1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 25TH DAY OF APRIL, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M. NAGAPRASANNA CRIMINAL PETITION No.11726 OF 2024 C/W CRIMINAL PETITION No.8786 OF 2024 CRIMINAL PETITION No.11808 OF 2024 CRIMINAL PETITION No.71 OF 2025 IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.11726 OF 2024 BETWEEN: XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX XXXXXXXX ... PETITIONER (BY SRI AKSHAY S., ADVOCATE FOR SRI SRINIVASA D.C., ADVOCATE) AND: 1 . SRI BALAMANJUNATHASWAMIJI S/O NANJAPPA, 2 AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS, PEETADHYAKSHA OF SRI VIDYA CHOWDESHWARI MUTT, RESIDING AT SRI MUTT, HANGARAHALLI VILLAGE, BENACHAKALLU ROAD, HULIYURUDURGA HOBLI, KUNIGAL TALUK TUMAKURU DISTRICT – 572 123. 2 . STATE OF KARNATAKA BY HULIYURUDURGA POLICE, REPRESENTED BY THE STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR HIGH COURT BUILDINGS, BENGALURU – 560 001. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SRI SANDESH J. CHOUTA, SR.ADVOCATE A/W SMT.LEELA P.DEVADIGA, ADVOCATE FOR R-1; SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, ADDL.SPP FOR R2) THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 439 (2) OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO ALLOW THIS CRIMINAL PETITION AND CANCEL THE BAIL ORDER PASSED BY THE HON’BLE ADDL. DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE (FTSC-1) AT TUMAKURU IN CRL.MISC.NO.796/2024 DATED 22.06.2024 IN GRANTING REGULAR BAIL TO THE 1ST RESPONDENT / ACCUSED NO.1 FOR OFFENCES P/U/S 376, 354A (i)(ii), 417, 342, 506 R/W 34 OF IPC, 1860, U/S 4 AND 6 OF POCSO ACT, 2012, U/S 66(E) AND 67(A) OF I.T. ACT, 2000, U/S 3(f) OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS (PREVENTION OF MISUSE) ACT, 1988 AND U/S 30 OF THE ARMS ACT, 1959. 3 IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.8786 OF 2024 BETWEEN: SRI MANJUNATHA N., @ BALAMANJUNATHA SWAMIJI S/O NANJAPPA AGED ABOUT 36 YEARS, SRI VIDYA CHOWDESHWARI MUTT HANGARAHALLI VILLAGE, HULIYURDURGA HOBLI, KUNIGAL TALUK TUMAKURU DISTRICT – 572 101. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI SANDESH J. CHOUTA, SR.ADVOCATE A/W SMT.LEELA P.DEVADIGA, ADVOCATE ) AND: 1 . THE STATE OF KARNATAKA THROUGH HULIYURUDURGA POLICE TUMAKURU REPRESENTED BY SPP OFFICE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA BENGALURU – 560 001. 2 . XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX ... RESPONDENTS (BY SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, ADDL.SPP FOR R1; DR. SHYAMSUNDAR S.U., ADVOCATE FOR R2) THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN SPL.C.NO.266/2024 FILED BY THE 1st RESPONDENT 4 HULIYURDURGA POLICE, ARISING OUT OF CHARGE SHEET DATED 03.05.2024 PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE ADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, FTSC-I, TUMAKURU FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S 4, 6, 11(iv) AND 12 OF POCSO ACT, 2012, SECTION 66(E) AND 67(A) OF INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ACT 2000, SECTION 376, 354(A)(1)(i), 354(A)(1)(ii), 417, 342, 506 R/W SECTION 34 OF IPC SECTION 3 OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS (PREVENTION OF MISUSE) ACT, 1988 AND SECTION 30 OF ARMS ACT 1959. IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.11808 OF 2024 BETWEEN: XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX ... PETITIONER (BY SRI AKSHAY S., ADVOCATE FOR SRI SRINIVASA D.C., ADVOCATE) AND: 1 . SRI. ABHILASH K., S/O KRISHNAPPA, AGED ABOUT 24 YEARS TRUSTEE OF SRI VIDYA CHOWDESHWARI TRUST (R) RESIDING AT SRI MUTT, HANGARAHALLI VILLAGE , BENACHAKALLU ROAD, HULIYURUDURGA HOBLI, KUNIGAL TALUK, TUMAKURU – 572 123. 5 2 . STATE OF KARNATAKA BY HULIYURUDURGA POLICE, REPRESENTED BY THE STATE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT BUILDINGS, BENGALURU – 560 001. ... RESPONDENTS (BY SRI KARTHIK N., ADVOCATE FOR R1; SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, ADDL.SPP FOR R2 ) THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 439(2) OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO ALLOW THIS CRIMINAL PETITION AND CANCEL THE BAIL ORDER PASSED BY THE HON’BLE ADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE (FTSC-1) AT TUMAKURU IN CRL.MISC.NO.797/2024 DATED 22.06.2024, IN GRANTING REGULAR BAIL TO THE 1ST RESPONDENT/ACCUSED NO.2 FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S 354-A(i)(ii), 342 R/W SEC.34 OF IPC IN CR.NO.50/2024 UNDER HULIDURGA POLICE STATION U/S.11(iv) AND 12 OF POCSO ACT, 2012 AND UNDER SECTION 3(f) OF THE RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS (PREVENTION OF MISUSE) ACT, 1988. IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.71 OF 2025 BETWEEN: SRI ABHILASH K., S/O KRISHNAPPA, AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS, TRUSTEE OF SRI VIDYA CHOWDESHWARI MUTT, HANGARAHALLI, CHOWDANAKUPPE, TUMAKURU DISTRICT – 572 123. (ADDRESS AS PER AADHAR CARD) ... PETITIONER (BY SRI SANDESH J. CHOUTA, SR.ADVOCATE A/W 6 SMT.LEELA P.DEVADIGA, ADVOCATE ) AND: 1 . THE STATE OF KARNATAKA THROUGH HULIYURUDURGA POLICE TUMAKURU REPRESENTED BY SPP OFFICE, HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA, BENGALURU – 560 001. 2 . XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX XXXXX ... RESPONDENTS (BY SRI B.N.JAGADEESHA, ADDL.SPP FOR R1; SRI AKSHAY S., ADVOCATE FOR SRI SRINIVASA D.C., ADVOCATE FOR R2) THIS CRIMINAL PETITION IS FILED UNDER SECTION 482 OF CR.P.C., PRAYING TO QUASH THE ENTIRE PROCEEDINGS IN SPL.C.NO.266/2024 FILED BY THE 1st RESPONDENT HULIYURDURGA POLICE, ARISING OUT OF CHARGE SHEET DATED 03.05.2024, PENDING ON THE FILE OF THE ADDITIONAL DISTRICT AND SESSIONS JUDGE, FTSC-I, TUMAKURU, FOR THE OFFENCES P/U/S 11(iv) AND 12 OF POCSO ACT, 2012, SECTION 354(A)(1)(ii), 342 R/W 34 OF IPC, SECTION 3 OF RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS (PREVENTION OF MISUSE) ACT, 1988. THESE CRIMINAL PETITIONS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDERS, COMING ON FOR PRONOUNCEMENT THIS DAY, THE COURT MADE THE FOLLOWING:- 7 CAV ORDER The batch of these petitions are filed by the accused or the complainant as the case would be, seeking different reliefs. Since parties to the lis are common arising out of a solitary incident, they are taken up together and considered by this common order. 2. Heard in Criminal Petition Nos. 8786 of 2024 and 71 of 2025 Sri Sandesh J.Chouta, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioners, Sri B.N.Jagadesha, learned State Public Prosecutor for respondent No.1; Dr. Shyamsundar S.U, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 in Crl.P.No.8786 of 2024 and Sri Akshay S, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.2 in Crl.P.No.71 of 2025; in Criminal Petition Nos. 11726 of 2024 and 11808 of 2024 Sri Akshay S, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, Sri B.N. Jagadeesha, learned Additional State Public Prosecutor for respondent No.2, Sri Sandesh J.Chouta, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent No.1 in Criminal petition CORAM: THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE M.NAGAPRASANNA 8 No.11726 of 2024 and Sri N.Karthik, learned counsel appearing for respondent No.1 in Criminal Petition No.11808 of 2024. 3. For the sake of convenience, facts obtaining in Criminal Petition No.8786 of 2024 would be narrated. 4. Facts, in brief, germane are as follows: - 4.1. The petitioner is a pontiff of Sri Vidyachowdeshwari Mutt, Huliyurudurga, Tumkur District. In the year 2022, the petitioner is said to be suffering from skin decease near his groins. Therefore, for the purpose of medical treatment he had asked one of his associates Mr. Abhishek to search for a Dermatologist. Abhishek then recommends one Dr. Roopa who is said to be his close friend. Abhishek had served the petitioner as his assistant between 2019 and 2022. Dr.Roopa, was a renowned doctor treating patients for skin decease. Thus, Dr. Roopa treats the petitioner. Over periods of treatment and improvement, it is the averment in the petition, that the said doctor was asking the petitioner to send pictures of the parts which underwent treatment, which are his private parts. A year later, the petitioner then meets Abhishek who is said to have 9 demanded certain money for construction of a house. The petitioner is said to have refused. Subsequently, Dr. Roopa, Abhishek and another Nandish collectively, as part of the alleged criminal conspiracy, began to harass and threaten the petitioner. The intimidation was that, if the pontiff did not agree to pay ransom, intimate videos would be shown to all devotees and persons connected with the mutt. The petitioner on being exasperated by the harassment and the attempted extortion, registeres a complaint before the jurisdictional Police which becomes a crime in Crime No.14 of 2024 for the offences punishable under Sections 120B, 384, 34 of the IPC and 66E of the Information Technology Act, 2000 (‘the IT Act’ for short) naming 6 accused in the said crime viz., Abhishek, Roopa, Srinivasa, Rajesh, Chethan and Nandish. 4.2. After registration of the said crime and investigation ensuing, the 2nd respondent who is said to be the devotee of the Temple registers a complaint against the petitioner before the jurisdictional police for offences punishable under Sections 4, 6, 8 and 12 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 10 (‘the POCSO Act’ for short), Section 66E of the IT Act and Sections 376, 354A(1)(i), 354A(1)(ii), 506 r/w 34 of the IPC. While filing the charge sheet, Section 8 of the POCSO Act is deleted and Section 11(iv) of the POCSO Act, Sections 417 and 342 of the IPC, Section 67A of the IT Act, Section 3 of the Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988 and Section 30 of the Arms Act, 1959 are added. The said complaint becomes a crime in Crime No.50 of 2024. The accused were the pontiff and one K.Abhilash. The allegation in the complaint was that, in the year 2017 when the victim was 14 years of age, she was suffering from health problems. Therefore, the parents, on the advise of her father’s friend, took her to Sri Vidhyachowdeshwari Temple (‘the Temple’ for short). Then they became acquainted with the pontiff who used certain kavades to seek answers to their problems and he instructed them to perform pooja of Devi at home. 4.3. Thereafter, the complainant began to visit the mutt for the purpose of treatment. It is at that point in time, the petitioner is alleged to have taken her into the “Garbhagudi” while alone and sexually assaulted her. Such incident is said to have been repeated 11 during the subsequent visits in the Temple. In 2019 while at the Temple, accused No.2 Abhilash assaulted her after instructing her to enter the room with bedsheets. Later, she is said to have attempted suicide, but another person intervened and advised her to inform her parents. This is the fulcrum of the complaint. The complaint is registered on 07-03-2024 for the incidents that are said to have taken place in 2017 or the latest in 2019. Accused Nos. 1 and 2 including the pontiff were taken into custody and later enlarged on bail. The police conduct investigation and file a charge sheet before the concerned Court adding several offences. The charge sheet now is for the offences punishable under Sections 376, 354A(1)(i), 354A(1)(ii), 417, 342, 506, 34 of the IPC; Sections 4, 6, 11(iv), 12 of the POCSO Act; Sections 66E, 67A of the IT Act; Section 3 of the Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988 and Section 30 of the Arms Act, 1959. Pursuant to filing of charge sheet, the matter is committed to the Court of Sessions and is now pending as Spl.C.No.266 of 2024. Filing of the charge sheet, the subsequent institution of criminal proceedings and it’s continuation, is what has driven the petitioner/pontiff to this Court in the subject petition. 12 4.4. Criminal Petition No.71 of 2025 is filed by accused No.2. The allegations are the same; the facts obtaining that led to registration of crime are also the same. Accordingly, the facts narrated in Criminal Petition No.8786 of 2024 would become applicable to the facts obtaining in this case as well and, therefore, they would not require any reiteration. 4.5. The other two petitions – Criminal Petition Nos.11726 of 2024 and 11808 of 2024 – are preferred by the complainant challenging the grant of regular bail to the pontiff and accused No.2 - Abhilash in Criminal Miscellaneous Nos.796 of 2024 and 797 of 2024 both, by orders dated 22-06-2024. 5. The learned senior counsel Sri Sandesh J.Chouta appearing for the petitioner/pontiff and accused No.2 in the companion petition would vehemently contend that the complaint is registered after about seven years of the incident, that too for offences that would become punishable under the POCSO Act, only to wreak vengeance, as the pontiff registers a crime of misrepresentation 13 against Abhishek and Roopa and all others. Therefore, the complaint is set up by registering a crime without there being any substance whatsoever. If at all the pontiff indulged in such acts, nothing stopped the complainant, who is said to have informed her parents in 2019 itself, from filing the complaint and she should not have waited for five years to register the crime. It is his contention that once the crime is registered with a delay of seven years, it would naturally contain all the embellishments. He would contend that it is gross misuse of the POSCO Act or any other offence alleged in the case at hand. Every offence is hit by delay. The pictures that are projected are the ones where the complainant comes close to the pontiff to take a selfie on the mobile phone and these are projected as proximity with the pontiff. The incidents narrated stop at 2019 and the complaint, as contended, is registered on 07-03-2024. There is no direct evidence. Every crime is brought in on hearsay evidence. 6. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the complainant would refute the submissions to contend that the charge sheet is filed after investigation. The matter is now 14 committed to the Court of Sessions. What is remaining, is framing of charges and continuation of trial. It is at that stage the petitioner approaches this Court in the subject petition. The learned counsel submits that all the offences against the petitioners in both these petitions i.e., accused Nos.1 and 2 are clearly met in the case at hand. Therefore, there should be no indulgence shown by this Court at this juncture. He would also take this Court through the documents appended to the charge sheet to demonstrate that the witnesses have clearly spoken about what the pontiff or accused No.2 have done. Though they are not eyewitnesses, they are witnesses whose statements are credible. All these will have to be tested in evidence. 7. In the other two cases filed by the complainant, the learned counsel would contend that bail could not have been granted to both accused Nos.1 and 2. Therefore, the complainant has challenged grant of regular bail to both the accused in the teeth of the offences alleged. 15 8. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions made by the respective learned counsel and have perused the material on record. 9. The afore-narrated facts are not in dispute. What forms the fulcrum of the present lis are three crimes viz., Crime Nos.50 of 2024; 52 of 2024 and 335 of 2024. Though the offences are different, the fulcrum of the offence remains the same. The entire issue gets triggered from registration of the complaint. Therefore, the complaint is required to be noticed. It reads as follows: “ರವೆ, ಾ ಾ ಾಗಳ, ಹುಯೂರುದುಗ ೕ ಾ ೆ, ಕುಗ ಾಲೂ, ತುಮಕೂರು "#ೆ ಇಂದ: XXXXXX XXXXXX 'ಾನ)*ೇ, +ಷಯ: 2017-ೇ .ಾ/ಂದ /ರಂತರ0ಾ1 #ೈಂ1ಕ 3ರುಕುಳ 4ಾಗೂ ನನ5 ಇ6ೆ7ೆ +ರುದ80ಾ1 ಅಾ)6ಾರ 'ಾ: 'ಾನ;ಕ 3ರುಕುಳ /ೕಡು=>ರುವ ಹಂಗರಹ?@ ABೕ +Cಾ)6ೌEೇಶG ಮ4ಾ ಸಂ.ಾIನ ಮಠದ .ಾGKೕ" Lಾಲ ಮಂಜು-ಾಥ .ಾGKೕ" 4ಾಗೂ ಇವರ ಸಹವ=Oಾದ ಅP#ಾQ 16 ೆ (CೊಡRಅS) ಇವರ +ರುದ8 ಾನೂನು ಕBಮ ಜರು1ಸಲು ೋ /ೕ:ದ ದೂರು. ಈ UೕಲVಂಡ +ಷಯೆV ಸಂಬಂ ;ದಂೆ ಈ ಮೂಲಕ ತಮX ದೂರು ಸ;ೊಳ@ವYCೇ-ೆಂದ*ೆ ನಮX ಸGಂತ ಊರು Lೆಂಗಳ[ರು ಾ'ಾ\]ಾಳ)ದ ಸಣ_3V Lೈಲು ಆ1ದುa, -ಾನು ಇbೕ ಹುcd Lೆeೆfರುೆ>ೕ-ೆ. ನಮX ತಂCೆ ಮಂಜು-ಾg ರವರು Lೆ.ಾVಂನ Kೕಟi ೕಡi ಆ1 ೆಲಸ 'ಾ:ೊಂ:ದುa ಾj ]ೆBೕಮಲಾ ¹.ಆi ರವರು ಗೃlOಾ1ರುಾ>*ೆ. ನನೆ 14 ವಷ ಇCಾaಗ ಅಂದ*ೆ 2017-ೇ .ಾನ ನನೆ ಆ*ೋಗ)ದ ಸಮ.ೆ) ಉಂnಾ1ದaಂದ ನನ5 ತಂCೆಯ .ೆ5ೕlತ*ಾದ ಪYಟd.ಾGK ರವರ ಸಲ4ೆಯಂೆ ನಮX ತಂCೆ ಾj ನನ5ನು5 ತುಮಕೂರು "#ೆ, ಕುಗ ಾಲೂಕು ಹುಯೂರುದುಗ 4ೋಬ?ಯ ಹಂಗರಹ?@ ಮಠದರುವ ABೕ +Cಾ)6ೌEೇಶG Cೇವ.ಾIನೆV 4ೋದ ಗುಣ0ಾಗುವYCಾ1 =?;ದaಂದ ನಮX ತಂCೆ ಾj 4ಾಗೂ ಪYಟd.ಾGKಯವ*ೊಂfೆ ನನ5ನು5 f-ಾಂಕ:25/03/2017 ರಂದು qದಲ Lಾೆ ಹಂಗರಹ?@ ಮಠೆV ಕ*ೆದುೊಂಡು ಬಂfದುa ಆ fನ ಮಠದ .ಾGKOಾದ Lಾಲ ಮಂಜು-ಾಥ .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ಇದaರು. ಅವರು ನಮXಗಳ ಪಚಯ 'ಾ:ೊಂಡು ನsನ tಾj#ೆಯನು5 =?ದುೊಂಡು ನನೆ Oಾ*ೋ uಾ-ಾಮ= ಪBvೕಗ 'ಾrìCಾa*ೆ ಎಂದು =?; ಇವತು> ಅಮXನವರ ಪBxೆ5 ಬ*ೆಸಲ ಕವEೆ 4ಾ3 -ೋಡುೆ>ೕ-ೆಂದು 4ೇ? ಅಮXನವರನು5 ಮ-ೆೆ ಕ*ೆದುೊಂಡು 4ೋ1 ಪyzೆ 'ಾ:ದ ಸ4ೋಗುವYCಾ1 =?;ದರು. ಇCೇ fವಸ .ಾGKೕ"ಯವರು ನಮX ತಂCೆ ಾjೆ ನನೆ xಾಸ{ -ೋಡುವYCಾ1 4ೇ? ನನ5 ೈ -ೋ: ನನೆ ಎರಡು ಮದು0ೆOಾಗುವYCಾ1 qದಲ-ೆಯದು ಲ| 'ಾ)*ೇ} ಆಗುತ>Cೆ. ಅCಾದ Uೕ#ೆ ಮ-ೆಯವರು -ೋಡುವ ಹುಡುಗನನು5 ಮದು0ೆOಾಗುೆ>ೕ-ೆಂದು 4ೇ?ದರು. ಇದು ಸ 4ೋಗLೇೆಂದ*ೆ ಕದೕ ಪyzೆ 'ಾ:ದ*ೆ ಸ 4ೋಗುತ>Cೆಂದು 4ೇ?ದರು. ಅವತು> ಸಂzೆ ಮಠfಂದ -ಾವYಗಳ 4ೊರಟು 4ೋzÉವY. ಮ-ೆೆ 4ೋ1 .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು 4ೇ?ದ ಪyzೆಗಳನು5 -ೇಮಗಳನು5 'ಾ:CೆವY. ಇCಾದ ಒಂದು 0ಾರದ ನಂತರ 6ೌEೇಶG Cೇವರನು5 ಕ*ೆದುೊಂಡು ನಮX ಮ-ೆೆ Lಾಲ ಮಂಜು-ಾಥ .ಾGKೕ 4ಾಗೂ ಅವರ ಸ4ಾಯಕ-ಾದ ಅP#ಾQ ೆ ಅವ*ೊಂfೆ ಬಂfದುa ಆ ಸಮಯದ -ಾನು ಜೂ) ೊಡು0ಾೈ ಅP#ಾQ ಈತನು ನ/5ಂದ ಜೂ) ಪEೆಯು0ಾಗ ೈಯನು5 l:ದುೊಂಡನು. -ಾನು ೈ S:;ೊಂEಾಗ ಆತನು .ಾ ಎಂದು 4ೇ?ದನು. ಇCಾದ ನಂತರ ನಮX ಮ-ೆಯ Cೇವೆ ಪyzೆ 'ಾಡು0ಾಗ, ಮಂಗeಾರ=ಯನು5 'ಾಡು0ಾಗ ಅP#ಾQ ನನ5 ಪಕV ಬಂದು /ಂತುೊಳ@ವYದು 'ಾಡು=>ದaನು. -ಾನು ಇದನು5 ;ೕಯ.ಾ•1 ೆೆದುೊಳ@ಲ. ಇCಾದ ನಂತರ Cೇವರನು5 ಕ*ೆದುೊಂಡು 4ೋದರು. ಪyzೆೆಂದು 35 .ಾ+ರಗಳನು5 ನಮX ತಂCೆ ಾjjಂದ ಪEೆದುೊಂಡರು. ಇCಾದ ನಂತರ ನನ5 ೈ ಪYನಃ ಊತ ಬಂfದaಂದ ನಮX ಾj Lಾಲ ಮಂಜು-ಾಥ.ಾGK" ರವೆ ಆಾಗ •ೕs 'ಾ: +6ಾರ =?;ದುa .ಾGKೕ"ಯವರು ನನ5ನು5 Cೇವ.ಾIನೆV 17 ಕ*ೆದುೊಂಡು ಬರುವಂೆ 4ೇ?ದaಂದ 2-3 Lಾ ಪYನಃ -ಾವYಗಳ ಹಂಗರಹ?@ ಮಠೆV 4ೋ1ದುa ಆ ಸಮಯದ .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ಪyzೆ 'ಾ:ೊಡು=>ದaರು. ಇCಾದ ಸGಲ‚ fವಸಗಳ ನಂತರ -ಾನು ನಮX ತಂCೆ ಾjvಂfೆ ಮಠೆV ಪyzೆೆಂದು 4ೋದ ಸಮಯದ .ಾGKೕ" -ರವರು ನಮX ತಂCೆ ಾjೆ ಇವ?ೆ cೕ 'ಾಡಲು ಕ; ಎಂದು 4ೇ?ದುa ಇCಾದ ಪYನಃ 15 fನಗಳ ನಂತರ -ಾವY ಮಠೆV 4ೋದ ಸಮಯದ .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ನನೆ ಅಡುೆ ಮ-ೆೆ 4ೋ1 cೕ. 'ಾ:ೊಂಡು ಬರಲು 4ೇ?ದುa ಆ ಸಮಯದ ನಮX ತಂCೆ ಾj .ಾGKೕ" ರವರ ಬ?bೕ ಕು?=ದaರು. -ಾನು ಅಡುೆ ಮ-ೆಯ cೕ 'ಾಡು0ಾೆƒ ಅP#ಾQ.ೆ. ಈತನು lಂf/ಂದ ಬಂದು ನನ5ನು5 ಬಲ0ಾ1 ತS„ೊಂಡನು. ನನೆ ಭಯ0ಾ1 3ರು†Cಾಗ ಆತನು ನನ5 Lಾjಯನು5 ಆತನ ೈಗ?ಂದ ಮು†‡ ತ]ಾ‚jತು Oಾಗೂ 4ೇಳLೇಡ ಎಂದು ೇ? ೊಂಡನು -ಾನು cೕ ೆೆದುೊಂಡು 4ೋ1 .ಾGKೕ" ರವೆ ೊnೆdನು. ನನೆ ಭಯ0ಾ1ರುವYದಂದ -ಾನು Oಾಗೂ 4ೇಳಲ. ಇCಾದ ನಂತರ -ಾವYಗಳ ಪYನಃ ಮಠೆV ಪyzೆೆ 4ೋCಾಗ .ಾGKೕ"ಯು ನನೆ cೕ 'ಾ:ೊಂಡು ಬರಲು =?;ದುa ನಮX ತಂCೆ ಾjೆ Lೇ*ೆ ೆಲಸ 4ೇಳ=ದaರು. -ಾನು cೕ 'ಾಡುವ ಸಮದಯ .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ಅೆ ಬಂದು -ಾನು ಓದು=>ರುವ xಾ#ೆಯ ಬೆƒ ಸೂV ಬೆƒ +6ಾರ 'ಾ: qLೈನ .ೆ‚ ೆೆದುೊeೆ[@ೕ ಾ Lಾ ಎಂದು ಎಡೈ l:ದು ಎeೆfದುa ಆ ಸಮದಯ -ಾನು =ರಸV; ನಮX ಅಪ‚ Lೈಯುಾ>*ೆ -ಾನು ಬರುವYfಲ0ೆಂದು 4ೇ? cೕ ಇಟುd ಬಂCೆನು. ಅವತು> ಮಠfಂದ -ಾವYಗಳ 0ಾಪ Lೆಂಗಳ[ೆ 4ೋCೆವY. ಈ ಘಟ-ೆ ಆದ ನಂತರ ಸು'ಾರು 20 fನಗಳ ನಂತರ -ಾನು ಅಮX †ಕVಮXರವ*ೊಂfೆ ಮಠೆV ಪyzೆೆ 4ೋ1ದುa ನಮX ತಂCೆ ಬಂfರಲ. ಆ fನ Lಾಲ ಮಂಜು-ಾಥ .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ನಮX ಾjೆ ನನ5 ಬ? 11 ರೂ ಗಳನು5 ಮಗಳ ಬ? ೊ: ಮುಡುಪY ಕcd;>ೕ/ ಎಂದು 4ೇ?ದರು. ನಮX ಾj ನನೆ 11 ರೂ ೊcdದುa -ಾನು ಅದನು5 Cೇವ.ಾIನದ ಒಳ1ನ ಗಭಗು: ಮುಂfನ ¹ÌçÃs ಒಳೆ 4ೋCಾಗ ಅ Aವಂಗ, ಸುಬBಮಣ) .ಾGK 4ೊeೆ +ಗBಹಗಳ ಇದುa ಅ ಹಣ ಇಡಲು .ಾGKೕ" ºÉÃ½zÁUÀ £Á£ÀÄ ಹಣವನು5 ಇಡಲು ಬ1ƒCಾಗ .ಾGKೕ"ರವರು ನನ5 .ೊಂಟವನು5 l:ದುೊಂ:ದುa ನನೆ ಭಯ0ಾ1 lಂCೆ =ರು1Cಾಗ .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ೈ/ಂದ ನನ5 Lಾjಯನು5 ಮು†‡ .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು tಾಸ1 ಅಂಾಂಗಗಳನು5 ೈಗ?ಂದ ಮುcdದರು. ನನೆ 3ರಚಲು 4ೋCಾಗ .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ನನೆ ೊ=>ರುವ +Cೆ)ಗಳನು5 ಬಳ; /ಮX ಅಪ‚ ಅಮXನನು5 LೇಾCೆB .ಾjಸುೆ>ೕ-ೆ. ಏನೂ 'ಾತ-ಾಡCೆ ಇರLೇಕು ಎಂದು ಭಯಪ:;ದರು. ಅಲCೆ /ಮX ಅಪ‚ ಅಮX/ೆ /ನ5 ಬೆƒ ಸುಳ@ 4ೇ?>/ ಎಂCೆ#ಾ 4ೇ? ನನ5ನು5 ಕ*ೆದುೊಂಡು 4ೋ1 4ೊರೆ ಬಂದರು. ನನೆ ಭಯ0ಾ1 ಅ ನEೆದ +6ಾರವನು5 Oಾಗೂ 4ೇಳCೆ ಸುಮX-ಾ1 Snೆdನು. ನಂತರ ಪB= Lಾ -ಾವYಗಳ Cೇವ.ಾIನೆV 4ೋCಾಗ ನಮX ಾjಯ ಕEೆjಂದ 11 ರೂ ಮುಡುಪನು5, ನ/5ಂದ Cೇವೆ ಇ:ಸLೇೆಂದು 4ೇ? ನನ5ನು5 ಗಭಗು:ೆ ಕ*ೆದುೊಂಡು 4ೋ1 ಹಲ0ಾರು Lಾ #ೈಂ1ಕ Cೌಜನ) 4ಾಗೂ tಾಸ1 ಅಂಗಗಳನು5 ಮುcd 3ರುಕುಳ /ೕ:ದುa Oಾಾದರೂ 4ೇ?ದ*ೆ ನಮX ತಂCೆ 18 ಾjಗಳನು5 +Cೆ)ಗಳನು5 ಬಳ; .ಾjಸುವYCಾ1 4ೆದ;ದರು. ಇದಂದ -ಾನು 'ಾನ;ಕ0ಾ1 -ೊಂfದುa ಮ-ೆಯ Oಾಗೂ 4ೇ?ರಲ. ಇCಾದ ನಂತರ Lಾಲ ಮಂಜು-ಾಥ .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ನಮX ಅಮXನವರ qLೈ ನಂ.8105794040 ಾ 'ಾ: ನನ5 ಆ*ೋಗ) +6ಾಸುವAvÉ 'ಾತ-ಾ: ನಂತರ 0ಾ‹•ಆŒ +:ೕvೕ`ಾ 'ಾ: ನನೆ Lೆತ>#ೆOಾಗುವಂೆ LೆದಸುವYದು, tಾಸ1 ಅಂಾಂಗಗಳನು5 ೋಸುವಂೆ 4ೇಳ=>ದaರು. ಅವರು 4ೇ?ದಂೆ -ಾನು 'ಾ:ರುೆ>ೕ-ೆ. 4ಾಗೂ .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ¥sÉÆÃs 0ೆ•.ೈ‹ /ಂದ ಅAೕಲ +:vೕಗಳ Eೌs #ೋŽ ಂ ಕ?ಸು ಎಂದು 4ೇ?ದುa -ಾನು ಅವರು 4ೇ?ದಂೆ Eೌs #ೋŽ ಂಗಳನು5 .ಾGKೕ"ವರ 9008459995 UÉ 0ಾ‹•ಆŒ ಮೂಲಕ ಕ?;ರುೆ>ೕ-ೆ. 2019-ೇ .ಾನ -ಾವYಗಳ ಪYನಃ Cೇವ.ಾIನೆV 4ೋCಾಗ .ಾGKೕ"ರವರು ನಮX ತಮX 4ಾಗೂ ಾj †ಕVಮX ರವರುಗಳನು5 .ೊಪY‚ 4ಾಗೂ ಹೂವನು5 3ತು>ೊಂಡು ಬರಲು .ಾGKೕ" 4ೇ? ಕ?;ದರು. ಆಗ CೊಡR ಅP#ಾQ ರವರು Uೕ#ೆ ಒಣ1 4ಾ3ರುವ LೆŽ Aೕ‹ಗಳನು5 ೆೆದುೊಂಡು 4ೋ1 ರೂಂನ EqÀÄ ಎಂದು 4ೇ?ದaಂದ -ಾನು ಅವನು 4ೇ?ದಂೆ LೆŽAೕ‹ ೆೆದುೊಂಡು 4ೋ1, ರೂಂ-ೊಳೆ ಇಡಲು 4ೋCಾಗ CೊಡR ಅP#ಾQ 4ೊರ1/ಂದ Lಾ1ಲು 4ಾ3ೊಂಡು -ಾನು 3ರು†Cಾಗ ಅP#ಾQ ನನೆ 3ರುಚದಂೆ ಕು?ತುೋ Lಾ1ಲು ೆೆಯುೆ>ೕ-ೆಂದು 4ೇ? †ಲಕ ೆೆದು. ಅವನು ಒಳೆ ಬಂದು ನನ5 ಬnೆdಯನು5 S†‡ tಾಸ1 ಅಂಾಂಗಗಳನು5 ಮುcd ನಂತರ ನನೆ Cೈlಕ ಸಂuೋಗ 'ಾಡಲು l:ದು ಎeೆCಾ:ದುa ನನೆ ಭಯ0ಾ1 3ರು†Cಾ1 ಅವನು .ಾGKೕ" /ನೆ ಏನೂ 4ೇ?#ಾG -ಾನು ಏನು 'ಾ:>ೕ/ ಅಂತ ಎಂCೆ#ಾ 4ೇ?ದನು5 ನಂತರ ಬnೆdಯನು5 4ಾ3ೊಳ@ವಂೆ 4ೇ? ಅವನು ಬnೆdಯನು5 4ಾ3ೊಂಡು 4ೊರೆ 4ೋದನು. -ಾನು ನನ5 ಬnೆdಯನು5 4ಾ3ೊಂಡು 0ೇ/ಂದ ಅbೕ ಇದa Cೇವರ ;ೕ*ೆjಂದ zಾjಂ‹ 'ಾ: •ಾ)/ೆ -ೇಣು 4ಾ3ೊಳ@ಲು ;ೕ*ೆಯನು5 ಕಟುd=>ರು0ಾೆƒ ಅbೕ ೆಲಸ 'ಾಡುವ ಅP•ೇ (†ಕV ಅP) ಬಂದು ನನೆ Lೈಯುa ಇದ-ೆ5#ಾ /ಮX ಅಪ‚ ಅಮX/ೆ 4ೇಳ ಇಲCೇ 4ೋದ*ೆ ಇೆ ಬರುವYದ-ೆ5ೕ /ಸು ಎಂದು 4ೇ?ದನು. ಅವತು> -ಾವY 0ಾಪ Lೆಂಗಳ[ೆ 4ೋCೆವY ಈ +6ಾರವನು5 -ಾನು ನಮX ಅಪ‚ ಅಮX/ೆ 4ೇಳಲ. ಇCಾದ ನಂತರ -ಾವYಗಳ ಮಠೆV 4ೋCಾಗ#ೆಲ .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು 4ಾಗೂ ಅP#ಾQ, ೆ ಅವರು ನನ5 Uೕ#ೆ ಹಲ0ಾರು Lಾ #ೈಂ1ಕ 3ರುಕುಳ /ೕ:ದುa, ಮ-ೆಯ ಇCಾaಗ +:vೕ ಾ 'ಾ: 'ಾತ-ಾಡುವYದು, tಾಸ1 ಅಂಾಂಗಳನು5 ೋಸುವಂೆ ಒಾ>jಸುವYದು 'ಾ:ರುಾ>*ೆ. ಇCಾದ ಸGಲ‚ fನಗಳ ನಂತರ ಅಂದ*ೆ ನನೆ f-ಾಂಕ -ೆನಪY ಇರುವYfಲ -ಾನು ನನ5 ಾj ನನ5 ತಮX ಕುxಾ ಮೂರು ಜನರು ನಮX ಾjೆ ಹು•ಾಲದ ಸಲು0ಾ1 ಹಂಗರಹ?@ ಮಠೆV ಮ‘ಾ)ಹ5 ಸು'ಾರು 1-00 ಗಂnೆ 0ೇeೆೆ 4ೋ1ದುa ಈ ಸಮಯದ ಮಠದ Lಾಲ ಮಂಜು-ಾಥ .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ಇದaರು. †ಕVಮX ಪBuಾವ= ರವಗೂ ಸ4ಾ ಹು•ಾಲದ ಬೆƒ =?;Cಾಗ .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ಅವರನು5 ಇ°èೇ ಕ*ೆ; -ಾನು ಪyzೆ 'ಾ: ಗುಣ ಪ:ಸುವYCಾ1 4ೇ?ದaಂದ ನಮX ಾjಯವರು ಇದನು5 ನಂS ನಮX †ಕVಮXರವೆ •ೕs 'ಾ: ಬರಲು 4ೇ?ದರು. ಅವರು ಬರಲು 19 ಸಮಯ ಇದುaದಂದ .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ನನ5 ಅಮX 4ಾಗೂ ತಮX/ೆ 6ೌಡನಕು]ೆ‚ೆ 4ೋ1 ೋ?, /ಂLೆಹಣು_, ಕು:ೆ, ಬ ’ೕಠೆV ಪyzೆ .ಾ'ಾನು ತರಲು 4ೇ? ನನೆ ಅbೕ ಇದುa ಪyzೆೆ *ೆ: 'ಾ:ೋ, ಎಂದು 4ೇ?ದರು. ಆಗ ಸಮಯ ಸಂzೆ ಸು'ಾರು 5-00 ಗಂnೆ ಆ1ತು>. ನನ5 ತಮX 4ಾಗೂ ಅಮX .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು 4ೇ?ದ ವಸು>ಗಳನು5 ೆೆದುೊಂಡು ಬರುವYCಾ1 4ೇ? 4ೋದರು. -ಾನು Cೇವ.ಾIನದ ಕಸ ಗು:; -ೆಲ ಒ*ೆ; ಅbೕ ಕು?=Cಾaಗ ನನ5 ಅಮX 4ಾಗೂ ತಮX ಪyzೆ .ಾ'ಾನುಗಳನು5 ೆೆದುೊಂಡು ಬಂfದುa .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ಅವYಗಳನು5 ೆೆದುೊಂಡು ಬ ’ೕಠೆV 4ೋ1 ಪyzೆೆ *ೆ:R 'ಾ:ೊ?@ ಎಂದು 4ೇ?ದರು. ಸಂzೆ ಸು'ಾರು 6-30 ಗಂnೆಯ ಅಮX 4ಾಗೂ ನನ5 ತಮX ಪyzೆೆ *ೆ: 'ಾಡಲು 4ೋCಾಗ .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ನನ5 qLೈೆ 0ಾ‹• ಅŒ ಮೂಲಕ ಾ 'ಾ: 4ೋ1 CೊಡR ಅPರೂಂನ ಕು?ತುೊಳ@ಲು 4ೇ?ದರು. -ಾನು ಅವರು 4ೇ?ದಂೆ . ಅP#ಾQ ರವರ ರೂಂ ಬ? ಇCಾaಗ .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ಸzೆ“ಯ Uೕ#ೆ - ಇದa ಾಂEೋ” ]ಾೆ‹ ೆೆದು ನನ5 ಮುಂCೆbೕ Lೆತ>#ೆOಾ1 ಾಂEೋ” 4ಾ3ೊಂಡು ಅP#ಾQ ರವೆ •ೕs 'ಾ: -ಾನು 'ಾEಾ ಎಂದು ೇ?ದರು. ಅವನು ಹೂಂ ಎಂದು 4ೇ?Cೆನು ಆಗ .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ಅವರ ಮ-ೆಯವರು Oಾ*ಾದರು ಬಂದ*ೆ -ೋEೋ ಎಂದು 4ೇ? •ೕs ಕ‹ 'ಾ: ನನೆ ಮಂಚದ Uೕ#ೆ ಮಲೊVೕ ಎಂದು 4ೇ?ದರು -ಾನು ನಮX ಅಪ‚ ಅಮX/ೆ 4ೇಳವYCಾ1 ೕೆ 4ೇಳವYCಾ1 4ೇ?ದaಂದ .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ನನೆ ೊ=>¯ÉÝÃ ಇ*ೋ ೕೕ¸Áì ಅCಾ)ವ K/¸ÀÄÖç ಕ*ೆಸು=>ೕvೕ ಕ*ೆಸು ನನೆ ಎ#ಾರು ೊತು> ಎಂದು 4ೇ? ನನ5ನು5 ಬಲವಂತ0ಾ1 ಎeೆದುೊಂಡು ನನ5 ಬnೆdಗಳನು5 ಅವ*ೇ ೆೆದು -ಾನು Lೇಡ Lೇಡ ಎಂದರೂ ಸಹ ಬಲವಂತ0ಾ1 ನನ5 ಇ6ೆ7ೆ +ರುದ80ಾ1 ನನ5 Uೕ#ೆ Cೈlಕ ಸಂuೋಗ 'ಾ:ದರು. Cೈlಕ ಸಂuೋಗ 'ಾ:ದ ನಂತರ ಬnೆd 4ಾ3ೊಂಡು 4ೊರೆ Lಾ Oಾ*ಾದರು ೇ?ದ*ೆ Cೇವರ ‘ಾ)ನ 'ಾಡು=>Cೆa ಎಂದು 4ೇಳLೇೆಂದು 4ೇ? .ಾGKೕ" ಅಂದ 4ೊರಟು 4ೋದರು. ಇCಾದ ಸGಲ‚ ಸಮಯದ ನಂತರ ನಮX ಅಪ‚ †ಕVಪ‚ †ಕVಮXನು5 ಕ*ೆದುೊಂಡು ಬಂದರು. .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ನಮXಗಳ ಬ? Cೇವೆ ಪyzೆ 'ಾ:; ಕಳl;ೊಟdರು. ಇCಾದ ನಂತರ ಹಲ0ಾರು Lಾ -ಾವYಗಳ ಹಂಗರಹ?@ ಮಠೆV 4ೋCಾಗ .ಾGKೕ" 4ಾಗೂ ಅವರ ಸ4ಾಯಕ-ಾದ ಅP#ಾQ ನನೆ Uೖೈ ಮುcd #ೈಂ1ಕ 3ರುಕುಳ /ೕ:ದುa ಮಠದbೕ ೆಲಸ 'ಾಡು=>ದa ನಂfೕ• ರವರು ಎ•ೊdೕ Lಾ ನನ5ನು5 ಅಂದ ಒಬ„eೇ ಕೂರದಂೆ ಕ?;ರುಾ>*ೆ. ಇCಾದ ನಂತರ .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ನನೆ 0ಾ‹• ಆŒ ಮೂಲಕ +:vೕಾ 'ಾ: Cೇಹದ tಾಸ1 uಾಗಗಳನು5 ೋಸುವಂೆ ಒಾ>jಸುವYದು ’ೕಯŽ• ಸಮಯದ +:vೕಾ 'ಾಡುವYದು 'ಾಡು=>ದುa ಇCೇ ವಷದ ಜನವ 'ಾ4ೆಯ ಅಂದ*ೆ f-ಾಂಕ: 15/01/2024 ರಂದು .ಾGKೕ" ರವರು ನನೆ •ೕs 'ಾ: ನನ5 †ಕVಪ‚ನ ಮಗeಾದ 14 ವಷದ /ನ5 ತಂ1 ಪಲ+ಯನು5 ನ-ೊ5ಂfೆ ಮಲ1ಸು ಎಂದು ೇ?ದುa -ಾನು •ೕs ಕ‹ 'ಾ:Cೆನು. ಇCಾದ ನಂತರ Lಾಲ ಮಂಜು-ಾಥ .ಾGKೕ" Oಾಗೕ, ಅP#ಾQ ೆ ಆಗೕ ನನೆ 'ಾ:ರುವYfಲ. ಇದಂದ -ಾನು 20 ಮನ-ೊಂದು, Oಾಗೂ 4ೇ? ೊಳ@#ಾರCೆ ಹಲ0ಾರು Lಾ: ಮ-ೆಯbೕ ಆತXಹೆ) 'ಾ:ೊಳ@ಲು ಪBಯ=5;ರುೆ>ೕ-ೆ. ಆದaಂದ ಹುಯೂರುದುಗ 4ೋಬ? ಹಂಗರಹ?@ ABೕ+Cಾ)6ೌEೇಶG ಮ4ಾಸಂ.ಾIನ ಮಠದ .ಾGKೕ" ಆದ Lಾಲ ಮಂಜು-ಾಥ .ಾGKೕ" 4ಾಗೂ ಅವರ ಸ4ಾಯಕ-ಾದ ಅP#ಾQ ೆ ರವರು -ಾನು ಅ]ಾBಪ>eಾ1ದa 2017 ಂದ ಇCೇ ವಷದ f-ಾಂಕ: . 15/01/2024 ರವ*ೆಗೂ ನನ5 Uೕ#ೆ #ೈಂ1ಕ 3ರುಕುಳ, .ಾGKೕ"ಯು ನನ5 ಇ6ೆ7ೆ +ರುದ80ಾ1 Cೈlಕ ಸಂuೋಗ 'ಾ:ದುa ಈ +6ಾರವನು5 ಮ-ೆಯ 4ೇ?ದ 'ಾಟ ಮಂತB 'ಾ: ನನ5 ತಂCೆ ಾjಯನು5 .ಾjಸುವYCಾ1 Lೆದೆ 4ಾ3ರುವYದಲCೇ qLೈನ +:vೕ ಾನ 'ಾತ-ಾ:ದ ನನ5 Cೇಹದ tಾಸ1 -ೋ:ರುವYದದಲCೇ +6ಾರ 4ೊರೆ ೊಾ>ದ ನನ5ನು5 4ಾಗೂ ನನ5 ಮ-ೆಯವರನು5 "ೕವ ಸlತ SಡುವYfಲ0ೆಂದು Lೆದೆ 4ಾ3ರುಾ>*ೆ. -ಾನು ನನ5 ತಂCೆ ಾjೆ ಏ-ಾದರೂ 4ೆಚು‡ ಕ:U 'ಾಡುಾ>-ೆಂದು 4ೆದ ಇಯವ*ೆಗೂ .ಾGKೕ" 4ಾಗೂ ಅವರ ಸ4ಾಯಕ ಅP#ಾQರವರು 3ರುಕುಳವನು5 ಸl;ೊಂಡು ಮ-ೆಯ Oಾಗೂ 4ೇಳCೆ ವ6ಾರವನು5 ಮು†‡cdರುೆ>ೕ-ೆ. ಆದaಂದ ನನ5 Uೕ#ೆ #ೈಂ1ಕ 3ರುಕುಳ 4ಾಗೂ ಹಠಸಂuೋಗ 'ಾ:ದ Lಾಲ ಮಂಜು-ಾಥ .ಾGKೕ" 4ಾಗು ಅವನ ಸ4ಾಯಕ ಅP#ಾQ ೆ ರವರ +ರುದ8 ಾನೂನು ೕಾ) ಕBಮ ಜರು1ಸLೇೆಂದು ಈ fವಸ ತಡ0ಾ1 ಬಂದು ದೂರು ಸ;ೊಂ:ರುೆ>ೕ-ೆ.” The date of the complaint is 07-03-2024. The subject of the petition is sexual harassment by the pontiff from the year 2017. Instances that have happened from the year 2017 up to the year 2019 are narrated in the complaint. The Police conduct investigation and file a charge sheet. The summary of the charge sheet, as obtaining in Column No.17, reads as follows: “17. ೇ;ನ ಸಂ\ಪ> .ಾ*ಾಂಶ ಕುಗೕ ಉಪ+uಾಗ 0ಾ)’>ಯ, ಕುಗ ಾಲೂಕು ಹುಯೂರುದುಗ 4ೋಬ?@ ಹಂಗರಹ?@: (ೆ.".Cೇವಪಟdಣ) ಯರುವ ABೕ+Cಾ)6ೌEೇಶG Cೇವ.ಾIನದ ಮಠೆV ಈ Cೋ•ಾ*ೋಪ ಾ ಪcd ಅಂಕಣ-12 ರ, ಕಂಡ ಆ*ೋ’-1 ಮಂಜು-ಾಥ,ಎs @ Lಾಲಮಂಜು-ಾಥ .ಾGKೕ"ಯು ’ೕಾಧ)—*ಾ1ದುa, ಆ*ೋ’-2 ಅP#ಾQ.ೆ ಈತನು ಆ*ೋ’-1 ರವೆ 21 ಸ4ಾಯಕ-ಾ1ದುa, ಈ Cೇವ.ಾIನೆV ಸಂಬಂ ;ದಂೆ ಎ1 ರವರು ಎ2 ರವ*ೊಳೊಂಡಂೆ ಟBdನು5 -ೊಂದ 'ಾ:;, ಎ1 ರವರು ಹಂಗರಹ?@ಯ 4ಾ Cೇವ.ಾIನದ ಸIಳದ qದಲು †ಕVCಾದ Cೇವ.ಾIನವನು5 'ಾ:ೊಂಡು ಪyzೆ 'ಾ:ೊಂ:ದುa, .ಾವಜ/ಕೆ xಾಸ{ವನು5 4ೇ? ೊಂಡು ಬರುಾ> f-ೇ f-ೇ ಈ Cೇವ.ಾIನೆV .ಾವಜ/ಕರು ಆಕ˜ತ*ಾ1 4ೆ†‡ನ ಸಂtೆ)ಯ ಬಂದು 4ೋಗು=>ದುa, ಅCೇ ೕ= CೊಡR CೊಡR *ಾಜಾರಗಳ, -ಾ)Oಾ ೕಶರು, lಯ ೕ ಅ ಾಗಳ Cೇವ.ಾIನೆV ಬಂದು 4ೋಗು=>ದaಂದ ಈ Cೇವ.ಾIನವY ಇನೂ5 4ೆ†‡ನCಾ1 ಪBವಧ'ಾನೆV ಬಂfರುತ>Cೆ. ಈ ಪBಕರಣದ .ಾ\-1 ಅ]ಾBಪ> Lಾಲ3 xxxx ರವೆ ಹು•ಾಲ0ೆಂCಾಗ .ಾ\-1 ರವರ ತಂCೆ .ಾ\-3 ಮಂಜು-ಾಥ.4ೆ™.; ರವರು ಹಂಗರಹ?@ಯರುವ ABೕ +CಾG6ೌEೇಶG Cೇವ.ಾIನೆV qದಲು f-ಾಂಕ:25-03-2017 ರಂದು ಹಂಗರಹ?@ಯ ABೕ +CಾG6ೌEೇಶG Cೇವ.ಾIನೆV ಬಂCಾಗ ಎ1 ರವರು .ಾ\-1 ರವರ ೈಯನು5 -ೋ: /ನೆ qದಲ-ೆಯದು ಲ| 'ಾ)*ೇ} ಆಗುವYCಾ1, ಈ ಮದು0ೆOಾದ Uೕ#ೆ ಮ-ೆಯವರು -ೋಡುವ ಹುಡುಗನ zೊೆ ಮದು0ೆOಾಗುತ>Cೆ ಎಂದು =?;, ಇದು ಸ 4ೋಗLೇೆಂದ*ೆ ಕದ ಪyzೆ 'ಾಡLೇೆಂದು =?;, ಮನš;ದaಂದ ಅದರಂೆ .ಾ\-1 ರವರ ಮ-ೆಯ ಎ1 ಎ2 ರವರು ಪyzೆಗಳನು5 'ಾ:ರುಾ>*ೆ. f-ಾಂಕ:27-03-2017 ರಂದು ಎ1 ಮತು> ಎ2 ರವರು ABೕ+Cಾ)6ೌEೇಶG Cೇವರನು5 Lೆಂಗಳ[ನ ಾ'ಾ\]ಾಳ)ದ .ಾ\-1 ರವರ ಮ-ೆೆ ಕ*ೆದುೊಂಡು 4ೋCಾಗ ಮ‘ಾ)ಹ5 12-30 ಂದ ಮ‘ಾ)ಹ5 1-00 ರ ನಡು0ೆ ಎ2 ರವೆ .ಾ\-1 ರವರು ಜೂ) ೊಡು0ಾಗ ಎ2 ರವರು #ೈಂ1ಕ ದೃ˜djಂದ .ಾ\-1 ರವರ ೈಯನು5 l:ದುೊಂಡುರುಾ>-ೆಂದು, f-ಾಂಕ:23-06-2017 ರಂದು .ಾ\-1 ರವರು .ಾ\-2 ಮತು> .ಾ\-3 ರವ*ೊಂfೆ ಹಂಗರಹ?@ಯ Cೇವ.ಾIನೆV 4ೋCಾಗ ಎ1 ರವರು .ಾ\-1 ರವೆ ಅಡುೆ ಮ-ೆೆ 4ೋ1 ತನೆ cೕ 'ಾ:ೊಂಡು ತರುವಂೆ 4ೇ?ದaಂದ .ಾ\-1 ರವರು ಅಡುೆ ಮ-ೆಯ cೕ 'ಾಡು=>Cಾaಗ ಮ‘ಾ)ಹ5 ಸು'ಾರು 2-00 ಗಂnೆ ಸಮಯದ ಎ2 ರವರು .ಾ\-1 ರವರ lಂಬfjಂದ ಬಂದು #ೈಂ1ಕ ದೃ˜djಂದ ತS„ೊಂ:ರುಾ>-ೆಂದು, f-ಾಂಕ:13-07-2017 ರಂದು .ಾ\-1 ರವರು .ಾ\-4 ಪBuಾವ=ರವ*ೊಂfೆ ಹಂಗರಹ?@ಯ ABೕ+Cಾ)6ೌEೇಶG Cೇವ.ಾIನೆV 4ೋCಾಗ ಎ1 ರವರು .ಾ\-1 ರವೆ ¹ÌçÃs ಇರುವ ಗಭಗು:ೆ ಮು:ಪನು5 ಕcdಸುವ -ೆಪದ, .ಾಯಂಾಲ 5-00 ಗಂnೆ ಸಮಯದ ಕ*ೆದುೊಂಡು 4ೋ1 .ಾ\-1 ರವರ .ೊಂಟ ಮತು> tಾಸ1 ಅಂಾಂಗಳನು5 #ೈಂ1ಕ ದೃ˜djಂದ ಮುcdCಾಗ, .ಾ\-1 ರವರು 3ರು†ೊಳ@ಲು ಪBಯ=5;Cಾಗ ಎ1 ರವರು /-ೇ-ಾದರೂ ಈ +6ಾರವನು5 Oಾಾದರು 4ೇ?ದ*ೆ ತನೆ ೊ=>ರುವ +Cೆ)ಗಳನು5 ಬ?; /ಮX ಅಪ‚ ಅಮXನನು5 .ಾjಸುೆ>ೕ-ೆಂದು 4ೆದ;, 'ಾನ;ಕ0ಾ1 .ಾ\-1 ರವರನು5 ಕು1ƒ;, Cೈlಕ0ಾ1 /ಶPÀÛಳ-ಾ51 'ಾ:, ಅ'ಾನ+ೕಯ0ಾ1 22 ಮೃಗದಂೆ ವ=; ಇCೇ ೕ= .ಾ\-1 ರವರು Cೇವ.ಾIನೆV ಬಂCಾಗ#ೆಲ, ಎ1 ರವರು .ಾ\-1 ರವೆ #ೈಂ1ಕ0ಾ1 Cೌಜನ) 'ಾಡು=>ದುa, ಎ ರವರು ತನ5 qLೈ /ಂದ .ಾ\-1 ರವರ ಆ*ೋಗ) +6ಾಸುವ -ೆಪದ 'ಾತ-ಾ:, ನಂತರ .ಾ\-1 ರವ*ೊಂfೆ 0ಾ‹• ಆ› ನ +:vೕ ಾ 'ಾ: tಾಸ1 ಅಂಾಂಗಗಳನು5 ೋಸುವಂೆ ಮತು> ೕs 0ೆ• .ೈ‹ /ಂದ ಅAೕಲ +:vೕ ಗಳ ಂ ಗಳನು5 Eೌs#ೋŽ 'ಾ: ಕಳlಸುವಂೆ Lೆದ;ದaಂದ, .ಾ\-1 ರವರು ಎ1 ರವರು 4ೇ?ದಂೆ 'ಾ:ರುಾ>*ೆ. 2019-ೇ .ಾನ .ಾ\-1 ರವರು .ಾ\-2 ಮತು> .ಾ\-4 ರವ*ೊಂfೆ ಹಂಗರಹ?@ಯ ABೕ+Cಾ) 6ೌEೇಶG Cೇವ.ಾIನೆV 4ೋCಾಗ .ಾ\-1 ರವೆ ಎ2 ರವರು ಒಣಗಲು 4ಾ3ರುವ LೆŽ Aೕ‹ ಗಳನು5 ತಂದು ರೂಂ ನ ಇಡುವಂೆ =?;ದaಂದ .ಾ\-1 ರವರು LೆŽ Aೕ‹ ಗಳನು5 ಎ2 ರವರು 4ೇ?ದಂೆ ರೂಂ ನ ಇಡಲು 4ೋCಾಗ ಎ2 ರವರು ರೂಂ ಒಳೆ 4ೋ1 Lಾ1ಲು 4ಾ3 .ಾ\-1 ರವರ ಬnೆdಯನು5 S†‡ tಾಸ1 ಅಂಾಂಗಗಳನು5 ಮುcd ಬಲವಂತ0ಾಗ Cೈlಕ ಸಂuೋಗ 'ಾಡಲು ಬಂCಾಗ .ಾ\-1 ರವರು zೋ*ಾ1 3ರು†ೊಂ:ದaಂದ Sಟುd 4ೋ1ರುಾ>-ೆಂದು, ಇCೇ ೕ= ಎ1 ಮತು> ಎ2 ರವರು .ಾ\1 ರವೆ #ೈಂ1ಕ Cೌಜನ) ಮುಂದುವ;ದುa, f-ಾಂಕ:25-04-2022 ರಂದು ಅ]ಾBಪ> Lಾಲ3 .ಾ\-1 ರವರು ತಮX ಕುಟುಂಬCೊಂfೆ ಹಂಗರಹ?@ ABೕ+Cಾ)6ೌEೇಶG Cೇವ.ಾIನೆV 4ೋCಾಗ ಸಂzೆ ಸು'ಾರು 6:30 ಗಂnೆಯ ಎ1 ರವರು .ಾ\-1 qLೈ ೆ 0ಾnಾ•Œ ಾ 'ಾ: ಎ2 ರೂಂ ನ ಇರುವಂೆ =?;ದುa ಅದರಂೆ .ಾ\-1 ರವರು ಎ2 ರವರ ರೂಂ ಬ? ಇCಾaಗ ಎ1 ರವರು .ಾ\-1 ರವರನು5 ಎ2 ರವರ ರೂಂ £ÉÆಳೆ ಕ*ೆದುೊಂಡು 4ೋ1 Lಾ1ಲು 4ಾ3 ಎ2 ರವೆ Oಾ*ಾದರೂ ಬಂದ*ೆ -ೋ:ೊಳ@ವಂೆ =?;, ಎ1 ರವರು Lೆತ>#ಾ1 ಾಂEೋ” 4ಾ3ೊಂಡು .ಾ\-1 ರವರು ಅ]ಾBಪ> Lಾಲ3 ಎಂದು =?fದaರು ಸಹ ಮಂಚದ Uೕ#ೆ ಮಲ1ೋ ಎಂದು 4ೇ?Cಾಗ .ಾ\-1 ರವರು ತನ5 ಅಪ‚ ಅಮX/ೆ 4ೇಳವYCಾ1, ೕಸೆ 4ೇಳವYCಾ1 =?; +*ೋ ;Cಾಗ ಎ1 ರವರು ತನೆ ೕಸರು, K/ಸdi ೊ=>ಲದವರು Oಾರು ಇಲ, ತನೆ ಎಲರೂ ೊತು> ಎಂದು 4ೇ? ಅ]ಾBಪ> Lಾಲ3 .ಾ\-1ರವರು Lೇಡ0ೆಂದರು ‘ಾKಕ žೇತB0ಾದ ABೕ +Cಾ)6ೌEೇಶG Cೇವ.ಾIನದ, ಎ1 ರವರು .ಾ\-1 ರವರ ಬnೆdಗಳನು5 ೆೆದು ಮೃಗದಂೆ ವ=;, ಅ'ಾನ+ೕಯ0ಾ1, ಬಲವಂತ0ಾ1 ಅ]ಾBಪ> Lಾಲ3ಯ Uೕ#ೆ #ೈಂ1ಕ ಸಂuೋಗ 'ಾ:, ಮನುಕುಲ 4ಾಗೂ ಸ'ಾಜ ತ#ೆತ1ƒಸುವಂತಹ lೕನ ಕೃತ)ವನು5 'ಾ:ರುಾ>ನಂತ, ಇCಾದ ನಂತರ .ಾ\-1 ರವರು Cೇವ.ಾIನೆV ಬಂCಾಗ ಹಲ0ಾರು .ಾ ಎ1 ಮತು>, ಎ2 ರವರು .ಾ\-1 ರವರ Uೖ ೈ ಮುcd #ೈಂ1ಕ 3ರುಕುಳ /ೕ:ರುಾ>*ೆಂದು ಎ1 ರವರು 0ಾ‹• ಆ› +:vೕ ಾ ಮುtಾಂತರ ಾ 'ಾ: tಾಸ1 ಅಂಾಂಗಗಳನು5 ೋಸುವಂೆ ಒಾ>j;ರುಾ>*ೆಂದು 4ಾಗೂ ಎ1 ಮತು> ಎ2 ರವರು Cೇವ.ಾIನೆV, ಬರುವ 4ೆಣು_ ಮಕVeೆ[ಂfೆ #ೈಂ1ಕ ದೃ˜djಂದ ವ=ಸು=>ದa ಬೆƒ .ಾ\-7 ನಂfೕಶರವೆ 6ೆ-ಾ51 =?fದaಂದ ಈ +6ಾರವನು5 4ೊರಗEೆ ಎ#ಾದರೂ 4ೇ?ದ*ೆ .ಾ\-7 ರವರನು5 ಎ1 ರವರು ತನ5 ಬ? ಇದa ’ಸೂ> /ಂದ 23 .ಾjಸುವYCಾ1 Lೆದೆ 4ಾ3ರುಾ>*ೆಂದು, ಎ1 ರವರು ABೕ+Cಾ)6ೌEೇಶG Cೇವರ 4ೆಸನ xಾಸ{ 4ೇ? tಾj#ೆ 0ಾ; 'ಾಡುವYCಾ1 .ಾ\-1 ಮತು> .ಾ\-1 ರವರ ಕುಟುಂಬದವೆ ವಂ†;ರುಾ>*ೆಂದು ತ/tೆಯ ಎ1 ಮತು> ಎಲ ರವರ +ರುದ8 ಆ*ೋಪ ಕಂಡು §A¢gÀÄªÀÅzÀjAzÀ J1 gÀªÀgÀÄ PÀ®A 376, 354(J)(I)(II), 506, 417, 342 gÉ/« 34 L.¦.¹ PÀ®A 4, 6 ¥ÉÆÃPÉÆìÃ PÁAiÉÄÝ, PÀ®A 66(ಇ), 87 (ಎ) ಐ.n ಆd, ಕಲಂ 3(ಎ›) ‘ಾKಕ ಸಂ.ೆIಗಳ ದುರುಪvೕಗ ಪB=ಬಂಧ ಅ /ಯಮ-1988 ಮತು> ಕಲಂ 30 xಾ.ಾ{ಸ{ಗಳ ಆ /ಯಮ-1959 ೕತ) ಕೃತ)0ೆಸ1 ರುಾ> -ೆಂದು ªÀÄvÀÄÛ ಎ2 ರವರು ಕಲಂ 354 (J) (I)(II), 342 ಐ’; gÉ/« 34 L.¦.¹ PÀ®A 11 (iv) 12 ೕೊ•ೕ PÁAiÉÄÝ ಮತು> ಕಲಂ 3(J¥sï) ‘ಾKಕ ಸಂ.ೆIಗಳ ದುರುಪvೕಗ ಪB=ಬಂಧ ಅ /ಯಮ-1988 ೕತ) ಕೃvÀåªÉಸ1ರುಾ>-ೆಂದು ಈ Cೋ•ಾ*ೋಪ ಾ ಪತBವನು5 /0ೇf;ೊಂ:ರುೆ>, (/0ೇದ-ೆ: ಈ ಪBಕರಣದ ಎ›.ಎ.ಎ ವರf ಮತು> ಇತ*ೇ Cಾಖ#ಾ=ಗಳನು5 ಪEೆಯLೇಾ1ದುa ಬಂದ ಕೂಡ#ೇ ಕಲಂ 173 (8) ;ಆi.’.; ೕಾ) 4ೆಚು‡ವ Cಾಖ#ಾ=ಗಳನು5 'ಾನ) ಘನ -ಾ)OಾಲಯೆV /0ೇf;ೊಳ@#ಾಗುವYದು.)” The offences alleged now, while filing the charge sheet, are quite different from what was alleged at the time of registration of crime. In the charge sheet, the offences alleged are as follows: (a) Under Sections 376, 354A(1)(i), 354A(1)(ii), 417, 342, 506, 34 of the IPC; (b) Under Sections 4, 6, 11(iv), 12 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (c) Under Sections 66E, 67A of the Information Technology Act, 2000; (d) Under Section 3 of the Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988 24 (e) Under Section 30 of the Arms Act, 1959. In the light of the offences being under five enactments, I deem it appropriate to consider them offencewise. 10. Let me first consider the offence alleged under the Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988. Whether offence under this enactment can be alleged in the teeth of the allegation need not detain this Court for long or delve deep into the matter. A coordinate Bench of this Court had clearly interpreted the Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988 in Dr. SHIVAMURTHY MURUGHA SHARANARU v. STATE OF KARNATAKA1 to hold that it would not become applicable to the religious institutions in the State of Karnataka. The said judgment is followed by this Court in Dr. SHIVAMURTHY MURUGHA SHARANARU v. STATE OF KARNATAKA2, wherein it has been held as follows: “…. …. …. A. RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS (PREVENTION OF MISUSE) ACT, 1988. 1 W.P.No.2331 of 2023 disposed on 22-05-2023 2 2024 SCC OnLine Kar.19105 25 11. The 5th charge is for offences punishable under Section 3 and 7 of the Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988. Sections 3 and 7 read as follows: “3. Prohibition of use of religious institutions for certain purposes.—No religious institution or manager thereof shall use or allow the use of any premises belonging to, or under the control of, the institution— (a) for the promotion or propagation of any political activity; or (b) for the harbouring of any person accused or convicted of an offence under any law for the time being in force; or (c) for the storing of any arms or ammunition; or (d) for keeping any goods or articles in contravention of law for the time being in force; or (e) for erecting or putting up of any construction or fortification, including basements, bunkers, towers or walls without a valid licence or permission under any law for the time being in force; or (f) for the carrying on of any lawful or subversive act prohibited under any law for the time being in force or in contravention of any order made by any court; or (g) for the doing of any act which promotes or attempts to promote disharmony or feelings of enmity, hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, language or regional groups or castes or communities; or (h) for the carrying on of any activity prejudicial to the sovereignty, unity and integrity of India; or 26 (i) for the doing of any act in contravention of the provisions of the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971 (69 of 1971). ……… 7. ……… 7. Penalties.—Where any religious institution or manager thereof contravenes the provisions of Section 3, Section 4, Section 5 or Section 6, the manager and every person connected with such contravention shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees.” (Emphasis supplied) Sections 3 and 7 as quoted supra need not detain this Court for long or delve deep into the matter qua its interpretation as a co-ordinate Bench of this Court in a case concerning the same accused, in Writ Petition No. 2331 of 2023 disposed of on 22-05-2023 has held as follows:— “A. THE RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS (PREVENTION OF MISUSE) ACT, 1988 IN A NUTSHELL: (i) This Act is a small statute in all comprising of ten sections. Itsone line Preamble reads: ‘An Act to prevent the misuse of religious institutions for political and other purposes.’ Section 1 gives the title; sub-section (2) of Section 1 gives the Act a pan-India application; sub-section (3) fixes 26 May 1988 as the date w.e.f. which the Act has come into force. Section (2) is the ‘dictionary clause’ of the statute. It inter alia defines the terms like ammunition, arms, political activity, political party, religious institution, manager of such institution, etc. (ii) Section 3 of the statute prohibits use of any religious institution or its premises for promotion of political activity, harboring of any accused/convict or for storing arms & ammunitions; it also bars commission of any unlawful or subversive acts or any act which promotes disharmony, hatred, enmity or ill-will between communities/groups of people. Further, its prohibits extends to any act calculated to insult the National Honour. Section (4) prohibits, subject to certain exceptions, entry of arms/ammunition or persons carrying them into religious institution. Section 5 prohibits use of funds & 27 properties of ‘religious institutions’ for political party or activity or for the commission of any offence. Section 6 prohibits allowing of any ceremony, festival, congregation, procession or assembly organized by or for any political party into the religious institution. (iii) Section 7 of the statute prescribes the penalties; sub- section (1) of section 8 provides for disqualification & removal of employees of any religious institution on conviction for the offence under this Act; sub-section (2) of section 8 empowers the Criminal Court to injunct the accused from exercising the powers and duties of his office/post in the religious institution ‘pending trial’ of criminal cases; sub-section (3) provides for filling of vacancy in such a contingency arising out of order of removal/restraint. Section 9 enjoins employees of the religious institutions with a duty to give information to the Police about the contravention of any provisions of the Act; it also prescribes penalty for infraction of this duty. Section 10 repeals the ordinance that preluded this Act. B. AS TO APPLICABILITY OF THE 1988 ACT TO THE CASE OF THE PONTIFF: (i) Petitioner-Pontiff happens to be one of the accused in the subject criminal cases and he having been arrested, continues to be in the judicial custody since 01.09.2022. After investigation, the Police have filed the charge sheet and the trial Court has taken cognizance of the alleged offences which prima facie involve moral turpitude; these offences are punishable under Sections 376(2)(n), 376(3) read with section 149of IPCandsections 17, 5(1) & 6 of POCSO Act, 2012, is apparent from the prosecution papers. As already mentioned above, the Government Order dated 13.12.2022 appointing the Administrator for the Mutt & its institutions, was put in challenge inter alia by the Petitioner & others in two Writ Petitions Nos. 25316/2022 & 25318/2022. This Court has handed the judgment today invalidating the said appointment, of course with some observations. Be that as it may. (ii) Learned Sr. Advocate Mr. C.V. Nagesh appearing for the Petitioner argued that going by the intent & policy content of the 1988 Act, there is absolutely no scope for the invocation of any of its provisions and therefore, the impugned order is liable to be voided. This is disputed by the learned A.G. In construing the nature, scope & application of plenary legislations like the one at hands, courts are entitled to take into account such external & historical facts as may be necessary. They 28 can also have regard to the surrounding circumstances that obtained at the time whilst the statute was enacted. This is the practice in all the civilized jurisdiction. Lord Halsbury in Herron v. Rathmines and Rathgar Improvement Commissioners observed at page 502 as under: …….. …….. ……. (iii) The 1988 Act came to be enacted by the Parliament when there was terrorism & turmoil in the State of Punjab and around perpetrated by unscrupulous individuals attempting to threaten the sovereignty & integrity of the nation; a sort of secessionist tendency was exhibited by generating fear amongst the masses; the shrines & religious places as holy as the Golden Temple in Amritsar were being misused for creating communal disharmony & hatred. These nefarious acts and other of the kind, the statute in question seeks to proscribe and makes them punishable. All other offences howsoever gruesome, would not fit into the restrictive framework of the statute, notwithstanding the enomity of moral turpitude involved therein. (iv) Courts should be less willing to extend express meanings if it is clear that the statute in question was designed to be restrictive or circumscribed in its operation rather than liberal or permissive. How liberally a statute is to be construed depends on the nature of enactment, and strictness or otherwise of the words in which the legislature has expressed its intent. Therefore there is force in the vehement submission of Mr. Nagesh that the 1988 Act mainly focuses on serious & distinct acts of nefarious designs that have something to do with secessionist tendencies, terrorism, or such other offences, ejusdem generis. This view gains support from the texture & architecture of the various provisions in the Act, namely, the charging and penal sections. The offences alleged against the Petitioner - Pontiff apparently lack the nature & kind of the acts contemplated by the Act, although what is alleged against him are grave. Therefore, this Act is not applicable. C. AS TO INVOKABILITY OF SECTION 8(2) OF THE 1988 ACT: (i) Mr. CV Nagesh secondly contended that provisions of Section 8(2) of the 1988 Act were not invokable in the 29 given fact matrix of the case, assuming that the said Act is otherwise applicable. He structures this argument on the basis of the expression “pending trial” employed in sub-section (2) of Section 8. He also told the Court that trial is a concept obtaining in criminal jurisprudence; there is no indication the provision in question has employed the term with a different meaning; and that, according to him, unless the trial commences, the question of pendency of trial would not arise. Learned AG disputed this contending that the term should receive a liberal interpretation to include all criminal cases wherein, on the filing of the charge- sheet the cognizance of offence has been taken by the Court. He hastened to add that Section 8(2) has the characteristic of civil law although it is enacted in a penal statute and therefore, strict construction is not warranted. (ii) Let me examine the nature, scope & meaning of Section 8(2) which has the following text: “Where any manager or other employee of a religious institution is accused of an offence under this Act and a charge-sheet for the prosecution of such person is filed in any court and the court is of the opinion, after considering the charge-sheet and after hearing the prosecution and the accused, that a prima facie case exists, it shall pass an order or direction restraining the person from exercising the powers or discharging the duties of his office or post pending trial.” This provision authorizes the trial judge to injunct any manager or other employee of a religious institution who happens to be an accused, from exercising the powers or discharging the duties of his office or post ‘pending trial’. The questions, what is meant by ‘trial’ and when the ‘trial commences’, are no longer res integra. The following observations of the Apex Court at paragraph 38 of Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab are a complete answer to the said questions: “…the law can be summarized to the effect that as ‘trial’ means determination of issues adjudging the guilt or the innocence of a person, the person has to be aware of what is the case against him and it is only at the stage of framing of the charges that the court informs him of the same, the ‘trial’ commences only on charges being framed. Thus, we do not approve the view taken by the courts that in a criminal case, trial commences on cognizance being taken…” 30 Admittedly, in the subject criminal cases, the investigation having been completed, charge sheet has been filed and the trial court has taken cognizance of the offences, is true. However, the charges are yet to be framed after hearing the prosecution and the accused, as prescribed by this section. In the light of the observations in HARDEEP SINGH, the trial cannot be said to have commenced; trial that has not commenced, cannot be said to ‘pend’. If that be so, it is not a case of ‘pending trial’, as contemplated by Section 8(2). Thus, the pendency of trial as being a sine qua non for the invocation of sub-section (2) of section 8, the subject application could not have been moved in the court below. (iii) The vehement contention of learned AG that the expression ‘pending trial’ employed in section 8(2) should receive liberal construction since that provision has characteristics of a ‘civil law’, is difficult to countenance, regard being had to its text. The provision which employs concepts of criminal law, such as, ‘accused’, ‘offence’, ‘charge sheet’, ‘prosecution’, etc. as its building blocks. Merely because, it empowers Criminal Court, to issue restraint order, one cannot at once hastily jump to the contra conclusion. Thus, the said provision having in its muscle criminal law elements in abundance, cannot be treated as a piece of civil law. It hardly needs to be stated that normally, penal laws are construed with usual strictness; the argued case of the Respondent - State, does not carve out an exception to this general norm. (iv) It is not uncommon that a penal statute may have a few provisions civil in nature. Illustratively, section 125 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 provides for awarding maintenance and, section 357A provides for awarding compensation to the victims of crime; such provisions arguably can be construed as being civil in nature. However, that is not the case when it comes to the text & context of section 8(2) of the 1988 Act. When the Parliament has made a dictionary clause for whole of the Act, leaving the term ‘pending trial’ undefined; there is no reason for not construing the said term as belonging to the realm of criminal jurisprudence. If something different was intended, the Parliament would have indicated the same by an appropriate text. Courts by interpretative process cannot rewrite the statute. (v) The above approach of this Court to the provisions of Section 8(2) gains support from the following 31 observations at paragraphs 42, 43 & 44 of Hardeep Singh, supra: “…It is a settled principle of law that an interpretation which leads to the conclusion that a word used by the legislature is redundant, should be avoided as the presumption is that the legislature has deliberately and consciously used the words for carrying out the purpose of the Act. The legal maxim “A VerbisLegisNon Est Recedendum” which means, “from the words of law, there must be no departure” has to be kept in mind… The court cannot proceed with an assumption that the legislature enacting the statute has committed a mistake and where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, the court cannot go behind the language of the statute so as to add or subtract a word playing the role of a political reformer or of a wise counsel to the legislature. The court has to proceed on the footing that the legislature intended what it has said and even if there is some defect in the phraseology etc., it is for others than the court to remedy that defect. The statute requires to be interpreted without doing any violence to the language used therein. The court cannot re-write, recast or reframe the legislation for the reason that it has no power to legislate… No word in a statute has to be construed as surplusage. No word can be rendered ineffective or purposeless. Courts are required to carry out the legislative intent fully and completely. While construing a provision, full effect is to be given to the language used therein, giving reference to the context and other provisions of the Statute. By construction, a provision should not be reduced to a “dead letter” or “useless lumber”. An interpretation which renders a provision an otiose should be avoided otherwise it would mean that in enacting such a provision, the legislature was involved in “an exercise in futility” and the product came as a “purposeless piece” of legislation and that the provision had been enacted without any purpose and the entire exercise to enact such a provision was “most unwarranted besides being uncharitable…” D. AS TO THE PHRASE ‘carrying on of any unlawful or subversive act’ EMPLOYED UNDER SECTION 3(f) OF THE 1988 ACT: (i) Mr. Nagesh, draws attention of the court to the expression ‘carrying on of any unlawful or subversive act’ employed in clause (f) of section 3 and contended that the said phrase is used in distinction to the phrase the ‘commission of any unlawful act’; this according to him is to signify that the alleged pernicious act should have elements of continuity and seriousness, not only as an ordinary offence define under the Penal 32 Code, 1860, but something more & distinct. This submission merits acceptance and, reasons for this are not far to seek: The 1988 Act has been enacted keeping in view the turmoil created by ‘anti-national’ acts that were perpetrated mainly within the precincts of shrines, temples & other religious institutions in Punjab & around, as already discussed above. The historical background of the statute needs to be borne in mind whilst construing its provisions, need no reiteration. The phrase ‘carrying on of any unlawful or subversive act’, employed in Section 3(f) of the Act obviously means such serious acts that are not just committed as sporadic acts, but those which have the factors of continuity, in their perpetration or effect. In other words, they do not have sporadicity, but have continuity, both in degree and duration. Otherwise, the Parliament would have employed the usual phrase such as ‘commission of an act’. (ii) Mr. Nagesh's reliance on K.P.S. Sathyamoorthy v. State of Tamil Nadu in a measure come to his aid. The Madras High Court at paragraph 24, observed as under: “…So far as the third above Section i.e. Section 3(g) of the Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988 is concerned, it requires the premises or the religious institution i.e. the Kanchimatt to have been used to promote disharmony or feeling of enmity or hatred or ill-will between different religious, racial, language or religion groups or castes or communities. Here again, the Section requires the use of the premises or religious institution as a place or instrument for promoting disharmony or hatred or ill-will. That the framers of law have not intended an isolated event or utterance but made use of the term “use”, which would mean habitual, well - designed with continuity making use of the premises or institution for repeated commission of the act in the usual manner and therefore an isolated or casual utterance or reference made cannot be construed to mean using the premises or the religious institution since the term “use”, at this juncture, has got wider connotation in the context of the case…” (iii) To put it in a grammatical sense, there is a subtle difference between ‘commission of an act’ and ‘carrying on of an act; the former roughly falls 33 into past perfect tense, whereas the latter fits into the present perfect continuous tense. In Deepak Aggarwal v. Keshav Kaushik, the Apex Court has said: “…present perfect continuous tense is used for a position which began at some time in the past and is still continuing…”. It hardly needs to be stated that in the construction of statutes, their words and phrases must be interpreted in their ordinary grammatical sense unless there be something in the context, or in the object of the statute in which they occur or in the circumstances in which they are used, to show that they were used in a special sense different from their ordinary grammatical sense vide Corporation of the City of Victoria v. Bishop of Vancouver Island. Added, the offences alleged against the Petitioner under IPC and POCSO, apparently having elements of sporadicity, do not fit into the architecture of section 3(f) of 1988 Act. The contra contention of learned AG if accepted, would bring into precincts of the statute which textually speaking the Parliament did not even remotely intend. E. AS TO MEANING OF THE TERM ‘religious institution’ UNDER SECTION 2(f) OF THE 1988 ACT: (i) There is force in the submission of learned Senior Advocate Mr. Nagesh that in the dictionary clause of the Act, ‘religious institution’ has been defined and the impugned order transcends this definition in extending the restraint beyond the Mutt, to even the educational institutions run under its aegis. The operative portion of the said order has the following text: “Requisition given by the Investigating Officer dated 28.11.2022 to pass an order under Section 8(2) of the Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988 is allowed. Accused No. 1 is restrained from exercising the Powers or discharging the duties of SJM Mutt and other institutions running under the said Mutt as a Pontiff and head of the institution pending conclusion of trial.’ Learned AG appearing for the State contended that the Mutt and its educational institutions in all numbering 105, in terms of their management are so intertwined with each other that they constitute a singularity and, the Pontiff manages & administers both of them; he draws attention of the Court to a paragraph in the registered Trust Deed which indicates that the Pontiff shall be the ‘supreme authority’, there being none above nor below who can veto his 34 decisions. Therefore, he had sought for placing a liberal interpretation on this term, to include such institutions thickly associated with the religious institution. He highlights the possible consequences of placing restrictive meaning on the said term. (ii) Let me examine the definition itself as given in section 2(f); it has the following text: “religious institution’ means an institution for the promotion of any religion or persuasion, and includes any place or premises used as a place of public religious worship, by whatever name or designation known.” Penal statutes in a modern State are actuated with some policy to curb some public evil. Such statues are primarily directed to the problems before the Legislature based on information derived from past and present experiences. They may also be designed by use of general words to cover similar problems arising in the future. Therefore, ordinarily, the legislatures in their wisdom employ a ‘dictionary clause’, so that the words & phrases employed in the statute are construed as provided in its definition clause and, not in their common parlance. It hardly needs to be stated that, in any language, words do not have fixed contours as eruditely said by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes in Towne v. Eisner: “…A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought, and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used…” Similarly, it is apt to recall what Maxwell writes in this regard: “…The words of a statute, when there is doubt about their meaning are to be understood in the sense in which they best harmonize with the subject of the enactment. Their meaning is found not so much in a strictly grammatical or etymological propriety of language, nor even in its popular use, as in the subject, or in the occasion on which they are used, and the object to be attained. Grammatically, words may cover a case; but whenever a statute or document is to be construed, it must be construed not according to the mere ordinary general meaning of the words, but according to the ordinary meaning of the words as applied to the subject matter with regard to which they are used, unless there is something 35 which renders it necessary to read them in a sense, which is not their ordinary sense in the English language so applied…” (iii) If, at the beginning was the word, the word changes its meaning as soon as it is put to the test of reality. Statutes change not only by formal legislative amendment but also and even more by an imperceptible metamorphosis of the established thought, political usages and habits. It is pertinent to see what Justice G.P. Singh says: “…The problem of interpretation is a problem of meaning of words and their effectiveness as a medium of expression to communicate a particular thought. A word is used to refer to some object or symbol in the real world and this object or symbol has been assigned a technical name referent. Word and phrases are symbols that stimulate mental references to referents. But words of any language are capable of referring to different referent in different contexts and times. More over, there is always the difficulty of borderline cases falling within or outside the connotation of a word. Language, therefore, is likely to be misunderstood. In ordinary conversation or correspondence it is generally open for the parties to obtain clarification if the referent is imperfectly communicated. The position is, however, different in the interpretation of statute law. A statute as A statute as enacted cannot be explained by the individual opinions of the legislators, not even by a resolution of the entire Legislature. After the enacting process is over the Legislature becomes functus officio so far as that particular statute is concerned, so that it cannot itself interpret it. The Legislature can no doubt amend or repeal any previous statute or can declare its meaning but all this can be done only by a fresh statute after going through the normal process of law making…” (iv) Section 2(f) is a case of ‘means and includes’ definition. The Legislature has power to define a word even artificially. So the meaning of a word in the definition clause of a statute may either be restrictive or expansive. When a word is defined to mean such and such, the definition is prima facie restrictive & exhaustive. Where the definition of a word is inclusive, its meaning is prima facie extensive. When the inclusive part of a definition specifically states what all is included, Courts in the interpretative process cannot widen such inclusion. The Apex Court in P. Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Technology has discussed the matter as under: 36 “…A particular expression is often defined by the Legislature by using the word ‘means’ or the word ‘includes’. Sometimes the words ‘means and includes’ are used. The use of the word ‘means’ indicates that “definition is a hard-and-fast definition, and no other meaning can be assigned to the expression than is put down in definition”. The word ‘includes’ when used, enlarges the meaning of the expression defined so as to comprehend not only such things as they signify according to their natural import but also those things which the clause declares that they shall include. The words “means and includes”, on the other hand, indicate “an exhaustive explanation of the meaning which, for the purposes of the Act, must invariably be attached to these words or expressions”. The use of the words “means and includes” in Rule 2(b) would, therefore, suggest that the definition of ‘college’ is intended to be exhaustive and not extensive and would cover only the educational institutions falling in the categories specified in Rule 2(b) and other educational institutions are not comprehended…” (v) The term ‘religious institution’ employed in Section 8(2) does not have elasticity which the learned AG wants this Court to ascribe to it. It does not admit anything that is not provided in the inclusive part of the definition under Section 2(f). Even in this inclusive part, the educational institutions of the Mutt do not fit, because of the employment of the qualifying expression in the inclusive part, namely, ‘a place of public religious worship’. The educational institutions are certainly not such a place. Thus, the impugned order transcends the statutory definitions to the prejudice of the Petitioner and therefore, suffers from an added legal infirmity. In the above circumstances, this Petition succeeds; a Writ of Certiorari issues quashing the impugned order, costs having been made easy. Nothing herein above observed shall cast its shadow on the trial and decision making in the subject criminal cases.” (Emphasis supplied) In the light of the finding that the very Act is not applicable to the subject religious institution, as the Act was notified at the time of reign of terror in Punjab and Haryana, the Act had been brought into effect which deals with search of arms in religious institutions. In the light of the finding rendered by the co-ordinate Bench qua the same parties, it is ununderstandable as to how 37 the charge for offences punishable under Sections 3 and 7 supra of the Act, could even be framed and the said charge being permitted to continue, would on the face of it, become an abuse of the process of law. 12. A herculean effort that is made by the learned Additional Special Public Prosecutor to justify the action of laying down the charge for the afore-quoted offences under the Act would tumble down in the teeth of the aforesaid finding, rendered by the coordinate Bench. It is submitted across the Bar that the judgment of the co-ordinate Bench though is tossed before the Division Bench, there is no interim order of stay of the findings recorded by the coordinate Bench. What is directed by the Division Bench is change in the Administrator and nothing against the finding recorded. Therefore, it can be safely concluded that the 5th charge laid against the petitioner is unsustainable and requires to be obliterated.” In the light of the reasons rendered by the coordinate Bench which is subsequently followed in several cases it can be safely inferred that the offence under the Religious Institutions (Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1988 is loosely laid against the petitioner. Therefore, the same needs to be obliterated. 11. The other offence is under Section 66E of the IT Act. Section 66E od the IT Act reads as follows: “66-E. Punishment for violation of privacy.— Whoever, intentionally or knowingly captures, publishes or transmits the image of a private area of any person without his or her consent, under circumstances violating the privacy of that person, shall be punished with imprisonment which may extend to three years or with fine not exceeding two lakh rupees, or with both. 38 Explanation.—For the purposes of this section— (a) “transmit” means to electronically send a visual image with the intent that it be viewed by a person or persons; (b) “capture”, with respect to an image, means to videotape, photograph, film or record by any means; (c) “private area” means the naked or undergarment clad genitals, public area, buttocks or female breast; (d) “publishes” means reproduction in the printed or electronic form and making it available for public; (e) “under circumstances violating privacy” means circumstances in which a person can have a reasonable expectation that— (i) he or she could disrobe in privacy, without being concerned that an image of his private area was being captured; or (ii) any part of his or her private area would not be visible to the public, regardless of whether that person is in a public or private place.” This section punishes whoever intentionally or knowingly captures, publishes or transmits image of the private area of any person with or without his or her consent. In the entire complaint or the charge sheet, there is no allegation that the pontiff has captured the image of the private area of the victim and has transmitted the same. Therefore, there is no offence under Section 66E of the IT Act that 39 can be laid against the petitioner. The next offence is Section 67A of the IT Act which reads as follows: “67-A. Punishment for publishing or transmitting of material containing sexually explicit act, etc., in electronic form.—Whoever publishes or transmits or causes to be published or transmitted in the electronic form any material which contains sexually explicit act or conduct shall be punished on first conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to five years and with fine which may extend to ten lakh rupees and in the event of second or subsequent conviction with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to seven years and also with fine which may extend to ten lakh rupees.” This section punishes for publishing or transmitting of material containing sexually explicit images in the electronic form. This again is loosely laid against the petitioner, as there is no allegation or complaint or narration in the summary of the charge sheet that there is transmission of material containing sexually explicit act. Therefore, the offences under the Information Technology Act, 2000 are unsustainable. 12. The third one is offence punishable under Section 30 of the Arms Act, 1959. Section 30 of the Arms Act, 1959 reads as follows: 40 “30. Punishment for contravention of licence or rule.—Whoever contravenes any condition of a licence or any provision of this Act or any rule made thereunder, for which no punishment is provided elsewhere in this Act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both.” Section 30 punishes a person for contravention of licence or a rule. Whoever would contravene the condition of a licence or any provision of this Act and where no punishment is provided elsewhere will be punished. A bald allegation is made against accused No.2 that he has threatened the victim about 7 years ago showing his revolver. Except this bald allegation, there is no whisper about the usage, mainly, when, where and how the licenced arm was used. It is not the case of the complainant that the arm was not licensed. It is the contravention of the conditions of licence, which is not proved even to the slightest. Therefore, the said offence is also loosely laid against accused No.2. Three of the heads of the offences that are noted hereinabove are therefore untenable. What remains now are the offences under the IPC and the POCSO Act. They pertain to the allegation of rape, sexual harassment, intimidation, cheating or otherwise. Even under the POCSO Act they are the same, of sexual assault on a victim. A 41 perusal at the complaint, summary of the charge sheet and statement of witnesses, are all indicative of the fact that incidents that have happened in the year 2017 and 2019 at best, are complained of in the year 2024, that too after the pontiff registers a crime against certain inimical persons. 13. Before embarking upon consideration with regard to the facts obtaining in the case at hand, now it is necessary to notice the judicial landscape with regard to delay in registration of such crime, alleging offences of rape, that has taken place decades ago or several years ago. 13.1. The Apex Court in the case of KISHAN SINGH v. GURPAL SINGH3 holds as follows: “22. In cases where there is a delay in lodging an FIR, the court has to look for a plausible explanation for such delay. In the absence of such an explanation, the delay may be fatal. The reason for quashing such proceedings may not be merely that the allegations were an afterthought or had given a coloured version of events. In such cases the court should carefully examine the facts before it for the reason that a frustrated litigant who failed to succeed before the civil court may initiate criminal proceedings just to harass the other side 3 (2010) 8 SCC 775 42 with mala fide intentions or the ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance on the other party. Chagrined and frustrated litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their frustrations by cheaply invoking the jurisdiction of the criminal court. The court proceedings ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment and persecution. In such a case, where an FIR is lodged clearly with a view to spite the other party because of a private and personal grudge and to enmesh the other party in long and arduous criminal proceedings, the court may take a view that it amounts to an abuse of the process of law in the facts and circumstances of the case. (Vide Chandrapal Singh v. Maharaj Singh [(1982) 1 SCC 466 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 249 : (1982) 1 SCC 466 : AIR 1982 SC 1238]; State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426 : 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : AIR 1992 SC 604]; G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P. (2000) 2 SCC 636 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 513 : (2000) 2 SCC 636 : AIR 2000 SC 754]; and GorigePentaiah v. State of A.P[(2008) 12 SCC 531 : (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 446])” 13.2. The Apex Court, on the aforesaid issue, in the case of PARKASH CHAND v. STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH4 has held as follows: “20. There is admittedly a delay of 7 months in lodging the FIR in the case of alleged rape. If the case is reported immediately apart from the inherent strength of the case flowing from genuineness attributable to such promptitude, the perceptible advantage would be the medical examination to which the prosecutrix can be subjected and the result of such examination in a case where there is a resistance. It is the case of the prosecution that she raised hue and cry and therefore apparently she would have resisted. Possibly, a medical examination may have revealed 4 (2019) 5 SCC 628 43 signs of any resistance or injuries. In this case the High Court has proceeded on the basis of testimony of the prosecutrix and sought to fortify it by the extra-judicial confession made before PW4 and PW5.” 13.3. The Apex Court in the case of RAJESH PATEL v. STATE OF JHARKHAND5, has held as follows: “…. …. …. 16. Further, there is an inordinate delay of nearly 11 days in lodging the FIR with the jurisdictional police. The explanation given by the prosecutrix in not lodging the complaint within the reasonable period after the alleged offence committed by the appellant is that she went to her house and narrated the offence committed by the appellant to her mother and on the assurance of Purnendu Babu, PW 3, the mother remained silent for two to four days on the assurance that he will take action in the matter. Further, the explanation given by the prosecutrix regarding the delay is that at the time of commission of offence the appellant had threatened her that in case she lodges any complaint against him, she would be killed. The said explanation is once again not a tenable explanation. Further, in the reason assigned by the High Court regarding not lodging the complaint immediately or within a reasonable period, it has observed that in case of rape, the victim girl hardly dares to go to the police station and make the matter open to all out of fear of stigma which will be attached with the girls who are ravished. Also, the reason assigned by the trial court which justifies the explanation offered by the prosecution regarding the delay in lodging the complaint against the appellant has been erroneously accepted by the High Court in the impugned judgment [ Criminal Appeal No. 58 of 1999, decided on 14-11-2006 (Jhar)] . In addition to that, further observation made by the High Court regarding the delay is that the prosecutrix as well as her mother tried to get justice by interference of PW 3, who is a common friend of both of them 5 (2013) 3 SCC 791 44 and PW 4, the doctor with whom the prosecutrix was working as a nurse. When the same did not materialise, after a lapse of 11 days, the FIR was lodged with the jurisdictional police for the offence said to have been committed by the appellant. Further, the High Court has also proceeded to record the reason that the prosecutrix had every opportunity to give different date of occurrence instead of 14-2-1993 but she did not do it which reason is not tenable in law. Further, the High Court accepted the observation made by the learned trial Judge wherein the explanation given by the prosecutrix in her evidence about being terrorised to be killed by the appellant in case of reporting the matter to the police, is wholly untenable in law. The same is not only unnatural but also improbable. Therefore, the inordinate delay of 11 days in lodging the FIR against the appellant is fatal to the prosecution case. This vital aspect regarding inordinate delay in lodging the FIR not only makes the prosecution case improbable to accept but the reasons and observations made by the trial court as well as the High Court in the impugned judgments are wholly untenable in law and the same cannot be accepted. Therefore, the findings and observations made by the courts below in accepting delay in lodging the FIR by assigning unsatisfactory reasons cannot be accepted by this Court as the findings and reasons are erroneous in law. 17. Further in the case in hand, PW 3, who is a common friend of the appellant and the prosecutrix, according to the prosecution case, has categorically stated that he does not know anything about the case for which he had received the notice from the court to depose in the case. PW 4 has stated in his evidence that the prosecutrix was getting nursing training privately in his chamber for the last three years as on the date of his examination, namely, on 16-11-1995. He has stated in his examination-in-chief that on 14-2-1993 when he opened his chamber the prosecutrix came to his chamber and further stated that her mother did not tell him anything. He has been treated as hostile by the prosecution, he was cross-examined by the prosecutor, in his cross-examination he has categorically stated that he has told the police that he does not know anything about the incident. He has further stated that neither the prosecutrix nor her mother told him about the incident and further stated that he does not know anything about the case. 45 18. Further, neither the doctor nor the IO has been examined before the trial court to prove the prosecution case. The appellant was right in bringing to the notice of the trial court as well as the High Court that the non-examination of the aforesaid two important witnesses in the case has prejudiced the case of the appellant for the reason that if the doctor would have been examined he could have elicited evidence about any injury sustained by the prosecutrix on her private part or any other part of her body and also the nature of hymen layer, etc. so as to corroborate the story of the prosecution that the prosecutrix suffered unbearable pain while the appellant committed rape on her. The non-examination of the doctor who had examined her after 12 days of the occurrence has not prejudiced the case of the defence for the reason that the prosecutrix was examined after 12 days of the offence alleged to have been committed by the appellant because by that time the sign of rape must have disappeared. Even if it was presumed that the hymen of the victim was found ruptured and no injury was found on her private part or any other part of her body, finding of such rupture of hymen may be for several reasons in the present age when the prosecutrix was a working girl and that she was not leading an idle life inside the four walls of her home. The said reasoning assigned by the High Court is totally erroneous in law. 19. In view of the above statement of evidence of PW 3 and PW 4 whose evidence is important for the prosecution to prove the chain of events as per its case, the statement of evidence of the aforesaid witnesses has seriously affected the prosecution case. Therefore, the courts below could not have, by any stretch of imagination, on the basis of the evidence on record held that the appellant is guilty of committing the offence under Section 376 IPC. Further, according to the prosecutrix, PW 3 who is alleged to have rescued her from the place of occurrence of offence, has clearly stated in his evidence that he does not know anything about the incident in his statement thereby he does not support the version of the prosecution. The High Court has erroneously accepted the finding of the trial court that the appellant has not been prejudiced for non- examination of the doctor for the reason that she was working as a nurse in the private hospital of PW 4 and being a nurse she knew that the information on commission of rape is grave in nature and she would not have hesitated in giving the 46 information to the police if the occurrence was true. Further, the finding of the courts below that non-examination of the IO by the prosecution who has conducted the investigation in this case has not caused prejudice to the case of the appellant, since the prosecution witnesses were unfavourable to the prosecution who were either examined or declared hostile by the prosecution, which reasoning is wholly untenable in law. Therefore, the finding and reasons recorded by both the trial court as well as the High Court regarding non-examination of the abovesaid two witnesses in the case has not prejudiced the case of the appellant is totally an erroneous approach of the courts below. For this reason also, we have to hold that the findings and reasons recorded in the impugned judgment [ Criminal Appeal No. 58 of 1999, decided on 14-11-2006 (Jhar)] that the trial court was justified in holding that the prosecution has proved the charge against the appellant and that he has committed the offence on the prosecutrix, is totally erroneous and the same is wholly unsustainable in law. 20. The finding with regard to the sentence of the appellant recorded by the trial court which is accepted by the High Court on the basis of the solitary testimony of the prosecutrix which is supported by the evidence of her mother, PW 2 is once again an erroneous approach on the part of the High Court. The offence of rape alleged to have been committed by the appellant is established without any evidence as the prosecution failed to prove the chain of events as stated by the prosecutrix. Since the evidence of PW 3 and PW 4 did not support the prosecution case, but on the other hand, their evidence has seriously affected the story of the prosecution. Therefore, the courts below could not have found the appellant as guilty of the charge and convicted and sentenced him for the offence of rape. 21. Further, one more strong circumstance which has weighed in our mind is that they had good acquaintance with each other as they were classmates and they were in terms of meeting with each other. The defence counsel had alternatively argued that the appellant had sex with her consent. The High Court proceeded not to accept the said argument by giving reasons that the appellant failed to explain as to under what circumstance he had sex with the consent of the prosecutrix 47 when she was confined in his house. The contention urged on behalf the appellant that it was consensual sex with the prosecutrix is to be believed for the reason that she herself had gone to the house of the appellant though her version is that she went there at the request of the appellant to take back her book which she had given to him. This is a strong circumstance to arrive at the conclusion that the defence case of the appellant is of consensual sex. Further, the prosecution case is that after the offence was committed by the appellant he had locked the room from outside and left. After half an hour Purnendu Babu, PW 3 arrived and unlocked the room. This story is improbable to believe and the prosecutrix has not lodged the complaint either immediately or within reasonable period from the date of occurrence. The complaint was indisputably lodged after a lapse of 11 days by the prosecutrix. In this regard, it is pertinent to mention the judgment of this Court in Raju v. State of M.P. [(2008) 15 SCC 133 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 751] , the relevant paragraph of which is extracted hereunder for better appreciation in support of our conclusion: (SCC p. 141, para 12) “12. Reference has been made in Gurmit Singh case [State of Punjab v. Gurmit Singh, (1996) 2 SCC 384 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 316] to the amendments in 1983 to Sections 375 and 376 of the Penal Code making the penal provisions relating to rape more stringent, and also to Section 114-A of the Evidence Act with respect to a presumption to be raised with regard to allegations of consensual sex in a case of alleged rape. It is however significant that Sections 113-A and 113-B too were inserted in the Evidence Act by the same amendment by which certain presumptions in cases of abetment of suicide and dowry death have been raised against the accused. These two sections, thus, raise a clear presumption in favour of the prosecution but no similar presumption with respect to rape is visualised as the presumption under Section 114-A is extremely restricted in its applicability. This clearly shows that insofar as allegations of rape are concerned, the evidence of a prosecutrix must be examined as that of an injured witness whose presence at the spot is probable but it can never be presumed that her statement should, without exception, be taken as the gospel truth. Additionally, her statement can, at best, be adjudged on the principle that ordinarily no injured witness would tell a lie or implicate a person falsely. We believe that it is under these principles that this case, and others such as this one, need to be examined.” 48 22. For the aforesaid reasons the prosecution case is not natural, consistent and probable to believe to sustain the conviction and sentence of the appellant for the alleged offence said to have been committed by him. 23. The trial court as well as the High Court should have appreciated the evidence on record with regard to delay and not giving proper explanation regarding delay of 11 days in filing FIR by the prosecutrix and non- examination of the complainant witnesses viz. the doctor and the IO which has not only caused prejudice to the case of the appellant but also the case of prosecution has created reasonable doubt in the mind of this Court. Therefore, the benefit of doubt must enure to the appellant. As we have stated above, the testimony of the prosecutrix is most unnatural and improbable to believe and therefore it does not inspire confidence for acceptance of the same for sustaining the conviction and sentence. Therefore, we are of the view that the impugned judgment [ Criminal Appeal No. 58 of 1999, decided on 14-11- 2006 (Jhar)] requires to be interfered with by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction. Accordingly, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned judgment [ Criminal Appeal No. 58 of 1999, decided on 14-11-2006 (Jhar)] . If the appellant has executed bail bonds, the same may be discharged.” 13.4. In the case of MOHD. ALI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH6, the Apex Court holds as follows: “…. …. …. 26. The obtaining factual matrix has to be appreciated on the touchstone of the aforesaid parameters. 27. Be it clearly stated here that delay in lodging FIR in cases under Section 376 IPC would depend upon facts of each case and this Court has given immense 6 (2015) 7 SCC 272 49 allowance to such delay, regard being had to the trauma suffered by the prosecutrix and various other factors, but a significant one, in the present case, it has to be appreciated from a different perspective. The prosecutrix was missing from home. In such a situation, it was a normal expectation that either the mother or the brother would have lodged a missing report at the police station. The same was not done. This action of PW 2 really throws a great challenge to common sense. No explanation has been offered for such delay. The learned trial Judge has adverted to this facet on an unacceptable backdrop by referring to the principle that prosecutrix suffered from trauma and the constraint of the social stigma. The prosecutrix at that time was nowhere on the scene. It is the mother who was required to inform the police about missing of her grown-up daughter. In the absence of any explanation, it gives rise to a sense of doubt. 28. That apart, the factum that the appellant informed the mother of the victim that he had left the prosecutrix at the door of her house also does not command acceptance. The recovery of the prosecutrix by the brother and his friends also creates a cloud of suspicion. We are not inclined to believe the prosecution version as has been projected that one Arif had informed the brother of the prosecutrix that his sister was at his place but for reasons best known to the prosecution, Arif has not been examined. That apart, the persons who were accompanying the brother have also not been examined by the prosecution. Thus, the manner of recovery of the prosecutrix from the house of Arif remains a mystery. 29. Be it noted, there can be no iota of doubt that on the basis of the sole testimony of the prosecutrix, if it is unimpeachable and beyond reproach, a conviction can be based. In the case at hand, the learned trial Judge as well as the High Court have persuaded themselves away with this principle without appreciating the acceptability and reliability of the testimony of the witness. In fact, it would not be inappropriate to say that whatever the analysis in the impugned judgment [ Criminal Appeal No. 602 of 2006, decided on 25-3-2009 (All)] , it would only indicate an impropriety of approach. The prosecutrix has deposed that she was taken from one place to 50 the other and remained at various houses for almost two months. The only explanation given by her is that she was threatened by the accused persons. It is not in her testimony that she was confined to one place. In fact, it has been borne out from the material on record that she had travelled from place to place and she was ravished a number of times. Under these circumstances, the medical evidence gains significance, for the examining doctor has categorically deposed that there are no injuries on the private parts. The delay in FIR, the non-examination of the witnesses, the testimony of the prosecutrix, the associated circumstances and the medical evidence, leave a mark of doubt to treat the testimony of the prosecutrix as so natural and truthful to inspire confidence. It can be stated with certitude that the evidence of the prosecutrix is not of such quality which can be placed reliance upon.” 13.5. The Apex Court in HAJI IQBAL v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH7 holds as follows: “…. …. …. 13. There is something more to add to the aforesaid and the same goes to the root of the matter. We take notice of the fact that for the alleged act of gang rape of 2018, the FIR came to be lodged sometime in the year 2022 i.e. after almost a period of four years. We do not propose to say anything in regard to delay in lodging the FIR as the trial against the other accused persons is in progress. The trial court on its own will examine this aspect. 14. It cannot be lost sight of that rape causes the greatest distress and humiliation to the victim but at the same time a false allegation of rape can cause equal distress, humiliation and damage to the accused as well. The accused must also be protected against the possibility of false implication, particularly where a large number of accused are involved. It must, further, be borne in mind that the broad 7 (2023) 20 SCC 209 51 principle is that an injured witness was present at the time when the incident happened and that ordinarily such a witness would not tell a lie as to the actual assailants, but there is no presumption or any basis for assuming that the statement of such a witness is always correct or without any embellishment or exaggeration. [See: Raju v. State of M.P. [Raju v. State of M.P., (2008) 15 SCC 133: (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 751] ] 15. At this stage, we would like to observe something important. Whenever an accused comes before the court invoking either the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more closely. 16. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal vengeance, etc. then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The complainant would ensure that the averments made in the FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not be just enough for the court to look into the averments made in the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are disclosed or not. 17. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the court owes a duty to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the lines. The court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section 482CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account the overall circumstances leading to 52 the initiation/registration of the case as well as the materials collected in the course of investigation. Take for instance the case on hand. Multiple FIRs have been registered over a period of time. It is in the background of such circumstances the registration of multiple FIRs assumes importance, thereby attracting the issue of wreaking vengeance out of private or personal grudge as alleged. 18. In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that no case is made out to put the appellant herein to trial for the alleged offence.” The Apex Court in HAJI IQBAL’s case clearly holds that in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., the High Court has a duty to look into the FIR very closely. It is empowered to take into account every circumstance leading to initiation of registration of the case as well as materials collected during the investigation. The case before the Apex Court was considering quashment of FIR for the offences of rape and criminal intimidation. 13.6. The Apex Court in SURESH GARODIA v. STATE OF ASSAM8 has held as follows: “…. …. …. 13. In the said case, the Court has given a caution that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the 8 (2024) 12 SCC 150 53 rarest of rare cases. The Court would normally not embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint. 14. However, we find that the present case would fall under Categories Nos. 5 and 7 of the categories of cases culled out by this Court in the said case. 15. We find that lodging a case after 34 years and that too on the basis of a bald statement that the prosecutrix was a minor at the time of commission of offence, could itself be a ground to quash the proceedings. No explanation whatsoever is given in the FIR as to why the prosecutrix was keeping silent for a long period of 34 years. The material on record shows that the relationship was consensual, inasmuch as the son who is born from the said relationship has been treated by the appellant as his son and all the facilities, including cash money, have been provided to him.” In the aforesaid case, the very complaint was lodged 34 years after the incident without any explanation for delay. The Apex Court holds that criminal proceedings against the accused can be quashed on the ground of delay, particularly when the proceedings are initiated solely based on the victim’s statement. 13.7. A singular thread of reason that runs through the judgments of the Apex Court quoted supra is, in cases of allegation of rape, the Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. should be circumspect in analysing the complaint and the 54 attendant circumstances attached to the said complaint. If the facts obtaining in the case at hand are considered on the bedrock of the principles laid down by the Apex Court, it would be rather difficult for the proceedings to be permitted to be continued. The complaint clearly narrates that it was in 2017 the act of sexual assault happens. The next incident is in 2019. There is nothing for five years. In 2024 the complaint is registered. Therefore, the complaint with regard to the offence under Section 376 of the IPC cannot be permitted to be continued on sheer delay in registering the crime. Delay is totally unexplained or vaguely explained in the complaint that runs into 10 pages. 14. On a blend of law as enunciated by the Apex Court in the afore-quoted judgments and if such enunciation is pitted to the facts obtaining in the case at hand, what would unequivocally emerge is that delay in lodging the FIR would vitiate the proceedings, unless delay is satisfactorily explained. The delay that the Apex Court considers in the aforementioned cases were all considering the offence of rape and the delay in those cases ranged from 8 days to 7 months. The delay in the case at hand is 7 years 55 and if the event of 2019 is considered, it is 5 years. A perusal at the complaint or the summary of the charge sheet quoted supra, would clearly indicate that the delay is not explained satisfactorily even to its semblance. Therefore, the delay in registering the crime has vitiated the registration and the proceedings in the aftermath. Therefore, the delay which is totally unexplained or vaguely explained would undoubtedly vitiate the entire proceedings in any given case. If the complaint and the summary of the charge sheet are considered on the bedrock of the elucidation of law by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgments, the allegations made for the offences punishable under the IPC would undoubtedly be vitiated by delay. What remains is the offence under the POCSO Act. 15. If the complaint had been registered in 2017 when the complainant was alleged to be of 16 years of age, it would have been a circumstance altogether different. Though it cannot be the law that in cases under the POCSO Act mere delay will vitiate the proceedings, in the light of the complaint and the summary of the charge sheet all of which would project incidents of 2017 without explanation for delay or a bald explanation for delay, for the very 56 reasons rendered to hold the offences under the IPC being vitiated, the offences under the POCSO Act also get vitiated. 17. In light of the aforesaid circumstances, it is appropriate to refer to judgments of other High Courts, addressing the issue of delay in registration of cases involving offences under the POCSO Act. 17.1. A Division Bench of the High Court of Delhi, in the case of STATE (GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI) v. MANOJ RAM9, holds as follows: “1. By the present criminal leave petition filed under section 378(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the State seeks leave to appeal against the judgment dated 22.09.2014 passed by Ms. Illa Rawat, Additional Sessions Judge in Sessions Case No. 79/2013 whereby the respondent (accused before the trial court) was acquitted of the charges punishable under Sections 363/366/376 of the Penal Code, 1860 and charges under Sections 5(l) punishable under Section 6 of the POCSO Act, 2012. ….. ….. ….. 25. According to the prosecution case, the prosecutrix went missing on 15.04.2013. If the prosecutrix went missing on the aforesaid date the mother who is expected to have necessitous concern, should have gone to the police station to lodge a missing report which could have prompted the Investigating Officer to act accordingly. It is worthwhile to mention that in rape cases the delay in filing FIR by the prosecutrix is not unusual on 92016 SCC OnLine Del 3136 57 account of trauma and agony suffered as also the fear of social stigma. However, what prevented the mother of the prosecutrix to lodge a missing report remains unanswered. PW9 stated that on 15.04.2013 in the evening she searched for her daughter here and there and returned home. Again on 16.04.2013, she searched for her daughter in the morning and found her inside the park. Since she was disturbed she did not talk with the victim. On 17.04.2013 in the evening when she asked her daughter about 15.04.2013 she disclosed the fact of rape. On 18.04.2013 she caught hold of the accused and reported the matter to police. 26. In Thulia Kali v. State of Tamil Nadu reported in (1972) 3 SCC 393, this Court held as under:- “12…First information report in a criminal case is an extremely vital and valuable piece of evidence for the purpose of corroborating the oral evidence adduced at the trial. The importance of the above report can hardly be overestimated from the standpoint of the accused. The object of insisting upon prompt lodging of the report to the police in respect of commission of an offence is to obtain early information regarding the circumstances in which the crime was committed, the names of the actual culprits and the part played by them as well as the names of eyewitnesses present at the scene of occurrence. Delay in lodging the first information report quite often results in embellishment which is a creature of afterthought. On account of delay, the report not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, danger creeps in of the introduction of coloured version, exaggerated account or concocted story as a result of deliberation and consultation. It is, therefore, essential that the delay in the lodging of the first information report should be satisfactorily explained…” 27. In Andhra Pradesh v. M. Madhusudhan Rao reported in 2008 (14) SCALE 118, the Hon'ble Apex Court observed that: “18. Having gone through the depositions of PW-1 and PW- 3, to which out attention was invited by learned Counsel for the State, we are convinced that in the light of the overall evidence, 58 analysed by the High Court, the order of acquittal of the Respondent is well merited and does not call for interference, particularly when the First Information Report was lodged by the complainant more than one month after the alleged incident of forcible poisoning. Time and again, the object and importance of prompt lodging of the First Information Report has been highlighted. Delay in loding the First Information Report, more often than not, results in embellishment and exaggeration, which is a creature of an afterthought. A delayedreport not only gets bereft of the advantage of spontaneity, the danger of the introduction of coloured version, exaggerated account of the incident or a concocted story as a result of deliberations and consultations, also creeps in, casting a serious doubt on its veracity. Therefore, it is essential that the delay in loding the report should be satisfactorily explained.” 28. In view of the settled proposistion of law as well as on the above conduct of the mother, no reasonable and plausible explanation has been tendered as to why the FIR was lodged belatedly by the complainant after knowing from her daughter about the alleged rape. The delay in lodging FIR creates a suspicion about the version of the prosecution. ….. ….. ….. 30. It is noteworthy that there is no medical evidence to connect the respondent with the offence of rape. As for charge framed under Section 5(l) punishable under Section 6 of POCSO Act, 2012 is concerned we find that the prosecution was not able to establish the charges under Section 363, 366 and 376 of the Penal Code, 1860 and therfore the question of determination of age of the prosecutrix does not arise. ….. ….. ….. 34. In the present case, on a cumulative reading and appreciation of the entire evidence on record, we are of the considered view that the the quality of the testimony of prosecutrix as also the testimonies of the other witnesses is not such which is sufficient for the conviction of respondent for such alleged heinous offence.” 59 17.2. A Division Bench of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in the case of STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH v. VED PRAKASH AND ORS.10, holds as follows: “Aggrieved by the acquittal of the respondents Ved Prakash, Ajay and Mithin @ Sahil of the offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 376-D, 506 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 3 of the POCSO Act and Section 3(1)(iii)(x) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, whereas respondent Mohinder was acquitted of the offences punishable under Sections 120-B, 376-D, 506 of IPC and Section 3 of the POCSO Act, the State has filed the instant appeal. ….. ….. ….. 36. ….. ….. ….. 36. In our considered view, the delay has to be considered in the back ground of the facts and circumstances of each case and is a matter of appreciation of evidence. It is well settled that the delay in registering FIR cannot by itself be a ground to doubt the case of the prosecution. 37. In cases of delay, the Courts are required to examine the evidence with a close scrutiny and in doing so; the contents of the FIR should also be scrutinized more carefully. If Court finds that there is no indication of fabrication or it has not been concocted or engineered to implicate innocent persons then, even if there is a delay in lodging the FIR, the case of the prosecution cannot be dismissed merely on that ground. The disinclination to inform the family or report the matter to the police might be due to apprehension and attitude of the society towards the victim. Therefore, the delay in lodging the complaint in such cases does not necessarily indicate that her version is false. 38. In the instant case, the victim is alleged to have been sexually assaulted in September, 2015 and lodged the complaint only in May, 2016 that too on the pretext that when she came to know that her obscene video/photographs were being uploaded on the Whatsapp, which allegations ultimately have been found to be false. 10Cr. A. No. 217 of 2018, Disposed on 01-09-2023 60 39. In such circumstances, inordinate and unexplained delay in registering the FIR casts cloud of suspicion regarding the credibility of the prosecution story when read with the testimony of the victim, medical evidence and all other evidence led by the prosecution. The inordinate delay in registration of FIR and the time and opportunities which the victim had, to report the matter to the police or any other person by raising an alarm when she was forced to undergo the trauma of rape is unexplainable. 40. It is here that the requirement of the testimony of the victim being credit worthy to be termed as sterling witness whose version can be accepted without corroboration steps in. It is here that the version of the victim on the core spectrum of the crime should remain intact while all other attendant materials, namely, oral, documentary and material objects should match the said version in material particulars in order to enable the Court trying the offence to rely on the core version to sieve the other supporting materials for holding the offender guilty of the charge alleged. ….. ….. ….. 42. The credit worthiness of the testimony of the victim has already been discussed in the earlier part of the judgment. The victim when put to test as laid down in Rai Sandeep Deepu case (supra), fails the test of being sterling witness of a high quality and calibre whose version should therefore be unassailable and such quality should be in a position to accept it on face value without any hesitation. 43. Not only is the case set up by prosecution suspect but even the contradiction, improvement and embellishments are so significant, which cannot be ignored. Moreso, the statement of the victim neither stood corroborated from medical evidence nor from any other material on record and even the story regarding uploading of photographs belies her claim. 44. There is no doubt that rape causes great distress and humiliation to the victim of rape but at the same time false allegation of committing a rape also causes humiliation 61 and damage to the accused. An accused has also rights which are to be protected and the possibility of false implication has to be ruled out. ….. ….. ….. 48. Bearing in mind the aforesaid exposition of law, the testimony of victim has to be consistent and natural in line with the case of the prosecution and free from infirmities which inspire confidence in the Court. It cannot be presumed that the statement of the victim is always true or without any embellishment. 49. Reverting back to the facts of the instant case, we find that the testimony of the victim is not natural and consistent with the case of the prosecution as her version has no correlation and does not find corroboration with other material being medical, scientific and expert evidence. 50. Having considered the entire case of the prosecution thoroughly and in its right perspective, we are of the firm view that if the evidence of the victim is read and considered in totality of the circumstances along with the other evidence on record on the basis of which the offence is alleged to have been committed, then her deposition does not inspire confidence and was otherwise required to be corroborated with other evidence on record. Moreover, the view taken by the learned trial Court is reasonable and plausible where the evidence has been considered in its right perspective and there is palpably no misreading of the evidence.” 17.3. Again, another Division Bench of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh, in the case of STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH v. PARVEEN KUMAR AND ORS11, holds as follows: “….. ….. ….. 4. The learned Trial Court, vide order dated 09.07.2013 framed charges against accused Parveen Kumar under Sections 11 Criminal Appeal No. 277 of 2015, Disposed on 10-09-2025 62 363, 366, 376 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), Section 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (for short 'POCSO Act') Act and Section 3(1)(XII) of the Schedules Castes and Schedules Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (SC & ST Act) and against accused Arvind Kumar under Sections 363, 366-A of IPC and Section 17 of POSCO Act, to which they did not plead guilty and claimed trial. ….. ….. ….. 22. ….. ….. ….. 22. When the statement of the prosecutrix is carefully scrutinized, we find that the same is not of sterling quality and does not inspireconfidence as it contains material inconsistencies and contradictions which affects the core of the prosecution case. 23. The medical evidence on record also reveals that no internal or external injury on her body as well as on her private parts was found and there was also no sign of any recent sexual intercourse because neither any blood, nor any secretions etc. were found. Hence, it can be said that the doctor opined about the possibility of sexual assault with the prosecutrix during the night of 05.06.2013 only on the basis of rupture of hymen. However, in the cross examination, the doctor admitted that the rupture of hymen was old and if that be so, it cannot be said that sexual act had taken place with her during the night of 05.06.2013. Therefore, the medical evidence on record is of no help to the prosecution and creates a doubt about the prosecution story. It has also come in the evidence that the police station was about 10 kms away from the village of the prosecutrix and despite that the matter was reported to police after quite delay and there is no explanation why the matter was not reported at the earliest. All these deficiencies cast grave doubt over the veracity of the prosecution case. 24. We are aware that conviction for the offence of sexual assault can be founded on the sole testimony of the prosecutrix but the same has to be of sterling quality. Given the fact that testimony of the prosecutrix does not inspire confidence coupled with the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the prosecution has been able to prove its case against accused Parveen beyond all reasonable doubt. 63 25. So far as accused Arvind Kumar is concerned, there is no evidence on the record to link him with the offence in question. A bare perusal of statements of the prosecutrix as well as her parents go to show that none of them have deposed anything against him. There is no evidence on the record to show that he aided accused Parveen in the alleged commission of offence. Moreover, when the offence against accused Parveen is not proved, then accused Arvind also cannot be held liable for the offence in question. 26. In view of what has been discussed hereinabove, no interference in the impugned judgment of acquittal, dated 06.02.2015, passed by the learned Special Court, Una, HP, in SCST case No.2/2013, is required. The view taken by the learned Trial Court was the only possible view, as such the appeal, which sans merits, deserves dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. Bail bonds are discharged.” 17.4. A Division Bench of the High Court of Tripura, in the case of TRIDIP CHAKMA v. STATE OF TRIPURA12, holds as follows: “This present appeal has been filed under Section 374(2) of Cr. P.C., 1973 against the judgment and order of conviction and sentence dated 12.08.2024 passed by the learned Special Judge (POCSO), Dhalai Judicial District, Ambassa, in connection with the case No. Special (POCSO) 04 of 2022 convicting the appellant to suffer R. 1 for 10 (Ten) years for the commission of offence punishable under section 376(2)(f) of the Penal Code, 1860 and also liable to pay a fine of Rs-10,000/- (Rupees Ten thousand) only for the said offence, in default, of payment of such fine, the convict shall undergo further R.I. for a period of 6(six) months. Further to suffer R.I. for 02(Two) years for the commission of offence punishable under Section 506 of the Penal Code, 1860 and also liable to pay a fine of Rs-5,000/- (Rupees five thousand) only for the said offence, in default of payment of such fine the convict shall undergo further R.I. for a period of 3(three) months and also further to suffer R.I. for 07(Seven) years for the commission of offence punishable under Section 4 of the POCSO Act, 2012 and also liable to pay 122026 SCC OnLine Tri 83 64 a fine of Rs-10,000/- (Rupees ten thousand) only for the said offence, in default, of payment of such fine, the convict shall undergo further R.I. for a period of 6(six) months. ….. ….. ….. 24. The delay of about ten days in lodging the FIR, though sought to be explained, assumes significance in the facts of the present case. The explanation offered for such delay does not find consistent support from the prosecution evidence itself. This Court is of the opinion that when such a ghastly incident allegedly occurred on 21.06.2022, and the victim fell ill on 22.06.2022 and disclosed the incident, the complainant mother filed the complaint only on 01.07.2022, after a lapse of several days, merely on the pretext of performing the funeral rites of her deceased sister-in-law. Such delay in lodging the FIR in a sensitive case of this nature, and the reasons assigned for the same, appear unnatural and raise serious doubts in the mind of this Court. In Vijayan v. State of Kerala (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court has cautioned that in cases resting solely on the testimony of the prosecutrix, unexplained or inadequately explained delay in lodging the FIR, coupled with absence of supporting medical or other evidence, makes it unsafe to sustain a conviction. 25. The medical evidence, as deposed by PW-2, does not lend corroboration to the prosecution case. PW-2 categorically stated that no fresh external injury was found on the body or private parts of the victim and that the hymen was torn, old and healed. The pregnancy of the victim, though established, has not been medically linked to the appellant. 26. Though it is true that absence of medical corroboration is not by itself fatal to the prosecution but the said principle applies where the oral testimony is otherwise found to be cogent, consistent and trustworthy. In the present case, the oral evidence itself suffers from inconsistencies, and therefore the lack of medical corroboration assumes relevance while appreciating the cumulative effect of the evidence. 65 ….. ….. ….. 29. As regards the presumption under Section 29 of the POCSO Act, it is well settled that such presumption arises only after the prosecution establishes the foundational facts beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case, in view of the inconsistencies in the prosecution evidence, the unexplained aspects surrounding delay, and the absence of corroborative medical or independent evidence, this Court is of the view that when the foundational facts themselves have not been established, the same does not attract the statutory presumption. ….. ….. ….. 31. In view of the above discussion and overall evaluation of the evidence and in light of the settled principles laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as cited supra, this Court finds that the prosecution has failed to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis supplied at each instance) 17.5. In the aforesaid judgments, the High Courts of Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, and Tripura, while dealing with cases involving offences under the POCSO Act, observe that, unexplained delay in lodging the FIR or complaint raises a doubt on the prosecution’s story. Further, where such cases rest solely on the victim’s statement, in the absence of any medical evidence for corroboration, the testimony must be of sterling quality, failing which, a conviction for offences under the POCSO Act cannot be sustained. Therefore, on sheer delay, both, the offences under the IPC and the POCSO Act also reach the same conclusion of they being obliterated. 66 18. What remains are two writ petitions viz., Writ Petition Nos.11726 of 2024 and 11808 of 2024, filed by the victim challenging the regular bail granted to accused Nos.1 and 2. In the light of the reasons rendered towards obliteration of very proceedings qua accused Nos.1 and 2, these two petitions challenging regular bail would be unnecessary to be considered. Therefore, they should stand dismissed. 19. For the aforesaid reasons, the following: O R D E R (i) Criminal Petition No.8786 of 2024 and Criminal Petition No.71 of 2025 are allowed. (ii) The proceedings in Spl.C.No.266 of 2024 pending before the Additional District and Sessions Judge, FTSC-I, Tumakuru, stand quashed. (iii) Criminal Petition No.11726 of 2024 and Criminal Petition No.11808 of 2024 stand dismissed. 67 Consequently, pending applications if any, also stand disposed. Sd/- (M.NAGAPRASANNA) JUDGE Bkp CT:MJ

XXXXXX v. SRI. BALAMANJUNATHASWAMIJI

Judgment text