[2026:RJ-JP:10320] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous (Petition) No. 1433/2026 1. Shaitan Gurjar S/o Sushpal, Aged About 24 Years, Makarwali Road Kacchi Basti, Opp. Ramdev Mandir, Ramdev Nagar, Ajmer (Raj). 2. Bablu S/o Laxman Gurjar, Aged About 25 Years, U.t.i. Colony Ke Piche Ramdev Nagar,katchi Basti, Ajmer (Raj). 3. Kasmlesh Gurjar S/o Ramratna Singh Gurjar, Aged About 24 Years, 227, Kacchi Basti Makarwali Road, Gali No. 2, Ramdev Nagar, Ajmer (Raj). 4. Shivraj S/o Mohan, Aged About 25 Years, Makarwali Road, Gali No. 02 Ramdev Nagar, Ajmer (Raj). 5. Nitin Gurjar S/o Ramdev, Aged About 20 Years, Ward No. 59, Ghandi Nagar Gali No. 02, Chorasiyawas, Ajmer (Raj). 6. Manish Gurjar S/o Hardev Gurjar, Aged About 28 Years, 578/3, Jawahar Nagar, Gurjar Mohalla, Ajmer (Raj). 7. Gajraj Mehra S/o Ramesh Chand Mehra, Aged About 26 Years, B-05/57, Ajmer (Raj). ----Petitioners Versus 1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Public Prosecutor. 2. Om Prakash S/o Bagharam, Aged About 20 Years, Didwana Dist. Nagaur (Raj). ----Respondents For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Akshat Jain Mr. Sharukh Khan For Respondent(s) : Mr. Vijay Singh Yadav, PP HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANIL KUMAR UPMAN Order 10/03/2026 1. Petitioners are present in person and they have duly been identified by their counsel. 2. Instant criminal misc. petition under Section 528 of the BNSS has been filed on behalf of the accused petitioners for quashing the impugned FIR No.50/2026 registered at Police Station Krishnaganj, District Ajmer for offences punishable under Sections 115(2), 126(2) & 189(2) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, [2026:RJ-JP:10320] (2 of 5) [CRLMP-1433/2026] (in short ‘BNS’) 2023 and Sections 3(1)(r), 3(1)(s) & 3(2)(va) of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (Amendment 2015) along with all subsequent proceedings arising out of it. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submits that parties have settled their dispute amicably and they have entered into compromise. The written compromise has been annexed with this petition. 4. Complainant, who is present in person, submits that he has no objection if the impugned FIR and all subsequent proceedings are quashed. 5. Learned Public Prosecutor submits that since the FIR has been registered under the provisions of SC/ST Act, the same cannot be quashed on the basis of compromise. He, however, accepts the factum of compromise having been entered into between the parties without any coercion and duress. 6. In order to support his contention that FIR/proceedings under the provisions of SC/ST Act can be quashed, learned counsel for the petitioners invites attention of this Court towards the order dated 25.10.2021 passed by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramawatar versus State of Madhya Pradesh reported in AIR 2021 SC 5228. 7. In the above referred case of Ramawatar (supra), Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed the following: “12. In view of the settled proposition of law, we affirm the decision of this Court in Ramgopal (Supra) and reiterate that the powers of this Court under Article 142 can be invoked to quash a criminal proceeding on the basis of a voluntary compromise between the complainant/victim and the accused. [2026:RJ-JP:10320] (3 of 5) [CRLMP-1433/2026] 13. We, however, put a further caveat that the powers under Article 142 or under Section 482 Cr.P.C., are exercisable in post conviction matters only where an appeal is pending before one or the other Judicial forum. This is on the premise that an order of conviction does not attain finality till the accused has exhausted his/her legal remedies and the finality is subjudice before an appellate court. The pendency of legal proceedings, be that may before the final Court, is sine qua non to involve the superior court’s plenary powers to do complete justice. Conversely, where a settlement has ensued post the attainment of all legal remedies, the annulment of proceedings on the basis of a compromise would be impermissible. Such an embargo is necessitated to prevent the accused from gaining an indefinite leverage, for such a settlement/compromise will always be loaded with lurking suspicion about its bona fide. We have already clarified that the purpose of these extraordinary powers is not to incentivise any hollow hearted agreements between the accused and the victim but to do complete justice by effecting genuine settlement(s). 14. With respect to the second question before us, it must be noted that even though the powers of this Court under Article 142 are wide and far reaching, the same cannot be exercised in a vacuum. True it is that ordinary statutes or any restrictions contained therein, cannot be constructed as a limitation on the Court’s power to do “complete justice”. However, this is not to say that this Court can altogether ignore the statutory provisions or other express prohibitions in law. In fact, the Court is obligated to take note of the relevant laws and will have to regulate the use of its power and discretion accordingly. The Constitution Bench decision in the case of Supreme Court Bar Assn. v. Union of India & Anr. has eloquently clarified this point as follows: “48. The Supreme Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 has the power to make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice “between the parties in any cause or matter pending before it”. The very nature of the power must lead the Court to set limits for itself within which to exercise those powers and 6 (1998) 4 SCC 409, 48 ordinarily it [2026:RJ-JP:10320] (4 of 5) [CRLMP-1433/2026] cannot disregard a statutory provision governing a subject, except perhaps to balance the equities between the conflicting claims of the litigating parties by “ironing out the creases” in a cause or matter before it. Indeed this Court is not a court of restricted jurisdiction of only dispute settling. It is well recognised and established that this Court has always been a law maker and its role travels beyond merely dispute settling. It is a “problem solver in the nebulous areas” (see K. Veeraswami v. Union of India [(1991) 3 SCC 655: 1991 SCC (Cri) 734] but the substantive statutory provisions dealing with the subject - matter of a given case cannot be altogether ignored by this Court, while making an order under Article 142. Indeed, these constitutional powers cannot, in any way, be controlled by any statutory provisions but at the same time these powers are not meant to be exercised when their exercise may come directly in conflict with what has been expressly provided for in a statute dealing expressly with the subject.” 15. Ordinarily, when dealing with offences arising out of special statutes such as the SC/ST Act, the Court will be extremely circumspect in its approach. The SC/ ST Act has been specifically enacted to deter acts of indignity, humiliation and harassment against members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes. The Act is also a recognition of the depressing reality that despite undertaking several measures, the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes continue to be subjected to various atrocities at the hands of upper- castes. The Courts have to be mindful of the fact that the Act has been enacted keeping in view the express constitutional safeguards enumerated in Articles 15, 17 and 21 of the Constitution, with a twin fold objective of protecting the members of these vulnerable communities as well as to provide relief and rehabilitation to the victims of caste based atrocities. 16. On the other hand, where it appears to the Court that the offence in question, although covered under the SC/ST Act, is primarily private or civil in nature, or where the alleged offence has not been committed on account of the caste of the victim, or where the continuation of the legal proceedings would be an [2026:RJ-JP:10320] (5 of 5) [CRLMP-1433/2026] abuse of the process of law, the Court can exercise its powers to quash the proceedings. On similar lines, when considering a prayer for quashing on the basis of a compromise/settlement, if the Court is satisfied that the underlying objective of the Act would not be contravened or diminished even if the felony in question goes unpunished, the mere fact that the offence is covered under a ‘special statute’ would not refrain this Court or the High Court, from exercising their respective powers under Article 142 of the Constitution or Section 482 Cr.P.C.” 8. The aforesaid judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court settles the legal position so far as this Court’s power to quash the proceedings/FIR (in exercise of powers under Section 528 of BNSS) is concerned, in cases where the parties have entered into compromise in the cases involving offences under the provisions of SC/ST Act. The only caution which is to be borne in mind is, that the compromise must be with free will. 9. In view of the aforesaid legal position and considering the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties and in light of judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramawatar (supra), the impugned FIR is liable to be quashed in the face of compromise arrived at between the parties although the offences are not compoundable. 10. In view of the above, this Criminal Misc. Petition is allowed and the impugned FIR No.50/2026 registered at Police Station Krishnaganj, District Ajmer along with all subsequent proceedings arising out of it is hereby quashed and set aside. Consequence to follow. 11. The stay application and pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of. (ANIL KUMAR UPMAN),J CHARU SONI /122