ORDER : K. V. Jayakumar, J. 1. This Civil Miscellaneous Application is filed by the review petitioner under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to condone the delay of 250 days in filing the Review Petition No.1227/2025 impugning the judgment in W.A.No.1858 of 2024 dated 09.12.2024 2. The reasons for the delay in filing the review petition are stated in paragraphs 3 and 4, which read as follows: “3. This Hon'ble Court passed the judgment on 09.12.2024. Online application for certified copy of the judgment was submitted and delivered only on 15.09.2025. The Review Petition ought to have been filed without delay on or before 08.01.2025. The Review Petition filed only on 15.09.2025. Thus there is a delay of 250 days in filing the Review Petition. 4. It is submitted that following the directions contained in the impugned judgment, the Bank has provided sufficient and reasonable opportunities to the 7th respondent to bring a private buyer. The 7th respondent neither brought a private buyer nor remitted any single penny towards the loan account. The review petitioner Bank also provided another opportunity by issuing a demand notice dated 13.08.2025 to the 7th respondent to clear off the entire liability. Even after providing sufficient opportunities, the 7th respondent did not bring a private buyer. As per the present market value of the property, even auctioning the entire property would not be sufficient to wipe off the outstanding liability. It would adversely affect the financial health of the Bank. Also, the filing of the review petition is inevitable because the presiding Judge is retiring from office. Hence there is a delay of 250 days in filing the Review Petition. The delay was not willful and deliberate.” 3. Sri. Manumon A, learned counsel for the 7th respondent, vehemently opposed the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and filed a detailed counter. 4. Smt. Nisha George, learned counsel for the petitioner, would submit that there are sufficient reasons for the condonation of the delay. The delay is not wilful and there is no laches or inaction on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, learned counsel seeks condonation of the delay and to consider the review petition on merits. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the 7th respondent would submit that there are no sufficient reasons for the condonation of the delay of 250 days. The delay is not wilful and there is no laches or inaction on the part of the petitioner. Therefore, learned counsel seeks condonation of the delay and to consider the review petition on merits. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the 7th respondent would submit that there are no sufficient reasons for the condonation of the delay of 250 days. Each day's delay is to be explained specifically by the petitioner. No such attempt was made by the petitioner. The reasons stated for the condonation of delay are vague and evasive. 6. We have heard the submissions of Smt. Nisha George, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri. Manumon, learned counsel for the party respondents. 7. The only point that arises for our consideration is whether there is sufficient cause for the condonation of the delay. 8. At this juncture, it would be useful to refer the principles laid down by the Apex Court on this point. In Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and Ors. , 1 (2013) 12 SCC 649 , the Apex Court elucidated the legal principles that must be taken into account when adjudicating an application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Paragraph Nos. 21 and 22 of the judgment read as follows:- “21. From the aforesaid authorities the principles that can broadly be culled out are: 21.1.(i) There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice-oriented, non pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2.(ii) The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact-situation. 21.3.(iii) Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4.(iv)No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5.(v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.4.(iv)No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5.(v) Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6.(vi) It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 21.7.(vii) The concept of liberal approach has to encapsulate the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8.(viii) There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9(ix) The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10.(x) If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 21.11.(xi) It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12. (xii) The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinised and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. 21.13. (xiii) The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 22. To the aforesaid principles we may add some more guidelines taking note of the present day scenario. They are: 22.1(a) An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a haphazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone the delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. 22.2. (b) An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3.(c) Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4. (d) The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non-serious matter and hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a nonchalant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.” 9. In Basawaraj and Another v. Special Land Acquisition Officer , (2013) 14 SCC 81 the Apex Court in paragraphs 9 and 15 observed as under: “9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "adequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The Court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. xxxxxxxxxxxxxx 15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the Court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the Court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the Court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No Court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the Court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” 10. The Apex Court in Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased) through Lrs. v. Union of India , AIR 2023 SC 5109 reiterated the same principle that condonation of delay being a discretionary power available to courts, exercise of discretion must necessarily depend upon the sufficiency of the cause shown and the degree of acceptability of the explanation, the length of delay being immaterial. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an 'explanation' and an 'excuse'. Sometimes, due to want of sufficient cause being shown or an acceptable explanation being proffered, delay of the shortest range may not be condoned whereas, in certain other cases, delay of long periods can be condoned if the explanation is satisfactory and acceptable. Of course, the courts must distinguish between an 'explanation' and an 'excuse'. An 'explanation' is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something. It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault. Care must however be taken to distinguish an 'explanation' from an 'excuse'. Although people tend to see 'explanation' and 'excuse' as the same thing and struggle to find out the difference between the two, there is a distinction which, though fine, is real. An 'excuse' is often offered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack. It is sort of a defensive action. Calling something as just an 'excuse' would imply that the explanation proffered is believed not to be true. Thus said, there is no formula that caters to all situations and, therefore, each case for condonation of delay based on existence or absence of sufficient cause has to be decided on its own facts. 11. We have carefully considered the submissions advanced by both sides, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court referred to above. On going through the submissions advanced by the counsels and the reasons stated in the affidavit, we find no sufficient grounds to condone the delay. 12. With regard to the substantive issues of the case, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that, although liberty was granted to the 7th respondent to bring a private purchaser, he has failed to produce any such purchaser or to remit any amount towards the outstanding loan liability. Consequently, no evidence of bonafide intent or genuine effort to discharge the debt has been demonstrated on his part. Therefore, it is submitted that the impugned judgment warrants reconsideration and review. 13. Furthermore, it is argued that the impugned judgment is contrary to well-established principles of law, specifically the proposition that a mere inadequacy of price does not constitute sufficient grounds to set aside a judicial sale. Therefore, it is submitted that the impugned judgment warrants reconsideration and review. 13. Furthermore, it is argued that the impugned judgment is contrary to well-established principles of law, specifically the proposition that a mere inadequacy of price does not constitute sufficient grounds to set aside a judicial sale. It is also pointed out that the judgment contains an apparent error, which undermines its correctness and warrants correction. 14. Going by the merits of the case also, we find no justifiable reason to interfere with the impugned judgment. There is no discernible error apparent on the face of the record that warrants rectification in the interest of justice. The review petitioner seeks to re-agitate the matter under the guise of a review petition, which is impermissible. It is well established that the court exercising review jurisdiction does not function as an appellate court. The scope of review is strictly circumscribed by the provisions of Order XLVII Rule 1 r/w Section 114 of the Civil Procedure Code , and must be confined within those limits. In the result, this petition for condonation of delay is devoid of any merit and liable to be dismissed in our view. The Civil Miscellaneous Application is dismissed.