law laid down by the Division Bench in Haji Anwar Ahmed Khan v. Punjab Wakf Board [AIR 1980 P&H 306] (which was a case under the Wakf Act), to our mind, does not lay down correct law.” 42. It may be seen that all these decisions dealt with the pre-Ninety-seventh Amendment status of the co-operative societies. The Amendment providing constitutional status to societies has brought out radical changes in the concept of cooperative societies. Democratic functioning and autonomy have now become the core constitutional values of a cooperative society. Such societies are to be registered only if they are founded on cooperative principles of democracy, equality, equity and solidarity.’ (underline supplied) 25.6. In Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary [ (2015) 8 SCC 1 ], the Apex Court held that a co-operative society registered under the Central Act or the State Act is bound to function as a democratic institution and conduct its affairs based on democratic principles. The democratic functioning on democratic principles is to be reflected in the respective Acts or the Rules or the bye-laws, both on principle and procedure. If not, it is for the court to read democratic principles into the Act or the Rules or the bye-laws. The democratic functioning on democratic principles is to be reflected in the respective Acts or the Rules or the bye-laws, both on principle and procedure. If not, it is for the court to read democratic principles into the Act or the Rules or the bye-laws. If a procedure is prescribed in any Act or Rule or bye-laws regarding the election of an office-bearer by the board, as defined under Article 243-ZH(b) of the Constitution of India , and for removal thereof, by way of a motion of no-confidence, the same procedure has to be followed. In case there is no express provision under the Act or the Rules or the bye-laws for the removal of an office- bearer, such office-bearer is liable to be removed in the event of loss of confidence by following the same procedure by which he was elected to office. Having declared the law regarding the democratic set-up of a co-operative society and that it is permissible to remove an elected office-bearer through motion of no-confidence, the Apex Court laid down certain guidelines in paragraph 52.2 of the decision, since in many States the relevant statutes have not carried out the required statutory changes in terms of the constitutional mandate. The Apex Court has made it clear that the said guidelines are open to be appropriately modified and given statutory shape by the competent legislature/authority. For different reasons, the Apex Court agreed with the view taken by the Gujarat High Court. The contrary view expressed by the High Courts of Andhra Pradesh, Bombay, Kerala and Punjab and Haryana was held to be no more good law in view of the 97 th Amendment to the. Paragraphs 51 to 53 of the decision of the Apex Court read thus: “51. The co-operative society registered under the Central or the State Act is bound to function as a democratic institution and conduct its affairs based on democratic principles. Democratic functioning on democratic principles is to be reflected in the respective Acts or Rules or bye-laws, both on principle and procedure. If not, it is for the court to read democratic principles into the Act or Rules or bye-laws. Democratic functioning on democratic principles is to be reflected in the respective Acts or Rules or bye-laws, both on principle and procedure. If not, it is for the court to read democratic principles into the Act or Rules or bye-laws. If a procedure is prescribed in any Act or Rule or bye-law regarding the election of an office-bearer by the board, as defined under Article 243-ZH(b) of the Constitution of India , and for removal thereof, by way of a motion of no- confidence, the same procedure has to be followed. In case there is no express provision under the Act or Rules or bye- laws for removal of an office-bearer, such office-bearer is liable to be removed in the event of loss of confidence by following the same procedure by which he was elected to office. 52. Now that this Court has declared the law regarding the democratic set-up of a co-operative society and that it is permissible to remove an elected office-bearer through motion of no-confidence, and since in many States the relevant statutes have not carried out the required statutory changes in terms of the constitutional mandate, we feel it just and necessary to lay down certain guidelines. However, we make it clear that these guidelines are open to be appropriately modified and given statutory shape by the competent legislature/authority: 52.1. Having gone through the provisions regarding motion of no-confidence in local self-governments, we find that there is no uniformity with regard to the procedure and process regarding motion of no-confidence. Some States provide for a protection of two years, some for one year and a few for six months, to the office-bearers in office before moving a motion of no-confidence. However, majority of the States provide for two years and a gap of another one year in case one motion of no-confidence is defeated. Some States provide for a protection of two years, some for one year and a few for six months, to the office-bearers in office before moving a motion of no-confidence. However, majority of the States provide for two years and a gap of another one year in case one motion of no-confidence is defeated. The Bihar Panchayat Raj Act, 2006 provides for a protection of two years and one year; the Bihar Municipal Act, 2007 provides for a protection of two years and one year; the Himachal Pradesh Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 provides for a protection of two years and two years; the Madhya Pradesh Panchayat Raj Avam Gram Swaraj Adhiniyam, 1993 provides for a protection of two-and-a-half years; the Madhya Pradesh Municipalities Act, 1961 provides for a protection of two years and one year; the Manipur Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 provides for a protection of two years and one year; the Orissa Panchayat Samiti Act, 1959 provides for a protection of two years; the Orissa Grama Panchayat Act, 1964 provides for a protection of two years; the Punjab Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 provides for a protection of two years; the Rajasthan Panchayati Raj Act, 1994 provides for a protection of two years and one year; the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 2009 provides for a protection of two years and the Uttar Pradesh Panchayat Raj Act, 1947, as followed by Uttarakhand, provides for a protection of two years and one year. 52.2. Having regard to the set-up in local self-governments prevailing in many of the States as above, we direct that in the case of co-operative societies registered under any Central or State law, a motion of no-confidence against an office-bearer shall be moved only after two years of his assumption of office. In case the motion of no-confidence is once defeated, a fresh motion shall not be introduced within another one year. A motion of no-confidence shall be moved only in case there is a request from one-third of the elected members of the Board of Governors/Managing Committee of the co-operative society concerned. The motion of no- confidence shall be carried in case the motion is supported by more than fifty per cent of the elected members present in the meeting. 53. Though for different reasons, we agree with the view taken by the High Court of Gujarat. The motion of no- confidence shall be carried in case the motion is supported by more than fifty per cent of the elected members present in the meeting. 53. Though for different reasons, we agree with the view taken by the High Court of Gujarat. The contra views expressed by the High Courts of Andhra Pradesh, Bombay, Kerala and Punjab and Haryana are no more good law in view of the Ninety-seventh Amendment to the Constitution of India .” (Underline supplied) 26. In Union of India v. Rajendra N. Shah,  AIR 2021 SC 4905 , the question that came up for consideration of the Apex Court was as to the vires of the Constitution (97 th Amendment) Act, 2011, which inter alia introduced Part IX-B under the chapter heading ‘The Co-operative Societies’. The Constitution 97 th Amendment Act was passed by the requisite majority of the Lok Sabha on 27.12.2011 and the Rajya Sabha on 28.12.2011. The Presidential assent to the aforesaid Amendment followed on 12.01.2012, and the said Amendment was published in the Official Gazette of India on 13.01.2012, coming into force with effect from 15.02.2012. The question raised before the Apex Court and decided by a Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court by the impugned judgment dated 22.04.2013 - Rajendra N. Shah v. Union of India,  2013 SCC OnLine Guj 2242 - was whether Part IX-B is non est for want of ratification by half of the States under the proviso to Article 368(2) of the Constitution of India . The impugned judgment of the High Court has declared that the said constitutional Amendment inserting Part IX-B as ultra vires the for want of the requisite ratification under Article 368(2) proviso, which however will not impact amendments that have been made in Article 19(1)(c) and in inserting Article 43B in the. The impugned judgment of the High Court was upheld by the Apex Court except to the extent that it strikes down the entirety of Part IX-B of the. The Apex Court declared that Part IX-B of the is operative only insofar as it concerns multi-State co-operative societies both within the various States and in the Union Territories of India. 27. The impugned judgment of the High Court was upheld by the Apex Court except to the extent that it strikes down the entirety of Part IX-B of the. The Apex Court declared that Part IX-B of the is operative only insofar as it concerns multi-State co-operative societies both within the various States and in the Union Territories of India. 27. Even before the amendment of the Constitution of India , by the Constitution (97 th Amendment) Act, 2011, whereby constitutional status was given to co-operative societies, Section 28AB of the KCS Act, inserted by the Kerala Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Act, 2002, with effect from 04.05.2002, deals with the removal of the President, the Vice-President, or the Treasurer or any other officer of the committee of a co-operative society by way of no-confidence motion. etc. As per sub-section (2) of Section 28AB , a committee shall remove from office the President, the Vice-President or the Treasurer or any other officer of the committee if a motion expressing want of confidence in any or all of them is carried with the support of the majority of the members of such committee, in accordance with the procedure as may be prescribed. As per Rule 43A of the KCS Rules [extracted hereinbefore at paragraph 23 at pages 20 and 21], inserted by SRO No.1185/2003 published in Kerala Gazette Extraordinary No.48 dated 23.12.2003, a provision inserted much before the decision of the Apex Court in Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary [(2015) 8 SCC 1] , a committee shall remove the President or the Vice- President or the Treasurer or any other officer of the committee from his office by a no-confidence motion in the manner prescribed in clauses (i) to (xii). As per clause (xi) of Rule 43A , if no meeting could be held for want of quorum as required under clause (v) or if the motion is not carried by such a majority as required under clause (x), no notice of any subsequent motion expressing want of confidence on the same President, Vice- President, the Treasurer or any officer of the committee, shall be allowed within a period of six months from the date of the meeting. As per clause (xii) of Rule 43A , no notice of motion under this rule shall be allowed within six months from the date of assumption of office by the President or the Vice-President or the Treasurer or any officer of the committee. Therefore, much before the decision of the Apex Court in Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary [ (2015) 8 SCC 1 ] laying down guidelines, specific provisions are contained in Section 28AB of the KCS Act and Rule 43A of the KCS Rules, regarding consideration of a motion of no-confidence against an office-bearer of the committee of a co-operative society governed by the provisions under the KCS Act and the KCS Rules. 28. As already noticed hereinbefore, as per sub-section (1) of Section 33 of the KCS Act, after its amendment by the Kerala Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Act, 1971, published in Kerala Gazette Extraordinary No.558 dated 23.12.1971, where the term of office of a committee has expired and a new committee has not been constituted, or where a no-confidence motion is passed by the general body against the existing committee or where the existing committee resigns en bloc or where vacancies occur in the committee either by resignation or otherwise and the number of remaining members cannot constitute the quorum for the meeting of the committee, or where the committee fails to hold its regular meeting consecutively for six months or where the Registrar is satisfied that (a) that a new committee cannot be constituted before the expiry of the term of office of the existing committee; or (b) that a new committee is prevented from entering upon office, or a new committee fails to enter upon office, on the date on which the term of office of the existing committee expires, the Registrar may, either suo motu or on the application of any member of the society, after intimating the circle co- operative union, appoint (i) a new committee consisting of not more than three members of the society; or (ii) one or more Administrator or Administrators who need not be a member or members of the society, to manage the affairs of the society till a new committee enters upon office. 29. Rule 43C of the KCS Rules, added by the Kerala Co- operative Societies (Amendment) Rules, 2025, with effect from 02.04.2025, deals with motion of no-confidence for removal of the managing committee by the general body. 29. Rule 43C of the KCS Rules, added by the Kerala Co- operative Societies (Amendment) Rules, 2025, with effect from 02.04.2025, deals with motion of no-confidence for removal of the managing committee by the general body. As per sub-rule (1) of Rule 43C , a motion expressing want of confidence in the managing committee of a society/bank shall be moved in accordance with the procedure laid down therein. As per sub-rule (13) of Rule 43C , if the motion is not carried by such majority as aforesaid or the meeting cannot be held for want of quorum, under sub-rule (6), no notice of any subsequent motion expressing want of confidence in the same Managing Committee shall be received until after the expiry of six months from the date of meeting or the date fixed for the motion, as the case may be. Rule 43C of the KCS Rules reads thus: “43C. Motion of no-confidence for removal of Managing Committee by General Body.- (1) A motion expressing want of confidence in the Managing Committee of a Society/Bank shall be moved in accordance with the procedure laid down herein. (2) Written notice of intention to move any motion referred to in sub-rule (1) signed by such number of members of the Society/Bank shall constitute not less than one-third of the total members together with a copy of the motion which is proposed to be moved shall be delivered to the Registrar, in person, by any of the two members of the Society/Bank signing the notice. (3) The Registrar or any officer authorised by him shall convene a meeting of the General Body of the Society/Bank for the consideration of the motion, to be held at the office of the Society/Bank at a date and time appointed by the Registrar or any officer authorised by him which shall not be later than thirty days from the date on which the notice under sub-rule (2) is delivered to the Registrar. (4) The Registrar or any officer authorised by him shall cause to publish/affix a notice on the notice board of the head office of the Society/Bank indicating the date, time and agenda, at least fifteen days prior to such meeting of the General Body to be held, for the knowledge of the members of General Body. (4) The Registrar or any officer authorised by him shall cause to publish/affix a notice on the notice board of the head office of the Society/Bank indicating the date, time and agenda, at least fifteen days prior to such meeting of the General Body to be held, for the knowledge of the members of General Body. (5) A meeting convened under this rule shall be presided over by the Registrar or any officer authorised by him. (6) A meeting convened for the purpose of considering the motion under this rule shall not be adjourned except for reasons beyond human control. No meeting under this rule shall be held, if at the time appointed under the foregoing provisions or, within half an hour from such time, such number of members as shall constitute the quorum of the General Body of the Society/Bank prescribed in the bye-laws of the Society/Bank are not present. (7) As soon as the meeting convened under this rule has commenced, the officer presiding shall read at the meeting the motion for the consideration of which it has been convened and declare it to be open for debate. (8) No debate on any motion under this rule shall be adjourned except for reasons beyond human control. (9) A debate on any no-confidence motion shall automatically terminate on the expiry of three hours from the time appointed for the commencement of the meeting. If it is not concluded earlier and upon the conclusion of the debate or upon the expiry of such period of three hours as the case may be, the motion shall be put to vote. (10) The officer presiding shall not speak on the merit/demerit of the motion, and shall not be entitled to vote thereon. (11) The copy of the minutes of the meeting together with the copy of the motion and the result of the voting therein shall forthwith, on the termination of the meeting, be forwarded to the Registrar by the officer presiding the meeting. (11) The copy of the minutes of the meeting together with the copy of the motion and the result of the voting therein shall forthwith, on the termination of the meeting, be forwarded to the Registrar by the officer presiding the meeting. (12) If the motion is carried with the support of the majority of the number of members of the General Body, the Managing Committee which lost the confidence shall cease to hold office thereafter and shall be deemed to be vacant forthwith, and the Registrar shall issue an order appointing an Administrator or Administrative Committee in accordance with the provisions of section 33 of the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 . (13) If the motion is not carried by such majority as aforesaid or the meeting cannot be held for want of quorum, under sub-rule (6), no notice of any subsequent motion expressing want of confidence in the same Managing Committee shall be received until after the expiry of six months from the date of meeting or the date fixed for the motion, as the case may be.” (underline supplied) 30. In Sivadasan Nair K. [ 2022 (2) KHC 58 ] - judgment dated 27.01.2022 in W.P.(C)No.5 of 2022 - a decision rendered prior to the addition of Rule 43C of the KCS Rules, by the Kerala Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Rules, 2025, the question came up for consideration was as to whether the power under Section 33 of the KCS Act, which provides for moving of a no- confidence motion against the managing committee, can be exercised in the absence of rules laying down the procedure for moving a no-confidence motion. The petitioner herein [Shaji Mohan], along with another member of the board of directors of the Kerala State Co-operative Agricultural and Rural Development Bank Ltd. (the Society), filed W.P.(C)No.5 of 2022 challenging the order dated 13.12.2021 issued by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, invoking the provisions under sub-section (3) of Section 30 of the KCS Act, nominating an officer under him to call for a special general body of the Society to consider the no-confidence motion and the notice issued by the Managing Director of the Society, based on the decision taken by the Authorised Officer to convene the special general body on 06.01.2022. Another relief sought for in that writ petition was a declaration that the amendment made to sub-section (1) of of the KCS Act, in terms of Act 33 of 1971, to the extent it enables appointment of a new committee or administrator on a no-confidence motion being passed by the general body against the existing managing committee, stands repealed by the application of the doctrine of desuetude. The petitioners have also sought for a declaration that a no-confidence motion cannot be moved against an elected managing committee of a society. In terms of the interim order dated 05.01.2022 in W.P.(C)No.5 of 2022, the learned Single Judge permitted consideration of the no-confidence motion on 06.01.2022, as proposed, but directed that the motion, if passed, shall not be given effect to without orders from this Court. 30.1. In Sivadasan Nair K.  [ 2022 (2) KHC 58 ], before the learned Single Judge, the contention of the petitioners was that Section 33 of the KCS Act has become a ‘dead letter’ consequent on its non-user. The petitioners relied on the doctrine of desuetude. They contended that though the provision for a no- confidence against a managing committee was brought into the statute book, as early as in the year 1971, there has not even been a single instance where it has been applied. Therefore, on the doctrine of desuetude, the provision has to be held as ‘lifeless’. The learned Single Judge observed that the one who seeks to take shelter under the doctrine of desuetude needs to prove and establish that, though occasions arose, the rule was not applied and that a contrary procedure was adopted. The mere fact that a person is ignorant about instances of application/user of such a rule does not satisfy the requirement of proof of ‘nonuser’. On the facts of the case at hand, the learned Single Judge found that the petitioners have failed to prove either of the ingredients. At the same time, the respondents pointed out that, in the lis that came up before this Court in Manojkumar K.M. [ 2018 (1) KHC 717 ] the issue related to a no-confidence motion that was moved against the managing committee. At the same time, the respondents pointed out that, in the lis that came up before this Court in Manojkumar K.M. [ 2018 (1) KHC 717 ] the issue related to a no-confidence motion that was moved against the managing committee. Therefore, it cannot be held that the provision under of the KCS Act, recognising a motion of no-confidence against the managing committee of a society, has become a ‘dead letter’ on the application of the doctrine of desuetude. Paragraph 11 of the said decision reads thus; ‘11. Authorities explaining the doctrine of desuetude are umpteen. For the doctrine to apply, two essentials are to be proved (i) non-user for a considerably long period, (ii) contrary procedure being followed in its place. See: State of Maharashtra v. Narayan Shamrao Puranik [ (1982) 3 SCC 519 ], Municipal Corporation for City of Pune v. Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. [ (1995) 3 SCC 434 ], Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd. v. Union of India [ (2012) 11 SCC 1 ], Davis B.O. and another v. B.T. Martin and others [ 2014 (2) KLJ 402 ], Shoba Ramachandran v. State of Kerala [ 2017 (1) KLT 217 ], Basheer v. Kozhikode Corporation [ 2021 (4) KLT 82 ]. Proof of both the ingredients are integral to establish desuetude. The burden of proof to establish the ingredients is on the person who banks upon the doctrine. The mere fact that the first limb calls for proof of a negative, does not relieve him of his burden. A person cannot be called upon to prove the negative, is not an absolute rule. In Abrath v. North Eastern Rail Company [(1983) 11 QBD 440], Bown LJ observed as follows:- “If the assertion of a negative is an essential part of the plaintiff’s case, the proof of the assertion still rests upon the plaintiff”. Instances are many where the onus to prove the negative has been placed on the person who asserts the same. The one who seeks to take shelter under the doctrine of desuetude needs to prove and establish that, though occasions arose, the rule was not applied and that a contrary procedure was adopted. The mere fact that a person is ignorant about instances of application/user of such rule, does not satisfy the requirement of proof of “nonuser”. In the case at hand, the petitioners have failed to prove either of the ingredients. The mere fact that a person is ignorant about instances of application/user of such rule, does not satisfy the requirement of proof of “nonuser”. In the case at hand, the petitioners have failed to prove either of the ingredients. At the same time, the respondents point out that, in the lis that came up before this Court in Manojkumar K.M. and others v. Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies (General), Kannur and another [ 2018 (1) KHC 717 ], the issue related to a no-confidence motion that was moved against the Managing Committee. Therefore, it cannot be held that the provision under Section 33 of the KCS Act, recognising a motion of no- confidence against the Managing Committee of a Society, has become a ‘dead letter’ on the application of the doctrine of desuetude.’ 30.2. In Sivadasan Nair K.  [ 2022 (2) KHC 58 ], another contention raised by the petitioners was that the power under Section 33 of the KCS Act cannot be exercised by the general body in the absence of a procedure being prescribed by the KCS Rules. In support of the said contention, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners placed reliance on the answer to the reference order by a Full Bench of this Court in S. Lakshmanan [AIR 2002 Ker 325] . The Full Bench noticed that no power is vested under the KCS Act or the KCS Rules (as it then existed) or in the bye- laws of Kerala State Co-operative Agricultural and Rural Development Bank Ltd. (the Society), enabling removal of the President, etc., by a motion of no-confidence and that an implied power cannot be read in. The learned Single Judge noticed that, even in the reference order in S. Lakshmanan [AIR 2002 Ker 325] , the Full Bench took note of the provision in of the KCS Act empowering the general body of a society to move a motion of no-confidence against the managing committee, and the stark absence of such a provision enabling a motion of no- confidence by the committee against the President, the Vice- President, etc. The Full Bench noticed that the only contingency under which the managing committee may be removed before the end of its tenure is indicated in sub-section (1) of of the KCS Act, which envisages the passing of a no-confidence motion by the general body, which results in the wholesale removal of the managing committee. Barring this provision, there is no other provision by which an elected individual, who is part of the managing committee, can be removed. In the judgment, the learned Single Judge noticed that in S. Lakshmanan [AIR 2002 Ker 325] the Full Bench had recognised the power conferred under the KCS Act on the general body of a society to remove its managing committee through a motion of no-confidence. Paragraphs 12 to 14 of the decision of the learned Single Judge read thus; ‘12. The power under Section 33 of the KCS Act cannot be exercised by the general body in the absence of a procedure being prescribed by Rules, is the next contention. It is not in dispute that no procedure/rules have been prescribed regarding the mode or manner of moving a no-confidence motion against a managing committee of the Society. As pointed out by the learned senior counsel for the petitioners, the fact that there is no rule or procedure laid down even though the provision was incorporated as early as in the year 1971, was taken note of by the Division Bench in Manojkumar K.M. and others v. Joint Registrar of Co- operative Societies (General), Kannur and another (supra). But it is to be noticed that the Division Bench in the said judgment had also observed thus:- “In a given case, where the entirety of the general body is present, even without notice in that regard, a motion of no-confidence against the office bearers of any organisation can be validly moved and passed”. In the said case, notice of the motion for no-confidence was not given to any of the members. 13. In the said case, notice of the motion for no-confidence was not given to any of the members. 13. To contend that, in the absence of Rules laying down the procedure, the power conferred under Section 33 , for moving a no-confidence motion against the Managing Committee, remains inoperative and unworkable, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the answer on a reference order by a Full Bench of this Court in S. Lakshmanan, President, Thiruvilwamala Weavers Co- operative Society Ltd. v. Vellankeri Member of Board of Directors, Thiruvilwamala Weavers Co-operative Society Ltd. and others [ AIR 2002 Ker. 325 ]. The issue involved therein related to a motion of no-confidence against the President of the Co-operative Society by the Managing Committee. The question referred to the Full Bench for its decision was as follows:- “Whether absence of a specific provision in the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act, 1969 , and the Rules framed thereunder, will stand in the way of any motion for loss of confidence relating to the President of a Co- operative Society?” The Full Bench answered the reference thus:- “In the absence of a specific provision in the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act 1969, the Rules framed thereunder and the bye-laws of a Co-operative Society, the Managing Committee has no right to move or consider a motion for loss of confidence in the President, Vice-President or Treasurer or any other office-bearer of the Managing Committee elected in accordance with Rule 43 of the Rules.” 14. The Full Bench noticed that no power is vested under the KCS Act or Rules (as it then existed) or in the bye-laws of the Society enabling removal of the President, etc., by a motion of no-confidence, and that an implied power cannot be read in. The Full Bench agreed with the view expressed by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Hindurao Balwant Patil and another v. Krishnarao Parshuram Patil and others [ AIR 1982 Bom. 216 ], which held, “….. a right arisen in connection with election laws is not a common law right. It is a special right created by the conditions and manner prescribed by the law concerned, and the argument of implied power by application of common law principles has no relevance”. 216 ], which held, “….. a right arisen in connection with election laws is not a common law right. It is a special right created by the conditions and manner prescribed by the law concerned, and the argument of implied power by application of common law principles has no relevance”. It is subsequent thereto that Section 28AB and Rule 43A were brought into the statute book, providing for the election and removal of the President, Vice-President, etc., of the Managing Committee of a Society. Incidentally, I would refer to a slightly different note struck by the Honourable Apex Court in Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary v. Gujarat Coop. Milk Mktg. Federation Ltd. [ (2015) 8 SCC 1 ]. Therein, the Apex Court at paragraph 51 of the judgment held :- “In case there is no express provision under the Act or Rules or bye-laws for removal of an office – bearer, such office-bearer is liable to be removed in the event of loss of confidence by following the same procedure by which he was elected to office”. Be that as it may, it is pertinent to note that, even in the reference order in Lakshmana’s case (supra), the Full Bench took note of the provision in Section 33 empowering the General Body of a Society to move a motion of no- confidence against the Managing Committee, and the stark absence of such a provision enabling a motion of no- confidence by the Committee against the President, Vice- President, etc. The Full Bench observed thus:- “The only contingency under which the Committee may be removed before the end of its tenure is indicated in Section 33 (1) of the Act. (1) of the Act envisages the passing of a no-confidence motion by the General Body, which results in the wholesale removal of the Committee. Barring this provision, there is no other provision by which an elected individual part of the committee can be removed.” Suffice to note that the Full Bench had recognised the power conferred under the KCS Act on the General Body of a Society to remove its Managing Committee through a motion of no-confidence.’ (underline supplied) 30.3. Barring this provision, there is no other provision by which an elected individual part of the committee can be removed.” Suffice to note that the Full Bench had recognised the power conferred under the KCS Act on the General Body of a Society to remove its Managing Committee through a motion of no-confidence.’ (underline supplied) 30.3. In Sivadasan Nair K. [ 2022 (2) KHC 58 ], the respondents therein canvassed for the proposition that the absence of rules or prescriptions of procedure is of no consequence when power is conferred, and especially when the empowering section does not say that the power is to be exercised ‘in the manner’ or ‘in the manner which may be prescribed’. The learned Single Judge held that Section 33 of the KCS Act does not prescribe any procedure for moving a motion of no-confidence, nor does it provide that the motion is to be moved in any particular manner ‘prescribed’ or ‘as may be prescribed’. Therefore, viewed in any manner, the mere absence of rules laying down the procedure for moving a no-confidence motion against the managing committee, when ample authority is conferred by the KCS Act, does not fetter the exercise of such right. A co-operative society is a democratic institution, bound to function so and to conduct its affairs based on democratic principles. That is the basis of the co-operative movement. Paragraphs 15 and 16 of the decision of the learned Single Judge read thus: ‘15. The respondents canvass for the proposition that, the absence of rules or prescriptions of procedure is of no consequence when power is conferred, and especially when, the empowering Section does not say that the power is to be exercised “in the manner” or “in the manner which may be prescribed”. The respondents place reliance on various judgments of the Apex Court in support. In Orissa State (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Board v. M/s. Orient Paper Mills [JT 2003 (3) SC 74], the point presently mooted was specifically dealt with in detail. Therein, the issue related to the exercise of the power conferred on the State Government under Section 19 of the Air (Prevention and control of Provisions) Act, 1981, to declare an area within the state as “air pollution control areas”. The section required the declaration to be made “in such a manner as may be prescribed”. However, no rules/procedure were prescribed. The section required the declaration to be made “in such a manner as may be prescribed”. However, no rules/procedure were prescribed. The question was posed thus, (at para 10):- “The question for consideration is, as to whether, as long as the manner is not prescribed under the Rules for declaration of an area as an air pollution control area, a valid notification under Section 19(1) of the Act can be published in the official gazette or not”. After elaborate discussions, the Apex Court concluded as follows:- “….. the power which vests in an authority would not cease to exist simply for the reason that the Rules have not been framed or the manner of exercise of the power has not been prescribed”. “Once the manner is prescribed under the Rules, undoubtedly the declaration of the area has to be only in accordance with the manner prescribed, but absence of rules will not render the Act inoperative…… Non-framing of Rules does not curtail the power of the state government to declare any area as an air pollution control area by means of a notification published in the official gazette”. Reference was made by the Apex Court to the following observations in Surinder Singh v. Central Government and others [ (1986) 4 SCC 667 : AIR 1986 SC 2166 ]: “….. Where a statute confers powers on an authority to do certain acts or exercise power in respect of certain matters, subject to rules, the exercise of power conferred by the statute does not depend on the existence of rules unless the statute expressly provides for the same. In other words, framing of the rules is not a condition precedent to the exercise of the power expressly and unconditionally conferred by the statute. The expression “subject to the rules” only means, in accordance with the rules, if any. If rules are framed, the powers so conferred on the authority could be exercised in accordance with these rules. But if no rules are framed, there is no void and the authority is not precluded from exercising the power conferred by the statute…..”. The expression “subject to the rules” only means, in accordance with the rules, if any. If rules are framed, the powers so conferred on the authority could be exercised in accordance with these rules. But if no rules are framed, there is no void and the authority is not precluded from exercising the power conferred by the statute…..”. The same is the law laid down by the Apex Court in the judgments in Mysore State Road Transport Corporation v. Gopinath Gundachar Char [ AIR 1968 SC 464 : 1968 (1) SCR 767 ] and U.P.S.E.B. v. City Board, Mussoorie [ (1985) 2 SCC 16 : AIR 1985 SC 883 ]. 16. Here, Section 33 of the KCS Act does not prescribe any procedure for moving a motion of no-confidence, nor does it provide that the motion is to be moved in any particular manner “prescribed” or “as may be prescribed”. Therefore, viewed in any manner, the mere absence of rules laying down the procedure for moving a no-confidence motion against the Managing Committee, when ample authority is conferred by the Act, does not fetter the exercise of such right. A co-operative society is a democratic institution, bound to function so and to conduct its affairs based on democratic principles. That is the basis of the co-operative movement. In Usha Bharti v. State of U.P. [ 2014 (7) SCC 663 : AIR 2014 SC 1686 ], wherein the validity of Section 29 of the UP (Kshetra Panchayat and Zilla Panchayats) Act, 1961, which provided for removal of ‘Adhyaksha’ by a no- confidence motion was considered, the Apex Court, at para 37 of the judgment observed thus:- “In our opinion, the amendment as well as the main provision in Section 28 is in absolute accord with the vision explicitly enunciated in the Preamble of the Constitution of India . In fact, the spirit which led to ultimately encoding the goals of “WE THE PEOPLE” in the Preamble of the permeates all other provisions of the. The fundamental aim of the is to give power to the People. The guiding spirit of the Constitution is “WE THE PEOPLE OF INDIA”. In India, the People are supreme through the, and not the elected representatives. The fundamental aim of the is to give power to the People. The guiding spirit of the Constitution is “WE THE PEOPLE OF INDIA”. In India, the People are supreme through the, and not the elected representatives. Therefore, in our opinion, the provision for the right to recall through the vote of no-confidence is in no manner repugnant to any of the provisions of the  Constitution of India.’ (Underline supplied) 30.4. In Sivadasan Nair K. [ 2022 (2) KHC 58 ], the learned Single Judge noticed that, adding teeth to the power conferred under Section 33 of the KCS Act, the bye-laws of the Kerala State Co-operative Agricultural and Rural Development Bank Ltd. (the Society) also provide for the removal of the managing committee of the society by its general body. The absence of a prescription for any procedure does not stall the operation of that provision. Paragraph 17 of the decision of the learned Single Judge reads thus: ‘17. To crown all these, is the provision in Clause 58(1) of the bye-laws of the Society which provides:- “….The following among other matters shall be dealt with by the General Body:- (1) The election of the members of the Board and their removal”. Therefore, adding teeth to the power conferred under Section 33 of the KCS Act, the bye-laws of the Society also provide for removal of the Managing Committee of the Society by its general body. The absence of prescription of any procedure does not stall the operation of the provision.’ (Underline supplied) 30.5. In Sivadasan Nair K. [ 2022 (2) KHC 58 ], another contention raised by the petitioners was regarding the lack of power of the Registrar to summon a general body for considering a no-confidence motion. After referring to the provisions under Sections 29 and 30 of the KCS Act and Rule 36 of the KCS Rules, the learned Single Judge held that the Registrar is, under the KCS Act and the Rules made thereunder, vested with powers to call for a special general body to consider a no-confidence motion against the managing committee. It was further held that, requisition by a prescribed number of members, etc., as provided in sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the KCS Act does not apply to summoning of a special general body by the Registrar. Paragraph 18 of the decision of the learned Single Judge reads thus: 18. It was further held that, requisition by a prescribed number of members, etc., as provided in sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the KCS Act does not apply to summoning of a special general body by the Registrar. Paragraph 18 of the decision of the learned Single Judge reads thus: 18. Now adverting to the contention regarding lack of power of the Registrar to summon a General Body for considering a no-confidence motion, Section 29 (3) and Section 30 (3) of the KCS Act empower the Registrar to call for a general body meeting of the Society. (1) provides for the matters to be transacted in an annual general body meeting. Sub-clause (e) of (1) reads thus:- “Consideration of any other matter which may be brought forward in accordance with the bye-laws”. In Abdul Rahman v. Cheranellor Service Cooperative Bank Ltd. [(2015) 1 KLT (SN) 86], this court held that all business that could be transacted in a General Body meeting can be transacted in a Special General Body meeting also. Section 30 (3) of the KCS Act and Rule 36(2) of the KCS Rules gives wide powers to the Registrar to call for a Special General Body Meeting. The relevant provisions read thus:- “30(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub section (1) or subsection (2) the Registrar or any person authorised by him in this behalf may, at any time, call a special general body meeting of the society in such manner and at such time and place within the area of its operation as he may direct and such meeting shall be deemed to be a meeting called by the committee.” “36(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in the bylaws of a society as to the mode of summoning general meetings and the object, time and place of such meetings, the Registrar or any person authorised by him may at any time summon any special general body meeting of the society in such manner and at such time and place within the area of its operation as he may direct. He may also direct who should preside over such meetings and what matters shall be discussed by the meeting. Such meetings shall have all the powers of meeting called according to the provisions of the bylaws of the society notwithstanding that the meeting does not have the quorum fixed for a general body meeting under the bylaws. He may also direct who should preside over such meetings and what matters shall be discussed by the meeting. Such meetings shall have all the powers of meeting called according to the provisions of the bylaws of the society notwithstanding that the meeting does not have the quorum fixed for a general body meeting under the bylaws. Such meetings will not be invalid on the ground of any defect in the issue of notice, if Registrar is of opinion that business transacted and the decision taken in the meeting were in the better interest of the society and orders that the meeting and its deliberations were in order. The orders of the registrar in the matter shall be final. The expenses for summoning such meetings shall be borne by the society.” As provided therein, the powers conferred thereunder are, “notwithstanding” the stipulations in the other provisions. Therefore, it could only be held that the Registrar is, under the KCS Act and the Rules thereunder, vested with powers to call for a Special General Body to consider a no- confidence motion against the Managing Committee. It is further to be held that, requisition by a prescribed number of members etc., as provided in Section 30 (1), does not apply to summoning of a Special General Body by the Registrar.’ (Underline supplied) 31. The judgment of the learned Single Judge in Sivadasan Nair K. [ 2022 (2) KHC 58 ] was under challenge in W.A.No.159 of 2022 filed by the petitioners in W.P.(C)No.5 of 2022 (the petitioner herein and another). The said writ appeal ended in dismissal by the judgment dated 14.03.2022 - K. Sivadasan Nair and another v. State of Kerala and others, 2022 KER 13011. 32. In paragraph 7 of the decision in K. Sivadasan Nair [2022 KER 13011] , the Division Bench noticed the elaborate submission made by the learned counsel for the appellants (the petitioner herein and another). Paragraph 7 of the said decision reads thus; “7. Sri.George Poonthottam, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants made elaborate submissions in the matter. The learned Senior Counsel did not contend that the Act does not contemplate removal of an elected managing committee through a no-confidence motion inasmuch as it provides for the course to be adopted in the event a no- confidence motion is passed by the general body against the committee in Section 33 (1). The learned Senior Counsel did not contend that the Act does not contemplate removal of an elected managing committee through a no-confidence motion inasmuch as it provides for the course to be adopted in the event a no- confidence motion is passed by the general body against the committee in Section 33 (1). The contention of the learned counsel however was that although the said provision was introduced in the statute as early as in the year 1971, rules for giving effect to the same have so far not been incorporated in the Kerala Co-operative Societies Rules, 1969 (the Rules) and as such, the provision cannot be given effect to. The learned counsel has elaborated the said submission pointing out that in order to ensure a fair election to the managing committee, an independent body was also constituted in terms of the provisions of the Act as Co-operative Election Commission and this being the scheme of the Act, in the absence of similar provisions either in the Act or in the Rules framed thereunder for removal of the managing committee elected to power by the general body, it cannot be said that an elected managing committee for society could be removed through a no confidence motion. It was also argued by the learned counsel in this regard that if it is held that an elected managing committee could be removed in the fashion in which the managing committee was removed in the case on hand, an elected managing committee will always be at the mercy of the Registrar. It was also the contention of the learned counsel that since the provision has not been given effect to, except once, during the last 50 years, the same has become a dead letter and unenforceable in the light of the doctrine of desuetude. It was pointed out by the learned counsel that the decision taken on the no-confidence motion moved invoking the provision once was set at naught by this Court in Manojkumar K.M. v. Joint Registrar of Co-operative Societies (General), Kannur [ 2018 (1) KHC 717 ]. It was argued by the learned counsel that the contention aforesaid was repelled by the learned Single Judge taking the stand that appellants have not established that the provision has not been given effect to all these years, as claimed by them. It was argued by the learned counsel that the contention aforesaid was repelled by the learned Single Judge taking the stand that appellants have not established that the provision has not been given effect to all these years, as claimed by them. According to the learned counsel, the fact alleged being a negative fact, the learned Single Judge ought not have insisted the appellants to establish the same, especially when the assertion made by the appellants in the writ petition in this regard has not been refuted by the Registrar in the counter affidavit filed in the matter. It was also argued by the learned counsel that in the absence of any rules in place, the position now is that a managing committee of a society elected for a term can now be removed on a no- confidence motion at the drop of a hat and the seriousness of the situation has not been considered by the learned Single Judge. The learned counsel has also assailed the finding of the learned Single Judge that Ext.P9 notice issued by the Managing Director of the third respondent is in order, on the ground that the notice of the extra ordinary general body should have been issued by the officer authorised by the Registrar. It was argued by the learned counsel that insofar as this Court allowed the extra ordinary general body pursuant to Ext.P9 notice to take place as scheduled, this Court ought to have considered the correctness of the decision adopted on the no-confidence motion.” (Underline supplied) 32.1. In paragraph 9 of the decision in K. Sivadasan Nair [2022 KER 13011] , the Division Bench has dealt with the provisions of the Constitution (97 th Amendment) Act, 2011, the law laid down by the Apex Court in Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary [ (2015) 8 SCC 1 ] that constitutional status has been conferred on co-operative societies with the object of ensuring their autonomy and democratic functioning and that after the 97 th amendment to the Constitution, a co-operative society has to function as a democratic institution. The Division Bench noticed that even though Gujarat High Court in Rajendra N. Shah [2013 SCC OnLine Guj 2242] has declared the 97 th amendment to the Constitution inserting Part IXB to the Constitution to be ultra vires the Constitution for want of requisite ratification in terms of the proviso to Article 368(2) of the Constitution, and the said decision of the Gujarat High Court was upheld by the Apex Court in Rajendra N. Shah [ AIR 2021 SC 4905 ], except to the extent that it strikes down the entirety of Part IXB of the Constitution and declared that Part IXB of the Constitution is operative only insofar as it concerns multi-state co-operative societies, insofar as the amendment made to Article 19(1)(c) and the amendment made to Part IV of the Constitution inserting Article 43B are still part of the Constitution unaffected by the said judgments. Paragraph 9 of the said decision of the Division Bench reads thus; “9. It is seen that having realised the need to strengthen the democratic basis of co-operative societies and to provide for a constitutional status to them, in terms of the 97 th amendment to the Constitution, a new part titled "THE COOPERATIVE SOCIETIES" was introduced in the Constitution prescribing, among others, the manner in which co-operative societies registered under the law relating to co-operative societies in force in the States and also providing for establishment of multi-state co-operative societies. In addition, in terms of the said constitutional amendment, Article 43B was introduced in part IV of the Constitution providing that the State shall endeavour to promote voluntary formation, autonomous functioning, democratic control and professional management of co- operative societies. Similarly, Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution was also amended conferring on citizens a fundamental right to form co-operative societies. Having regard to the object of the 97 th amendment to the Constitution, in Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary v. Gujarat Co- operative Milk Marketing Federation Ltd. [ (2015) 8 SCC 1 ], the Apex Court has held that constitutional status has been conferred on co-operative societies with the object of ensuring their autonomy and democratic functioning and that after the 97 th amendment to the Constitution, a co- operative society has to function as a democratic institution. Paragraphs 14 and 15 of the judgment of the Apex Court in the said case read thus: xxx xxx xxx xxx Vipulbhai is a case where the question considered was as to whether in the absence of a provision in the regulatory enactment, an office bearer of a co-operative society could be removed by a no-confidence motion. Earlier, in S. Lakshmanan, President, Thiruvilwamala Weavers Cooperative Society Ltd. v. V. Velliankeri Member of Board of Directors, Thiruvilwamala Weavers Co-operative Society Ltd. [ AIR 2002 Ker 325 ], a Full Bench of this Court held that in the absence of a specific provision in the Act, the Rules made thereunder and the bye-laws of a co-operative society, an elected committee of a Society cannot move or consider a motion for loss of confidence in the President, Vice- President, Treasurer or any other office bearer of the managing committee. After referring to the decision of the Full Bench in Lakshmanan and the judgments of other High Courts taking identical views, the Apex Court has held that in the background of the 97 th amendment to the Constitution, since co-operative societies are bound to function as democratic institutions and conduct their affairs based on democratic principles, provisions for the same shall be reflected in the regulatory enactments and if not, it is for the court to read the democratic principles into the regulatory enactments. It was also held by the Apex Court in the case that if a procedure is prescribed in any Act, Rules or bye-laws regarding election of an office bearer and for removal thereof by way of motion of no confidence, the same procedure have to be followed and in case there is no express provision under the Act, Rules or bye-laws for removing of an office bearer, such office-bearer is liable to be removed in the event of loss of confidence by following the same procedure by which he was elected to office. Paragraphs 38, 42 and 51 of the judgment read thus : xxx xxx xxx xxx As seen from the extracted judgment, the argument based on the decision of this Court in Lakshmanan has not been accepted since the same is a decision rendered prior to the 97 th amendment to the Constitution. Paragraphs 38, 42 and 51 of the judgment read thus : xxx xxx xxx xxx As seen from the extracted judgment, the argument based on the decision of this Court in Lakshmanan has not been accepted since the same is a decision rendered prior to the 97 th amendment to the Constitution. Even though Gujarat High Court has declared the 97 th amendment to the Constitution inserting Part IXB to the Constitution to be ultra vires the Constitution for want of requisite ratification in terms of the proviso to Article 368(2) of the Constitution and even though the said decision of the Gujarat High Court was upheld by the Apex Court in Union of India v. Rajendra N. Shah [ AIR 2021 SC 4905 ], except to the extent that it strikes down the entirety of Part IXB of the Constitution and declared that Part IXB of the Constitution is operative only insofar as it concerns multi-state co-operative societies, insofar as the amendment made to Article 19(1)(c) and the amendment made to Part IV of the Constitution inserting Article 43B are still part of the Constitution unaffected by the judgments aforesaid, we are of the view that this court is bound to give due regard to the decision in Vipulbhai while considering a matter of this nature. It is all the more so since it is seen that the judgment in Vipulbhai was rendered having regard to the provision in Article 43B of the Constitution as well.” 32.2. It is all the more so since it is seen that the judgment in Vipulbhai was rendered having regard to the provision in Article 43B of the Constitution as well.” 32.2. In paragraph 10 of the decision in K. Sivadasan Nair [2022 KER 13011] , after referring to the provisions under sub- section (1) of Section 33 of the KCS Act, the law laid down by the Full Bench of this Court in S. Lakshmanan [ AIR 2002 Ker 325 ] and the law laid down by the Apex Court in Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary [ (2015) 8 SCC 1 ], the Division Bench observed that in the light of Article 43B of the Constitution of India providing for democratic control of co-operative societies, it is unnecessary to go into the question whether there exists any enabling provision for removal of an elected managing committee by the general body through a no-confidence motion, for a managing committee is constituted in a society in terms of Section 28 of the KCS Act by its general body, and as clarified by the Apex Court in Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary [ (2015) 8 SCC 1 ] , the authority of a body to remove a person elected by them to an office is part of the democratic control of co-operative societies. Paragraph 10 of the decision of the Division Bench reads thus; ‘10. The only provision in the Act contemplating removal of an elected committee by no-confidence motion is Section 33 . Sub-section (1) of, which is relevant in the context, reads thus: “33. Appointment of new committee or administrator on failure to constitute committee, etc.- xxx xxx xxx As noted, Section 33 is a provision dealing with the authority of the Registrar to appoint a new committee or administrator in any one of the contingencies mentioned therein. Removal of managing committee of a society through a no- confidence motion is one of the contingencies made mention of in the said provision. In other words, there is no specific enabling provision in the Act for removal of an elected managing committee of a society by its general body through a no-confidence motion. Removal of managing committee of a society through a no- confidence motion is one of the contingencies made mention of in the said provision. In other words, there is no specific enabling provision in the Act for removal of an elected managing committee of a society by its general body through a no-confidence motion. Even though there is no specific enabling provision, in Lakshmanan, a Full Bench of this Court has clarified that (1) of the Act empowers a no-confidence motion being passed against an elected committee, although the said judgment was not followed in Vipulbhai on a different score. The relevant clarification in Lakshmanan reads thus: “ Section 33 (1) of the Act envisages the passing of a no-confidence motion by the general body which results in wholesale removal of the committee. Barring this provision, there is no other provision by which an elected individual member of the committee can be removed.” However, in the light of Article 43B of the Constitution providing for democratic control of co-operative societies, we are of the view that it is unnecessary to go into the question whether there exists any enabling provision for removal of an elected managing committee by the general body through a no confidence motion, for a managing committee is constituted in a society in terms of Section 28 by its general body, and as clarified by the Apex Court in Vipulbhai, the authority of a body to remove a person elected by them to an office is part of the democratic control of co-operative societies.’ (Underline supplied) 32.3. In paragraphs 11 to 16 of the decision in K. Sivadasan Nair [2022 KER 13011] , the Division Bench has dealt with various arguments advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants and found no merit in such arguments and accordingly, dismissed the writ appeal. In paragraph 18 of the decision, the Division Bench pointed out the urgent need to frame rules for giving effect to the provisions of Section 28AB of the KCS Act. Paragraph 18 of the said decision reads thus: ‘18. Before parting with this judgment, it is necessary to mention that Section 28AB has been introduced to the Act so as to enable the managing committee of the society to remove an elected office bearer on a no-confidence motion for the first time only in the year 2002 in terms of Act 3 of 2002. Before parting with this judgment, it is necessary to mention that Section 28AB has been introduced to the Act so as to enable the managing committee of the society to remove an elected office bearer on a no-confidence motion for the first time only in the year 2002 in terms of Act 3 of 2002. Soon thereafter, by SRO No.1185 of 2003, the Rules have also been amended incorporating additional rules necessary to give effect to the said provision, obviously as it was felt that rules are required for a fair operation of the statutory provision. Rule 43A is the rule introduced to the Rules in this regard. Rule 43A reads thus: “43A. Removal of President, Vice-President, etc. by no-confidence motion.- xxx xxx xxx As evident from the extracted rule, it provides for various matters including the requirements of a notice to move the no-confidence motion, the procedure to be followed for giving notice, the officer who has to arrange for the consideration of the motion, the time within which the meeting of the committee shall be held for the consideration of the motion, the manner in which business shall be transacted in the meeting etc., whereas, in a more serious matter like removal of the entire managing committee by the general body, rules have not been framed, despite lapse of almost 50 years since the provision has been contemplated. There is, therefore, an urgent need to frame rules for giving effect to the provision in the Act which enables removal of a managing committee by the general body through a no-confidence motion, or else, with the frequent shifting of loyalties by persons belonging to different political parties who are in the helm of affairs in majority of co-operative societies in the State, the smooth functioning of the co-operative societies would be affected. The registry is, therefore, directed to forward a copy of this judgment to the Chief Secretary of the State for appropriate action.’ (Underline supplied) 33. Seeking review of the judgment of the Division Bench in K. Sivadasan Nair [2022 KER 13011] , the appellants therein (the petitioner herein and another) filed R.P.No.330 of 2022. By the order dated 10.06.2022 - K. Sivadasan Nair and another v. State of Kerala and others [2022 KER 27367] the Division Bench dismissed R.P.No.330 of 2022. Seeking review of the judgment of the Division Bench in K. Sivadasan Nair [2022 KER 13011] , the appellants therein (the petitioner herein and another) filed R.P.No.330 of 2022. By the order dated 10.06.2022 - K. Sivadasan Nair and another v. State of Kerala and others [2022 KER 27367] the Division Bench dismissed R.P.No.330 of 2022. In paragraph 7 of the order, the Division Bench has referred to the arguments advanced by the learned Senior Counsel for the review petitioners. Paragraph 7 of the order in R.P.No.330 of 2022 reads thus: “7. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants raised two contentions. The first contention was that the statement in paragraph 7 of the judgment that he did not contend at the time of hearing that the Act does not contemplate removal of an elected managing committee on a no-confidence motion is incorrect inasmuch as one of the contentions urged at the time of hearing was that in the absence of a provision enabling the same in the Act, a no-confidence motion cannot be moved against an elected managing committee. The submission of the learned Senior Counsel, therefore, was that the said argument should have been met by this court while disposing of the appeal. The second contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel is that the judgment sought to be reviewed was one rendered solely based on the decision of the Apex Court in Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary v. Gujarat Coop. Milk Mktg. Federation Ltd. [ (2015) 8 SCC 1 ]; that the said judgment was one rendered based on the 97 th amendment to the Constitution, and since the 97 th amendment to the Constitution has been declared unconstitutional subsequently, the very foundation of the judgment is lost.” (Underline supplied) 33.1. In the order dated 10.06.2022 in R.P.No.330 of 2022 - K. Sivadasan Nair [2022 KER 27367] , the Division Bench found that in paragraph 10 of the judgment sought to be reviewed, although the Court has taken note of the fact that there is no specific enabling provision in the KCS Act for removal of an elected managing committee on a no-confidence motion, it was found that in the light of the observation made by the Full Bench of this Court in S. Lakshmanan [AIR 2002 Kerala 325] , the provision in Section 33 (1) of the Act needs to be understood as an enabling provision. It was also observed in the said paragraph that, in the light of Article 43B of the Constitution of India providing for democratic control of co-operative societies, it is unnecessary to delve deep into the question whether there exists any enabling provision for the removal of an elected managing committee on a no-confidence motion. Paragraph 9 of the order reads thus; “9. As evident from the judgment rendered by the learned Single Judge, the appellants were proceeding in the writ petition as if Section 33 (1) of the Act enables moving of a no-confidence motion against an elected managing committee. The argument before the learned Single Judge, therefore, was that the said provision has become a dead letter consequent on its non-user, applying the doctrine of desuetude. True, in the course of arguments, the court entertained a doubt as to whether the provision in (1) could be construed as an enabling provision for moving a no-confidence motion against an elected managing committee and in the said context, the learned Senior Counsel for the appellants submitted that the said provision cannot be construed as an enabling provision for the said purpose. It was also submitted by the learned Senior Counsel that the provision in (1) can be understood only as one providing for the further course of action to be adopted by the authorities under the Act in the event a no-confidence motion being passed against an elected managing committee. The learned Senior Counsel for the appellants, however, is not right in contending that this Court has not considered the said contention. In paragraph 10 of the judgment, although this Court has taken note of the fact that there is no specific enabling provision in the Act for removal of an elected managing committee on a no-confidence motion, it was found that in the light of the observation made by the Full Bench of this Court in S. Lakshmanan, President, Thiruvilwamala Weavers Co-operative Society Ltd. v. V. Velliankeri, Member of Board of Directors, Thiruvilwamala Weavers Co-operative Society Ltd. [AIR 2002 Kerala 325], the provision in (1) of the Act needs to be understood as an enabling provision. As noted, it was also observed by this court in the said paragraph that, in the light of Article 43B of the Constitution providing for democratic control of co-operative societies, it is unnecessary to delve deep into the question whether there exists any enabling provision for removal of an elected managing committee on a no-confidence motion. Needless to say, there is no merit in the first contention.” (Underline supplied) 33.2. In paragraphs 10 and 11 of the order in R.P.No.330 of 2022 - K. Sivadasan Nair [2022 KER 27367] , the Division Bench dealt with the second contention raised by the review petitioners. The Division Bench noticed that the 97 th amendment to the Constitution, inserting Part-IXB into the Constitution, was held to be ultra vires the Constitution by the Gujarat High Court in W.P. (PIL) No.166 of 2012 - Rajendra N. Shah v. Union of India, 2013 SCC OnLine Guj 2242 - for not taking recourse to Article 368(2) of the Constitution providing for ratification by the majority of the State Legislatures. It was, however, clarified in the judgment that the said decision will not affect other parts of the 97 th amendment to the Constitution. In Rajendra N. Shah [ AIR 2021 SC 4905 ], the decision of the Gujarat High Court was upheld by the Apex Court only to the limited extent it strikes down the entirety of Part IXB of the Constitution in relation to co- operative societies other than multi-state co-operative societies by declaring that Part IXB of the Constitution is operative only to multi-state co-operative societies. In other words, the amendment made to Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution and the amendment made to Part IV of the Constitution inserting Article 43B as part of the Constitution are unaffected by the judgments aforesaid. It cannot, therefore, be said that the decision of the Apex Court in Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary [ (2015) 8 SCC 1 ] cannot be relied on for any purpose whatsoever. The said facts in the judgment were referred to in the judgment sought to be reviewed, in which the decision of the Apex Court in Vipulbhai M. Chaudhary [(2015) 8 SCC 1] was relied only to the extent the said judgment deals with the scope of Article 43B introduced into the Constitution in terms of the 97 th amendment. Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the said order read thus; “10. Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the said order read thus; “10. Coming to the second contention, as noted, the argument is that the judgment sought to be reviewed is one rendered solely based on the decision of the Apex Court in Vipulbhai; that the decision in Vipulbhai was one rendered based on the 97 th amendment to the Constitution, and since the said amendment has been declared unconstitutional subsequently, the very foundation of the judgment is lost. It is doubtful as to whether a review of the judgment could be sought on this ground. Be that as it may, we propose to deal with this contention. First of all, the judgment sought to be reviewed is not one rendered solely based on the decision of the Apex Court in Vipulbhai. The foundation of the judgment is the provision contained in Section 33 (1) of the Act, the scope of which has been explained by the Full Bench of this Court in Lakshmanan. Of course, Article 43B of the Constitution introduced in terms of the 97 th amendment to the Constitution, and its scope explained by the Apex Court in Vipulbhai that the authority of a body to remove a person elected by that body to an office is part of the democratic control of co-operative societies, has been relied on by this Court to reinforce the conclusion arrived at. 11. True, Vipulbhai is a case where decision was rendered by the Apex Court based on the 97 th amendment to the Constitution, in terms of which, among others, Part-IXB was introduced to the Constitution. In terms of the said constitutional amendment, Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution was also amended, conferring a fundamental right on citizens to form co-operative societies and Article 43B was introduced in Part IV of the Constitution, providing that the State shall endeavour to promote voluntary promotion, autonomous functioning, democratic control and professional management of co-operative societies. The 97 th amendment to the Constitution, inserting Part-IXB into the Constitution, was held to be ultra vires the Constitution by the Gujarat High Court in W.P. (PIL) No.166 of 2012 for not taking recourse to Article 368(2) of the Constitution providing for ratification by the majority of the State Legislatures. It was, however, clarified in the judgment that the said decision will not affect other parts of the 97 th amendment to the Constitution. It was, however, clarified in the judgment that the said decision will not affect other parts of the 97 th amendment to the Constitution. The operative portion of the judgment of the Gujarat High Court reads thus: “We, therefore, allow this Public Interest Litigation by declaring that the Constitution [97 th amendment] Act, 2011 inserting part IXB containing Articles 243ZH to 243ZT is ultra vires the Constitution of India for not taking recourse to Article 368(2) of the Constitution providing for ratification by the majority of the State Legislatures. This order, however, will not affect other parts of the Constitution [97 th amendment] Act, 2011. In the facts and circumstances, there will be no order as to costs.” The said decision of the Gujarat High Court was challenged before the Apex Court and the matter was disposed of in terms of the judgment in Union of India v. Rajendra N. Shah [ AIR 2021 SC 4905 ]. In terms of the said judgment, the decision of the Gujarat High Court was upheld by the Apex Court only to the limited extent it strikes down the entirety of Part IXB of the Constitution in relation to co-operative societies other than multi-state co-operative societies by declaring that Part IXB of the Constitution is operative only to multi-state co-operative societies. The operative portion of the majority opinion in the said case reads thus: “The judgment of the High Court is upheld except to the extent that it strikes down the entirety of Part IXB of the Constitution of India . As held by us above, it is declared that Part IXB of the is operative only insofar as it concerns multi-state co- operative societies both within the various States and in the Union territories of India. The appeals are accordingly disposed of.” In other words, the amendment made to Article 19(1)(c) and the amendment made to Part IV of the Constitution inserting Article 43B is part of the Constitution unaffected by the judgments aforesaid. We are of the view that it cannot, therefore, be said that the decision of the Apex Court in Vipulbhai cannot be relied on for any purpose whatsoever. We are of the view that it cannot, therefore, be said that the decision of the Apex Court in Vipulbhai cannot be relied on for any purpose whatsoever. We have referred to the said facts in the judgment, and we have relied on the decision of the Apex Court in Vipulbhai only to the extent the said judgment deals with the scope of Article 43B introduced into the Constitution in terms of the 97 th amendment. Needless to say, there is no merit in the second contention as well.” (Underline supplied) 34. The judgment dated 14.03.2022 in W.A.No.159 of 2022 - K. Sivadasan Nair [2022 KER 13011] - and the order dated 10.06.2022 in R.P.No.330 of 2022 - K. Sivadasan Nair [2022 KER 27367] - were under challenge before the Apex Court in SLP(C)Diary No.21745 of 2022 filed by the appellants- petitioners. The said SLP ended in dismissal by the order of the Apex Court dated 05.08.2022. The said order reads thus: “Delay condoned. We are not inclined to interfere with the impugned judgment, and hence, the special leave petition is dismissed. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.” 35. As already noticed hereinbefore, the amendment made to Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution of India , providing for the right to form co-operative societies as a fundamental right, and the insertion of Article 43B in Part IV of the, under the Directive Principles of State Policy, are unaffected by the decision of the Gujrat High Court in Rajendra N. Shah [2013 SCC OnLine Guj 2242] and the decision of the Apex Court in Rajendra N. Shah [ AIR 2021 SC 4905 ] . Therefore, Article 19(1)(c), as amended by the Constitution (97 th Amendment) Act, 2011, and Article 43B are still part of the. Under Article 19(1)(c) of the, as amended by the Amendment Act of 2011, all citizens shall have the right to form associations or unions or co-operative societies. As per Article 43B inserted by the Amendment Act of 2011, the State shall endeavour to promote voluntary formation, autonomous functioning, democratic control and professional management of co-operative societies. Even before the said amendment, the ‘National Policy on Co-operatives’, announced in March 2002, has recognised democracy, equality, equity and solidarity as values of co-operatives. 36. As per Article 43B inserted by the Amendment Act of 2011, the State shall endeavour to promote voluntary formation, autonomous functioning, democratic control and professional management of co-operative societies. Even before the said amendment, the ‘National Policy on Co-operatives’, announced in March 2002, has recognised democracy, equality, equity and solidarity as values of co-operatives. 36. The amendment made to Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution of India by the Amendment Act of 2011, providing for the right to form co-operative societies as a fundamental right, and the insertion of Article 43B in Part IV, under the Directive Principles of State Policy, providing for constitutional status to co- operative societies, have brought out radical changes in the concept of co-operative societies. Democratic control and autonomy have now become the core constitutional values of a co-operative society, and a co-operative society registered under the Central Act or the State Act is bound to function as a democratic institution and conduct its affairs on democratic principles. 37. In view of the provisions under sub-section (1) of Section 33 of the KCS Act, after its amendment by the Kerala Co- operative Societies (Amendment) Act, 1971, where a no- confidence motion is passed by the general body against the existing committee, the Registrar may, either suo motu or on the application of any member of the society, after intimating the circle co-operative union, appoint (i) a new committee consisting of not more than three members of the society; or (ii) one or more Administrator or Administrators who need not be a member or members of the society, to manage the affairs of the society till a new committee enters upon office. 38. In S. Lakshmanan [ AIR 2002 Ker 325 ], a Full Bench of this Court noticed the position (before the insertion of Section 23AB of the KCS Act and Rule 43A of the KCS Rules) that the only contingency under which the committee may be removed before the end of its tenure is indicated in sub-section (1) of Section 33 of the KCS Act, which envisages the passing of a no-confidence motion by the general body, which results in the wholesale removal of the committee. 39. 39. Prior to the addition of Rule 43C of the KCS Rules, by the Kerala Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Rules, 2025, the petitioner herein [Shaji Mohan], along with another member of the board of directors of the Kerala State Co-operative Agricultural and Rural Development Bank Ltd. (the Society), filed W.P.(C)No.5 of 2022 before this Court. In the said writ petition, the petitioners have sought for a declaration that the amendment made to sub- section (1) of Section 33 of the KCS Act, in terms of Act 33 of 1971, to the extent it enables appointment of a new committee or administrator on a no-confidence motion being passed by the general body against the existing managing committee, stands repealed by the application of the doctrine of desuetude; and a declaration that a no-confidence motion cannot be moved against an elected managing committee of a society. The question that came up for consideration before the learned Single Judge was whether the power under of the KCS Act, which provides for moving a no-confidence motion against the managing committee, can be exercised in the absence of rules laying down the procedure for moving a no-confidence motion. 40. In Sivadasan Nair K. [ 2022 (2) KHC 58 ] - judgment dated 27.01.2022 in W.P.(C)No.5 of 2022 - a decision rendered prior to the addition of Rule 43C of the KCS Rules, by the Kerala Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Rules, 2025, the learned Single Judge noticed that in S. Lakshmanan [AIR 2002 Ker 325] the Full Bench had recognised the power conferred under the KCS Act on the general body of a society to remove its managing committee through a motion of no-confidence. The learned Single Judge held that Section 33 of the KCS Act does not prescribe any procedure for moving a motion of no-confidence, nor does it provide that the motion is to be moved in any particular manner ‘prescribed’ or ‘as may be prescribed’. Therefore, the mere absence of rules laying down the procedure for moving a no- confidence motion against the managing committee, when ample authority is conferred by the KCS Act, does not fetter the exercise of such right. Therefore, the mere absence of rules laying down the procedure for moving a no- confidence motion against the managing committee, when ample authority is conferred by the KCS Act, does not fetter the exercise of such right. The learned Single Judge noticed that, adding teeth to the power conferred under of the KCS Act, the bye- laws of the Kerala State Co-operative Agricultural and Rural Development Bank Ltd. (the Society) also provide for the removal of the managing committee of the Society by its general body. The absence of a prescription for any procedure does not stall the operation of that provision. 41. Rule 43C of the KCS Rules, added by the Kerala Co- operative Societies (Amendment) Rules, 2025, [extracted hereinbefore at paragraph 29, pages 45 to 47], laid down the procedure for a motion of no-confidence for the removal of the managing committee by the general body. As per sub-rule (1) of Rule 43C , a motion expressing want of confidence in the managing committee of a society/bank shall be moved in accordance with the procedure laid down therein. As per sub-rule (13) of Rule 43C , if the motion is not carried by such majority as aforesaid or the meeting cannot be held for want of quorum, under sub-rule (6), no notice of any subsequent motion expressing want of confidence in the same managing committee shall be received until after the expiry of six months from the date of meeting or the date fixed for the motion, as the case may be. 42. The principle of ‘representative democracy’ in the case of co-operative societies is the election of representatives by the general body, which consists of members eligible to cast their votes, and the representatives thus elected constitute the board of the elected representatives, which may be called the board of directors, the governing body, or the managing committee, to which the general body entrust the control and management of the affairs of the society. That representative body elects from among them the President, the Vice-President and other office- bearers, by choosing someone as the most suitable to be the leader or the office-bearer. When democracy, equality, equity and solidarity are recognised as the values of co-operatives, democratic accountability, mutual trust, unity or agreement of feeling among the elected representatives, cooperativeness, fairness, impartiality, etc., are among the cardinal dimensions of the co-operative principles. 43. When democracy, equality, equity and solidarity are recognised as the values of co-operatives, democratic accountability, mutual trust, unity or agreement of feeling among the elected representatives, cooperativeness, fairness, impartiality, etc., are among the cardinal dimensions of the co-operative principles. 43. A co-operative society built on co-operative principles cannot be controlled and managed by a board of directors, a governing body, or a managing committee, in which the general body, which consists of members eligible to cast their votes, has no confidence. In such an event, the general body should necessarily have a democratic right to remove from office the board of directors, the governing body, or the managing committee in which they do not have confidence. Similarly, if persons elected to the office of the President, the Vice-President, and other office-bearers lose the confidence of the board of directors, the governing body, or the managing committee, such board of directors, the governing body, or the managing committee should necessarily have a democratic right to remove from office such President, Vice-President or other office-bearers, in whom they do not have confidence. Therefore, having regard to the democratic set-up of co-operative societies, the right of the board of directors, the governing body, or the managing committee, under Section 28AB of the KCS Act, to remove from the office the President, the Vice-President, and other office- bearers in whom they do not have confidence, through a no- confidence motion, as per the procedure prescribed in Rule 43A of the KCS Rules, and the right of the general body under sub-section (1) of Section 33 of the KCS Act, to remove from office the board of directors, the governing body, or the managing committee of a society, in which they do not have confidence, through a no- confidence motion, as per the procedure laid down in Rule 43C of the KCS Rules, are part of the democratic control of co-operative societies, which cannot be said to be against the scheme under which election to the managing committee of a co-operative society is held under the provisions of the KCS Act and the rules made thereunder, i.e., the KCS Rules. Therefore, we find absolutely no merit in the contention of the petitioner that Rule 43C of the KCS Rules, added by the Kerala Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Rules, 2025, is unconstitutional, ultra vires the provisions under the KCS Act, and against the scheme under which election to the managing committee of a co-operative society is being held. 44. In State of U.P. v. Hindustan Aluminium Corporation, (1979) 3 SCC 229 , the Apex Court held that the grounds of challenging the validity of subordinate legislation are well known. The challenge may be on the ground that the power to make the law could not have been exercised in the circumstances which were prevailing at the time when it was made, or that a condition precedent to the making of the legislation did not exist, or that the authority which made the order was not competent to do so, or that the order was not made according to the procedure prescribed by law, or that its provisions were outside the scope of the enabling power in the Parent Act or were otherwise violative of its provisions or of any other existing statute. 45. In Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education v. Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth, (1984) 4 SCC 27 , the Apex Court held that it would be wholly wrong for the Court to substitute its own opinion for that of the Legislature or its delegate as to what principle or policy would best serve the objects and purposes of the Act and to sit in judgment over the wisdom and effectiveness or otherwise of the policy laid down by the regulation-making body and declare a regulation to be ultra vires merely on the ground that, in the view of the Court, the impugned provisions will not help to serve the object and purpose of the Act. So long as the body entrusted with the task of framing the rules or regulations acts within the scope of the authority conferred on it, in the sense that the rules or regulations made by it have a rational nexus with the object and purpose of the statute, the Court should not concern itself with the wisdom or efficaciousness of such rules or regulations. It is exclusively within the province of the Legislature and its delegates to determine, as a matter of policy, how the provisions of the statute can best be implemented and what measures, substantive as well as procedural, would have to be incorporated in the rules or regulations for the efficacious achievement of the objects and purposes of the Act. It is not for the Court to examine the merits or demerits of such a policy because its scrutiny has to be limited to the question as to whether the impugned regulations fall within the scope of the regulation-making power conferred on the delegate by the statute. 46. In Pankajaksy [ 1987 (2) KLT 723 ] , a decision relied on by the learned Advocate General, after referring to the law on the point, including the law laid down in the decisions referred to supra, a Division Bench of this Court held that the rule made under a statute by an authority delegated for the purpose can be challenged on the ground that (i) it is ultra vires of the Act; (ii) it is opposed to the Fundamental rights; (iii) it is opposed to other plenary laws. To ascertain whether a rule is ultra vires of the Act, the Court can go into the question (a) whether it contravenes expressly or impliedly any of the provisions of the statute; (b) whether it achieves the intent and object of the Act; and (c) whether it is ‘unreasonable’ to be manifestly arbitrary, unjust or partial implying thereby want of authority to make such rules. 47. As already noticed hereinbefore, in W.P.(C)No.5 of 2022 filed by the petitioner herein [Shaji Mohan], along with another member of the board of directors of the Kerala State Co- operative Agricultural and Rural Development Bank Ltd. (the Society), the petitioners have sought for a declaration that the amendment made to sub-section (1) of Section 33 of the KCS Act, in terms of Act 33 of 1971, to the extent it enables appointment of a new committee or administrator on a no-confidence motion being passed by the general body against the existing managing committee, stands repealed by the application of the doctrine of desuetude; and a declaration that a no-confidence motion cannot be moved against an elected managing committee of a society. 48. 48. In the judgment dated 27.01.2022 - Sivadasan Nair K. [ 2022 (2) KHC 58 ] - while declining the reliefs sought for in W.P.(C)No.5 of 2022, the learned Single Judge noticed that in S. Lakshmanan [ AIR 2002 Ker 325 ] the Full Bench had recognised the power conferred under the KCS Act on the general body of a society to remove its managing committee through a motion of no-confidence. W.A.No.159 of 2022 filed by the petitioners in that writ petition ended in dismissal by the judgment dated 14.03.2022 - K. Sivadasan Nair [2022 KER 13011] - after taking note of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Rajendra N. Shah [ AIR 2021 SC 4905 ] . R.P. No. 330 of 2022 filed by the appellants in W.A.No.159 of 2022 ended in dismissal by the order dated 10.06.2022 - K. Sivadasan Nair [2022 KER 27367] . SLP(C) Diary No.21745 of 2022 filed by the appellants in W.A.No.159 of 2022 also ended in dismissal by the order of the Apex Court dated 05.08.2022. 49. After the addition of Rule 43C of the KCS Rules, by the Kerala Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Rules, 2025, the petitioner has chosen to file W.P.(C)No.15817 of 2025 before this Court, seeking various reliefs, including a declaration that the said amendment made to the KCS Rules is unconstitutional and against the scheme under which election to the managing committee of a co-operative society is being held. As already noticed, the contingency under which the managing committee may be removed before the end of its tenure is indicated in sub-section (1) of Section 33 of the KCS Act, which envisages the passing of a no-confidence motion by the general body, which results in the wholesale removal of the committee. As already noticed, the contingency under which the managing committee may be removed before the end of its tenure is indicated in sub-section (1) of Section 33 of the KCS Act, which envisages the passing of a no-confidence motion by the general body, which results in the wholesale removal of the committee. As already held, having regard to the democratic set-up of co-operative societies, the right of the general body under sub-section (1) of of the KCS Act, to remove from office the board of directors, the governing body, or the managing committee of a society, in which they do not have confidence, through a no-confidence motion, as per the procedure laid down in Rule 43C of the KCS Rules, is part of the democratic control of co-operative societies, which cannot be said to be against the scheme under which election to the managing committee of a co-operative society is held under the provisions of the KCS Act and the rules made thereunder, i.e., the KCS Rules. Rule 43C of the KCS Rules only laid down the procedure for a no- confidence motion under sub-section (1) of of the KCS Act, for the removal of the managing committee by the general body. 50. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in Hindustan Aluminium Corporation [ (1979) 3 SCC 229 ] Paritosh Bhupeshkumar Sheth [ (1984) 4 SCC 27 ] and the law laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in Pankajaksy [ 1987 (2) KLT 723 ] , a rule made under a statute by an authority delegated for the purpose can be challenged on the ground that (i) it is ultra vires of the Act; (ii) it is opposed to the Fundamental rights; (iii) it is opposed to other plenary laws. Rule 43C of the KCS Rules laid down the procedure for a no-confidence motion under sub-section (1) of Section 33 of the KCS Act, for the removal of the managing committee by the general body. Rule 43C of the KCS Rules laid down the procedure for a no-confidence motion under sub-section (1) of Section 33 of the KCS Act, for the removal of the managing committee by the general body. So long as the body entrusted with the task of framing the rules under Section 109 of the KCS Act acts within the scope of the authority conferred on it, while laying down the procedure for a no-confidence motion under sub-section (1) of of the said Act, by adding Rule 43C to the KCS Rules, this Court in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should not concern itself with the wisdom or efficaciousness of such a rule. None of the grounds raised in W.P.(C)No.15817 of 2025 to contend that Rule 43C of the KCS Rules is ultra vires the provisions of the KCS Act and hence unconstitutional, would fall within the permissible grounds, as laid down by the Apex Court and the Division Bench of this Court in the decisions referred to supra, for challenging Rule 43C of the KCS Rules made under of the KCS Act by the authority delegated for the purpose. Therefore, contention to the contra raised by the petitioner is absolutely untenable, and the same is accordingly rejected. 51. In State of M.P. v. G.C. Mandawar,  (1954) 1 SCC 970 , a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court held that the power of the Court to declare a law void under Article 13 of the Constitution of India has to be exercised with reference to the specific legislation which is impugned. It is conceivable that when the same Legislature enacts two different laws, but in substance they form one legislation, it might be open to the Court to disregard the form and treat them as one law and strike it down, if in their conjunction they result in discrimination. But such a course is not open where the two laws sought to be read in conjunction are by different Governments and by different legislatures. Article 14 does not authorise the striking down of a law of one State on the ground that, in contrast with a law of another State on the same subject, its provisions are discriminatory. But such a course is not open where the two laws sought to be read in conjunction are by different Governments and by different legislatures. Article 14 does not authorise the striking down of a law of one State on the ground that, in contrast with a law of another State on the same subject, its provisions are discriminatory. Nor does it contemplate a law of the Centre or of the State dealing with similar subjects being held to be unconstitutional by a process of comparative study of the provisions of the two enactments. The sources of authority for the two statutes being different, Article 14 can have no application. 52. In Javed v. State of Haryana, (2003) 8 SCC 369 , a Three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court held that it is not permissible to compare a piece of legislation enacted by a State in exercise of its own legislative power with the provisions of another law, though pari materia it may be, but enacted by Parliament or by another State Legislature within its own power to legislate. The sources of power are different, and so are those who exercise power. The Constitution Bench in G.C. Mandawar [(1954) 1 SCC 970] held that the power of the Court to declare a law void under Article 13 has to be exercised with reference to the specific legislation which is impugned. Two laws enacted by two different Governments and by two different legislatures can be read neither in conjunction nor by comparison for the purpose of finding out if they are discriminatory. Article 14 does not authorise the striking down of a law of one State on the ground that, in contrast with a law of another State on the same subject, its provisions are discriminatory. When the sources of authority for the two statutes are different, Article 14 can have no application. So is the view taken in Bar Council of U.P. v. State of U.P. (1973) 1 SCC 261 , State of T.N. v. Ananthi Ammal , (1995) 1 SCC 519 and Prabhakaran Nair v. State of T.N. (1987) 4 SCC 238 . 53. When the sources of authority for the two statutes are different, Article 14 can have no application. So is the view taken in Bar Council of U.P. v. State of U.P. (1973) 1 SCC 261 , State of T.N. v. Ananthi Ammal , (1995) 1 SCC 519 and Prabhakaran Nair v. State of T.N. (1987) 4 SCC 238 . 53. As already held, having regard to the democratic set- up of co-operative societies, the right of the general body under sub-section (1) of Section 33 of the KCS Act, to remove from office the board of directors, the governing body, or the managing committee of a society, in which they do not have confidence, through a no-confidence motion, as per the procedure laid down in Rule 43C of the KCS Rules, is part of the democratic control of co-operative societies, which cannot be said to be against the scheme under which election to the managing committee of a co- operative society is held under the provisions of the KCS Act and the rules made thereunder, i.e., the KCS Rules. Rule 43C of the KCS Rules only laid down the procedure for a no-confidence motion under sub-section (1) of of the KCS Act, for the removal of the managing committee by the general body. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in G.C. Mandawar [(1954) 1 SCC 970] and Javed [ (2003) 8 SCC 369 ] , the absence of a provision pari materia to Rule 43C of the KCS Rules, which confers power on the general body of a co-operative society to remove its managing committee, under sub-section (1) of of the KCS Act, through a motion of no-confidence, in the laws relating to co-operative societies in other states is not a ground on which the provisions under the said rule can be declared as unconstitutional and ultra vires the provisions of the KCS Act, in exercise of the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India . Therefore, contention to the contra raised by the petitioner, after referring to the provisions under Section 34A of the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Act, 1964, Rule 24A of the Andhra Pradesh Co-operative Societies Rules, 1964; Rule 62 of the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Rules, 1988, made under the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act, 1983; etc., is absolutely untenable, and the same is accordingly rejected. 54. 54. Therefore, the question of law referred to the Division Bench, by the order of reference dated 06.10.2025 of the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No.15817 of 2025 is answered against the petitioner by holding that Rule 43C of the KCS Rules, added by the Kerala Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Rules, 2025, which laid down the procedure for a no-confidence motion under sub- section (1) of Section 33 of the KCS Act, for the removal of the managing committee by the general body, is neither unconstitutional nor ultra vires the provisions of the KCS Act. The said rule is also not against the scheme under which election to the managing committee of a co-operative society is held under the provisions of the KCS Act and the rules made thereunder, i.e. the KCS Rules. Registry to list W.P.(C)No.15817 of 2025 before the Single Bench as per roster, on 08.06.2026.