2026:HHC:15032 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH SHIMLA CWP No.18292 of 2025 Reserved on: 09.04.2026 Decided: 06.05.2026 __________________________________________________________________ Surendra Singh ...Petitioner Versus SJVN Ltd. and another ...Respondents __________________________________________________________________ Coram Hon'ble Mr. Justice Jiya Lal Bhardwaj, Judge Whether approved for reporting? 1 Yes For the petitioner: Mr. Sunil Mohan Goel, Senior Advocate with Mr. Paras Dhaulta and Mr. Abhinav M. Goel, Advocates. For the respondents: Ms. Devyani Sharma, Senior Advocate with Ms. Srishti Negi, Advocate. Jiya Lal Bhardwaj, Judge The petitioner by way of present writ petition, has prayed for the following substantive reliefs:- “a) That Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue writ of certiorari quashing order dated 04.07.2025 (Annexure P-1) whereby the petitioner has been put 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? 2 under suspension in contemplation of disciplinary proceedings under SJVN Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules. b) That Hon’ble Court may be pleased to issue writ of mandamus directing the respondents to pay to the petitioner all the benefits as provided under FRSR Rule 53.” 2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the key facts of the case are that the petitioner, who was working as General Manager with respondent No.1-Company, while posted at Devsari Hydro Electric Project Tharali, District Chamoli, Uttrakhand, put under suspension vide order dated 04.07.2025, passed by respondent No.2. 3. It has been averred that the petitioner has approached this Court contending that the order of suspension was required to be reviewed by the authority, which is competent to modify or revoke the suspension before expiry of 90 days from the date of suspension on the recommendation of the review committee constituted for the purpose. However, since the Article of Charges dated 08.10.2025 were served upon him on 10.10.2025, i.e., beyond 3 the period of 90 days as contemplated under the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (for short “CCS (CCA) Rules”), and no orders either extending or revoking the suspension of the petitioner have been passed by respondent No.1-Company, the said act on its part is arbitrary, discriminatory, wrong, and illegal in the teeth of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhary vs. Union of India and another, (2015) 7 SCC 291. Respondent No.1-Company has its own Rules called as SJVN Conduct, Discipline and Appeal Rules (for short SJVN CDA Rules), but Rule 20 is silent about the aspect of period of suspension and thus, respondent No.1-Company, being a public sector undertaking under the Ministry of Power, Government of India, CCS (CCA) Rules, are to be taken into account. Further when the Rules are silent, the respondent No.1-Company falls back on the instructions/memorandum, issued by the Department of Personnel & Training (DoPT) 4 Government of India and the DoPT has issued the office memorandum dated 23.08.2016, which clearly provides that the suspension should not exceed beyond three months, if within three months charge-sheet is not served on the charged officer. 4. It has also been averred that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that while continuing the suspension of an employee, the disciplinary authority has to take into consideration whether the continuance of the employee in service would prejudice the investigation, trial, or enquiry by apprehending tampering with witnesses or documents, or whether continuance in office is likely to seriously subvert discipline. Once respondent No.1-Company had not served the charge-sheet within ninety days, the order of suspension is liable to be revoked in view of the instructions issued after the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhary’s case (supra). 5 5. The respondents filed reply to the petition and averred that the petition filed by the petitioner is misconceived inasmuch as no legal right, much less fundamental right of the petitioner, has been violated, so as to enable him to invoke the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court. The action of the replying respondents is strictly in accordance with the SJVN CDA Rules, which are applicable to the petitioner and there is no challenge to the said Rules. The suspension order was issued to the petitioner on receipt of a complaint against him relating to hiring of office premise for SJVNL at Kanpur, during his posting at the said place and after receipt of enquiry in respect of serious allegations of misconduct made in the complaint, he was put under suspension. On enquiry, it was found that the allegations are prima facie substantiated and the competent authority in exercise of the powers conferred under Rule 20(1)(a) of the SJVN CDA Rules, placed him under suspension on 04.07.2025 6 and he was informed through email dated 04.07.2025 and by registered post on 07.07.2025 (5th and 6th July, 2025 being holidays on account of Saturday and Sunday). The petitioner was served with the memorandum of charges, vide letter dated 08.10.2025, with a direction to submit his reply within 15 days from the date of receipt of the memorandum. It is incorrect to submit that Rule 20 of the SJVN CDA Rules, is silent with respect to the provisions, as having been provided under CCS (CCA) Rules, with regard to suspension and further the DoPT guidelines are not applicable unless specifically mentioned and endorsed by the Department of Public Enterprises (in short DPE). Respondent No.1-Company has not adopted the said guidelines in view of the Rules. The chargesheet has been issued to the petitioner on 08.10.2005, which has slightly exceeded the period of 90 days. There is no specific period of 90 days, within which suspension order is required to be reviewed under SJVN CDA 7 Rules. 6. It has further been averred that Rule 21 of SJVN CDA Rules, provides that suspension order can exceed six months and even more and only subsistence allowance can be varied, in case, suspension continued for six months or more. The allegations against the petitioner are serious and since the Director (Projects) was not manning the post, therefore, some time was taken for deliberations with regard to seek advice and decision of the appropriate authority as disciplinary authority, which is Chairman-cum-Managing Director, in the absence of Director (Projects). There is no mandatory period of 90 days prescribed under the Rules for issuance of charge-sheet within 90 days of suspension and further no prejudice has been caused to the petitioner since there is marginal delay in issuing the charge-sheet. The judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court was dealing with a case in which CCS (CCA) Rules were applicable, but in 8 the facts of the present case, the same are not applicable and thus the action on the part of respondents is justified. 7. The petitioner has filed rejoinder to the reply filed by the respondents and controverted the facts alleged in the reply. 8. I have heard Mr. Sunil Mohan Goel, learned Senior Counsel duly assisted by Mr. Paras Dhaulta and Mr. Abhinav M. Goel, learned counsel as well as Ms. Devyani Sharma, learned Senior Counsel duly assisted by Ms. Srishti Negi, learned counsel and also perused the record carefully. 9. Before delving upon the issue of quashing the order of suspension, it would be relevant to have a bare look on the provisions of Rules 20 and 21 of the SJVN CDA Rules, which are reproduced as under:- “Rule 20 Suspension: 1) The appointing authority or any authority to which it in subordinate or the Disciplinary Authority or any other authority empowered in that behalf by the Competent Authority by general or special order may place an employee under suspension: a) where a disciplinary proceeding against him is 9 contemplated or is pending; or b) where a case against him in respect of any Criminal offence is under investigation or trial. c) Where, in the opinion of the authority aforesaid, he has engaged oneself in activities prejudicial to the interest of the security of the State/CPSE. 2) An employee who is detained in police/judicial custody, whether on criminal charge or otherwise, for a period exceeding 48 hours shall be deemed to have been suspended with effect from the date of detention, by an order of the appointing authority and shall remain under suspension till further orders. 3) Where a penalty of dismissal or removal from service imposed upon an employee under suspension is set aside on appeal or on review under these rules and the case is remitted for further inquiry or with any other directions the order of his suspension shall be deemed to have continued in force on and from the date of the original order of dismissal or removal and shall remain in force until further orders. 4) Where a penalty of dismissal or removal from service imposed upon an employee is set aside or declared or rendered void in consequence of or by decision of a court of law and the Disciplinary Authority, on consideration of the circumstances of the case, decides to hold a further inquiry against the employee on the allegations on which the penalty of dismissal or removal was originally imposed, the employee shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by the appointing authority from the date of the original order of dismissal or removal and shall continue to remain under suspension until further orders. 5) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this Rule may at any time be revoked by the authority which made or is deemed to have made the 10 order or by any authority to which that authority in subordinate. 6) The suspended employee shall not leave the station without the written permission of the Competent Authority. Rule 21 Subsistence Allowance: 1) An employee under suspension shall be entitled to draw subsistence allowance equal to 50 percent of his basic pay provided the Disciplinary Authority is satisfied that the employee is not engaged in any other employment or business or profession or vocation. In addition the employee shall be entitled to Dearness Allowance admissible on such subsistence allowance and any other compensatory allowance of which the employee was in receipt on the date of suspension provided the suspending authority is satisfied that the employee continues to meet the expenditure for which the allowance was granted. 2) Where the period of suspension exceeds six months, the authority which made or is deemed to have made the order of suspension shall be competent to vary the amount of subsistence allowance for any period subsequent to the period of the first six months as follows: i) The amount of subsistence allowance may be increased to 75 percent of basic pay and allowances thereon if, in the opinion of the said authority the period of suspension has been prolonged for reasons to be recorded in writing not directly attributable to the employee under suspension. ii) The amount of subsistence allowances may be reduced to 25 percent of basic pay and allowances thereon if in the opinion of the said authority, the period of suspension has been prolonged due to the reasons to be recorded in writing directly attributable 11 to the employee under suspension. 3) If an employee is arrested by the Police on a criminal charge and bail is not granted, no subsistence allowance is payable. On grant of bail, if the competent authority decides to continue the suspension, the employee shall be entitled to subsistence allowance from the date employee is granted bail.” 10. A perusal of Rule 20 of SJVN CDA Rules, reveals that there is no period prescribed for suspension and sub- rule 5 thereof only talks about the order of suspension, may at any time be revoked by the authority, which made or is deemed to have made the order or by any authority to which that authority is subordinate. Sub-rule 2 of Rule 21 of SJVN CDA Rules, prescribes that where the period of suspension exceeds six months, the authority, which made or is deemed to have made the order of suspension, shall be competent to vary the amount of subsistence allowance for any period subsequent to the period of first six months. Thus, it is clear that the authority is not mandatorily required to take decision before expiry of 90 days as required under the CCS(CCA) Rules, which are not applicable in the case of the petitioner. 12 Sub-rule 2 of Rule 21 of SJVN CDA provides that if the period of suspension, exceeds six months, the competent authority can vary the amount of subsistence allowance for any period subsequent to the period of first six months. Once the Rule does not prescribe a fixed period and furthermore, the services of the petitioner are governed by the Rules framed by respondent No.1-Company, no assistance can be taken from CCS (CCA) Rules, under which the Hon’ble Supreme Court had issued the guidelines in the aforementioned case. 11. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has vehemently contended that once Rule 20 of SJVN CDA Rules, is silent regrading the period of suspension, one has to fall back upon CCS (CCA) Rules. But the said contention cannot be accepted for the simple reason that once there are specific Rules to govern the service conditions of the employees of respondent No.1-Company, the petitioner cannot harp upon CCS (CCA) Rules. Furthermore, as already held above, once 13 there is no period prescribed to consider the order of suspension under Rule 20, Rule 21 has to be taken into account, which provides that where the period of suspension exceeds six months, the authority would be competent to vary the amount of subsistence allowance, meaning thereby, the period of suspension can be beyond even six months and the authority has only to consider the varying of the subsistence allowance. Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently contended that once Rule 20 is silent regrading the period of suspension, Rule 21 cannot be attracted. If this plea is accepted, then the vary purpose of engrafted Rule 21, become otiose. If Rule 20 is silent regrading period of suspension one can fall back upon Rule 21. The purpose of engrafting sub-rule 2 of Rule 21, is that if the period of suspension exceeds six months, the amount of subsistence allowance may be increased. So far as the guidelines issued by DoPT are concerned, the same cannot be ipso facto made 14 applicable to the employees of respondent No.1-Company, while governing their service conditions, especially when the same were not adopted by it. 12. Learned counsel representing the petitioner placed heavy reliance upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in State of Tamil Nadu vs. Promod Kumar IPS and another, (2018) 17 SCC 677, to contend that once the respondents had not issued the charge-sheet or not taken any decision to revoke the suspension order, the order of suspension cannot subsist. However, in the present case, the said judgment is not attracted for the simple reason that the same is under CCS (CCA) Rules. It is true that the person under suspension should be for short duration, but once the Rules do not stipulate that the same has to be revoked after a particular time, a slight delay cannot automatically result the revocation of the suspension order. 13. Ms. Devyani Sharma, learned Senior Counsel, 15 representing the respondents, has vehemently argued that the prayer made by the petitioner has rendered infructuous in view of the fact that after serving the charge-sheet upon the petitioner, the enquiry is complete and the Enquiry Officer has submitted his report on 12.02.2026 and further suspension is not a punishment. She has further argued that since the petitioner had not laid challenge to the Rules framed by respondent No.1-Company, and further instructions of DoPT have not been followed by respondent No.1-Company, the action on the part of the respondents in not revoking the suspension order is justified. 14. Learned counsel representing the respondents has placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the Division Bench of Delhi High Court in Union of India and another vs. Ajay Kumar Choudhary, (2013) SCC OnLine Del 3437, to contend that in the case, which was relied upon by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, the Hon’ble 16 Supreme Court had interpreted the CCS(CCA) Rules, 1965 and since in the present case, the petitioner is governed by different set of Rules, the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court is not attractive. 15. Reliance has also been placed by the learned counsel for the respondents upon the judgment in CWP No.3702 of 2024, titled, Dr. Harminder Singh Baweja vs. Dr. Y.S. Parmar University and another, wherein, it was held that once the Rule does not contain any provision akin to Rule 10(7) of CCS(CCA) Rules, the suspension order cannot be altered. 16. The judgment passed by the Agartala Bench, in Kinkar Sarkar vs. State of Tripura and others, (2012) 4 Gauhati Law Reports 880, has also been relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondents, to contend that until and unless the amendments are adopted, the same cannot be made applicable automatically. 17 17. Learned counsel representing the respondents has also placed reliance upon the judgment passed by the Full Bench in P. Kannan vs. Commissioner for Municipal Administration and Others, (2022) SCC OnLine Mad 1154, to contend that the suspension is not a punishment and further the decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or co-equal strength and thus the law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhary’s case (supra), ignoring the set of Rules applicable therein, was not laying absolute preposition of law that in no case, the order of suspension can continue beyond a period of three months, if memorandum of charges/chargesheet is not served to the delinquent within a period of three months rather it was not applied in the said case itself. The relevant paras of the judgment reads as under:- “24. Admittedly, in Ajay Kumar Choudhary, supra, the Two-Judges Bench did not consider the earlier Constitution Bench judgments on the issue of suspension. 18 Qua the binding precedent of the law laid down by a Bench of larger strength, a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Central Board of Dawoodi Bohra Community v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 2 SCC 673 held as under: “12. Having carefully considered the submissions made by the learned Senior Counsel for the parties and having examined the law laid down by the Constitution Benches in the abovesaid decisions, we would like to sum up the legal position in the following terms: (1) The law laid down by this Court in a decision delivered by a Bench of larger strength is binding on any subsequent Bench of lesser or coequal strength. (2) A Bench of lesser quorum cannot disagree or dissent from the view of the law taken by a Bench of larger quorum. In case of doubt all that the Bench of lesser quorum can do is to invite the attention of the Chief Justice and request for the matter being placed for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum than the Bench whose decision has come up for consideration. It will be open only for a Bench of coequal strength to express an opinion doubting the correctness of the view taken by the earlier Bench of coequal strength, whereupon the matter may be placed for hearing before a Bench consisting of a quorum larger than the one which pronounced the decision laying down the law the correctness of which is doubted. (3) The above rules are subject to two exceptions: (i) the abovesaid rules do not bind the discretion of the Chief Justice in whom vests the power of framing the roster and who can 19 direct any particular matter to be placed for hearing before any particular Bench of any strength; and (ii) in spite of the rules laid down hereinabove, if the matter has already come up for hearing before a Bench of larger quorum and that Bench itself feels that the view of the law taken by a Bench of lesser quorum, which view is in doubt, needs correction or reconsideration then by way of exception (and not as a rule) and for reasons given by it, it may proceed to hear the case and examine the correctness of the previous decision in question dispensing with the need of a specific reference or the order of the Chief Justice constituting the Bench and such listing. Such was the situation in Raghubir Singh (1989) 2 SCC 754) and Hansoli Devi [(2002) 7 SCC 273].” [emphasis supplied] 25. Inasmuch as the Apex Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhary, supra, has not considered the earlier judgments of Constitution Benches of the Apex Court, the earlier Judgments, delivered by Bench of larger strength would be binding on High Courts too and it cannot be said that the judgment in Ajay Kumar Choudhary, supra, lays down absolute proposition of law on suspension, as what was held in paragraph (21) of the judgment was not applied in the said case itself in paragraph (22). It is despite the fact that charge-sheet therein was submitted much beyond the period of three months. 26. Learned counsel for the petitioners referred to the judgment in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary, supra, ignoring the set of rules applicable therein and otherwise the judgment therein was not laying absolute proposition 20 of law that in no case the order of suspension can continue beyond a period of three months if memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is not served to the delinquent within a period of three months, rather it was not applied in the said case itself. 35. For the foregoing reasons, the reference is answered by holding that: (i) The judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Ajay Kumar Choudhary, supra, does not lay down absolute proposition of law that an order of suspension cannot be continued beyond the period of three months if the memorandum of charges/charge-sheet has not been served within three months, or if memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is served without reasoned order of extension. (ii) The judgment in R. Balaji, supra, has no reference to the earlier judgments of co- equal strength and is thereby rendered per incuriam. (iii) The issue of challenge to the order of suspension should be analyzed on the facts of each case, considering the gravity of the charges and the rules applicable. (iv) Revocation of suspension with a direction to the employer to post the delinquent in a non-sensitive post cannot be endorsed or directed as a matter of course. It has to be based on the facts of each case and after noticing the reason for the delay in serving the memorandum of charges/charge-sheet.” 18. Further, the learned counsel for the respondents 21 has laid emphasis on the judgment passed by the Delhi High Court in Munendra Kumar vs. Government of NCT Delhi and others, (2024) SCC OnLine Del 8186, wherein it was held that if the charge-sheet is not issued within a period of 90 days from the date of suspension, the suspension would not automatically lapse. The relevant paras of the judgment reads as under:- “8. The primordial contention of the Petitioner, as canvassed by learned counsel, is that in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra), if the charge sheet is not issued within a period of 90 days from the date of suspension, the suspension would automatically lapse. There is no quarrel with the proposition that even though suspension is not a specified penalty but it does affect an employee and prolonged and indefinite suspension causes injury and prejudice and therefore, Courts have repeatedly asserted that disciplinary proceedings, if initiated, must be concluded within a reasonable time and an employee should not be indefinitely suspended. Prolonged suspension does become punitive in nature, more so when it is for an unjustified reason. However, it cannot be overlooked that the employer has a right to suspend an employee to refrain him from perpetuating the alleged misconduct and/or destroying the evidence. Each case, therefore, turns on its own facts and circumstances and no hard and fast rule can be laid down that only because chargesheet has not been issued within 90 days of initial suspension 22 period or even during extended suspension period for a justified reason, the suspension period would automatically lapse. In this context, it would be useful to refer to the observations of the Supreme Court in State of Orissa through its Principal Secretary, Home Dept. v. Bimal Kumar Mohanty, (1994) 4 SCC 126, as follows: "13. It is thus settled law that normally when an appointing authority or the disciplinary authority seeks to suspend an employee, pending inquiry or contemplated inquiry or pending investigation into grave charges of misconduct or defalcation of funds or serious acts of omission and commission, the order of suspension would be passed after taking into consideration the gravity of the misconduct sought to be inquired into or investigated and the nature of the evidence placed before the appointing authority and on application of the mind by disciplinary authority. Appointing authority or disciplinary authority should consider the above aspects and decide whether it is expedient to keep an employee under suspension pending aforesaid action. It would not be as an administrative routine or an automatic order to suspend an employee. It should be on consideration of the gravity of the alleged misconduct or the nature of the allegations imputed to the delinquent employee. The Court or the Tribunal must consider each case on its own facts and no general law could be laid down in that behalf. Suspension is not a punishment but is only one of forbidding or disabling an employee to discharge the duties of office or post held by him. In other words it is to refrain him to avail further opportunity to 23 perpetrate the alleged misconduct or to remove the impression among the members of service that dereliction of duty would pay fruits and the offending employee could get away even pending inquiry without any impediment or to prevent an opportunity to the delinquent officer to scuttle the inquiry or investigation or to win over the witnesses or the delinquent having had the opportunity in office to impede the progress of the investigation or inquiry etc. But as stated earlier, each case must be considered depending on the nature of the allegations, gravity of the situation and the indelible impact it creates on the service for the continuance of the delinquent employee in service pending inquiry or contemplated inquiry or Investigation. It would be another thing if the action is actuated by mala fides, arbitrary or for ulterior purpose. The suspension must be a step in aid to the ultimate result of the investigation or inquiry. The authority also should keep in mind public interest of the impact of the delinquent's continuance in office while facing departmental inquiry or trial of a criminal charge". 9. Learned counsel for the Petitioner has vehemently relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) to contend that on the failure of the employer to issue a chargesheet within 90 days from the date of the suspension order, the suspension order would lapse. This contention, in my considered view, only deserves to be rejected for the simple reason that this proposition canvassed by the Petitioner does not even flow from a plain reading of the said judgment. In paragraph 21 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court 24 has directed that currency of the suspension order should not extend beyond three months, if within this period memorandum of charges is not served on the delinquent employee. This, in my view, does not lay down an absolute proposition of law that in every case, failure to issue a charge sheet within three months would lead to the suspension order coming to an end, automatically. In fact, in para 22 of the said judgment, the Supreme Court, noting that charge sheet had now been issued to the Appellant, permitted him to challenge his continued suspension, if so advised and this was despite the fact that the charge sheet was issued much beyond a period of 08 months. 10. It may be relevant to note that a Division Bench of this Court in Govt. of NCT of Delhi v. Dr. Rishi Anand, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 10506, had the occasion to consider the same issue and after going through the judgment in Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra), the Division Bench held as follows:- "13. We have heard learned counsels for the parties and considered their submissions. We have also perused the decision of the Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra). In Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra), the appellant had assailed his suspension even before issuance of the charge sheet. He had been suspended with effect from 30.09.2011 and the Supreme Court observed that the same "has been extended and continued ever since". xxx xxx xxx 16. It appears that before the Supreme Court rendered its decision on 16.02.2016, the charge sheet had been served on the appellant though from a reading of the 25 decision it is not clear as to on what date the same was so served. This development was taken note of by the Supreme Court in its decision. In para 22 of the decision, the Supreme Court observed: "22. So far as the facts of the present case are concerned, the appellant has now been served with a charge-sheet, and, therefore, these directions may not be relevant to him any longer. However, if the appellant is so advised he may challenge his continued suspension in any manner known to law, and this action of the respondents will be subject to judicial review". (emphasis supplied) 17. Thus, even though the charge sheet had not been served on the appellant Ajay Kumar Choudhary when he initially assailed his suspension, or even till the hearing of the appeal took place before the Supreme Court on 09.09.2014 (it was only between 09.09.2014 and the date of decision on 16.02.2015 that the charge sheet appears to have been served), the Supreme Court held that since the charge sheet had been served on the appellant, therefore, the directions issued by it would not be relevant to his case. Despite the fact that the appellant Ajay Kumar Choudhary had remained under suspension right from 30.09.2011, the Supreme Court did not set aside the order of suspension since, in the meantime, Ajay Kumar Choudhary had been served with a charge sheet sometime after 09.09.2014, i.e. 26 nearly three years after his suspension. xxx xxx xxx 19. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that a government servant who is suspended in contemplation of a disciplinary proceedings or criminal proceedings under Rule 10 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, should not be kept under suspension indefinitely or unnecessarily. It is for this reason that a review of the on-going suspension is required to be undertaken by the government at regular intervals under Rule 10(6) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, which reads as under: "10(6) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule shall be reviewed by the authority competent to modify or revoke the suspension [before expiry of ninety days from the effective date of suspension] on the recommendation of the Review Committee constituted for the purpose and pass orders either extending or revoking the suspension. Subsequent reviews shall be made before expiry of the extended period of suspension. Extension of suspension shall not be for a period exceeding one hundred and eighty days at a time." (emphasis supplied) 20. It may not always be possible for the government to serve the charge sheet on the officer concerned within a period of 90 days, or even the extended period, for myriad justifiable reasons. At the same time, there 27 may be cases where the conduct of the government servant may be such, that it may be undesirable to recall the suspension and put him in position once again, even after sanitising the environment so that he may not interfere in the proposed inquiry. On a reading of Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra), we are of the view that the Supreme Court has not denuded the Government of its authority to continue/extend the suspension of the government servant - before, or after the service of the charge sheet of if there is sufficient justification for it. The Supreme Court has, while observing that the suspension should not be extended beyond three months if within this period the memorandum of charges/charge-sheet is not served on the delinquent officer, has stopped short of observing that if the charge memo/charge-sheet is not issued within three months of suspension, the suspension of the government servant shall automatically lapse, without any further order being passed by the Government. No such consequence the automatic lapsing of suspension at the expiry of three months if the charge memo/charge-sheet is not issued during that period, has been prescribed. In Kailash v. Nanhku, (2005) 4 SCC 480: AIR 2005 SC 2441, while examining the issue whether the obligation cast on the defendant to file the written statement to the plaint under Rule (1) of Order 8 CPC within the specified time was directory or mandatory i.e. whether the Court could 28 extend the time for filing of the written statement beyond the period specified in Rule 1 of Order 8, the Supreme Court held that the Court had the power to extend the time for filing of the written statement, since there was no consequence prescribed flowing from non-extension of time. In para 29 of this decision, the Supreme Court observed as follows: "29. It is also to be noted that though the power of the court under the proviso appended to Rule 1 Order 8 is circumscribed by the words "shall not be later than ninety days" but the consequences flowing from non- extension of time are not specifically provided for though they may be read in by necessary Implication. Merely because a provision of law is couched in a negative language implying mandatory character, the same is not without exceptions. The courts, when called upon to interpret the nature of the provision, may, keeping in view the entire context in which the provision came to be enacted, hold the same to be directory though worded in the negative form." (emphasis supplied) 21. The direction issued by the Supreme Court is that the currency of the suspension should not be extended beyond three months, if the charge memorandum/charge- sheet is not issued within the period of 3 months of suspension. But it does not say 29 that if, as a matter of fact, it is so extended it would be null and void and of no effect. The power of the competent authority to pass orders under Rule 10(6) of the CCS (CCA) Rules extending the suspension has not been extinguished by the Supreme Court. The said power can be exercised if good reasons therefor are forthcoming. 22. The decision of the Supreme Court in Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) itself shows that there cannot be a hard and fast rule in this regard. If that were so, the Supreme Court would have quashed the suspension of Ajay Kumar Choudhary. However, in view of the fact that the charge memo had been issued to Ajay Kumar Choudhary though after nearly three years of his initial suspension, the Supreme Court held that the directions issued by it would not be relevant to his case. 23. From a reading of the decision in Ajay Kumar Choudhary (supra) and Rule 10 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, it emerges that the government is obliged to record its reasons for extension of the suspension which, if assailed, would be open to judicial scrutiny not as in an appeal, but on grounds available in law for judicial review of administrative action. 24. Learned counsel for the respondent has argued that since the charge sheet/charge memo was not served on the respondent within the initial 90 days of suspension, the suspension of the respondent automatically lapsed. Under Rule 10 of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 30 there is no automatic reinstatement of a suspended government servant upon expiry of 90 days, or the extended period of suspension if, by the date of expiry of such suspension/extended period of suspension, the charge sheet is not issued. The only circumstance in which the suspension of the government servant lapses automatically is the one contained in sub-rule (7) of Rule 10. The same reads as under: "(7) An order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under sub- rules (1) or (2) of this rule shall not be valid after a period of ninety days unless it is extended after review, for a further period before the expiry of ninety days. Provided that no such review of suspension shall be necessary in the case of deemed suspension under sub- rule (2), if the Government servant continues to be under suspension at the time of completion of ninety days of suspension and the ninety days period in such case will count from the date the Government servant detained in custody is released from detention or the date on which the fact of his release from detention is intimated to his appointing authority, whichever is later." (Emphasis supplied) 25. Thus, it is only if the suspension is not extended after review within the initial period of 90 days (in a case to which sub- 31 rule (2) does not apply), that the suspension of the government servant would lapse automatically. In all other cases, the suspension would continue unless and until it is modified or revoked by the competent authority though it would not imply that there is no requirement to conduct periodic renewal of the suspension. This is so provided in sub-rule (5)(a) of Rule 10, which reads as follows: "10(5)(a) Subject to the provisions contained in sub-rule (7), an order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule shall continue to remain in force until it is modified or revoked by the authority competent to do so." (Emphasis supplied) 26. Thus, there is no force in the submission of the respondent that the suspension of the respondent automatically lapsed since the charge sheet was not issued within the initial period of 90 days. Pertinently, the respondents suspension was reviewed and extended by the government within the initial period of 90 days on 27.09.2016. Thus, the suspension of the respondent did not lapse under sub rule (7) of Rule 10 CCS (CCA) Rules." 19. Learned counsel representing the respondents has also relied upon the judgment passed by the Bombay High Court in Writ Petition No.8298 of 2023, titled, Mr. 32 Krishna Tukaram Thorave vs. The Union of India and others, to contend that the instructions issued by the DoPT are not applicable to Central Government employees and the relevant para of the judgment reads as under:- “8. The method of recruitment, salary and allowances, discipline and other conditions of service of various officers of EPFO are to be determined by the Central Board of Trustees. Thus, the administrative instructions issued by the DoPT which are usually applicable to the Central Government employees, are not ipso-facto applicable to the officials of EPFO. It was not mandatory on the part of Central Board of Trustees in EPFO to apply the scheme of grant of NFSG to the officials of EPFO. Nonetheless, the Central Board of Trustees has adopted the scheme for grant of NFSG initially with ceiling of 15% and subsequently with ceiling of 30%, albeit from different dates than the one decided by DoPT.” 20. Learned counsel representing the respondents has further placed reliance upon the judgment passed by this Court in CWP No.1050 of 2022, titled, Ajay Kumar & Others vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, wherein it was held that suspension order is not a punishment. Further the employee is entitled to subsistence allowance during its operation and the employee must obey the suspension order. 33 During the period of suspension order, there is no change in the service condition of the petitioner. 21. Learned counsel for the respondents has also relied upon a three-Judge Bench decision in Balvantrai Ratilal Patel versus State of Maharashtra, AIR 1968 SC 800 to contend that the order of suspension will not come to an end, until another order terminating the suspension is passed. She has vehemently contended that the petitioner can approach the authority for revocation of the suspension order. 22. From the above facts, it can be safely concluded that once there are specific Rules governing the service conditions of the petitioner, it cannot be said that the suspension order after 90 days of serving of the charge-sheet has become non est. Furthermore, once the respondents have conducted an enquiry and the enquiry report has been submitted to respondent No.1-Company, the petitioner cannot be granted any relief inasmuch as the order of 34 suspension cannot be said to be automatically revoked. The petitioner if aggrieved by the continuation of his suspension order, can make a representation to the authorities for its revocation, especially when the enquiry has been completed. 23. Consequently, I do not find any merit in the present petition and the same is accordingly dismissed. However, it is made clear that the petitioner, if wishes, may approach respondent No.1-Company, for revocation of the suspension order, in view of the fact that the enquiry in the matter is complete. In case, such a representation is made by the petitioner before respondent No.1-Company, the same be decided within a period of two weeks, from the date of receipt of the same, uninfluenced by the observation made in this judgment. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. 6 th May, 2026 ( Jiya Lal Bhardwaj ) (ankit) Judge