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2026 DAILYLAW 47268 (CAL)

P M MURALI AND ANOTHER v. THE LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR AND OTHER

WPA/501/2026 · 2026-10-05

Madhuresh Prasad

body2026

Judgment text

Extracted from the PDF above. The PDF is authoritative.

1 IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA [ CIRCUIT BENCH AT PORT BLAIR ] *** WPA/501/2026 P M Murali and Another Vs. The Lieutenant Governor and Others Mr. Adarsh Ilango … for the petitioners Ms. Babita Das … for the respondents October 5, 2026 [SR] Item No.3 1. The writ petition is filed by the petitioner claiming to be Member Secretary of the Society for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, South Andaman. He stated in paragraph 13 of the writ petition that “the Managing Committee is in the process of getting notified officially”. 2. The writ petitioner by filing the writ petition is making allegation that the process for notification of the new committee is de hors the existing provisions governing the constitution of the Committee in terms of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Establishment and Regulation of Societies for Prevention of Cruelty to Animals) Rules, 2001. 3. The writ petitioner challenged alleged notings dated 26.02.2026 in the departmental file wherein constitution of the new committee was being processed. The petitioner did not rely on any order/notification regarding constitution/notification of the committee in question. 2 4. Since the admitted position is that the constitution of the committee is in the process, there is no scope at this stage for the petitioner to assert on the basis of file notings that the constitution of the committee is not in accordance with law. 5. In support of such conclusion, this court is fortified by decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of State of Orissa vs and another vs. Laxmi Narayan Das reported in (2023) 15 SCC 273: 51. The aforesaid legal issue was considered by this Court in Mahadeo v. Sovan Devi [Mahadeo v. Sovan Devi, (2023) 10 SCC 807] . It was pointed out therein, that inter-departmental communications are merely in the process of consideration for an appropriate decision. These cannot be relied upon as a basis to claim any right. Mere notings in the file do not amount to an order unless an order is communicated to a party, thus, no right accrues. Relevant paras 15 to 18 are extracted hereinbelow : (SCC pp. 813- 16) “15. It is well settled that inter-departmental communications are in the process of consideration for appropriate decision and cannot be relied upon as a basis to claim any right. This Court examined the said question in a judgment reported as Omkar Sinha v. Sahadat Khan [Omkar Sinha v. Sahadat Khan, (2022) 12 SCC 228 : (2023) 2 SCC (L&S) 391] . Reliance was placed on Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab [Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 11 : AIR 1963 SC 395] to hold that merely writing something on the file does not amount to an order. Before something amounts to an order of the State Government, two things are necessary. First, the order has to be expressed in the name of the Governor as required by clause (1) of Article 166 and second, it has to be communicated. As already indicated, no formal order modifying the decision of the Revenue Secretary was ever made. Until such an order is drawn up, the State Government cannot, in our opinion, be regarded as bound by what was stated in the file. The said judgment was followed in K.S.B. Ali v. State of A.P. [K.S.B. Ali v. State of A.P., (2018) 11 SCC 277] and Dyna Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves Ltd. [Dyna Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Crompton Greaves Ltd., (2019) 20 SCC 1] 16. In Bachhittar Singh [Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 11 : AIR 1963 SC 395] , it has been held as under : (Bachhittar Singh case [Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 11 : AIR 1963 SC 395] , SCC OnLine SC paras 8-9 & 11) ‘8. What we have now to consider is the effect of the note recorded by the Revenue Minister of PEPSU upon the file. We will assume for the purpose of this case that it is an order. Even so, the question is whether it can be regarded as the order of the State 3 Government which alone, as admitted by the appellant, was competent to hear and decide an appeal from the order of the Revenue Secretary. Article 166(1) of the Constitution requires that all executive action of the Government of a State shall be expressed in the name of the Governor. Clause (2) of Article 166 provides for the authentication of orders and other instruments made and executed in the name of the Governor. Clause (3) of that article enables the Governor to make rules for the more convenient transaction of the business of the Government and for the allocation among the Ministers of the said business. What the appellant calls an order of the State Government is admittedly not expressed to be in the name of the Governor. But with that point we shall deal later. What we must first ascertain is whether the order of the Revenue Minister is an order of the State Government i.e. of the Governor. In this connection we may refer to Rule 25 of the Rules of Business of the Government of PEPSU which reads thus: ‘Except as otherwise provided by any other Rule, cases shall ordinarily be disposed of by or under the authority of the Minister in charge who may by means of standing orders give such directions as he thinks fit for the disposal of cases in the Department. Copies of such standing orders shall be sent to the Rajpramukh and the Chief Minister.’ According to the learned counsel for the appellant his appeal pertains to the department which was in charge of the Revenue Minister and, therefore, he could deal with it. His decision and order would, according to him, be the decision and order of the State Government. On behalf of the State reliance was, however, placed on Rule 34 which required certain classes of cases to be submitted to the Rajpramukh and the Chief Minister before the issue of orders. But it was conceded during the course of the argument that a case of the kind before us does not fall within that rule. No other provision bearing on the point having been brought to our notice we would, therefore, hold that the Revenue Minister could make an order on behalf of the State Government. 9. The question, therefore, is whether he did in fact make such an order. Merely writing something on the file does not amount to an order. Before something amounts to an order of the State Government two things are necessary. The order has to be expressed in the name of the Governor as required by clause (1) of Article 166 and then it has to be communicated. As already indicated, no formal order modifying the decision of the Revenue Secretary was ever made. Until such an order is drawn up the State Government cannot, in our opinion, be regarded as bound by what was stated in the file. As long as the matter rested with him the Revenue Minister could well score out his remarks or minutes on the file and write fresh ones. 4 *** 11. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the remarks or the order of the Revenue Minister, PEPSU are of no avail to the appellant.’ 17. This Court in Municipal Committee, Barwala v. Jai Narayan & Co. [Municipal Committee, Barwala v. Jai Narayan & Co., (2023) 14 SCC 786] held that a noting recorded in the file is merely a noting simpliciter and nothing more. It merely represents expression of an opinion by the particular individual. It was held as under : (SCC paras 16- 17) ‘16. This Court in a judgment reported asState of Uttarakhand v. Sunil Kumar Vaish [State of Uttarakhand v. Sunil Kumar Vaish, (2011) 8 SCC 670 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 325 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 542 : (2011) 2 SCC (L&S) 410] held that a noting recorded in the file is merely a noting simpliciter and nothing more. It merely represents expression of opinion by the particular individual. By no stretch of imagination, such noting can be treated as a decision of the Government. It was held as under : (SCC p. 678, para 24) “24. A noting recorded in the file is merely a noting simpliciter and nothing more. It merely represents expression of opinion by the particular individual. By no stretch of imagination, can such noting be treated as a decision of the Government. Even if the competent authority records its opinion in the file on the merits of the matter under consideration, the same cannot be termed as a decision of the Government unless it is sanctified and acted upon by issuing an order in accordance with Articles 77(1) and (2) or Articles 166(1) and (2). The noting in the file or even a decision gets culminated into an order affecting right of the parties only when it is expressed in the name of the President or the Governor, as the case may be, and authenticated in the manner provided in Article 77(2) or Article 166(2). A noting or even a decision recorded in the file can always be reviewed/ reversed/overruled or overturned and the court cannot take cognizance of the earlier noting or decision for exercise of the power of judicial review. (See : State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh [State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 38 : AIR 1961 SC 493] , Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab [Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 11 : AIR 1963 SC 395] , State of Bihar v. Kripalu Shankar [State of Bihar v. Kripalu Shankar, (1987) 3 SCC 34 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 442] , Rajasthan Housing Board v. Shri Kishan [Rajasthan Housing Board v. Shri Kishan, (1993) 2 SCC 84] , Sethi Auto Service Station v. DDA [Sethi Auto Service Station v. DDA, (2009) 1 SCC 5 180] and Shanti Sports Club v. Union of India [Shanti Sports Club v. Union of India, (2009) 15 SCC 705 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 707] .)” 17. Thus, the letter seeking approval of the State Government by the Deputy Commissioner is not the approval granted by him, which could be enforced by the plaintiff in the court of law.’ 18. The basis of the claim of the writ petitioner is a letter written by the Secretary of the Soldier Welfare Department to the District Collector, Udaipur on 19-3- 1971 for allotment of land. The Rules contemplate that if the possession is not taken within 6 months, the allotment shall be deemed to have been cancelled. Firstly, the inter-departmental communication dated 19-3-1971 cannot be treated to be a letter of allotment. Alternatively, even if it is considered to be a letter of allotment, the writ petitioner could not claim possession on the basis of such communication after more than 30 years in terms of the Rules applicable for allotment of land to the disabled ex-servicemen.” (emphasis supplied) 52. Reference can also be made to another judgment of this Court in Municipal Committee, Barwala v. Jai Narayan & Co. [Municipal Committee, Barwala v. Jai Narayan & Co., (2023) 14 SCC 786] , wherein the Court took a similar view. … … … 54.3. (iii) There was no order passed by the Government and conveyed to the respondents for allotment of any land in their favour. Hence, the respondents are not entitled to any relief solely based on the official notings.” 6. As and when a committee is notified pursuant to the exercise in process; and if the petitioner feels aggrieved, it will be open to him to avail remedies, in accordance with law. The writ petition is pre-mature and dismissed. 7. All parties are directed to act on a server copy of this order duly downloaded from the official website of this Court. ( Madhuresh Prasad, J. )