[2026:RJ-JP:15631] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 1439/2014 Mohit Anupkumar Sukhwani S/o Shri Anup Sukhwani, R/o House No. 13, Opposite Shankar Bhuvan,Bungalow Ara, Kubernagar, Ahmedabad. ----Petitioner Versus 1. State of Rajasthan through PP 2. Smt. Pujaben Fatwani D/o Shri Omprakash Fatwani, W/o Shri Mohit Anupkumar Sukhwani, presently resident of House No. 1 Kha 15, Near Jyoti Mandir, Dadawadi, Kota. ----Respondent For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Jaswant Singh for Mr. Harendra Singh Sinsinwar For Respondent(s) : Mr. Jitendra Singh Rathore, PP with Mr. Shubham Sain, AAAG For Complainant : None present JUSTICE ANOOP KUMAR DHAND Order 15/04/2026 1. By way of filing the instant criminal misc. petition, a prayer has been made to quash and set aside the entire proceedings arising out of the impugned FIR No. 175/2013, registered with the Mahila Police Station, District Kota City for the offences punishable under Sections 498A and 406 IPC, and a further challenge has also been led to the impugned order dated 04.07.2013, by which cognizance has been taken against the petitioner by the Court of the Judicial Magistrate No. 5, Kota in Criminal Case No. 134/2013 for the above stated offences. 2. Learned counsel for the accused-petitioner submits that marriage of the accused-petitioner was solemnised with the [2026:RJ-JP:15631] (2 of 9) [CRLMP-1439/2014] complainant-respondent No. 2 on 31.10.2012 but their marriage could not pull on well, therefore, the accused-petitioner submitted an application under Section 12 & 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 before the Family Court, Ahmedabad on 22.04.2013. Counsel further submits that in counterblast to the aforesaid application for divorce, the impugned FIR was registered by the complainant-respondent against the accused-petitioner on 07.05.2013. 3. Counsel submits that during pendency of the investigation in the impugned FIR and the proceedings before the Family Court, Ahmedabad, the parties have amicably settled their dispute by entering into a compromise on 20.05.2013 and it was mutually agreed that the complainant-respondent would withdraw the impugned FIR No. 175/13 from the concerned Police Station and the accused-petitioner would pay a lumpsum amount of Rs. 2,50,000/- in cash and Rs. 3,01,000/- by way of Demand Draft to the complainant, as permanent maintenance and the complainant- respondent has agreed not to demand any maintenance in the future. The complainant-respondent has also received her stridhan along with other articles received by her during the marriage. Counsel submits that the entire amount was paid by the accused- petitioner to the complainant-respondent and the receipts in this regard are available on the record. He further submits that at the time of execution of the aforesaid compromise between the parties, the accused-petitioner was in police custody and on the basis of the aforesaid compromise, the petitioner was released on bail. [2026:RJ-JP:15631] (3 of 9) [CRLMP-1439/2014] 4. Counsel submits that in furtherance of the aforesaid compromise, the acused-petitioner withdrew the application submitted by him under Section 12 & 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act before the Family Court, Ahmedabad. Counsel submits that even after receipt of the aforesaid amount of permanent maintenance by the complainant-respondent and release of the accused- petitioner from jail, the complainant-respondent never turned up before any Court of Law for rejuvenation of their marriage. Thereafter, a social divorce took place between the parties and the complainant-respondent has solemnised second marriage with another person namely Omprakash. In spite of the above development of the settlement arrived at between the parties, continuation of such proceedings against the accused-petitioner tantamounts to abuse of the process of law. Counsel submits that under these circumstances, the impugned proceedings arising out of the impugned FIR No. 175/2013 be quashed on the basis of the aforesaid compromise. 5. Per contra, learned Public Prosecutor opposes the prayer made in the instant petition. 6. None has put appearance on behalf of the respondent No.2 inspite of service. 7. Heard and considered the submissions made at the Bar and perused the material available on record. 8. Considering the arguments put forward by the learned counsel for the accused-petitioner and looking to the fact that a settlement has been arrived at between the parties on 20.05.2013, wherein, it has been mutually agreed that the complainant-respondent would withdraw the impugned FIR from [2026:RJ-JP:15631] (4 of 9) [CRLMP-1439/2014] the concerned Police Station, after receiving the lumpsum amount of permanent maintenance. The perusal of the record indicates that she has received the aforesaid lumpsum amount of maintenance, however, she has not appeared before the police station or before the Trial Court for execution of the compromise deed and for closure of the proceedings pending against the accused-petitioner under Section 498A IPC and 406 IPC. 9. Recently, the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Dhananjay Rathi Vs. Ruchika Rathi reported in 2026 SCC OnLine SC 587 has held in para Nos. 30 to 41 as under:- “30. It is trite law that once the parties have entered into a settlement agreement which was duly authenticated by the mediator, in case of any resilement from such terms as agreed upon in the settlement, the resiling party must be encumbered with heavy costs. Any deviation from the terms of the settlement arrived in mediation and later confirmed by the Court should be dealt with strictly as such deviation harbors an attack to the foundational basis of the entire process of mediation. This Court in the case of Gimpex Private Limited v. Manoj Goel, (2022) 11 SCC 705, while dealing with a compromise entered between the parties in case of cheque dishonour, held that the parties cannot be allowed to reverse the effect of a settlement agreement by pursuing either original or subsequent complaints. A three-Judge Bench of this Court therein emphasized that a settlement once entered and authenticated by a mediator subsumed the original complaint. The relevant portion of the said judgment is reproduced herein under: “41. When a complainant party enters into a compromise agreement with the accused, it may be for a multitude of reasons — higher compensation, faster recovery of money, uncertainty of trial and strength of the complaint, among others. A complainant enters into a settlement with open eyes and undertakes the risk of the accused failing to honour the cheques issued pursuant to the settlement, based on certain benefits that the settlement agreement postulates. Once parties have voluntarily entered into such an agreement and agree to abide by the consequences of non compliance of the settlement agreement, they cannot be allowed to reverse the effects of the agreement by pursuing both the original complaint and the subsequent complaint [2026:RJ-JP:15631] (5 of 9) [CRLMP-1439/2014] arising from such non compliance. The settlement agreement subsumes the original complaint. Noncompliance of the terms of the settlement agreement or dishonour of cheques issued subsequent to it, would then give rise to a fresh cause of action attracting liability under Section 138 of the NI Act and other remedies under civil law and criminal law. XXX C.2. Liability arising from the settlement agreement 49. Once a settlement agreement has been entered into between the parties, the parties are bound by the terms of the agreement and any violation of the same may result in consequential action in civil and criminal law.” 31. The exception to the above rule is that a party can resile from the Settlement Agreement arrived in the mediation proceedings is, if it successfully demonstrates that the said Settlement Agreement was procured by force, fraud or undue influence. The party can also resile from the Settlement Agreement on account of non-fulfillment of any of the conditions by the opposite party as set out in the Settlement Agreement. 32. The Respondent-Wife alleged that the Appellant Husband assured the Respondent-Wife that apart from the considerations specified in the Settlement Agreement, the Appellant-Husband would give Rs. 120 Crores worth of jewellery along with gold biscuits worth Rs. 50 Crores in lieu of the stridhan (apart from those mentioned in the Settlement Agreement) to her before signing of the Second Motion Petition. However, since the Appellant-Husband did not adhere to his promise, the Respondent-Wife did not sign the Second Motion Petition. 33. Another argument raised by the Respondent-Wife, that she only agreed to exclude these terms from the Settlement Agreement upon being asked so by the Appellant-Husband in order to avoid alerting the Income Tax Department and to evade any liability towards wealth tax, is highly egregious. We are appalled at the sheer audacity of such a submission being advanced before a court of law and deplore the evident disregard exhibited towards the legal system. 34. We are not impressed by the reasons given by the learned counsel of the Respondent-Wife for resiling out of the Settlement Agreement. It is difficult to comprehend as to why in the Settlement Agreement the condition for return of jewelleries and gold biscuits have not been mentioned. It is an admitted position that the Respondent Wife had signed the Settlement Agreement and we are not sure as to why she, being a mature and educated woman assisted by her advocate, [2026:RJ-JP:15631] (6 of 9) [CRLMP-1439/2014] did not press for the inclusion of these conditions in the Settlement Agreement. 35. In addition, we find no plausible explanation as to why the Respondent-Wife waited for eight long months from the date of the Second Motion Petition before initiating the DV proceedings. It is evident from the WhatsApp chats dated 17.02.2025 between them, wherein the Respondent-Wife listed all articles she sought to be returned, that were not a part of the Settlement Agreement, that the said list did not make any mention whatsoever of any jewellery worth Rs. 120 crores or gold biscuits worth Rs. 50 crores, which she claims were assured to her by the Appellant-Husband. Notably, these allegations were raised for the first time only in the DV complaint. This prolonged delay in raising such a substantial ground raises serious suspicion as to the credibility and authenticity of the allegations made therein in blatant disregard of the terms of the Settlement Agreement. In addition to this, with regard to the email sent by the counsel for the Appellant-Husband dated 21.02.2025, wherein it was mentioned that the Appellant-Husband would make good all other obligations, apart from those mentioned in the Settlement Agreement, it must have been in pursuance of the list of items sent by the Respondent- Wife through the WhatsApp chat dated 17.02.2025 and it cannot be construed in such a manner that it would have included the demands for jewellery worth Rs. 120 Crores or gold biscuits worth Rs. 50 Crores. 36. Reliance was placed upon by the learned counsel for the Respondent-Wife on certain judgments, however, all the said cases would not apply in the present case for the following reasons: A. Smt Sureshta Devi v. Om Prakash, (1991) 2 SCC 25 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 292: The Respondent-Wife relied on the said judgment to the effect that the consent of the parties must subsist not only at the stage of filing of the petition but also, is required to continue to exist till the passing of the final decree. However, in the present case, regarding the withdrawal of consent before the Second Motion, the Respondent-Wife could not prove any fraud, force, or undue influence and her withdrawal of consent is merely on the ground of non- adherence to the promise made by the Appellant-Husband which was not even the part of the Settlement Agreement and thus, cannot benefit her to initiate another proceeding. B. Hitesh Bhatnagar v. Deepa Bhatnagar, (2011) 5 SCC 234 : (2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 701: The Respondent relied on the said judgment to the effect that one of the parties could withdraw his/her consent at any time before passing of the decree. In the said case, the agreement was entered into between the parties independently, however, in the present case the [2026:RJ-JP:15631] (7 of 9) [CRLMP-1439/2014] settlement was arrived upon mediation between the parties on specific order of the Court and which was also later ratified by the Court. C. Smruti Pahariya v. Sanjay Pahariya, (2009) 13 SCC 338 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 96: The said judgment of the Court was given after following the reasoning given in the case of Surestha Devi (supra) which has been already distinguished above. Proceedings under the DV Act 37. A careful perusal of the complaint filed by the Respondent-Wife under the DV Act depicts that there are no specific allegations regarding any sort of domestic violence that could emanate from the pleadings. The Respondent-Wife has failed to mention any event describing any sort of violence carried out either by the Appellant Husband or his mother. A criminal complaint regarding domestic violence, with mere reference to the names of the family members or the husband without any specific allegation that points towards their active involvement in commission of such an act of violence, shall be nipped in the bud. 38. While we are conscious of the fact that the parties to a long standing marital dispute are often fuelled by emotions, we cannot allow such emotions to take a drastic turn in as much as allowing the bursts of emotions to form the basis of criminal prosecution. Such criminal prosecution, if allowed, would lead to an abuse of law and cause harassment. 39. It is evident from the petition filed by the Respondent Wife that apart from the Appellant- Husband's noncompliance with the condition of giving Rs. 120 Crores and gold biscuits worth Rs. 50 Crores, all the other allegations seems to be trivial disagreements exaggerated, solely to justify the institution of the complaint under the DV Act. 40. Moreover, we cannot be oblivious to the fact that, admittedly, since the last couple of years (from 2022- 23), the Respondent-Wife is living separately from the Appellant Husband. The proceedings under the DV Act appear to be premeditated, one filed in order to sustain some sort of litigation between the parties after she had resiled from the Settlement Agreement, as it was evidently for the first time in a long span of about 23 years of their sustained marriage, that such a petition alleging domestic violence has been filed by the Respondent Wife. The proceedings initiated under the DV Act were merely an afterthought, as they were filed after notice was issued in the contempt petition filed by the Appellant-Husband. 41. Therefore, we are of the view that the proceedings under the DV Act as initiated by the Respondent-Wife are liable to be quashed, the continuance of which would be an abuse of the process of law.” [2026:RJ-JP:15631] (8 of 9) [CRLMP-1439/2014] 10. Perusal of the aforesaid judgment rendered in the case of Dhananjay Rathi (Supra) and looking to the proposition of law, as laid down therein by the Hon’ble Apex Court, it is clear that after a settlement has been arrived at between the parties, one of the parties cannot resile from such compromise, unless and until the same has been entered into between them on the basis of fraud, threat or coercion. In the instant case, no such facts are available on the record to show that any fraud, threat or coercion was used by either side, while entering into settlement, rather the compromise was arrived at between the parties at their own free will, wish and desire. The complainant-respondent has disappeared and has not appeared forward either before this Court or before the Trial Court and the compromise between the parties has not been executed on account of use of any fraud, threat, coercion or fear etc. by the petitioner. 11. Similarly, in the case of Ruchi Agarwal Vs. Amit Kumar Agrawal & Ors. reported in (2005) 3 SCC 299, the Hon’ble Apex Court has held that after settlement in a matrimonial dispute, the parties cannot resile from the same. 12. Considering the overall facts and circumstances of the case and more particularly the fact that a settlement has already been arrived at between the parties pertaining to the alleged matrimonial dispute between them and while applying the principles of law, as laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case of Gian Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Anr. reported in (2012) 10 SCC 303 & State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Laxmi Narayan & Ors., reported in (2019) 5 SCC 688, this Court deems it just and proper to quash the entire proceedings arising [2026:RJ-JP:15631] (9 of 9) [CRLMP-1439/2014] out of the impugned FIR No. 175/2013, registered with the Mahila Police Station, District Kota City for the offences punishable under Sections 498A and 406 IPC and the proceedings pending before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate No. 5, Kota also stand quashed and set aside. Accordingly, the instant Criminal Misc. Petition stands allowed. 13. Stay application and all pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. (ANOOP KUMAR DHAND),J Shivam-Puneet/36