2026:HHC:1260 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr.MMO No.:  977 of 2024 Reserved on : 31.12.2025 Decided on : 06.01.2026 Diwakar Dev Sharma & Ors. …Petitioners Versus State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors. …Respondents Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh,  Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1   Yes. For the petitioners     :Mr. Ashwani   Kaundal,   Advocate, vice   Mr. Naresh   K.   Sharma, Advocate. For the respondents  : Mr. Mohinder   Zharaick,   Additional Advocate   General,   for   respondent No. 1­State. Mr. V.B.   Verma,   Central   Govt. Counsel, for respondents No. 2 and 3. Virender Singh, Judge The petitioners have filed this petition, under Section 528 of the  Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter referred to  as ‘BNSS’), with a prayer to quash case bearing Crime No. 90 dated 28.11.2021, under 1 Whether Reporters of local papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:1260 Sections 145, 146, 147 & 174 of the Railway Act, registered with Railway Police Station Shimla, District Shimla, H.P., as well as, the resultant proceedings thereto, pending in the Court of learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistate, Court   No.   1,   Shimla,   District   Shimla,   H.P.   (hereinafter referred to as the ‘trial Court’), in case titled as “State of H.P. Vs Diwakar Dev Sharma & Ors.” 2. According to the petitioners, respondent No. 2, Railway Police Station Shimla, District Shimla, H.P. has registered the said false and frivolous complaint, at the instance of respondent No. 3. Elaborating their stand, the petitioners have pleaded that Railway Police, in order to evacuate the local residents, from the place of incident, has also   lodged   FIR   No.   08/2021,   dated   28.11.2021,   under Sections 341, 147, 149 of the Indian Penal Code and under Section 174 of the Railway Act, 1989, with Railway Police Station   Shimla,   for   the   same   offence   against   the petitioners. In the said FIR, there was no complaint of any   damage   to   public   property,   as   well   as,   personal property. 3 2026:HHC:1260 3. It is the further case of the petitioners that due to the lapse of Railway Authorities, one person died, as his leg was crushed under train. The Railway Authorities have not   taken   any   timely   action   to   save   the   said   person. Thereafter,   the   local   residents   made   a   genuine representation in a peaceful manner and the said agitation was called off on the assurance of local authorities. 4. It   is   their   specific   case   that   during   the   said gathering, there was no violence or damage to the public, as well as, personal property. 5. It is their further case that in the year 2017, petitioner No. 1, on behalf of entire habitants of the Ward, filed CWPIL No. 26/2019, which is still pending before this Court, with a prayer to provide access for ambulance road/ railway over bridge facilities to the general public, whereas, in the year 2020, railway authorities fixed/erected the iron poles on the path, which was used by the general public. Due   to   this   fact,   the   local   inhabitants   raised   their grievances on 01.10.2020. 6. Consequently,   a   meeting   was   fixed   on 07.10.2020, but, the meeting was held on 08.10.2020, in 4 2026:HHC:1260 which,   railway   authorities   have   assured   to   provide   the railway   over   bridge   facilities,   however,   the   railway authorities   have   not   taken   any   action,   even   after considerable   time. Thereafter,   the   unfortunate   incident had taken place on 28.11.2021, when one person died. 7. The relief of quashing has also been sought on the ground that FIR No. 8 of 2021, dated 28.11.2021, has already   been   quashed   by   this   Court   by   passing   the judgment in Cr. MMO No. 902/2022, titled as “Diwakar Dev Sharma & Ors. Vs Government Railway Police Station & Anr.” 8. It is their specific case that Crime No. 90 of 2021,   dated   28.11.2021,   is   nothing,   but   the   repetitive version of FIR No. 08 of 2021. 9. According to the petitioners, the complaint filed by the railway authorities bearing Case Crime No. 90 of 2021, dated 28.11.2021, is the double jeopardy, as the earlier   FIR   No.   8/2021,   dated   28.11.2021,   has   already been quashed by this Court. 10. On the basis of above facts, a prayer has been made to allow the petition, as prayed for. 5 2026:HHC:1260 11. When, put to notice, respondent No. 1 has filed the reply, disclosing therein, that on 28.11.2021, at about 10:55 am, around 250 persons gathered and obstructed the movement of the train No. 52456 DN H. Queen SML­ KLK EXP, as such, inconvenience has been caused to the travellers. The mob including petitioner No. 1, sat on the railway  track and obstructed the railway  traffic, for 3½ hours. As such, appropriate action be taken in accordance with law. 12. It   has   been   admitted   that   FIR   No.   08/2021, dated 28.11.2021, has already been quashed by this Court, vide judgment dated 26.04.2023, passed in Cr. MMO No. 902 of 2022. 13. Respondents No. 2 and 3, have also taken the similar stand. Factual position with regard to the filing of Cr. MMO No. 902/2022, by virtue of which, the FIR No. 08 of 2021, has been quashed, has also been admitted by respondents No. 2 and 3. In addition to this, a plea has also   been   taken   that   petitioners   are   not   entitled   for protection,   as   prayed,   under   Article   20(2)   of   the 6 2026:HHC:1260 Constitution of India, as the said principle does not apply to the case registered by RPF, against the petitioners. 14. The   petitioners   are   before   this   Court   under Section 528 of BNSS, with a prayer to quash the Case Crime No. 90, dated 28.11.2021, registered with Railway Police Station Shimla, along with the resultant proceedings thereto, which are stated to be pending before the learned trial Court. 15. The jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. (528 of BNSS), has elaborately been discussed by the Hon’ble Apex Court in the year 1992, in the case titled as  State   of   Haryana  Vs. Chaudhary   Bhajan   Lal   & Others,  reported   as  1992   CrLJ,   527,   in   which,   the Hon’ble Supreme Court has formulated the guidelines for exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Relevant paragraph 107 of the judgment is reproduced, as under:­ “107. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant  provisions  of the Code under Chapter   XIV   and   of   the   principles   of   law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating   to   the   exercise   of   the   extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under section 482 of the Code which we have extracted   and   reproduced   above,   we   give   the following   categories   of   cases   by   way   of illustration   wherein   such   power   could   be 7 2026:HHC:1260 exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice,   though   it   may   not   be   possible   to   lay down   any   precise,   clearly   defined   and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad   kinds   of   cases   wherein   such   power should be exercised. 1. Where   the   allegations   made   in   the   First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. 2. Where the allegations in the First Information Report   and   other   materials,   if   any, accompanying   the   FIR. do   not   disclose   a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156 (1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate with the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. 3. Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in   support   of   the   same   do   not   disclose   the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. 4. Where,   the   allegations   in   the   FLR   do   not constitute   a   cognizable   offence   but   constitute only. a non­cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. 5. Where   the   allegations   made   in   the   FIR   or complaint   are   so   absurd   and   inherently improbable  on the  basis  of  which no  prudent person   can   ever   reach   a   just   conclusion   that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. 6. Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in   any   of   the   provisions   of   the   Code   or   the 8 2026:HHC:1260 concerned   Act   (under   which   a   criminal proceeding is instituted)  to  the  institution and continuance   of   the   proceedings   and/or   where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. 7. Where   a   criminal   proceeding   is   manifestly attended   with   mala   fide   and/or   where   the proceeding   is   maliciously   instituted   with   an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” 16. This view has again been reiterated by a three Judge Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. Versus  State of Maharashtra &   Others,  reported   as  2021   SCC   Online   SC   315. Relevant paragraph 38 of the judgment is reproduced, as under:­ 38. In the case of Golconda Lingaswamy (supra), after considering the decisions of this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra)  and  other decisions  on the exercise of inherent powers by the High Court under Section 482  Cr.P.C.,   in   paragraphs   5,   7   and   8,   it   is observed and held as under: “5. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the  Code  in a case  of  this nature  is  the exception and not the rule. The section does not   confer   any   new   powers   on   the   High Court. It   only   saves   the   inherent   power which   the   Court   possessed   before   the enactment  of the Code. It envisages three circumstances   under   which   the   inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely: (i) to 9 2026:HHC:1260 give effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down   any   inflexible   rule   which   would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. No   legislative   enactment   dealing   with procedure   can   provide   for   all   cases   that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherent   powers   apart   from   express provisions of law which are necessary for proper   discharge   of   functions   and   duties imposed   upon   them   by   law. That   is   the doctrine   which   finds   expression   in   the section   which   merely   recognises   and preserves   inherent   powers   of   the   High Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal, possess   in   the   absence   of   any   express provision, as inherent in their constitution, all such powers as are necessary to do the right   and   to   undo   a   wrong   in   course   of administration   of   justice   on   the   principle quando   lex   aliquid   alique   concedit, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsa esse non potest   (when   the   law   gives   a   person anything, it gives him that without which it cannot   exist). While   exercising   powers under   the   section,   the   Court   does   not function as a court of appeal or revision. Inherent   jurisdiction   under   the   section though wide has to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and only when such   exercise   is   justified   by   the   tests specifically laid down in the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to do real   and   substantial   justice   for   the administration of which alone courts exist. Authority   of   the   court   exists   for advancement of justice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as to produce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. It would be an abuse of   the   process   of   the   court   to   allow   any action which would result in injustice and 10 2026:HHC:1260 prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the   powers   court   would   be   justified   to quash   any   proceeding   if   it   finds   that initiation  or  continuance   of  it   amounts   to abuse of the process of court or quashing of these   proceedings   would   otherwise   serve the   ends   of   justice. When   no   offence   is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine   the   question   of   fact. When   a complaint   is   sought   to   be   quashed,   it   is permissible   to   look   into   the   materials   to assess what the complainant has alleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegations are accepted in toto. 7. In dealing with the last category, it is important   to  bear   in  mind  the  distinction between   a   case   where   there   is   no   legal evidence or where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with the accusations made,   and   a   case   where   there   is   legal evidence   which,   on   appreciation,   may   or may   not   support   the   accusations. When exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the   Code,   the   High   Court   would   not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable appreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the   function   of   the   trial   Judge. Judicial process,   no   doubt   should   not   be   an instrument   of   oppression,   or,   needless harassment. Court  should  be  circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion and should   take   all   relevant   facts   and circumstances   into   consideration   before issuing   process,   lest   it   would   be   an instrument   in   the   hands   of   a   private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any person needlessly. At the same time the   section   is   not   an   instrument   handed over   to   an   accused   to   short­circuit   a prosecution   and   bring   about   its   sudden death….. 11 2026:HHC:1260 8. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Court under Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful to see that its   decision   in   exercise   of   this   power   is based   on   sound   principles. The   inherent power should not be exercised to stifle a legitimate prosecution. High Court being the highest   court   of   a   State   should   normally refrain from giving a prima facie decision in a case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not been collected and produced before the Court   and   the   issues   involved,   whether factual   or   legal,   are   of   magnitude   and cannot   be   seen   in   their   true   perspective without   sufficient   material. Of   course,   no hard­and­fast   rule   can   be   laid   down   in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise   its   extraordinary   jurisdiction   of quashing the proceeding at any stage. [See Janata  Dal   v. H.S. Chowdhary  [(1992)  4 SCC 305 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 36 : AIR 1993 SC 892] and  Raghubir Saran (Dr.) v. State of Bihar [AIR 1964 SC 1 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 1] .] It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of the complainant in the light   of   all   probabilities   in   order   to determine whether a conviction would be sustainable and on such premises, arrive at a conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. It would be erroneous to assess the material before it and conclude that the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In a proceeding instituted on complaint, exercise of   the   inherent   powers   to   quash   the proceedings   is   called   for   only   in   a   case where the complaint does not disclose any offence   or   is   frivolous,   vexatious   or oppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do not constitute the offence of which cognisance has been taken by the Magistrate, it is open to the High Court to 12 2026:HHC:1260 quash the same in exercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. It is not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysis of the case before the trial to find out whether the case would end   in   conviction   or   acquittal. The complaint/FIR has to be read as a whole. If it   appears   that   on   consideration   of   the allegations   in   the   light   of   the   statement made   on   oath   of   the   complainant   or disclosed in the FIR that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there   is   no   material   to   show   that   the complaint/FIR   is   mala   fide,   frivolous   or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification   for   interference   by   the   High Court. When an information is lodged at the police station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be   of   secondary   importance. It   is   the material collected during the investigation and evidence led in court which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves be the basis for quashing the proceeding.” 17. It is no longer  res integra  that at the time of deciding  the petition,  under  Section  482 Cr.PC (Section 528 of BNSS), this Court cannot assume the powers of the appellate/revisional Court, nor, this Court can act as trial Court. While holding so, the view of this Court is being guided   by   the   decision   of   Hon’ble   Supreme   Court   in Chilakamarthi Venkateswarlu & Another versus State of Andhra Pradesh & Another,  reported as  (2019) 10 13 2026:HHC:1260 SCALE 239. Relevant paragraph 15 of the judgment is reproduced, as under:­ “15. In exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 it is not permissible for the Court to act as if it were a trial Court. The Court is only to be prima facie   satisfied   about   existence   of   sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. For that   limited   purpose,   the   Court   can   evaluate materials   and   documents   on   record,   but   it cannot   appreciate   the   evidence   to   conclude whether the materials produced are sufficient or not for convicting the accused.” 18. Similar view has also been taken by the Hon’ble Supreme   Court   in  S.W.   Palanitkar   &   Others   versus State   of   Bihar   &   Another,  reported   as  (2002)   1 Supreme Court Cases 241. 19. In   view   of   the   above,   now,   this   Court   would proceed   further   to   determine   the   fact   whether   the documentary evidence produced by the petitioners can be taken into consideration. 20. The petitioners have annexed the copy of the complaint made by Station Master Jutogh, addressed to CRP Shimla on 28.11.2021. This document falls within the definition of admitted document and can be taken into consideration. Apart from this, copy of Case Crime No. 90 14 2026:HHC:1260 of 2021, has also been annexed. Copy of FIR No. 08 of 2021 has been annexed as Annexure P­2. Annexure P­3 is the minutes of meeting held on 28.11.2021, along with minutes of meeting held on 29.11.2021. Annexure P­4 is the judgment of this Court passed in Cr.MMO No. 902 of 2022,   by   virtue   of   which,   FIR   No.   8   of   2021,   dated 28.11.2021,   under   Sections   341,   147,   149   of   IPC   and Section 174 of Railway Act, 1989 was quashed. The above documents   i.e.   Annexure   P­1   to   Annexure   P­3,   in   the considered opinion of this Court are admitted documents, which can be taken into consideration. 21. The perusal of the FIR No. 8 of 2021, shows that the said FIR was registered with Government Railway Police Station Shimla, on the complaint of Station Master Jutogh. As per the said FIR, on 28.11.2021, at about 10:55 am, about 250 persons along with the Diwakar Dev Sharma,   Counselor   Majyath,   sat   on   railway   track, resultantly causing obstruction in the free flow of railway service. They sat on dharna for about 3½ hours, as such, a   request   has   been   made   to   take   action   against   them, whereas, in the complaint bearing Case Crime No. 90 of 15 2026:HHC:1260 2021,   dated   28.11.2021,   similar   allegations   have   been levelled. 22. In such situation, this Court is of the view that for the same crime, second FIR/case i.e. Case Crime No. 90 of 2021, dated 28.11.2021, is not sustainable in the eyes of law, as the FIR bearing No. 8 of 2021, which was registered at the instance of Station Master Jutogh, has already been quashed by this Court on 26.04.2023, by holding that no case   is   made   out   against   the   petitioners. Relevant paragraphs No. 20 to 32, are reproduced, as under:­ “20. Similarly,   this   Court   finds   that   though   the petitioners   herein   stand   booked   under   S.147   and 149   IPC,   but   there   is   no   allegation   that   the petitioners   and   other   persons,   ever   formed   an unlawful   assembly   and   caused   damage,   to   the public property or train. 21. Provisions of Ss. 147 and 149 IPC read as under: “147. Punishment for rioting.—Whoever is guilty   of   rioting,   shall   be   punished   with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. 148. Rioting, armed with deadly weapon. —Whoever   is   guilty   of   rioting,   being   armed with a deadly weapon or with anything which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. 149. Every member of unlawful assembly guilty of offence committed in prosecution of   common   object.—If   an   offence   is 16 2026:HHC:1260 committed   by   any   member   of   an   unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that   assembly   knew   to   be   likely   to   be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that   offence,   is   a   member   of   the   same assembly, is guilty of that offence.” 22. Bare  perusal   of  aforesaid   provisions   of  law reveals   that,   under   S.147,   whoever   is   guilty   of rioting,   shall   be   punished   with   imprisonment   of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both. 23. Apart from aforesaid provision, S.148 reveals that, “Whoever is guilty of rioting, being armed with a deadly weapon or with anything which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both” 24. Perusal   of   S.149   IPC   reveals   that,   “If   an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that   object,  every  person   who,  at   the  time   of   the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence.” 25. To attract Ss. 147 and 149 IPC, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that on the date of alleged incident, some force or violence was used by members   of   unlawful   assembly   and   that   at   the relevant time, they had come on the spot with deadly weapon. 26. In   the   instant   proceedings,   bare   perusal   of contents of FIR as well as final report under S.173 CrPC,   suggests   that   no   member   of   ‘unlawful assembly’ was carrying any kind of deadly weapon with   them,   rather,   as   per   own   case   of   the prosecution, they had obstructed railway track with a view to lodge their protest on account of death of one person, who died after being hit by train. 27. To attract S.149, firstly, it is incumbent upon prosecution   to   prove   that   an   unlawful   act   was 17 2026:HHC:1260 committed by any member of the assembly and all members gathered on the spot had a common object. In the case at hand, common object, if any, of the persons on the spot was to protest against death of one   person   and   they   were   compelled   to   obstruct traffic on account of apathy shown by railways to the repeated requests for construction of overhead bridge enabling locals to cross the traffic safely. 28. Since there is no specific complaint, if any, of rioting or any damage caused to the public property including train, provisions of Ss. 147 and 149 are also not attracted. 29. Mr. Vishal   Panwar,   learned   Additional Advocate General invited attention of this Court to S.174 of the Indian Railways Act, 1989, which is reproduced herein below: “174. Obstructing running of train, etc.—If any railway   servant   (whether   on   duty   or otherwise)   or   any   other   person   obstructs   or causes to be obstructed or attempts to obstruct any train or other rolling stock upon a railway, — (a) by squatting or picketing or during any Rail roko agitation or bandh; or (b)  by  keeping  without  authority  any  rolling stock on the railway; or (c)   by   tampering   with,   disconnecting   or interfering in any other manner with its hose pipe   or   tampering   with   signal   gear   or otherwise,   he   shall   be   punishable   with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees, or with both.” 30. No doubt, as per aforesaid provision of law, a person shall be punished with imprisonment for a term   not   exceeding   two   years   on   account   of   his having obstructed railway track, but if the averments contained in the FIR sought to be quashed in the instant   proceeding,   are   perused   in   their   entirety, there is no specific allegation that the persons named in the FIR obstructed passage of train rather, they came on the spot to lodge protest against death of a local   person   but   thereafter,   they   disbursed   after being assured by the authorities of Railways and the 18 2026:HHC:1260 State i.e. Sub Divisional Magistrate that necessary provision of overhead bridge shall be made. 31. Leaving   everything   aside,   this   court   having taken note of the material placed on record alongwith final report filed under S.173 CrPC, has no hesitation to conclude that the alleged incident of obstructing railway   track   happened   on   account   of   emotional outburst on account of death of a local person and none of the agitators including the petitioners had any kind of intention to obstruct the railway track or cause   damage   to   public   property   but   since   their repeated requests were not paid any heed by the railway   administration   or   district   administration, after   death   of   one   person,   petitioners   gathered   to agitate against railway administration. 32. Moreover,   this   Court   finds   from   the   list   of witnesses enclosed with the final report under S.173 CrPC, that prosecution intends to prove its case with the   help   of   witnesses,   who   are   employees   of railways. During proceedings of the case, Mr. Verma, learned Central Government Counsel was unable to point   out   any   independent   witness   associated   by railway   authorities   or   the   railway   police   to   prove case of prosecution against the petitioners. No doubt, version put forth by interested witnesses cannot be brushed aside on account of their being interested or having   relation   with   the   complainant/injured,   but certainly   their   statements   cannot   be   taken   as   a gospel   truth   rather,   same   are   required   to   be corroborated by independent witnesses, which in the present case is missing.” 23. The   learned   Additional   Advocate   General,   as well as, learned Counsel appearing for respondents No. 2 and   3,   could   not   satisfy   the   judicial   conscience   of   this Court as how the second/similar complaint, on the same facts, is maintainable before the Court of Law, that too, 19 2026:HHC:1260 when   FIR   No.  8  of  2021  has  already  been  quashed  by holding that no case is made out, against the petitioners. 24. In view of the above, this Court is of the view that the petitioners are able to make out a case in their favour for allowing the petition.  Consequently, the petition under consideration is allowed and Case Crime No. 90 of 2021, dated 28.11.2021, under Sections 145, 146, 147 and 174   of   the   Railway   Act,   registered   with   Railway   Police Station   Shimla,   District   Shimla,   H.P.,   as   well   as,   the proceedings   resultant   thereto,   which   are   stated   to   be pending before the learned trial Court, are ordered to be quashed. 25. Pending   miscellaneous   applications,   if   any, shall also stand disposed of accordingly. 26. Record be sent back forthwith. ( Virender Singh ) Judge 6th January, 2026 (Pramod Kumar)