2026:HHC:13029 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 4036 of 2013 Reserved on: 01.04.2026 Date of Decision: 23.04.2026 Kanta Kapoor and Others ...Appellant Versus Him Khadi Gramodyog and another ...Respondents Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Appellants : Mr Ajay Sipahiya, Advocate. For the Respondent : Ms Dhanwanti, Advocate. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 26.03.2013 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kasauli, District Solan, H.P. (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (NI Act). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:13029 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the complainant filed a complaint before the learned Trial Court for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act. It was asserted that plot No. 10, DIC, Industrial Area Baddi, belonged to accused No. 1. Accused No. 2 is the Chairman of accused No. 1. The complainant agreed to purchase the land. The accused failed to honour their promise and issued a cheque of ₹ 1,50,000/- drawn on UCO Bank, the Mall Solan, to return the amount paid by the complainant. The complainant presented the cheque to his bank, and it was sent to the bank of the accused. However, the bank of the accused dishonoured the cheque with an endorsement ‘insufficient funds’. The complainant served a legal notice upon the accused asking them to pay the amount. The notice was duly returned with an endorsement unclaimed, which is a deemed service. The accused failed to pay the amount. Hence, a complaint was filed before the learned Trial Court for taking action as per the law. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of accusation was put to accused No. 2 for the commission of an offence punishable under Section 138 of the NI Act, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 3 2026:HHC:13029 4. The complainant examined Puneet Kapoor (CW1), his Special Power of Attorney, to prove his complaint. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., denied the complainant’s case in its entirety. He stated that he had issued one cheque of ₹ 3 lakh and another cheque of ₹ 1,50,000/- to the complainant at the instance of Devender Mohan. The cheques were taken after practising fraud. He examined Braham Dass (DW1), Mukesh Kumar (DW2), Virender Kumar (DW3) and Baldhari Singh (DW4) to prove his defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the complainant had agreed to purchase the plot from Devender Mohan, who had resigned in 1996. The public was also informed of the resignation by issuing an advertisement in the daily newspapers, Indian Express and Jansatta. Devender Mohan had no authority to enter into any agreement on behalf of accused No. 1. The cheque issued by the accused could not be said to be issued in discharge of debt/liability. The defence taken by the accused was probable. Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the successors of the complainant have filed the 4 2026:HHC:13029 present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court had erred in acquitting the accused. The accused admitted his signature on the cheque, and a presumption arose that the cheque was issued for consideration for discharging the debt/liability. Learned Trial Court did not consider the presumption. Therefore, it was prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Ajay Sipahiya, learned counsel for the appellant/complainant and Ms Dhanwanti, learned Counsel, for the respondent/accused. 9. Mr Ajay Sipahiya, learned counsel for the appellant/complainant, submitted that the learned Trial Court had erred in acquitting the accused. The accused admitted his signature on the cheque, and a presumption arose that the cheque was issued for consideration to discharge the debt/liability. The learned Trial Court failed to consider this presumption. The statements of defence witnesses were not probable. The appeal before this Court is not maintainable and should have been filed before the Learned Sessions Court. Therefore, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. He relied upon the judgments of Celestium 5 2026:HHC:13029 Financial versus A Ganasekaran 2025 SCC Online SC 1320, Raj Kumar versus Rajender 2025:PHHC:079740 and Puran Chand versus Mohit Gupta Criminal Appeal (A – SB) No. 27 of 2025, decided on 01/12/2025, in support of his submission. 10. Ms. Dhanwanti, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the complainant did not appear in the witness box. He examined his Special Power of Attorney. An adverse inference should be drawn against the complainant. The complainant's version that he had agreed to purchase the plot from accused No. 1, through Devender Mohan was rightly rejected by the learned Trial Court because Devender Mohan had resigned in the year 1996 and could not have entered into any agreement on behalf of accused No. 1. The cheque issued by accused No. 2 could not be said to be issued in discharge of debt/liability. This was a reasonable view that could have been taken based on the evidence produced on the record, and this court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court, even if another view is possible. Hence, she prayed that the present appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given a considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 6 2026:HHC:13029 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on misreading/omission to consider the material evidence and reached at a conclusion, which no reasonable person could have reached. It was observed on page 440: “12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 13. This position was reiterated in P. Somaraju v. State of A.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2291, wherein it was observed: “ 12. To summarise, an Appellate Court undoubtedly has full power to review and reappreciate evidence in an appeal against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. However, due to the reinforced or ‘double’ presumption of innocence after acquittal, interference must be limited. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the record, the acquittal should not be disturbed. Judicial intervention is only warranted where the Trial Court's view is perverse, based on misreading or ignoring material evidence, or results in a manifest miscarriage of justice. Moreover, the Appellate 7 2026:HHC:13029 Court must address the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal before reversing it and assigning its own. A catena of the recent judgments of this Court has more firmly entrenched this position, including, inter alia, Mallappa v. State of Karnataka 2024 INSC 104, Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund v. The State of Madhya Pradesh 2024 INSC 258, Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 INSC 320, and Constable 907 Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand 2025 INSC 114.” 14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. It was submitted that the appeal before this Court is not maintainable and should have been filed before the Court of Ld. Sessions Judge. This submission cannot be accepted. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Celestium Financial (supra) that the complainant has an option of filing an appeal before the High Court or the Court of Sessions. It was observed: 9….As already noted, a victim of an offence could also be a complainant. In such a case, an appeal can be preferred either under the proviso to Section 372 or under Section 378 by such a victim…."(Emphasis supplied) 16. Therefore, the appeal filed before this Court is fully maintainable, and the submission to the contrary is rejected. The cited judgments cannot be followed in view of the binding precedent of the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 8 2026:HHC:13029 17. The complainant filed the complaint through his special Power of Attorney, Suresh Kaushal. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in A.C. Narayanan v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 11 SCC 790: 2013 SCC OnLine SC 839 that the complainant can file a complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act, but the power of attorney must be conversant with the facts, and this fact should be mentioned in the complaint. It was observed at page 808: “33.1. Filing of a complaint petition under Section 138 of the NI Act through a power of attorney is perfectly legal and competent. 33.2. The power-of-attorney holder can depose and verify on oath before the court in order to prove the contents of the complaint. However, the power-of-attorney holder must have witnessed the transaction as an agent of the payee/holder in due course or possess due knowledge regarding the said transactions. 33.3. It is required by the complainant to make a specific assertion as to the knowledge of the power-of-attorney holder in the said transaction explicitly in the complaint, and the power-of-attorney holder who has no knowledge regarding the transactions cannot be examined as a witness in the case.” 18. In the present case, the complaint does not mention that the power of attorney holder was aware of the facts of the case. The proof affidavit (Ex. CB) also does not mention any such fact. Puneet (CW1) stated in his cross-examination that he could not say on which day Devender Mohan came to the office, which documents were shown by him, which resolution was produced by 9 2026:HHC:13029 him, on which day the cheque was handed over and presented before the bank. All these admissions show that Puneet Kapoor (CW1) did not have personal knowledge of the facts, and his statement was not sufficient to prove the complainant's case. 19. Puneet Kapoor (CW1) stated in his cross-examination that Devender Mohan had entered into an agreement on behalf of accused No. 1. Ld. trial Court had rightly held that Devender Mohan had resigned in the year 1996 as per the statement of Virender Kumar (DW3) and this fact was duly published in the newspaper Indian express on 05/09/1996 as per the statement of Mukesh Kumar (DW2). Therefore, Devender Mohan was not competent to enter into any agreement on behalf of accused No. 1, and any cheque issued by the accused will not be in discharge of the legal liability/debt. 20. It was submitted that the cheque could have been issued to discharge the liability of another person, and the cheque issued by the accused to discharge the liability of Devender Mohan would be valid. This submission will not help the complainant. The complainant never pleaded that the cheque was issued to discharge the liability of Devender Mohan. The complainant asserted that the cheque was issued to return the amount taken by 10 2026:HHC:13029 accused No. 1 regarding the sale of the plot, which version was not proved, and it is impermissible to substitute one consideration for another to hold the accused liable. 21. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view that could have been taken based on the material placed before the learned Trial Court, and no interference is required with it while deciding an appeal against acquittal. 22. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of 23. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the accused is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹25,000/- each with one surety each in the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Trial Court within four weeks, which shall be effective for six months with stipulation that in the event of Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment, or on grant of the leave, the accused on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 24. 24. A copy of the judgment, along with records of the 11 2026:HHC:13029 learned Courts below, be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 23rd April, 2026 Nikita