1 2026:CGHC:14680 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WP227 No. 813 of 2019 1 - Basant Lal(Died And Deleted) As Per Court Order Dated 03-09-2025. 1.1 - Mahesh Kumar S/o Late Basant Lal Aged About 35 Years R/o Village Mayapur (1) P.O. Chandaura, P.S. And Tehsil Pratappur, Distt. Surajpur, Chhattisgarh. 1.2 - Ramesh Kumar S/o Late Basant Lal Aged About 30 Years R/o Village Mayapur (1) P.O. Chandaura, P.S. And Tehsil Pratappur, Distt. Surajpur, Chhattisgarh. 1.3 - Mukesh Kumar S/o Late Basant Lal Aged About 26 Years R/o Village Mayapur (1) P.O. Chandaura, P.S. And Tehsil Pratappur, Distt. Surajpur, Chhattisgarh. 1.4 - Shrawan Kumar S/o Late Basant Lal Aged About 22 Years R/o Village Mayapur (1) P.O. Chandaura, P.S. And Tehsil Pratappur, Distt. Surajpur, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Shankhlal, S/o Late Ramchandar, Aged About 52 Years By Caste Panika, R/o Village Mayapur-01, Police Station And Tahsil Pratappur, District Surajpur Chhattisgarh.............Applicant, District : Surajpur, Chhattisgarh ... Petitioners versus 1 - Fulsay S/o Mangalsay, Aged About 52 Years By Caste Panika, R/o Village Karsi, Police Station And Tahsil Pratappur, District Surajpur Chhattisgarh.............Non Applicant, District : Surajpur, Chhattisgarh 2 - Dilip Kumar S/o Mangalsay, Aged About 40 Years By Caste Panika, R/o Village Karsi, Police Station And Tahsil Pratappur, District Surajpur Chhattisgarh.............Non-Applicant, District : Surajpur, Chhattisgarh 3 - Somari, D/o Mangalsay, Aged About 55 Years By Caste Panika, R/o VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Digitally signed by VED PRAKASH DEWANGAN Date: 2026.03.30 19:29:17 +0530 2 Village Karsi, Police Station And Tahsil Pratappur, District Surajpur Chhattisgarh.............Non-Applicant, District : Surajpur, Chhattisgarh 4 - Virajo, D/o Mangalsay, Aged About 30 Years By Caste Panika, R/o Village Karsi, Police Station And Tahsil Pratappur, District Surajpur Chhattisgarh.............Non-Applicant, District : Surajpur, Chhattisgarh 5 - Manki Wd/o Mangalsay, Aged About 60 Years By Caste Panika, R/o Village Karsi, Police Station And Tahsil Pratappur, District Surajpur Chhattisgarh.............Non-Applicant, District : Surajpur, Chhattisgarh 6 - Dashmet, D/o Dhansay, W/o Rambahar, Aged About 35 Years R/o Village Chera, Post Kalyanpur, Police Station Gandhi Nagar, District Surguja Chhattisgarh.............Non-Applicant, District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh 7 - Maheshri, D/o Dhansay, Aged About 28 Years By Caste Panika, R/o Village Baghima, Tahsil Rajpur, District Surguja Chhattisgarh............Non- Applicant, District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh 8 - Tilo, D/o Dhansay, Aged About 25 Years By Caste Panika, R/o Village Baghima, Tahsil Rajpur, District Surguja Chhattisgarh............Non-Applicant, District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh 9 - Tilsay, S/o Dhanay, Aged About 22 Years By Caste Panika, R/o Village Baghima, Tahsil Rajpur, District Surguja Chhattisgarh............Non-Applicant, District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh 10 - Bihari S/o Dhansay, Aged About 18 Years By Caste Panika, R/o Village Baghima, Tahsil Rajpur, District Surguja Chhattisgarh............Non-Applicant, District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh 11 - Lakhapatiya, Wd/o Dhansay, Aged About 50 Years By Caste Panika, R/o Village Baghima, Tahsil Rajpur, District Surguja Chhattisgarh............Non-Applicant, District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh 12 - Dharampal, S/o Moharsay, Aged About 40 Years By Caste Panika, R/o Village Makanpur, Police Station And Tahsil Pratappur, District Surajpur Chhattisgarh...................Non-Applicant, District : Surajpur, Chhattisgarh 13 - Budhni, Wd/o Moharsay, Aged About 65 Years By Caste Panika, R/o Village Makanpur, Police Station And Tahsil Pratappur, District Surajpur Chhattisgarh...................Non-Applicant, District : Surajpur, Chhattisgarh 14 - Dinesh S/o Mahabir, Aged About 35 Years By Caste Panika, R/o Village Makanpur, Police Station And Tahsil Pratappur, District Surajpur 3 Chhattisgarh...................Non-Applicant, District : Surajpur, Chhattisgarh 15 - Jokhni, Wd/o Mahabir, Aged About 60 Years By Caste Panika, R/o Village Makanpur, Police Station And Tahsil Pratappur, District Surajpur Chhattisgarh...................Non-Applicant, District : Surajpur, Chhattisgarh 16 - Dashrath S/o Bimaldas, Aged About 58 Years By Caste Panika, R/o Village Makanpur, Police Station And Tahsil Pratappur, District Surajpur Chhattisgarh...................Non-Applicant, District : Surajpur, Chhattisgarh 17 - Harishchand S/o Bimaldas, Aged About 52 Years By Caste Panika, R/o Village Makanpur, Police Station And Tahsil Pratappur, District Surajpur Chhattisgarh...................Non-Applicant, District : Surajpur, Chhattisgarh ---Respondents (Cause title taken from Case Information System) For Petitioners : Mr. Ashok Kumar Shukla, Advocate For Respondent No. 14 to 17 : Mr. D.N. Prajapati, Advocate For other Respondents : None Hon'ble Shri R avindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Order on Board 27/03/2026 1. The present petition has been filed by the petitioners challenging the impugned order dated 26.09.2019, passed by learned Additional District Judge, Pratappur, District Surajpur, in Misc. Civil Appeal No. 3/2018 and prayed for the following reliefs:- "10.1. This Hon'ble Court may graciously be pleased to issue the writ of mandamus / certiorari or of like nature to quash the impugned order dated 26.09.2019. (Annexure P-1), consequently order dated 31.08.2018 (Annexure P-5) may also be quashed allowing the application U/o 9 Rule 13 of CPC condoning delay. 4 10.2. This Hon'ble Court may graciously be pleased to call the entire record pertaining to the case alongwith the entire records of civil suit no. 51-A/1981. 10.3. Any other relief, which is deemed fit and proper may also be awarded alongwith the cost of the petition." 2. The brief facts of the case are that, the original petitioner No.1 Basant Lal and petitioner No.2 Shankh Lal are the sons of late Ramchandra. During pendency of the petition, the petitioner No.1 Basant Lal has died and his legal representatives have been substituted. In the year 1981-82, the father of the respondents No. 1 to 5 namely Mangalsay, father of the respondents No. 6 to 11 namely Dhansay and one Bataso wife of Bhuneshwar prosecuted a civil suit bearing Civil Suit No. 51-A/1981 before the Court of learned Civil Judge Class-II, Surajpur for declaration of title of the suit land mentioned in schedule-B annexed with the plaint, possession of the suit land mentioned in schedule-C annexed with the plaint. The said civil suit was decreed ex parte on 12.03.1982 and the plaintiffs of that case were declared title holder of the schedule-B property and held entitled for possession of schedule-C property. 3. On 17.12.2013, the present petitioners have filed an application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 for setting aside the ex parte decree dated 12.03.1982, passed in Civil Suit No. 51-A/1981. It is averred in the application by the petitioners 5 that their father Ramchandra was resident of village Mayapur, whereas in the suit his address is shown as village Karsi and without any service of summons upon him, the plaintiffs got the ex parte judgment and decree. Their father Ramchandra has died in the year 2002 and were not in knowledge of the ex parte judgment and decree. In the month of July 2013, the respondents stopped them from cultivating the subject land by saying that it is their own property and then the petitioners inquired from the revenue authorities and then they came to know about the ex parte judgment and decree and mutation of the names of the respondents. Thereafter they filed the application for setting aside the ex parte decree. 4. The application filed by the petitioners was replied by the respondents and denied that without service of summons upon their father Ramchandra, ex parte decree was obtained. They averred in the reply that the father of the petitioners was the permanent resident of village Karsi and on that basis, his address was shown to be the resident of village Karsi. On 04.11.1981, the summons was served upon him and his mother and it was service of summons in due course of proceeding. Late Ramchandra was having knowledge of the civil suit No. 51-A/1981 and he was duly served, but he has not chosen to participate in the proceeding and remained ex parte. The land of khasra No. 222/3 is recorded in the names of the respondents since 22.03.1982 and it is only to bring their application within limitation, the petitioners have pleaded that in the month of July 2013, they came to know about the ex parte decree. The application for setting aside the ex parte judgment and decree is filed after about 6 32 years and there is no proper explanation for the delay. It is further averred that the petitioners are not challenging the order, by which Ramchandra was proceeded ex parte. On 04.11.1981, the service report of the summons was produced before the learned trial Court and on 24.11.1981, the process server submitted the Halafnama under the Civil Court Rules with respect to service of summons upon the defendant No.1/Ramchandra and thereafter the learned trial Court proceeded ex parte against him. It is further averred that the application filed by the petitioners are hopelessly barred by limitation and the same is liable to be dismissed. 5. The learned trial Court after recording evidence of the parties and hearing them, passed the order on 31.08.2018 and dismissed the application filed by the petitioners for setting aside the ex parte decree holding that the father of the petitioners namely Ramchandra was duly served with the summons and in his absence the ex parte decree was passed. The application has been filed after 32 years and there is no proper explanation for the delay. Even during the lifetime of Ramchandra, i.e. up till 2002, he has not challenged the ex parte judgment and decree and the petitioners do not have any cause of action to challenge the ex parte judgment and decree and their application has been dismissed. 6. The order dated 31.08.2018, passed by learned trial Court in Misc. Civil Case No. 6/2013 was challenged by the petitioners before the learned Appellate Court by filing their appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 of the CPC, which was registered as Misc. Civil Appeal No. 3/2018. The said Misc. Civil Appeal No. 3/2018 has also been dismissed by 7 the learned Appellate Court vide its order dated 26.09.2019, which is under challenge in the present writ petition. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioners would submit that, in the civil suit, there is no proper service of summons upon the defendant No.1 Ramchandra. He was resident of village Mayapur, but his address is shown as village Karsi and the summons is shown to be served upon his brother. Ramchandra was not in knowledge of the civil suit and the ex parte decree and it is only came to his legal heirs in the year 2013, when they stopped them from cultivation of the subject land. The application of the petitioners has been rejected on the ground of delay, whereas non-service of summons itself is a ground of explanation of delay. Condonation of delay is an benevolent provision and the issue of limitation has to be considered liberally. The impugned judgment and decree has not been executed till date and the petitioners were in possession of their land. It is only when the respondents raised dispute in the year 2013, they came to know about ex parte judgment and decree and immediately thereafter they filed an application for setting aside the same. The order passed by the learned trial Court as well as Appellate Court is perverse on the facts of the case and law applicable to it and the same is liable to be set aside and the impugned ex parte judgment and decree is also liable to be set aside. 8. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondents No. 14 to 17 opposed the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioners and submitted that, the defendant No.1 Ramchandra was duly served with the summons in the suit and after having 8 satisfied with the service of summons upon Ramchandra, the learned trial Court proceeded ex parte in the case in his absence and passed the ex parte judgment and decree. The other defendants have also not participated in the proceedings of the suit and it is only the legal representatives of defendant No.1 challenged that Ramchandra was not duly served with summons. As per his permanent resident, he was made as a party defendant showing his address to be the resident of village Karsi. The application for setting aside the ex parte judgment and decree has been filed after a long delay of 32 years and there is no proper explanation for condonation of delay. Ramchandra has not challenged the ex parte judgment and decree during his lifetime. Keeping silence for such a long period, itself sufficient to hold that the defendants particularly Ramchandra was duly served with the summons and and they were having knowledge of the civil suit and judgment and decree dated 12.03.1982. The learned trial Court as well as Appellate Court has rightly considered the delay and explanation for condonation of delay and has dismissed the application filed by the petitioners holding that the summons was duly served upon Ramchandra and the reasons for delay have not been properly explained. Therefore, there is no merit in the petition and the same is liable to be dismissed. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the trial Court as well as Appellate Court and also gone through the original record of Civil Suit No. 51-A/1981. 10. The petitioners have raised the issue in the application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the CPC before the learned trial Court that the defendant 9 No.1 Ramchandra was not duly served with the notice and he was not in knowledge of the proceeding and therefore, the ex parte decree passed by the learned trial Court suffers from material irregularity and the same is liable to be dismissed. Two questions arises for consideration in the present writ petition, as to whether (i) the summons was duly served upon Ramchandra or not, and (ii) whether the petitioners have duly explained the cause for delay of 32 years or not. 11. While considering the first question, I gone through the order sheet of Civil Suit No. 51-A/1981 of the learned trial Court. On 24.09.1981, the notices were ordered to be issued to the defendants and the case was fixed for 04.11.1981. On 04.11.1981, it is mentioned that “izfroknh dz-1] 3 rFkk 4 dk leal HkkbZ rFkk muds eka leal izkIr fd, gS] tks ,MYV esEcj gSa] ijUrq vk]ok- ds }kjk muds mez ds laca/k esa gyQukek leal ds lkFk ugha fn;k gSA ,slh lwjr esa vknsf’kdk okgd ls gyQukek is’k djus gsrq funsZ’k fn;k tkosA” and the case was fixed for 10.11.1981. On 10.11.1981, the case was further adjourned for 24.11.1981 and then on 24.11.1981, the process server Mukund Ram submitted the Halafnama and then the learned trial Court has passed the order that “vknsf’kdk okgd eqdqUnjke us izfroknh dz-1] 3 rFkk 4 ds leal rkfeyh dh ekU;rk gsrq gyQukek is’k fd;kA mDrkuqlkj izfroknh dz-1] 3 rFkk 4 dk leal ,MYV esEcj ij rkfey gSA vr% mDr izkslsl ls leal dh tkudkjh izfroknh dz-1] 3 rFkk 4 dks izkIr gks ldrh gSA vr% izfroknh dz-1] 3 rFkk 4 dk leal rkfey ekuk tkrk gSA izfroknh dz-1] 3 rFkk 4 ds uke ls vyx&vyx iqdkj yxk;k x;kA izfroknh dz-1] 3 rFkk 4 ds vuqifLFkfr ij izdj.k 4 cts ,di{kh; dk;Zokgh fd;k tkrk gS”. The Halafnama of the process server Mukund Ram dated 24.11.1981 is also perused, which is available in the original record. As per the Halafnama, it is mentioned that the summons upon Ramchandra was served on 10 19.10.1981 in his house at village Karsi upon his brother, who was adult member and residing jointly with him as Ramchandra was not present at that time and specifically mentioned that “fnukad 19-10-1981 dks eqn~nkysg ugha jgus ij mlds ’kkfey 'kjhd ckfyx HkkbZ ij ,d fdrk leal rkfey fd;k” presence of the witness Kalamsay also mentioned in the said Halafnama. From perusal of the copy of summons also bears with the signature of brother of Ramchandra namely Harishchandra and the witness Kalamsay and also the signature of the process server. His brother Harishchandra was also defendant No.6 in the suit. Notably none of the defendants, despite service of summons appeared in the proceeding and then after recording evidence of the plaintiffs, the ex parte judgment and decree was passed. 12. The service of summons on an adult member of defendants’ family is provided under Order V Rule 15 of the CPC, which reads as under:- “15. Where service may be on an adult member of defendant's family.— Where in any suit the defendant is absent from his residence at the time when the service of summons is sought to be effected on his at his residence and there is no likelihood of his being found at the residence within a reasonable time and he has no agent empowered to accept service of the summons on his behalf, service may be made on any adult member of the family, whether male or female, who is residing with him. 11 Explanation. —A servant is not a member of the family within the meaning of this rule.” 13. When the summons is served upon the brother of the defendant No.1, who is an adult member of the joint family and none of the defendants have challenged that Ramchandra was not the resident of village Karsi and the endorsement made in the summons with respect to its service is false, it cannot be said that summons was not served upon Ramchandra or it was an irregular mode of service of summons upon him, which makes the impugned ex parte judgment and decree liable to be set aside. Except the self served statement that Ramchandra was not the resident of village Karsi, no other sufficient evidence produced by the petitioners to prove that he was not the resident of village Karsi, but the resident of village Mayapur. The voter list of the year 1980 and 1985 (exhibit A-6 and A-7) was found to be insufficient by the learned trial Court by holding that the voter list is only for casting their votes and it cannot be determined on the basis of such voter list that the defendant No.1 Ramchandra was the resident of village Mayapur. Further, there is no averment in the application under Order 9 Rule 13 filed by the petitioners with respect to the said documents. Further, the ex parte judgment and decree dated 12.03.1982 has not been challenged by any other defendants till date and thus, the consideration of the learned trial Court as well as Appellate Court that Ramchandra was duly served with the summons in the suit, does not found to be perverse or contrary to the facts of the record. 12 14. So far as the limitation to file the application is concerned, the application for setting aside the ex parte judgment and decree has been filed after about 32 years. The impugned ex parte judgment and decree has been passed on 12.03.1982 and the application for setting aside ex parte judgment and decree has been filed on 17.12.2013. In the meantime, the original defendant No.1 Ramchandra has died in the year 2002 and the application for setting aside ex parte judgment and decree is filed by his legal heirs. They explained that their father was not duly served with the summons in the suit and was not in knowledge of the proceedings and it is only in the year 2013, they came to know about the ex parte judgment and decree, when the plaintiffs raised dispute. Delay of 32 years is quite a long delay. True it is that, the length of delay would not be the relevant consideration, but it is the explanation for delay, which is relevant for condonation of delay. However, in the facts of the present case, when the learned trial Court found that the summons was duly served on the defendant No.1 Ramchandra, which was served upon his adult brother, they have not chosen to participate in the proceeding and even none of the defendants have challenged the ex parte judgment and decree, it cannot be said that the defendants were having no knowledge of the proceeding of the civil suit and ex parte judgment and decree. Had there been any real dispute between the parties, all the defendants must have raised objection. It is only a ground found by the defendants to raise dispute by way of saying that the defendant No.1 was not served with the summons properly as the same was served upon his brother. It is also notably here that the summons of the defendant No.1 was served upon his 13 brother Harishchandra, who was the defendant No.6 in the suit. In view of the provisions of Order V Rule 15 of the CPC, the learned trial Court has considered that the summons upon the defendant No.1 has been duly served. Therefore, the submission of learned counsel for the petitioners that the legal heirs of the defendant No.1 came to know about the proceeding and ex parte judgment and decree in the year 2013 is misconceived rather it transpires that the defendant No.1 Ramchandra was duly served with the summons and he was in knowledge of the proceeding. During his lifetime, he has not challenged the ex parte judgment and decree passed in favour of the plaintiffs. 15. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of “State of Madhya Pradesh v. Ramkumar Choudhary” 2024 INSC 932, has considered the scope of condonation of delay and has issued certain directions that: ““5. The legal position is that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the petitioner has to explain the Court as to what was the "sufficient cause" which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In Majji Sannemma v. Reddy Sridevi, 2021 SCC Online SC 1260, it was held by this Court that even though limitation may harshly affect the rights of a party, it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. A reference 14 was also made to the decision of this Court in Ajay Dabra v. Pyare Ram, 2023 SCC Online 92 wherein, it was held as follows: "13. This Court in the case of Basawaraj v. Special Land Acquisition Officer [(2013) 14 SCC 81] while rejecting an application for condonation of delay for lack of sufficient cause has concluded in Paragraph 15 as follows: “15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No Court could be justified in 15 condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” 14. Therefore, we are of the considered opinion that the High Court did not commit any mistake in dismissing the delay condonation application of the present appellant." Thus, it is crystal clear that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of each case and that, the expression 'sufficient cause' cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction 16 or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. 5.1. In Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, 2024 INSC 262, wherein, one of us (J.B.Pardiwala, J) was a member, after referring to various decisions on the issue, it was in unequivocal terms observed by this Court that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity and rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The relevant passage of the same is profitably extracted below: “24. In the aforesaid circumstances, we made it very clear that we are not going to look into the merits of the matter as long as we are not convinced that sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of such a long and inordinate delay. 25. It hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or Union of India when it comes to condoning the gross delay of more than 12 years. If the litigant chooses 17 to approach the Court long after the lapse of the time prescribed under the relevant provisions of the law, then he cannot turn around and say that no prejudice would be caused to either side by the delay being condoned. This litigation between the parties started sometime in 1981. We are in 2024. Almost 43 years have elapsed. However, till date the respondent has not been able to reap the fruits of his decree. It would be a mockery of justice if we condone the delay of 12 years and 158 days and once again ask the respondent to undergo the rigmarole of the legal proceedings. 26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has 18 prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay. 27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a 19 technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the ‘Sword of Damocles’ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants. xxx xxx xxx 34. In view of the aforesaid, we have reached to the conclusion that the High Court committed no error much less any error of law in passing the impugned order. Even otherwise, the High Court was exercising its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 35. In a plethora of decisions of this Court, it has been said that delay should not be excused as a matter of generosity. Rendering substantial justice is not to cause prejudice to the opposite party. The appellants have failed to prove that they were 20 reasonably diligent in prosecuting the matter and this vital test for condoning the delay is not satisfied in this case. 36. For all the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.” Applying the above legal proposition to the facts of the present case, we are of the opinion that the High Court correctly refused to condone the delay and dismissed the appeal by observing that such inordinate delay was not explained satisfactorily, no sufficient cause was shown for the same, and no plausible reason was put forth by the State. Therefore, we are inclined to reject this petition at the threshold. 6. At the same time, we cannot simply brush aside the delay occurred in preferring the second appeal, due to callous and lackadaisical attitude on the part of the officials functioning in the State machinery. Though the Government adopts systematic approach in handling the legal issues and preferring the petitions/applications/ appeals 21 well within the time, due to the fault on the part of the officials in merely communicating the information on time, huge revenue loss will be caused to the Government exchequer. The present case is one such case, wherein, enormous delay of 1788 days occasioned in preferring the second appeal due to the lapses on the part of the officials functioning under the State, though valuable Government lands were involved. Therefore, we direct the State to streamline the machinery touching the legal issues, offering legal opinion, filing of cases before the Tribunal / Courts, etc., fix the responsibility on the officer(s) concerned, and penalize the officer(s), who is/are responsible for delay, deviation, lapses, etc., if any, to the value of the loss caused to the Government. Such direction will have to be followed by all the States scrupulously. 7. There is one another aspect of the matter which we must not ignore or overlook. Over a period of time, we have noticed that whenever there is a plea for condonation of delay be it at the instance of a private litigant or State the delay is sought to be explained right from the time, the limitation starts and if there is a delay of say 2 22 years or 3 years or 4 years till the end of the same. For example if the period of limitation is 90 days then the party seeking condonation has to explain why it was unable to institute the proceedings within that period of limitation. What events occurred after the 91st day till the last is of no consequence. The court is required to consider what came in the way of the party that it was unable to file it between the 1st day and the 90th day. It is true that a party is entitled to wait until the last day of limitation for filing an appeal. But when it allows the limitation to expire and pleads sufficient cause for not filing the appeal earlier, the sufficient cause must establish that because of some event or circumstance arising before the limitation expired it was not possible to file the appeal within time. No event or circumstance arising after the expiry of limitation can constitute such sufficient cause. There may be events or circumstances subsequent to the expiry of limitation which may further delay the filing of the appeal. But that the limitation has been allowed to expire without the appeal being filed must be traced to a cause arising within the period of limitation. (See: Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC 733).” 23 16. For the aforesaid consideration, this Court does not find any perversity or illegality in the order dated 31.08.2018, passed by the learned trial Court and the order dated 26.09.2019, passed the learned Appellate Court, by which the application filed by the petitioners for setting aside the ex parte judgment and decree is rejected. 17. Accordingly, the writ petition fails and is hereby dismissed. 18. The record of the trial Court concerned shall be returned back along with a copy of this order. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge ved