1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 27TH DAY OF JANUARY 2026 PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. G. PANDIT AND THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE K.V.ARAVIND WRIT PETITION NO.11871/2023 (S-KSAT) C/W WRIT PETITION NO.9020/2023 (S-KSAT) W.P.NO.11871/2023 BETWEEN: SRI SUNIL KUMAR S/O LATE ARJUN MARKHAL AGED ABOUT 40 YEARS WORKING ON CONTRACT BASIS AS PHARMACIST DISTRICT AYURVEDA AND UNNANI HOSPITAL BIDAR – 585 401. ... PETITIONER (BY SRI. PRITHVEESH M.K., ADV.) AND: 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND FAMILY WELFARE REPRESENTED BY ITS ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY PRINCIPAL SECRETARY 2 105, I FLOOR, VIKAS SOUDHA BANGALORE – 560 001. 2. THE DIRECTOR DEPARTMENT OF AYUSH DHANAVANTRI ROAD ANAND RAO CIRCLE BANGALORE – 560 009. 3. THE KARNATAKA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION REP. BY ITS SECRETARY UDYOG SOUDHA BANGALORE- 560 001. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI VIKAS ROJIPURA, AGA FOR R1 & R2 SRI A N GUNA RANJAN, ADV. FOR R3) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO A) CALL FOR RECORDS PERTAINING TO THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 25.01.2023 PASSED IN APPLICATION NO.20043/2021 BY THE KARNATAKA STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, BANGALORE (ANNEXURE-A) AND ETC. W.P.NO.9020/2023 BETWEEN: 1. SRI VEERASHETTY S/O LATE SIDDARAMAPPA AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS WORKING AS PHARMACIST ON CONTRACT BASIS GOVERNMENT AYURVEDIC HOSPITAL BASAVAKALYAN, BIDAR-585327. 2. SRI ANAND S/O DHANARAJ AGED ABOUT 35 YEARS 3 WORKING AS PHARMACIST ON CONTRACT BASIS ZILLA AYUSH HOSPITAL BIDAR – 585327. ... PETITIONERS (BY SRI. PRITHVEESH M.K., ADV.) AND: 1. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND FAMILY WELFARE REPRESENTED BY ITS ADDITIONAL CHIEF SECRETARY PRINCIPAL SECRETARY 105, I FLOOR, VIKAS SOUDHA BANGALORE – 560 001. 2. THE DIRECTOR DEPARTMENT OF AYUSH DHANAVANTRI ROAD ANAND RAO CIRCLE BANGALORE – 560 009. 3. THE KARNATAKA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION REP. BY ITS SECRETARY UDYOG SOUDHA BANGALORE- 560 001. …RESPONDENTS (BY SRI VIKAS ROJIPURA, AGA FOR R1 & R2 SRI A N GUNA RANJAN, ADV. FOR R3) THIS WRIT PETITION IS FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 AND 227 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA PRAYING TO A) CALL FOR RECORDS PERTAINING TO THE IMPUGNED ORDER DATED 25.01.2023 PASSED IN APPLICATION NOS.20044-47/2021 BY THE KARNATAKA STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL, BANGALORE (ANNEXURE-A) AND ETC. 4 THESE PETITIONS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED FOR ORDER ON 09.01.2026 COMING ON THIS DAY, S.G.PANDIT J., PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING: CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT and HON'BLE MR JUSTICE K.V.ARAVIND CAV ORDER (PER: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE S.G.PANDIT) In the above two writ petitions, the petitioners are before this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, questioning the order dated 25.01.2023 in Application Nos. 20043/2021 and 20044 to 20047/2021 passed by the Karnataka State Administrative Tribunal at Bengaluru, (for short “Tribunal”) whereunder, both the writ petitioners’ prayer to quash the Notification dated 30.07.2020 insofar as calling applications to fill up the post of Pharmacists and for a direction to the first respondent to extend the benefit of age relaxation and also to provide service weightage, is rejected. 5 2. Brief facts of the case are that: The petitioners are working as pharmacists on contract basis in the second respondent – Department under National Ayush Mission Scheme, having been appointed in the year 2012-13. The third respondent – KPSC under Notification dated 30.07.2020 (Annexure-A3) invited applications from eligible candidates to fill up various posts including that of pharmacists. Questioning the said Notification insofar as calling applications in respect of pharmacists, the petitioners approached the Tribunal in the above stated applications questioning the Notification and in the alternative, seeking for a direction to the first respondent to provide age relaxation and also to provide weightage for the service rendered by them on contract basis. The Tribunal under impugned orders, rejected the prayer of the petitioners holding that contract employees do not fall within the category 6 of Government servants and no age relaxation could be provided under Rule 6(3) of the Karnataka Civil Services (General Recruitment) Rules, 1977 (for short “Recruitment Rules”) and also that doctors and pharmacists are governed by different set of Rules and benefit available to doctors i.e., part – II in the impugned Notification cannot be extended to part-I. Questioning the said orders of the Tribunal, the petitioners are before this Court in these writ petitions. 3. Heard Sri. Prithveesh M K, learned counsel for petitioners, Sri. Vikas Rojipura, learned AGA for respondent Nos. 1 and 2 and also Sri. A N Guna Ranjan, leaned counsel for respondent No.3. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioners would contend that under Notification dated 30.07.2020, applications are called for to fill up various posts. 7 Part-II which relates to the Medical Officers, provides relaxation of age and Part-II which consists of pharmacists and other staff, would not provide for age relaxation, which amounts to discrimination and there is no basis for such classification and such classification would be arbitrary. Further, learned counsel would submit that Rule 6(3) of General Recruitment Rules applies to petitioners and in terms of the said Rule, age relaxation ought to have been provided to the petitioners. It is also submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the staff nurses who were also recruited in the same Notification are provided age relaxation, whereas, the petitioners who are the applicants for the post of Pharmacists are denied age relaxation and service weightage. Learned counsel for the petitioners places reliance on the decisions of the Hon’ble Apex Court in UNION OF INDIA PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 8 vs. DR. JAMUNA KUROOP AND OTHERS, (2011) SCC 10 as well as UNIVERSITY OF DELHI vs. DELHI UNIVERSITY CONTRACT EMPLOYEES UNION AND ANOTHER, 2021 SCC OnLine SC 256, in support of his contention to provide age relaxation. 5. Per contra, learned AGA would submit that contract employees are not Government servants and the age relaxation which is provided to Government servants under Rule 6(3) of General Recruitment Rules would not be available to the contract employees. Further, learned AGA would submit that pharmacists and the Medical Officers are governed by different set of Rules, as such the Pharmacists- petitioners herein cannot claim parity with the Medical Officers. Moreover, he submits that providing age relaxation or service weightage is a policy decision and judicial review in the matters of policy decision is very limited. Thus, he would pray for dismissal of the 9 writ petitions. Learned AGA would further submit that the petitioners have not made the selected candidates as parties, who would be affected by the order if any, to be passed in favour of the writ petitioners. In the absence of necessary parties, he submits that these writ petitions seeking to give direction for appointment is not maintainable. 6. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties and having perused the entire writ petition papers, the only point which falls for consideration is as to: “Whether the petitioners would be entitled for relief as prayed?” 7. The answer to the above point would be negative for the following reasons: There is no dispute with regard to working of the petitioners on contract basis as pharmacists in the second respondent – Ayush Department under National Ayush Mission Scheme. The grievance of the 10 petitioners is that first respondent – State Government has failed to provide age relaxation to the contract employees in the recruitment process under Notification dated 30.07.2020 (Annexure-A3). Providing age relaxation, prescribing age limit or providing service weightage falls in the realm of State Government and it is a policy decision. Whether for any recruitment to any particular post, age relaxation could be provided or service weightage could be provided, depends on various facts and by considering such relevant factors, it is for the State Government to take policy decision. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in UNION OF INDIA vs. SHIVABACHAN RAI, (2001) 9 SCC 356, has specifically held that “prescribing age limit for a given post or the extent of relaxation of age to be given are essentially matters of policy.” The relevant paragraph No.6 reads as follows: “6. The only question that we are required to consider is whether the Rules framed under the proviso to 11 Article 309 of the Constitution and dated 29-3-1985 whereby age relaxation up to 5 years is permitted in the case of government servants can be considered as arbitrary or unreasonable. Prescribing of any age limit for a given post, as also deciding the extent to which any relaxation can be given if an age limit is prescribed, are essentially matters of policy. It is, therefore, open to the Government while framing rules under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution to prescribe such age limits or to prescribe the extent to which any relaxation can be given. Prescription of such limit or the extent of relaxation to be given, cannot be termed as arbitrary or unreasonable. The only basis on which the respondent moved the Central Administrative Tribunal was the earlier Rules of 1976 under which, though an age limit was prescribed, a limit had not been placed on the extent of relaxation which could be granted. If at all any charge of arbitrariness can be levied in such cases, not prescribing any basis for granting relaxation when no limit is placed on the extent of relaxation, might lead to arbitrariness in the exercise of power of relaxation. In any case, the Rules of 1976 have been replaced by the Rules of 1985 which govern direct recruitment to the post of Assistant Director in the present case. One 12 has, therefore, to look to the Rules of 1985 in order to decide the eligibility of the respondent for the post of Assistant Director. We, therefore, do not agree with the finding of the Tribunal that the Rules of 1985 insofar as they prescribe the extent of relaxation of age limit, are arbitrary or unreasonable. This is also not a case where promotional avenues are being closed partially or fully. The post in question was to be filled by direct recruitment and not by promotion. Therefore, there could be no grievance on that score by the respondent.” (emphasis supplied) 8. Similarly, in SATYA DEV BHAGAR Vs. STATE OF RAJASTHAN, (2022) 5 SCC 314, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down the extent of interference in judicial review in the matter of policy decisions. The relevant paragraph Nos. 15 and 16 read as under: “15. It is trite that the Courts would be slow in interfering in the policy matters, unless the policy is found to be palpably discriminatory and arbitrary. This Court would not interfere with the 13 policy decision when a State is in a position to point out that there is intelligible differentia in application of policy and that such intelligible differentia has a nexus with the object sought to be achieved. 16. This Court in Krishnan Kakkanth v. State of Kerala [Krishnan Kakkanth v. State of Kerala, (1997) 9 SCC 495] has observed thus : (SCC p. 509, para 36) “36. To ascertain unreasonableness and arbitrariness in the context of Article 14 of the Constitution, it is not necessary to enter upon any exercise for finding out the wisdom in the policy decision of the State Government. It is immaterial whether a better or more comprehensive policy decision could have been taken. It is equally immaterial if it can be demonstrated that the policy decision is unwise and is likely to defeat the purpose for which such decision has been taken. Unless the policy decision is demonstrably capricious or arbitrary and not informed by any reason whatsoever or it suffers from the vice of discrimination or infringes any statute or provisions of the Constitution, the policy decision cannot be struck down. It should be borne in mind that except for the limited purpose of testing a public policy in the context of illegality and unconstitutionality, courts should avoid “embarking on uncharted ocean of public policy”.” (emphasis supplied) 9. The petitioners, as seen from the records, have not impleaded necessary parties(selected candidates) either to the applications field before the Tribunal or 14 to the writ petitions filed before this Court. In the absence of necessary parties, no order could be passed. If the petitioners were to be favored, then the selected candidates shall have to go out. No order to that effect could be passed without providing the selected candidates an opportunity of hearing and if orders were to be passed to that effect, it would amount to violation of principles of natural justice. In a matter of selection and appointment, in the absence of necessary parties, who would be affected, judicial review is impermissible. In the said context, the Hon’ble Apex Court in J S YADAV vs. STATE OF U.P. (2011) 6 SCC 570, at paragraph No.31 has held as follows: “31. No order can be passed behind the back of a person adversely affecting him and such an order if passed, is liable to be ignored being not binding on such a party as the same has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. The principles enshrined in the proviso to 15 Order 1 Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provide that impleadment of a necessary party is mandatory and in case of non-joinder of necessary party, the petitioner-plaintiff may not be entitled for the relief sought by him. The litigant has to ensure that the necessary party is before the court, be it a plaintiff or a defendant, otherwise the proceedings will have to fail. In service jurisprudence if an unsuccessful candidate challenges the selection process, he is bound to implead at least some of the successful candidates in representative capacity. In case the services of a person are terminated and another person is appointed at his place, in order to get relief, the person appointed at his place is the necessary party for the reason that even if the petitioner-plaintiff succeeds, it may not be possible for the Court to issue direction to accommodate the petitioner without removing the person who filled up the post manned by the petitioner-plaintiff. (Vide Prabodh Verma v. State of U.P. [(1984) 4 SCC 251 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 704 : AIR 1985 SC 167] , Ishwar Singh v. Kuldip Singh [1995 Supp (1) SCC 179 : 1995 SCC (L&S) 373 : (1995) 29 ATC 144] , Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B. [(2009) 1 SCC 768 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 119] , State of Assam v. Union 16 of India [(2010) 10 SCC 408 : (2010) 2 SCC (L&S) 812 : (2010) 4 SCC (Civ) 187] and Public Service Commission v. Mamta Bisht [(2010) 12 SCC 204 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 208 : AIR 2010 SC 2613] .) More so, the public exchequer cannot be burdened with the liability to pay the salary of two persons against one sanctioned post.” (emphasis supplied) 10. Insofar as the contention that there is discrimination, wherein Part-II posts are provided with age relaxation and Part-I posts are not provided relexation of age, it is noticed from the impugned Notification dated 30.07.2020 (Annexure-A3) that the medical officers are recruited under Karnataka Ayurveda, Unani, Siddha, Homeopathy, Nature Cure and Yoga (AYUSH) (Special Recruitment of Physician Grade-II) Rules, 2017, whereas, the recruitment of petitioners and other part-I posts are under a different Recruitment Rules. Since the Special Recruitment Rules of 2017 provided for relaxation, the respondent 17 – authorities are justified in providing such relaxation to the part-II posts. Therefore, we do not find any irregularity or discrimination. 11. Insofar as the contention with regard to age relaxation under Rule 6(3) of the Recruitment Rules is concerned, the same would be available to the Government servants who are in service and not to the contract employees. The decisions which are relied upon the by the petitioners i.e.,. DR. JAMUNA KURUP AND OTHERS (supra) and DELHI UNIVERSITY CONTRACT EMPLOYEES UNION AND ANOTHER(supra) are not applicable to the facts of the present case. 12. In Dr. Jamuna Kurup and Others case, the Hon’ble Apex Court found that all employees including contractual employees are included in the Delhi 18 Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 by noticing that the term “employee” is not defined. 13. In Delhi University case, it is on the concession made by the University, the Hon’ble Apex Court directed age relaxation. Therefore, both the decisions would not assist the petitioners in any way. 14. For the reasons recorded above, we are of the considered opinion, there is no merit in the writ petitions and accordingly, writ petitions stand dismissed. Sd/- (S.G.PANDIT) JUDGE Sd/- (K.V.ARAVIND) JUDGE BSV CT: bms