[2026:RJ-JP:13011] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Civil First Appeal No. 428/2026 Dasrath Singh Shekhawat S/o Shri Bhanwar Singh Shekhawat Aged About 61 Years, R/o House No. 197, Moti Nagar Queens Road Jaipur District Jaipur (Rajasthan). ----Appellant Versus 1. Suryaprakash S/o Sitaram, R/o Phagi Tehsil Phagi Hal R/o Jhag Stand Bagru Tehsil Sanganer District Jaipur (Rajasthan). 2. Tehsildar, Tehsil Phagi District Jaipur. 3. Sub Registrar, Phagi District Jaipur ----Respondents For Appellant(s) : Mr. Dushyant Singh Naruka For Respondent(s) : Mr. Shiv Shanker Choudhary HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANEESH SHARMA Order REPORTABLE 27/03/2026 1. The present first appeal has been filed by the plaintiff/appellant, assailing the judgment and decree dated 23.02.2026 passed in Civil Suit No. 50/2025 (NCV No. 52/2025) titled 'Dasrath Singh Shekhawat Vs. Suryaprakash & Ors.', by the learned Additional District Judge, Phagi, District Jaipur, whereby the application filed by the defendant/respondent under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC was allowed and the suit for specific performance filed by the plaintiff/appellant was dismissed as being barred by limitation. 2. The brief facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the plaintiff/appellant had filed a suit for specific performance of an agreement to sell dated 12.11.2007. In the plaint, it was averred that a specific date, i.e., 25.12.2008, was fixed for the payment of the remaining sale consideration and execution of the sale deed. [2026:RJ-JP:13011] (2 of 10) [CFA-428/2026] The plaintiff admittedly did not pay the balance consideration amount by that date, i.e., 25.12.2008. Although, the plaintiff served a legal notice dated 05.12.2008 on the defendants, and despite serving the legal notice, the sale deed was not registered. However, the parties orally agreed that the defendant would have the land measured and thereafter the sale deed would be registered, and that from 2007 to 10.12.2025, the defendant failed to perform his part of the contract, therefore, after serving a second legal notice dated 25.11.2025. The present suit was filed by the plaintiff in December 2025, praying for a decree of specific performance of the contract dated 12.11.2007. 3. Upon service of notice, the defendant filed an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC and prayed for rejection of the plaint as being barred by the provisions of Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963. In the application, it was stated that as per the averments of the plaint, the agreement dated 12.11.2007 specified a date for specific performance, i.e., 25.11.2008, and further, as per the averments of the plaint, the first legal notice was issued on 05.12.2008, whereas the suit has been filed after a delay of around 17 years from the date fixed for specific performance, i.e., 25.12.2008, the present suit is barred by limitation. 4. The said application was contested by the plaintiff by filing a reply, wherein it was contended that after the issuance of the first notice dated 05.12.2008, it was orally agreed between the parties that the defendant would get the land partitioned and measured and thereafter get the sale deed registered; therefore, the period [2026:RJ-JP:13011] (3 of 10) [CFA-428/2026] of limitation would be deemed to be extended. He accordingly prayed for the dismissal of the said application. 5. After hearing the arguments of the respective parties on the said application, the learned Trial Court allowed the application filed by the defendant/respondent under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC and rejected the plaint as being barred by the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963. 6. Aggrieved by the aforesaid rejection of the plaint, the plaintiff/appellant has preferred the present first appeal. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that from the averments of the plaint, it is nowhere established that the plaint is barred by any law. He further submits that after the issuance of the first notice, it was orally agreed between the parties that the defendant would get the property partitioned and measured and thereafter get the sale deed executed; thus, the time period would be deemed to have been extended. He, therefore, contends that in the present set of facts, the question of limitation is a mixed question of fact and law, which can be examined during the course of the trial after issues are framed and evidence is led, and not at the stage of considering an application under Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC. 8. In order to buttress his contentions, he places reliance upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Urvashiben & anr. Vs. Krishnakant Manuprasad Trivedi1 accordingly, prays that the impugned order may kindly be set 1 (2019) 13 SCC 372 [2026:RJ-JP:13011] (4 of 10) [CFA-428/2026] aside and matter may kindly be remitted back to be adjudicated on merits. 9. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent vehemently opposes the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant and supports the impugned order. He submits that from the averments of the plaint, it is evident that the agreement in question was executed on 12.11.2007, and the date specified for specific performance as indicated in the said agreement was 25.12.2008. He further submits that from para No. 6 of the plaint, it is evident that in the year 2008, the appellant served a legal notice upon the respondent. Therefore, the cause of action and limitation period began in 2008. Thus, the filing of the suit for specific performance in the year 2025 is nothing but an abuse of the process of law, and the present suit is hit by the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963, and it is grossly time barred. He accordingly prays for its dismissal, as the present plaint is liable to be rejected as being barred by law under the provisions of Order 7 Rule 11 of the CPC. 10. In order to buttress his contentions, he placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matters of Nikhila Divyang Mehta and anr. Vs. Hitesh P. Sanghvi & Ors.2 and Dahiben Vs. Arvindbhai Kalyanji Bhanusali (Gajra) (D) thr LRs & Ors.3. 11. Heard and considered the submissions made by learned counsel for both the parties and perused the material available on record. 2 Civil Appeal No.5180 of 2025 (arising out of SLP (C) No.13459 of 2024) 3 2021 (1) Civil Court Cases 210 (SC) [2026:RJ-JP:13011] (5 of 10) [CFA-428/2026] 12. From a bare perusal of the record, it is evident that in the plaint, the plaintiff has stated that the agreement in question was executed on 12.11.2007 and the date specified for specific performance was 25.12.2008, as evident from para Nos.2 and 3 of the plaint. 13. From the para No.6 of the plaint, it is also evident that the plaintiff vide legal notice dated 05.12.2008, requested the defendants to execute the sale deed, but that request was not adhered to. Later on, a second notice was issued on 25.11.2025, and the present suit for specific performance was filed on 18.12.2025. 14. From a bare perusal of the plaint, it is established that the date stipulated for performance of the agreement was 25.12.2008, and from the record, it is evident that the plaintiff also served a legal notice on 05.12.2008, which clearly indicates that the limitation period to file the suit started to run in the year 2008. But by way of clever drafting, the plaintiff has set up a story that after service of the legal notice, it was orally agreed that the defendant would get the property partitioned and measured and thereafter the said deed would be registered, and the time limit fixed earlier would be deemed to have been extended, which is otherwise ex facie contrary to the terms and conditions set out in the agreement dated 12.11.2007. 15. It would be apt to reproduce Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963, at this stage as under: Sr No. Description of Suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run 54. For specific Three years The date fixed for the [2026:RJ-JP:13011] (6 of 10) [CFA-428/2026] performance of a contract performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused. 16. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Ahmmadsahab Abdul Milla (Dead) by proposed Lrs. Vs. Bibijan & Ors.4, has held as under: "7. The inevitable conclusion is that the expression 'date fixed for the performance' is a crystallized notion. This is clear from the fact that the second part "time from which period begins to run" refers to a case where no such date is fixed. To put it differently, when date is fixed it means that there is a definite date fixed for doing a particular act. Even in the second part the stress is on 'when the plaintiff has notice that performance is refused'. Here again, there is a definite point of time, when the plaintiff notices the refusal. In that sense both the parts refer to definite dates. So, there is no question of finding out an intention from other circumstances. Whether the date was fixed or not the plaintiff had notice that performance is refused and the date thereof are to be established with reference to materials and evidence to be brought on record. The expression 'date' used in Article 54 of the Schedule to the Act definitely is suggestive of a specified date in the calendar. We answer the reference accordingly. The matter shall now be placed before the Division Bench for deciding the issue on merits." 17. A bare look to the above Article 54 and judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court clearly indicates that in a suit for specific performance, there are two dates from which the period of limitation begins to run: (a) where there is a date fixed for performance of contract, three years from the date so fixed; and (b) where there is no such date fixed, three years from when the plaintiff has notice of refusal of performance. Thus, it is clear that the second contingency (period of limitation beginning from when the plaintiff has notice of refusal of performance) is only attracted when there is no date specified for performance of the contract. 18. In the present case, the date fixed for such performance is 25.12.2008, thus, it will be the first contingency (three years from 4 AIR 2009 SC 2193 [2026:RJ-JP:13011] (7 of 10) [CFA-428/2026] the date specified for performance of contract) that is attracted, whereas the present suit was filed with an inordinate delay on 18.12.2025. 19. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Dahiben (supra), while seized of a matter of a similar nature, has held that in cases where an illusory cause of action has been cleverly drafted to bring the suit within limitation, the same should be nipped in the bud, so that bogus litigation will end at the earliest stage. In the present case, it is evident that the limitation period started from 25.12.2008 (as specified in the agreement dated 12.11.2007) and the present suit was filed on 18.12.2025 (after an inordinate delay of 14 years). 20. It would be apt at this juncture to refer to Section 9 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which is reproduced as under: 9. Continuous running of time.— Where once time has begun to run, no subsequent disability or inability to institute a suit or make an application stops it: Provided that where letters of administration to the estate of a creditor have been granted to his debtor, the running of the period of limitation for a suit to recover the debt shall be suspended while the administration continues. 21. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Indian Evangelical Lutheran Church Trust Association Vs. Sri Bala & Co.5 has held as under: 9. The Limitation Act, 1963 consolidates and amends the law of limitation of suits, appeals and applications and for purposes connected therewith. The law of limitation is an adjective law containing procedural rules and does not create any right in favour of any person, but simply prescribes that the remedy can be exercised only up to a certain period and not beyond. The Limitation Act therefore does not confer any substantive right, nor defines any right or cause of action. The law of limitation is based on delay and laches. Unless there is a complete cause of action, limitation cannot run and there cannot be a complete cause of action unless there is a person who can sue and a person who can be sued. There is also another important principle under the Law of Limitation which 5 2025 INSC 42 [2026:RJ-JP:13011] (8 of 10) [CFA-428/2026] is crystallized in the form of maxim that “when once the time has begun to run, nothing stops it”. 9.1 In “Limitation Periods” by Andrew McGee, Barrister of Lincoln’s Inn, published in 2002, the author says that “Once time has begun to run it will run continuously, except in certain situations. Time ceases to run when the plaintiff commences legal proceedings in respect of the cause of action in question. It is a general principle of some importance that the bringing of an action stops the running of time for the purposes of that action only.” (Emphasis Supplied) 22. Thus, from a perusal of Section 9 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and the above judgment passed by the Hon’ble Apex Court, it is clear that it is trite law that once the period of limitation begins to run, it does not stop, and in the present case the limitation period began to run in the year 2008, and the suit was filed after an inordinate delay of 14 years in 2025. Therefore, the present suit is barred by limitation as it has been instituted 14 years after the expiry of the limitation period prescribed under Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963. 23. As far as the argument raised by the learned counsel for the appellant qua the limitation period being extended by virtue of an oral agreement between the parties is concerned, the same is contrary to the agreement dated 12.11.2007, and appears to be a mere afterthought to cleverly draft the plaint to create an illusory cause of action, in an attempt to bring the suit within limitation. 24. From a bare perusal of the impugned order, it is evident that the learned Trial Court has conducted a valid examination of the averments of the plaint, judgments cited before it and has also considered the provisions of Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and only after a careful examination of the same and relying upon [2026:RJ-JP:13011] (9 of 10) [CFA-428/2026] judgments passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the Trial Court has come to a conclusion that the present issue of limitation is not a mixed question of fact and law, since in the agreement a fixed date was specified for the performance. 25. It is also evident that the learned Trial Court has also held that looking to the peculiar facts of the case, and from the plaint averments, it is established that the agreement was executed on 12.11.2007, the date for performance was given as 25.12.2008, and the plaintiff served the first legal notice on 05.12.2008. Therefore, there is no room for the appellant to contend that the issue of limitation in the present facts is a mixed question of fact and law. The reasoning recorded by the learned Court below, while allowing the application, appears to be correct and in accordance with law, as in the present case, the plaintiff has cleverly drafted the plaint in order to create an illusory cause of action to bring the suit within limitation. Thus, the argument advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant cannot be accepted. 26. So far as the judgment relied upon by learned Counsel for the appellant in the matter of Urvashiben (supra) is concerned, even though there is no quarrel on the legal principle laid down therein, the issue involved in the said case stands on a different footing as in the said case no date was fixed for performance of agreement; therefore, the same is distinguishable on facts. 27. In that view of the matter, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned order rejecting the plaint under Order 7 Rule 11 of CPC as being barred by law, does not suffer from any [2026:RJ-JP:13011] (10 of 10) [CFA-428/2026] perversity, or legal infirmity so as to warrant any interference by this Court under Section 96 of the CPC. 28. Accordingly, the present civil first appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. 29. All other pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of. (MANEESH SHARMA),J SOURAV /35