1 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR Reserved for orders on : 15.01.2026 Order passed on : 13.02.2026 WPS No. 366 of 2023 1 - Hirmaram Markam S/o Shri Kesha Markam Aged About 38 Years R/o Near Higher Secondary School, Chhindgarh, P.O. Chhindgarh, District : Sukuma, Chhattisgar ... Petitioner(s) versus 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through The Secretary, Department Of Panchayat And Rural Development, Mahanadi Bhawan, Mantralaya, P.S. And P.O. - Rakhi, Atal Nagar, Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Chief Executive Officer, Zila Panchayat, Sukma, District : Sukuma, Chhattisgarh 3 - Collector, Sukma, District : Sukuma, Chhattisgarh 4 - Chief Executive Officer, Janpad Panchayat, Chhindgarh, District : Sukuma, Chhattisgarh 5 - Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue) Sukma, District : Sukuma, Chhattisgarh 6 - Tahsildar, Chhindgarh, District : Sukuma, Chhattisgarh ... Respondent(s) (Cause-title is taken from Case Information System) For Petitioner : Mr. Akash Deep Sharma, Advocate holding brief on behalf of Mr. Anish Tiwari, Advocate For State : Mr. Ujjwal Choubey, Panel Lawyer For Resp. No. 4 : Ms. Akanksha Jain, Advocate Digitally signed by SHAYNA KADRI 2 (Hon'ble Shri Amitendra Kishore Prasad, Judge)] C.A.V. Order 1. The Petitioner, by way of the present writ petition, has called in question the legality, validity, and propriety of the impugned order dated 29.10.2020 (Annexure P-1), passed by respondent No. 02, whereby the services of the petitioner have been terminated. The said impugned order is assailed on the ground that it has been issued in an arbitrary, illegal, and unconstitutional manner, without following the procedure prescribed under law and in complete violation of the principles of natural justice, resulting in grave prejudice to the petitioner, hence, this writ petition is preferred seeking following reliefs : “10.1 Issue appropriate writ/direction/order setting-aside the impugned order dt. 29.10.2020 (Annexure P-1) and the entire subsequent action, in the interest of justice. 10.2 To direct the concerned respondent authority to reinstate the petitioner into his services with all consequential benefits of period of suspension and termination. 10.3 To hold that the entire enquiry is illegal and the subsequent enquiry report may kindly be set aside. 10.4 To provide compensation and cost of the petition to the petitioner, in the interest of justice.” 3 2. Facts of the case, as canvased are that, at the relevant time, the petitioner was working as Panchayat Secretary, Gram Panchayat Kawasiras, Janpad Panchayat Chhindgarh, District Sukma (C.G.). While the petitioner was discharging his duties as Panchayat Secretary, certain private individuals made complaints alleging misappropriation of Government funds pertaining to various schemes. Pursuant thereto, a preliminary enquiry was conducted by the respondent authorities and, thereafter, a charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner. On the basis of the said preliminary enquiry report, the petitioner’s services were terminated and a recovery order dated 17.05.2019 was also issued against him. Aggrieved by the said termination order, the petitioner preferred an appeal under Section 91 of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993 before the Commissioner, Bastar Division, Jagdalpur (C.G.). The learned Commissioner, vide order dated 28.09.2019, partly allowed the appeal and categorically held that the enquiry report was contrary to law, non-speaking in nature, and contained recommendations for punishment which was impermissible under the rules. Consequently, the termination order was set aside and the respondent authorities were directed to reinstate the petitioner and to conduct a fresh departmental enquiry strictly in accordance with law. After passing of the appellate order, the petitioner submitted several applications seeking reinstatement in service in compliance of the directions 4 issued by the learned Commissioner. However, instead of reinstating the petitioner as directed, the respondent authorities issued several letters to the petitioner repeatedly calling upon him to submit various documents. In response thereto, the petitioner submitted letters requesting reasonable time for furnishing the documents, stating specifically that he had not been supplied with the copy of any fresh preliminary enquiry report as directed by the learned Commissioner. Ultimately, after persistent efforts by the petitioner, he was reinstated into service vide order dated 22.09.2020. However, in the said order it was stated that the enquiry committee earlier constituted would merely carry out a “fact check” of the earlier enquiry report, despite the fact that the said enquiry report had already been declared illegal by the learned Commissioner. It is pertinent to note that instead of conducting a fresh departmental enquiry by issuing a fresh charge-sheet as required under Rule 7(2) of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999, the respondent authorities illegally continued proceedings on the basis of the earlier charge-sheet and enquiry, in direct violation of the appellate order. Thereafter, on 28.10.2020, the enquiry committee submitted its report stating that the earlier enquiry report was found to be correct and verified, despite the fact that the said report had already been set aside by the appellate authority. Shockingly, the said enquiry report was never supplied to the petitioner, nor was any show cause notice issued to him as 5 mandated under Rule 7(9) of the Rules of 1999. On the very next day, i.e., 29.10.2020, respondent No. 02 (Chief Executive Officer, Zila Panchayat, Sukma) passed the impugned order terminating the services of the petitioner, without affording him any opportunity of hearing and without supplying the enquiry report. A bare perusal of the impugned order shows that it is a verbatim reproduction of the findings of the enquiry committee, reflecting complete non-application of mind. It is further submitted that the entire action of the respondent authorities is vitiated by bias, inasmuch as even before passing the final impugned order dated 29.10.2020 and before holding the petitioner guilty of the charges, the respondents had already issued recovery notices to the petitioner for alleged embezzlement of funds. Under similar circumstances, this Court has been pleased to pass orders in W.P.S. No. 11/2021 (order dated 28.01.2021) and W.P.S. No. 196/2021 (order dated 02.02.2021), wherein identical actions of the authorities were held to be illegal. Being aggrieved by the arbitrary, illegal and unconstitutional impugned order dated 29.10.2020 passed by respondent No. 02, whereby the petitioner’s services have been terminated in gross violation of statutory rules and principles of natural justice, the petitioner has been constrained to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned 6 termination order dated 29.10.2020 and the entire departmental enquiry proceedings suffer from serious legal infirmities and procedural irregularities, rendering the same arbitrary, illegal and unsustainable in the eyes of law. On this ground alone, the impugned order deserves to be quashed. It is submitted that the respondent authorities could not have acted upon or relied upon a preliminary enquiry and charge-sheet which had already been set aside by a competent appellate authority, namely the learned Commissioner, Bastar Division, vide order dated 28.09.2019. Once the earlier enquiry was declared illegal, any action founded upon the same stood vitiated ab initio. The petitioner submits that there is a gross violation of the principles of natural justice. The subsequent enquiry report dated 28.10.2020 was never supplied to the petitioner, nor was any second show cause notice issued. Shockingly, the impugned termination order was passed on the very next day, i.e., 29.10.2020, thereby denying the petitioner any meaningful or effective opportunity to defend himself, in clear violation of the rule of audi alteram partem. Learned counsel submits that the entire departmental enquiry conducted by the respondents is vitiated, biased and contrary to law, and consequently, the impugned order based thereon is wholly unsustainable. It is further submitted that the action of the respondent authorities is premeditated and malafide, which is clearly evident from the official note-sheets placed on record. The respondents had even issued recovery notices through the 7 Tahsildar against the petitioner prior to passing the impugned termination order and even before holding the petitioner guilty of the charges, demonstrating pre-determination and bias. The petitioner submits that there has been complete non-compliance with the mandatory provisions of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999. Such non- compliance vitiates the entire disciplinary proceedings. It is submitted that despite being fully aware of the appellate order passed by the learned Commissioner, the respondent authorities illegally proceeded with recovery and termination actions against the petitioner, which are ex facie contemptuous, arbitrary and without jurisdiction. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that in his earlier replies, he had furnished a detailed explanation of the alleged expenditures and denied any misappropriation. However, the said replies were completely overlooked and ignored by the respondent authorities, causing grave prejudice to the petitioner. It is also submitted that no embezzlement whatsoever has been committed by the petitioner, which is evident from his detailed replies submitted during the proceedings. The findings recorded against him are perverse and unsupported by evidence. Learned counsel submits that the respondent authorities have proceeded against the petitioner in a wholly arbitrary manner, acting on their whims and fancies while ignoring binding statutory provisions. Such action is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and is liable to be set aside. 8 The impugned termination order dated 29.10.2020 has been passed without supplying the enquiry report and without issuing a second show cause notice to the petitioner. The disciplinary authority acted in undue haste by passing the order on the very next day of submission of the enquiry report, thereby denying the petitioner a reasonable and effective opportunity of hearing, in clear violation of settled principles of natural justice. It is submitted that after the earlier termination order dated 17.05.2019 was set aside by the learned Commissioner with a categorical direction to conduct a fresh enquiry, the respondent authorities failed to issue a fresh charge-sheet as mandated under Rule 7(2) of the Rules, 1999. Absence of framing and communication of definite charges strikes at the very root of disciplinary proceedings and vitiates the entire enquiry. In the present case, the CEO, Janpad Panchayat acted as the Enquiry Officer, while the CEO, Zila Panchayat acted as the Disciplinary Authority. Rule 7(9) mandates that the Enquiry Officer shall submit the enquiry report without making any recommendation regarding penalty. However, the enquiry report dated 28.10.2020 illegally recommends recovery of Rs. 21,81,510/- from the petitioner, which is impermissible in law. Further, Rule 7(9) requires that if the disciplinary authority proposes to impose a major penalty, it must supply a copy of the enquiry report to the delinquent employee and record independent findings on each charge. In the present case, neither was the enquiry report furnished nor were 9 independent findings recorded. The disciplinary authority merely reproduced the enquiry report verbatim, demonstrating total non- application of mind. The enquiry report dated 28.10.2020 is ex facie illegal as the enquiry committee was never constituted to conduct a de novo departmental enquiry. A bare perusal of the order dated 01.09.2020 reveals that the committee was constituted merely to verify the correctness of the earlier enquiry report which had already been set aside by the learned Commissioner vide order dated 28.09.2019. This is in direct violation of para-6 of the Commissioner’s order, rendering the entire exercise illegal and biased. The constitution and functioning of the enquiry committee itself demonstrate pre- determination. Instead of conducting a fresh enquiry as directed, the committee merely validated an already invalid report, making the enquiry a mere formality and contrary to settled principles governing fair disciplinary proceedings. The impugned termination order is a verbatim reproduction of the enquiry report and does not reflect any independent consideration of the record by the disciplinary authority. The enquiry report was never communicated to the petitioner, and the impugned order was passed in undue haste on the very next day, further evidencing arbitrariness and non-application of mind. The recovery notice dated 15.09.2020 (Annexure P-11) was issued much prior to the enquiry report dated 28.10.2020 and the termination order dated 29.10.2020. This clearly establishes that the respondent 10 authorities had pre-decided the imposition of penalty, rendering the enquiry biased and unfair. The petitioner, being a public servant, is entitled to protection under Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. Failure to issue a fresh charge-sheet, denial of enquiry report, and denial of reasonable opportunity before imposing a major penalty constitute a direct violation of constitutional safeguards. Reliance is placed upon Parikshit Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors., 2015 SCC OnLine Ch 1240 (Para-11), State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Prakash Singh, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 891 (Para-38), Gyaneshwar Karma v. State of Chhattisgarh (WPS No. 11/2021, decided on 28.01.2021) and Podiyami Hidma v. State of Chhattisgarh (WPS No. 196/2021, decided on 02.02.2021). In view of the aforesaid submissions, it is prayed that this Court may be pleased to set aside the impugned order dated 29.10.2020 (Annexure P-1) along with the entire enquiry proceedings, including the enquiry report, and further direct reinstatement of the petitioner with all consequential benefits including back wages and continuity of service. 4. Learned State Counsel and counsel appearing for respondent No. 4 jointly submit that a bare perusal of the pleadings, averments made in the writ petition, and the documents annexed thereto clearly demonstrates that the principal and substantive relief sought by the petitioner is directed against respondent No. 2, 11 namely the Chief Executive Officer, Zila Panchayat, Sukma. The impugned order under challenge has admittedly been issued by respondent No. 2, and therefore, respondent No. 2 is the main contesting party to the present writ petition. It is submitted that the petitioner has neither sought any specific relief against the answering respondents nor has made any adverse allegation against them in the entire body of the writ petition. The pleadings disclose no cause of action against the answering respondents, and the controversy raised by the petitioner is confined solely to the actions of respondent No. 2. It is further submitted that since no relief has been claimed and no allegation has been levelled against the answering respondents, the present writ petition deserves to be dismissed as against the answering respondents, including the State and respondent No. 4. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, and in the absence of any direct allegation or relief sought against the answering respondents. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the impugned orders, and examined the record with due care. 6. The question that falls for consideration is whether the termination of the petitioner satisfies the requirements of Rule 7 of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 ? 7. Rule 5(b)(vi) of the Rules of 1999 clearly prescribes removal from 12 service as a major penalty. Rule 7 mandates that no major penalty can be imposed without a formal enquiry. Such an enquiry necessarily requires framing of definite charges, communication of allegations to the delinquent employee, opportunity to inspect records, oral hearing with right to cross-examine witnesses, submission of enquiry report, and supply of findings to the delinquent for his representation before passing of final orders. Rule 5 and Rule 7 of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 is quoted below for ready reference : 5. Penalties. - The following penalties may, for good and sufficient reasons, and as hereinafter provided by imposed on a member of the Panchayat Service namely :- xxx xxx xxx (b) Major Penalties- xxx xxx xxx (vi)Removal from service not disqualifying for future employment; 7. Procedure for imposing major penalties. - (1)No order, imposing on a member of the Panchayat Service, any of the penalties specified in clauses (iv) to (via) of Rule 5 shall be passed except after a formal inquiry is held as far as may be, in the manner hereinafter provided. (2)When an order for formal inquiry has 13 been made, the disciplinary authority shall frame Definite charges on the basis of allegations and shall communicate such charges, alongwith the statement of the allegations, to the member of the Panchayat Service and also require him to submit, within such time as may be specified a written statement of defence and also to state whether he desires to be heard in person. (3)The person against whom inquiry is to be held shall, for the purpose of preparing to defence, be permitted to inspect and take extracts from such records as he may specify : Provided that such permission may be refused if, for reasons to be recorded in writing, in the opinion of the Enquiry' Officer such records are not relevant for the purpose or it is against the public interest to allow his access thereto. (4)On receipt of the written statement of defence or if any such statement is not received within the time specified, the disciplinary authority may himself enquire into such of the charges as are not admitted or appoint an Enquiry Officer to hold the inquiry and forward to him his report and, if advised, his recommendation alongwith all the inquiry papers. (5)The disciplinary authority may nominate any person to present the case in support of the charges before the Enquiry Officer. The member of the Panchayat Service may present his 14 case with the assistance of any other Panchayat Servant of State Government Servant approved by the Enquiry Officer but may not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose, unless the person nominated by the disciplinary authority as aforesaid is a legal practitioner or unless the disciplinary authority having regard to the circumstances of the case so permits. (6)If the servant of the Panchayat Service desires to be heard in person, he shall be so heard. If he so desires or if the disciplinary authority so directs, an oral enquiry shall be held by the Enquiry Officer. At such inquiry, evidence shall be heard as to such of the allegations as are not admitted and the person charged shall be entitled to cross examine the witness, to give evidence in person, to produce documentary evidence, if any and to have such witness called as he may wish : Provided that the Enquiry Officer may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, refuse to call a witness. (7)At the conclusion of the inquiry, the Enquiry Officer shall prepare a report of the inquiry, recording his findings on each of the charges together with reasons therefor. (8)The proceedings conducted against the persons charged shall contain a sufficient record of :- (i)the charges framed against such person and the statement of 15 allegations; (ii)the written statement of defence if any; (iii)the oral evidence taken in the course of the inquiry; (iv)the documentary evidence considered in the course of the inquiry; (v)the orders, if any, made by the Enquiry Officer or the disciplinary authority, as the case may be, with regard to the inquiry; (vi)a report setting out the findings on each charge and the reasons therefor. (9)The Enquiry Officer, if he is other than the disciplinary authority, shall submit the records of the proceedings mentioned in clause (8) above to the disciplinary authority without recommendation relating to the penalty to be imposed. The disciplinary authority shall consider the record of the enquiry and its findings on each charge, having regard to the findings on the charges and the record (if the proceedings) if he is of the opinion that any of the penalties specified in clauses (iv) to (vii) of Rule 5 should be imposed, it shall furnish to the person charged a copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer, and where the disciplinary authority is not the Enquiry Officer a statement of its findings together with brief reasons for disagreement, if any, with the findings of the Enquiry Officer. (10)The disciplinary authority shall consider the representation, it any, made by the person charged in response to the notice and determine the penalty, if any, should be imposed 16 and shall pass appropriate order on the case. (11)The orders passed by the disciplinary authority shall be communicated lo the member of the Panchayat Service, who shall also be supplied with a copy of the report of the Enquiry Officer and where disciplinary authority is not the Enquiry Officer, a statement of its findings together with the brief reasons for disagreement, if tiny, with the findings of the Enquiry Officer, unless they have already been supplied to the person charged. 8. From the undisputed facts on record, it is evident that the petitioner was earlier terminated from service on the basis of a preliminary enquiry and charge-sheet. The said termination order was assailed by the petitioner in an appeal under Section 91 of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Raj Adhiniyam, 1993, which was partly allowed by the learned Commissioner, Bastar Division, vide order dated 28.09.2019. The learned Commissioner categorically held that the enquiry report was contrary to law, non-speaking in nature and contained impermissible recommendations regarding punishment. Consequently, the termination order was set aside and the respondents were directed to reinstate the petitioner and to conduct a fresh departmental enquiry strictly in accordance with law. 9. Despite the aforesaid clear directions, the record reveals that no fresh charge-sheet was issued to the petitioner as mandated 17 under Rule 7(2) of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999. Instead, the respondents proceeded on the basis of the very same charge-sheet and enquiry which had already been declared illegal by the appellate authority. Such action is ex facie contrary to the binding order of the learned Commissioner and is impermissible in law. The enquiry committee constituted thereafter was not tasked with conducting a de novo departmental enquiry. 10. A bare perusal of the order constituting the enquiry committee clearly indicates that it was constituted merely to “verify” or “fact- check” the earlier enquiry report, which had already been set aside. This approach defeats the very purpose of the appellate order and renders the entire exercise vitiated. The enquiry report dated 28.10.2020 further suffers from serious legal infirmities. Firstly, the Enquiry Officer has made recommendations regarding recovery and penalty, which is expressly prohibited under Rule 7(9) of the Rules, 1999. Secondly, the said enquiry report was never supplied to the petitioner. Thirdly, no second show cause notice was issued before imposing the major penalty of termination. The impugned termination order dated 29.10.2020 was passed on the very next day of submission of the enquiry report, without affording the petitioner any opportunity to respond thereto. Such undue haste clearly violates the principles of natural justice, particularly the rule of audi alteram partem. The 18 disciplinary authority has also failed to record independent findings on each charge, as required under Rule 7(9) of the Rules, 1999, and has merely reproduced the enquiry report verbatim, reflecting complete non-application of mind. The issuance of recovery notices even prior to the conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings and before holding the petitioner guilty further demonstrates pre-determination and bias on the part of the respondent authorities, rendering the proceedings unfair. 11. The law on the subject is no longer res integra. A Division Bench of this Court, in Rooplal Nayak v. State of Chhattisgarh and Others, reported in 2006 (4) M.P.H.T. 99 (C.G.), has clearly held that no major penalty, as prescribed under Rule 5(b)(iv) of the Chhattisgarh Panchayat Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999, can be imposed on a member of the Panchayat service governed by the said Rules without conducting a regular departmental enquiry in accordance with Rule 7 thereof. 12. In an identical petition coordinate bench of this Court has passed an order in case of Prakash Chand Soni Vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others in WPS No.1846/2011 on 15/07/2015 and it was held as under:- “(3)The short issue arisen for determination is - whether services of a Panchayat Secretary can be dispensed with or terminated without conducting any enquiry as envisaged under Rule 7 19 of the C.G. Panchayat Service (Discipline and Appeal) Rules, 1999 (in short "the Rules, 1999")? (4)Admittedly, on certain allegations, an enquiry was conducted against the petitioner and eventually, an enquiry report was submitted vide Annexure R/4 and thereafter, show cause notice was issued to him on 28.04.2008 vide Annexure R/3, therefore before removing him the principles of natural justice have been complied with. However, at the same time, it is to be seen that a Division Bench of this Court in the matter of Rooplal Nayak vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others, 2006(4) M.P.H.T. 99 (C.G.) has held that any of the major penalty prescribed under Rule 5(b) (iv) of the Rules, 1999 cannot be imposed on a member of Panchayat service to whom the said Rules are applicable without conducting regular Departmental Enquiry as envisaged under 7 of the Rules, 1999. (5)In the case at hand, an enquiry officer was appointed, who conducted some sort of enquiry and submitted an enquiry report, however, that runs short of a departmental enquiry as contemplated under Rule 7. The said provisions uses the words "formal inquiry" with further stipulation that when an order for 'formal enquiry has been made, the disciplinary authority shall frame Definite charges, communicate the same to the delinquent along with the statement of allegations, requiring him to submit within the specified time a written statement of defence and also to state whether he desires to be heard in person. Thereafter, the defence is 20 required to be permitted to inspect and take extracts from the records, which can be refused for reasons to be recorded in writing. On submission of reply by the delinquent, the disciplinary authority may himself enquire or appoint an enquiry officer. Appointment of Presenting Officer and seeking assistance of some other officers by the delinquent is also contemplated therein. The enquiry officer is also enabled to record evidence and thereafter, at the conclusion of the enquiry, the enquiry officer is supposed to prepare enquiry report, the copy of which is required to be furnished to the delinquent. Thus, the 'formal inquiry' envisaged under the Rules is akin to the procedure prescribed for a regular enquiry under Rule 14 of the C.G. Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966.” 13. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kalpraj Dharamshi v. Kotak Investment Advisors Ltd., reported in (2021) 10 SCC 401 has further held that an action taken in breach of natural justice or de hors jurisdiction warrants interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. 14. Very recently, in the matter of Uttar Pradesh vs. Ram Prakash Singh, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 891, Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under : “38. Thus, the right to receive the enquiry report as a fundamental safeguard in disciplinary proceedings, where such report holds the charges 21 against the delinquent employee to be established, was firmly entrenched by the Constitution Bench in the jurisprudence relating to proceedings initiated for disciplinary action for misconduct. This valuable right applies uniformly, regardless of who the employer is (Government, public or private) and regardless of what the rules governing the service ordain. Even if the rules are silent or do not require furnishing of the enquiry report, the same has to be furnished. Additionally, the report must be furnished to the employee even without a request, as it forms an integral part of ensuring a fair and reasonable opportunity to defend against the charges. By not furnishing the report, an employer cannot scuttle the rights of the delinquent employee.” 15. In view of the aforesaid discussion and the rulings of Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that the impugned termination order dated 29.10.2020 and the entire disciplinary proceedings culminating therein suffer from incurable procedural defects, statutory violations and breach of principles of natural justice, and therefore cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. 16. The impugned order dated 29.10.2020 (Annexure P-1), along with the entire subsequent enquiry proceedings including the enquiry report, is hereby quashed and set aside. However, it is clarified that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the allegations levelled against the petitioner. The respondents are at 22 liberty to proceed afresh against the petitioner strictly in accordance with law, after granting due and reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and by following the procedure prescribed under the applicable statutory rules. 17. In the meanwhile, the petitioner shall be reinstated in service forthwith. Such reinstatement shall be subject to the outcome of the fresh proceedings, if any, initiated by the respondents in accordance with law. No order as to costs.. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Shayna JUDGE