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2026 DAILYLAW 4981 (GAU)

PURNIMA BEGUM ALIAS MINARABEGUM v. THE UNION OF INDIA AND OTHRS

WP(C)/6741/2025 · 2026-02-24

Kalyan Rai Surana, Susmita Phukan Khaund

Writ Petition (Civil)body2026

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

Page No.# 1/12 GAHC010225262025 2026:GAU-AS:3006-DB THE GAUHATI HIGH COURT (HIGH COURT OF ASSAM, NAGALAND, MIZORAM AND ARUNACHAL PRADESH) Case No. : WP(C)/6741/2025 PURNIMA BEGUM ALIAS MINARABEGUM RO MODHUPUR , MORANGIAL , CHOTTAHAIBOR , PS NAGAON SADAR ,DIST NAGAON VERSUS THE UNION OF INDIA AND OTHRS REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY, MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS, GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, SHASTRI BHAWAN, NEW DELHI-110001. 2:THE STATE OF ASSAM REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF ASSAM HOME DEPARTMENT DISPUR GUWAHATI. PIN-781006 3:THE ELECTION COMMISSION OF INDIA REPRESENTED BY THE CHIEF ELECTION COMMISSION NIRVACHANSADAN ASHOKA ROAD NEW DELHI-110001 4:THE STATE COORDINATOR NATIONAL REGISTRATION OF CITIZENS ASSAM 1ST FLOOR ACHYUT PLAZA G.S. ROAD BHANGAGARH GUWAHATI ASSAM Page No.# 2/12 PIN-781005 5:THE DISTRICT COMMISSIONER NAGAON DIST NAGAON 6:THE SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE BORDER NAGAON DIST NAGAO ASSAM 7:THE OFFICER IN CHARGE NAGAON DIST NAGAON ASSA Advocate for the Petitioner : MR. S. K. CHAKMA, MS. D GHOSH Advocate for the Respondent : DY.S.G.I., GA, ASSAM,SC, ECI,SC, NRC,SC, F.T BEFORE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE KALYAN RAI SURANA HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE SUSMITA PHUKAN KHAUND ORDER Date : 25.02.2026 (K.R. Surana, J) Heard Ms. D. Ghosh, learned legal aid counsel for the petitioner. Also heard Mr. U.K. Goswami, learned CGC; Mr. A.I. Ali, learned standing counsel for the ECI; Mr. G. Sarma, learned standing counsel for the FT and Border matters; Mr. H.K. Hazarika, learned Junior Govt. Advocate for the State respondent. 2. By filing this writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner, namely, Purnima Begum @ Minara Begum, has assailed the impugned ex parte opinion dated 29.01.2018, passed by the learned Member, Foreigners Tribunal, 1st, Nagaon, in F.T. Case No. 108/15, arising out of Page No.# 3/12 Case No. 579/14, dated 15.09.2014, by which she was declared to be a foreigner who had entered into India illegally from Bangladesh after 25.03.1971. 3. This writ petition was filed on 03.10.2025 to assail the ex parte opinion dated 29.01.2018, i.e. after there has been an extraordinary delay of 7 years, 8 months, 5 days (or 2804 days). Hence, the learned legal counsel for the petitioner was heard on delay and laches on part of the petitioner to assail the ex parte opinion. 4. The learned legal aid counsel for the petitioner has strenuously submitted that the petitioner is a citizen of India by birth and belongs to the indigenous Muslim community of Assam, having all the requisite documents. It was also submitted that the petitioner belongs to a very marginalized and financially weak background and lacked the financial resources to obtain certified copies of the impugned ex parte opinion dated 29.01.2018 or to engage a lawyer in time. It was submitted that due to extreme financial hardship, she could not approach this Hon’ble Court within the prescribed time. Hence, it was submitted that the delay in filing the present petition was neither wilful nor deliberate. Moreover, on behalf of the petitioner, the learned legal aid counsel has tendered unconditional apology for the delay in approaching this Court within a reasonable time. In her additional affidavit filed on 23.02.2026, the petitioner has reiterated about her financial hardship. She has also stated that she was unaware about the legal proceedings and consequences. 5. Per contra, the learned standing counsel for the FT, Border matters and NRC had submitted that the explanation given is vague, and not supported by any documents or any other cogent and reliable material. Page No.# 4/12 6. The learned CGC and the learned Junior Govt. Advocate for the other appearing respondents have adopted the submissions made by the learned standing counsel for the FT, Border matters and NRC. 7. As per the contents of the impugned ex parte opinion dated 29.01.2018, the notice of the proceeding was duly received by the son of the petitioner, namely, Rajib Ali, on 20.12.2017. However, despite due service of notice, the petitioner had remained absent on all the next three dates. Since the provision of Order 3(5)(c) of the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 allows notice to be served on an adult member of the family, the Court cannot hold that the service of notice was not proper. 8. As mentioned hereinbefore, this writ petition has been filed after 7 years, 8 months, 5 days (or 2804 days) after the ex parte opinion was passed. It may also be stated that no period of limitation is prescribed for filing a writ petition. But, unless the petitioner demonstrates good and cogent reason, delay and laches would disentitle the petitioner to equitable relief on the principle that “delay defeats equity”. If one needs any authority on the point, the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Mrinmoy Maity v. Chhanda Koley, 2024 INSC 314: (2024) 0 Supreme(SC) 351, and Chairman/Managing Director, U.P. Power Corporation Ltd. V. Ram Gopal, (2020) 13 SCC 225: (2020) 0 Supreme(SC) 93 (Full Bench). In the later case, while approving the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of P.S. Sadasivaswamy v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1975) 1 SCC 152 and S.S. Balu v. State of Kerala, (2009) 2 SCC 479, it was held to the effect that limitation does not strictly apply to a proceeding under Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution of India, nevertheless, such rights cannot be enforced after an unreasonable lapse Page No.# 5/12 of time and the High Courts were cautioned by observing that prolonged delay of many years ought not to have been overlooked or condoned. Paragraph 16 thereof [as extracted from (2020) 0 Supreme(SC) 93 ] is quoted below:- 16. Whilst it is true that limitation does not strictly apply to proceedings under Articles 32 or 226 of the Constitution of India, nevertheless, such rights cannot be enforced after an unreasonable lapse of time. Consideration of unexplained delays and inordinate laches would always be relevant in writ actions, and writ courts naturally ought to be reluctant in exercising their discretionary jurisdiction to protect those who have slept over wrongs and allowed illegalities to fester. Fence- sitters cannot be allowed to barge into courts and cry for their rights at their convenience, and vigilant citizens ought not to be treated alike with mere opportunists. On multiple occasions, it has been restated that there are implicit limitations of time within which writ remedies can be enforced. In SS Balu vs. State of Kerala, (2009) 2 SCC 479 this Court observed thus: "17. It is also well-settled principle of law that "delay defeats equity". ...It is now a trite law that where the writ petitioner approaches the High Court after a long delay, reliefs prayed for may be denied to them on the ground of delay and laches irrespective of the fact that they are similarly situated to the other candidates who obtain the benefit of the judgment." 9. In this case, it is not at all disputed that the son of the petitioner had received the notice of the proceeding. Thus, for non-appearance of the petitioner despite service of notice on the adult member of the family, which is in accordance with the provisions of the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964, the petitioner has to assign good, cogent and acceptable reason for not appearing before the learned Tribunal. Moreover, from the date of opinion, the petitioner has filed this writ petition after 7 years, 8 months, 5 days (i.e. 2804 days), as stated hereinbefore. The said delay is sought to be explained merely by stating that the petitioner is poor and unable to manage the cost and expenditure of approaching this Court and she was unaware of the legal proceedings and its consequences. Such a vague statement cannot be accepted Page No.# 6/12 as nothing prevented the petitioner from availing free legal aid, which she did not. 10. Though the petitioner has stated that due to financial constraints, she could not apply for certified copy earlier. It is noticed from the photocopy of the certified copy of the impugned opinion that the said photocopy discloses that court fees stamps of Rs.4/- (Rupees Four only) had been paid for the certified copy. The Court fee stamp paid is only Rs.60/- (Rupees Sixty only). Thus, it cannot be accepted that the court fees is so high that it is beyond the approach of the common man. It is not the case of the petitioner that she had applied for certified copy as a pauper and that issuance of certified copy was refused to her for non-payment of court fee. 11. The petitioner had obtained the certified copy of the impugned ex parte opinion on 30.07.2025. Thus, by virtue of the long delay of over seven years, the petitioner is deemed to have accepted the ex parte opinion passed against her without any demur. As notice was served to the son of the petitioner, who is an adult member of the family, it must be deemed that the petitioner had full knowledge of the fact that she has been declared to be a foreigner, who has illegally entered into India (Assam) from the specified territory. Thus, the writ petition is also not maintainable in view of the delay and laches. 12. In this case, the delay and laches of the petitioner are in three phases. Firstly, after due service of notice in accordance with the provisions of Order 3(5)(c) of the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964, i.e. from 20.12.2017 till passing of the ex parte opinion; secondly, from 29.01.2018, the date of the impugned ex parte opinion till the certified copy of the opinion was obtained on Page No.# 7/12 30.07.2025; thirdly, from 30.07.2025, till this writ petition was filed on 03.10.2025. The overall delay, as stated above, is of 7 years, 8 months, 5 days (or 2804 days). Hence, on all counts, the delay is not properly and/or sufficiently explained. 13. It is not the case of the petitioner that neither the petitioner nor any person in her family was aware that an inquiry as to whether or not the petitioner was an illegal migrant from the specified territory was made against the petitioner by the concerned authorities. Thus, despite having knowledge of such a serious inquiry regarding the petitioner, wherein she was accused of being an illegal migrant from the specified territory, the petitioner did not participate in the proceeding. It may also be stated that usually and/or in the normal course, the uniformed police personnel from the Border Branch of the concerned Police Station visit the house of the proceedee to serve notice and/or process for appearance. It would be hard to believe that no villager would come to know about police visiting any household in the village to serve process and that none in the house or in the village would be bothered by the visit of police in a co-villager’s house. 14. In paragraph 46 of the case of Urban Improvement Trust v. Vidhya Devi, 2024 INSC 980: (2024) 0 Supreme(SC) 1189, the Supreme Court of India has reiterated the law that undue delay in approaching the Court can be a ground for refusing relief and it has been expressed that only in exceptional cases, delay can be condoned. The said paragraph 46 is quoted below:- “46. As regards the appellant’s challenge to the inordinate delay of 21 years in filing of the writ petitions by the respondents, we are of the view that the same needs to be considered in the facts and circumstances of the case. While it is true that the courts have consistently held that undue delay in approaching the court Page No.# 8/12 can be a ground for refusing relief, the courts have also recognized that in exceptional cases, where the impugned action is patently illegal or affects fundamental rights, the delay must be condoned.” 15. In respect of the legal proposition that delay and laches is fatal to a belated challenge to the opinion of the Foreigners Tribunals, it may be relevant to refer to the decision of this Court in the case of Jonali Das v. Union of India, 2018 (5) GLT 492: (2018) 0 Supreme (Gau) 1186. Paragraph 9 thereof is as follows:- “9. In Azmat Ali @ Amzad Ali Vs. Union of India [W.P.(C) No.4971/2018, disposed of on 01.08.2018], this Court had observed as follows:- "It is more than three decades that the issue of influx of foreign nationals has been in public domain in the State of Assam and has engaged the attention of the people. Interest of the State is of paramount importance in that unabated influx has the potential to affect the integrity and sovereignty of the country. Citizenship of a person, no doubt, is a very valuable right and should be zealously guarded. There is no gainsaying the fact that a person who is alleged to be a foreigner must be given due and reasonable opportunity to establish that he is a citizen of India. However, if a person does not take steps for safeguarding his interest, he does so at his own risk and peril as grant of opportunity cannot be an endless exercise. Right to a fair hearing or principles of natural justice cannot be permitted to lead to a farcical situation and to be an engine for defeating the very object of identification and deportation of foreigners." 16. The Supreme Court of India, in the case of Shivamma (Dead) by LRs v. Karnataka Housing Board & Ors., 2025 INSC 1104: 2025 Supreme(SC) 1679, while dealing with the provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, has laid down certain guidelines. Though Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply to a writ petition, but in the considered opinion of the Court, when a writ petition is filed to assail the opinion of the Foreigners Tribunals, under certiorari jurisdiction, the same principles should apply, requiring the Page No.# 9/12 petitioner to provide at least some cogent and acceptable explanation for the inordinate delay in assailing the opinion. 17. Moreover, this Court, in the case of Ajbahar Ali v. Union of India, (2025) 0 Supreme (Gau) 763, had held to the effect that the plea of compliance with the principles of natural justice cannot be permitted to lead to a farcical situation and to be an engine for defeating the very object of identification and deportation of foreigners. A similar opinion was also expressed by this Court in the case of Abu Bokkor Siddique v. Union of India, 2019 (1) GLT 813. 18. It must be taken note of the fact that the Supreme Court of India, in the case of Sarbananda Sonowal v. Union of India, (2005) 5 SCC 665, in paragraph 73, has held to the effect that the procedure under the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 is just, fair and reasonable and does not offend any constitutional provision. In paragraph 63, the Supreme Court of India had observed that there can be no manner of doubt that the State of Assam is facing external aggression and internal disturbance on account of large-scale illegal migration of Bangladeshi nationals and that it, therefore, becomes the duty of the Union of India to take all measures for protection of the State of Assam from such external aggression and internal disturbance as enjoined in Article 355 of the Constitution of India. In paragraph 70, it was observed that the influx of Bangladeshi nationals who have illegally migrated into Assam pose a threat to the integrity and security of the North Eastern region and that their presence has changed the demographic character of that region and the local people of Assam have been reduced to a status of minority in certain districts. 19. In this case, the learned legal aid counsel for the petitioner could Page No.# 10/12 not show as to which fundamental right of the petitioner would be violated if the ex parte opinion is not set aside. Rather, it is the interest of the Country that would suffer if persons who are declared illegal migrants are allowed to defeat the process of expulsion of detected illegal foreigners/migrants, by allowing such illegal migrants endless time to assail the opinion passed by the learned Tribunals. 20. By showering sympathy in this particular case, this Court would be encouraging the unscrupulous practice of not appearing before Courts and Tribunals, despite notice being duly served on an adult member of the family. 21. The Court is of the considered opinion that if such belated petitions are entertained after 7 years, 8 months, 5 days, all delays, irrespective of the number of days, will have to be condoned at the drop of a hat. It would also render the provisions of Order 3 (5)(c), Order 3(8) and Order 3(14) of the Foreigners (Tribunals) Order, 1964 otiose. 22. It may also be stated that the learned legal aid counsel for the petitioner had submitted that the petitioner has all the documents to prove that she is an Indian citizen. In the said context, this Court is reminded of the fact that this Court is exercising certiorari jurisdiction and thus, cannot act as a Foreigners Tribunal, having original jurisdiction and start examining and appreciating the documents annexed to the writ petition, which were hitherto not presented before the learned Foreigners Tribunal. In this case, the Court is not exercising appellate or revisional jurisdiction. The petitioner has failed to show that the impugned opinion is vitiated by any error apparent on the face of the record. Accordingly, the Court is of the considered opinion that in exercise of certiorari jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the High Page No.# 11/12 Court ought not to substitute its view over the opinion of the learned Foreigners Tribunal, which is not found to be vitiated by any error whatsoever. If one needs any authority on the point, the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences v. Bikartan Das, 2023 INSC 733: (2023) 0 Supreme(SC) 763, may be referred to. Paragraph 77 thereof is quoted below:- “77. The purpose of certiorari, as we understand, is only to confine the inferior tribunals within their jurisdiction, so as to avoid the irregular exercise, or the non- exercise or the illegal assumption of it and not to correct errors of finding of fact or interpretation of law committed by them in the exercise of powers vested in them under the statute. The accepted rule is that where a Court has jurisdiction it has a right to decide every question which crops up in the case and whether its decision is correct or otherwise, it is bound to stand until reversed by a competent Court. This Court in G. Veerappa Pillai v. Messrs Raman and Raman Ltd. Kumbakonam, Tanjore District and Others, (1952) 1 SCC 334 observed: “26. Such writs as are referred to in Article 226 are obviously intended to enable the High Court to issue them in grave cases where the subordinate tribunals or bodies or officers act wholly without jurisdiction, or in excess of it, or in violation of the principles of natural justice, or refuse to exercise a jurisdiction vested in them, or there is an error apparent on the face of the record, and such act, omission, error, or excess has resulted in manifest injustice. However extensive the jurisdiction may be, it seems to us that it is not so wide or large as to enable the High Court to convert itself into a court of appeal and examine for itself the correctness of the decision impugned and decide what is the proper view to be taken or the order to be made.” 23. Thus, the challenge to the impugned ex parte opinion dated 29.01.2018, passed by the learned Member, Foreigners Tribunal, 1st, Nagaon, in F.T. Case No. 108/15, arising out of Case No. 579/14, dated 15.09.2014, by which the petitioner, namely, Purnima Begum @ Minara Begum, was declared to be a foreigner who had entered into India illegally from Bangladesh after Page No.# 12/12 25.03.1971, fails. Resultantly, this writ petition is dismissed at the “motion stage” without issuing notice upon the respondents. The consequences of the said opinion shall follow. 24. There shall be no order as to cost. 25. The learned standing counsel for the FT, Border matters and NRC shall communicate a downloaded copy of this order to the Home and Political (B) Department, so as to send a copy of this order to be made a part of the record of the learned Foreigners Tribunal for future reference. 26. The Court appreciates the efforts put in by the learned legal aid counsel. She would be entitled to her usual honorarium. JUDGE JUDGE Comparing Assistant