C/SCA/3782/2026 ORDER DATED: 17/03/2026 IN THE HIGH COURT OF GUJARAT AT AHMEDABAD R/SPECIAL CIVIL APPLICATION NO.3782 of 2026 ========================================= NIRUPKUMAR RAMESHBHAI GAMIT Versus STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. ========================================= Appearance : MR VAIBHAV A VYAS for the Petitioner. MS PRACHI UPADHYAY for the Petitioner. MR AAKASH GUPTA, AGP for the Respondent No.1. ========================================= CORAM:HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE NIRZAR S. DESAI Date : 17/03/2026 ORAL ORDER 1. By way of this petition, the petitioner has prayed for the following reliefs :- “(A) Quash and set aside the charge sheet dated 24.1.2024, Annexure-A to this petition, and (B) Quash and set aside the final show-cause notice dated 28.1.2026, Annexure-B to this petition, and (C) Pending admission and final disposal of this petition, the Honourable Court may be pleased to stay the departmental proceedings initiated against the petitioner pursuant to the impugned charge sheet dated 24.1.2024, Annexure-A, and / or C/SCA/3782/2026 ORDER DATED: 17/03/2026 (D) Pending admission and final disposal of this petition, the Honourable Court may be pleased to stay the operation and implementation of charge sheet dated 24.1.2024, Annexure-A to this petition, and/or (E) Pending admission and final disposal of this petition, the Honourable Court may be pleased to stay the operation and implementation of show cause Annexure-B to this application, and notice dated 28.1.2026, (F) Award the cost of this petition, and (G) Grant any other relief or pass any other order which the Honourable Court may consider as just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.” 2. It is the case of the petitioner that he was selected and appointed to the post of Multipurpose Health Worker, Class-III, after completing the regular selection process initiated by the Gujarat Panchayat Service Selection Board. The petitioner had appeared in the competitive examination and, after successfully clearing the same, was appointed to the said post. The petitioner was appointed in the year 2014 and, after completing satisfactory service for a period of five years, he was placed in regular service and was granted regular pay scale in the year 2020 with effect from 2019. C/SCA/3782/2026 ORDER DATED: 17/03/2026 3. According to the petitioner, the appointment to the post of Multipurpose Health Worker (Male), Class-III is governed by the Multipurpose Health Worker (Male), Class-III (Panchayat Service) Recruitment Rules, 2011. As per the said Rules, in order to be eligible for appointment to the post of Multipurpose Health Worker (Male) by way of direct selection, a candidate is required, inter alia, to possess the qualification of completion of one year training in the Multipurpose Health Worker Basic Course from an institution recognized by the Government, or must have passed the Sanitary Inspector Examination from an institution recognized by the Government. 4. The present petitioner has passed the Diploma Course in Health and Sanitary Inspector (BHSI) Examination from Vinayaka Missions University, which is a Deemed University duly recognized by the University Grants Commission (UGC). After the appointment of the petitioner in the year 2014, for the purpose of verification of the genuineness of their educational qualifications, the petitioner was issued a communication dated 15.09.2018. In response to the said communication, the petitioner submitted the necessary information and relevant documents to the respondent authorities. 5. Since the services of similarly situated employee from another district were terminated, the petitioner, along with other similarly situated persons, approached this Court by filing Special Civil Application No.11430 of 2019. The said petition came to be disposed of by order dated 03.10.2022, in terms of Clause 6 of the operative portion of the judgment and order dated 08.07.2022 passed in Letters Patent Appeal No.1411 of 2018. By the said C/SCA/3782/2026 ORDER DATED: 17/03/2026 order, the order passed by the learned Single Judge setting aside the order of termination was upheld, and the respondents were directed to pay back wages from the date of the order of the learned Single Judge, with a modification in the order passed by the learned Single Judge. The respective District Panchayats were granted liberty to initiate fresh proceedings, if deemed fit, by treating the order of termination as a show-cause notice, and upon consideration of the reply submitted by the concerned employees, to pass a fresh order in accordance with law. It was further clarified by the Court that it had not expressed any opinion with regard to the correctness, authenticity, or validity of the diploma certificates produced in the petition. The District Panchayats were directed to issue show-cause notices and were also directed to furnish copies of the internal inquiry report to the concerned employees. 6. Pursuant to the aforesaid orders, the petitioner was issued fresh show-cause notice, followed by charge sheet and fresh departmental inquiry was initiated against the petitioner herein. The show-cause notice was issued on 29.11.2022, thereafter, the charge sheet was issued on 24.01.2024, and subsequently a final show-cause notice came to be issued on 28.01.2026. 7. In view of the above, the present petition has been preferred by the petitioner seeking the reliefs as incorporated in the foregoing paragraphs. 8. Learned advocate Mr. Vaibhav Vyas submitted that though the petitioner has filed the present petition seeking extensive reliefs, the limited relief now pressed for by the C/SCA/3782/2026 ORDER DATED: 17/03/2026 petitioner is that in the event the respondents ultimately pass any order imposing penalty upon the petitioner, the implementation of such order may be stayed for a specific period, as may be deemed appropriate by this Court. 8.1. Learned advocate Mr. Vaibhav Vyas submitted that so far as the legal position is concerned, the petitioner is not disputing the same. However, considering the fact that the petitioner has been in employment for almost 12 years, his appointment relating back to the year 2014, it is submitted that his services may not be abruptly terminated. Therefore, it is prayed that in the event any order of punishment is imposed upon the petitioner in future, the implementation of such order may be kept in abeyance for a specific period, as may be deemed appropriate by this Court. 8.2. Learned advocate Mr. Vaibhav Vyas relied upon two decisions of this Court. In the case of Gopalbhai Veneeshankar Ladhwa vs. State of Gujarat, in Letters Patent Appeal No.651 of 2024, by order dated 20.03.2025, the Division Bench of this Court issued direction of not to implement the final order of punishment for a period of two weeks. Learned advocate Mr. Vyas also relied upon the decision dated 25.09.2025 passed in Special Civil Application No. 13539 of 2025, in the case of Vaibhavkumar Prabhatsangh Palania vs. State of Gujarat, wherein the Coordinate Bench of this Court directed the respondents to keep the order of punishment in abeyance for a period of two weeks. Learned advocate Mr. Vyas, therefore, submitted that with this limited prayer, the present petition has been preferred. C/SCA/3782/2026 ORDER DATED: 17/03/2026 8.3 Learned advocate Mr. Vyas did not make any other submissions nor did he rely upon any other judgments except the orders and judgments already annexed with the petition. 9. Learned AGP Mr. Aakash Gupta vehemently opposed the petition and submitted that it is a settled legal position that the present petition is premature, inasmuch as the departmental inquiry has already been concluded and only a final show-cause notice has been issued to the petitioners. It is submitted that no order of punishment has been passed as of now, and therefore, as on date, there is no adverse order passed against the present petitioner. 9.1. Learned AGP further relied upon a recent decision of the Coordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Ashishkumar Vithaldas Gohil vs. State of Gujarat and Others, decided on 24.12.2025 in Special Civil Application No. 17857 of 2025. Relying upon the observations made in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the said judgment, it was submitted that the present petition is not only premature but is also liable to be dismissed without grant of any relief in favour of the petitioner. 9.2. Learned AGP drew the attention of this Court to the observations made by the Coordinate Bench, which relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Odisha and Others vs. Satishkumar Ishwardas Gajbhiye and Others, reported in (2021) 7 SCC 90. By placing reliance upon the said decision, as well as the observations made by the Coordinate Bench in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the judgment dated 24.12.2025 in the case of Ashishkumar Vithaldas Gohil (supra), C/SCA/3782/2026 ORDER DATED: 17/03/2026 learned AGP prayed for dismissal of the petition. 10. I have heard learned advocates for the parties and perused the record. It cannot be disputed by learned advocate Mr. Vaibhav Vyas that the legal proposition, in respect of the facts of the case, is settled and that to the extent that though the petition is premature, the petition is preferred with a limited prayer to keep the proposed order of punishment in abeyance for a specific period, and therefore, I do not wish to elaborately state as to how the petition is premature, as the same could not be disputed by learned advocate Mr. Vaibhav Vyas. 11. In view of the above factual background, the only question that remains to be considered is whether, when the petitioner has participated in the ongoing inquiry and considering the fact that this is the second round of litigation, the prayer made by the petitioner to keep the proposed order of punishment in abeyance for a specific period deserves to be granted or not. Therefore, the submission made by learned AGP is required to be considered, particularly when, according to him, the issue is covered by the latest decision of the Coordinate Bench. Accordingly, the observations made by the Coordinate Bench in paragraphs 9 and 10 are required to be considered. 12. I have also considered the fact that what is under challenge by way of the present petition is the charge sheet as well as the show-cause notice, and therefore the observations made by the Coordinate Bench in paragraphs 9 and 10 are required to be taken into consideration. . In paragraphs 9 and 10, the Coordinate Bench, in the case of Ashishkumar Vithaldas Gohil (supra), C/SCA/3782/2026 ORDER DATED: 17/03/2026 made the following observations :- “[9] It is more or less settled legal position of law that mere issuance of a charge-sheet and or show cause notice would not amount to any penalty or consider to be an adverse order passed against delinquent. Since both the sides, in support their respective submissions, have relied upon the same decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court; it would be apt to refer few observations from the said decision in the case of Kunisetty Satyanarayana (Supra), which reads as under: “11. Instead of replying to the aforesaid Charge Memo, the respondent filed an OA before the Central Administrative Tribunal, Hyderabad which was disposed of vide order 15.3.2004 with the direction to the applicant to submit his reply to the Charge Memo dated 23.12.2003 and on submission of the said reply the Disciplinary Authority should consider the same. Instead of filing any reply the respondent filed a Writ Petition in the High Court which has been allowed, and hence this appeal. 12. In our advice, the High Court was not justified in allowing the Writ Petition. 13. It is well settled by a series of decisions of this Court that ordinarily no writ lies against a charge sheet or show-cause notice vide Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board vs. Ramdesh Kumar Singh and others JT 1995 (8) SC 331, Special Director and another vs. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse and another AIR 2004 SC 1467, Ulagappa and others vs. Divisional Commissioner, Mysore and others 2001(10) SCC 639, State of U.P. vs. Brahm Datt Sharma and another AIR 1987 SC 943 etc. 14. The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should not be entertained against a mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet is that at that stage the writ petition may be held to be premature. A mere charge-sheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show-cause notice or after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold C/SCA/3782/2026 ORDER DATED: 17/03/2026 that the charges are not established. It is well settled that a writ lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of any one. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance. 15. Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and hence such discretion under Article 226 should not ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show-cause notice or charge sheet. 16. No doubt, in some very rare and exceptional cases the High Court can quash a charge-sheet or show-cause notice if it is found to be wholly without jurisdiction or for some other reason if it is wholly illegal. However, ordinarily the High Court should not interfere in such a matter.” (emphasis supplied) [9.1] Thus, in view of the aforesaid position of law, mere issuance of a charge-sheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action. At the same time, as a word of caution, the Court has also said that in very rare and exceptional circumstances, the High Court can exercise its discretionary powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and may quash a charge-sheet or show- cause notice, as the case may be, but when it is found that it is wholly without jurisdiction or it’s illegal. [9.2] In view of above, the petitioner must make out a rare and exceptional case to entertain this Writ Petition. [10] The entire emphasis in challenging the impugned charge- sheet is based upon premise that no preliminary inquiry should have been undertaken by respondent No.1, and that upon receipt of the preliminary inquiry, the impugned charge-sheet could not have been served upon the petitioner. [10.1] The heavy reliance is placed upon the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Satish Kumar Ishwardas Gajbhiye & Ors (supra). The facts of aforesaid decision are entirely distinct from the present one, as set out below: “(i) In the case before the Hon’ble Apex Court, the preliminary inquiry was conducted covertly as the C/SCA/3782/2026 ORDER DATED: 17/03/2026 delinquent was not made aware of it; Whereas, the petitioner herein was called upon during course of the preliminary inquiry, then had its knowledge. (ii) When the delinquent was served with the charge-sheet, he immediately approached the Central Administrative Tribunal (CAT), challenging the charge-sheet; Whereas, the petitioner herein has not only participated in the departmental inquiry without any demur but not questioned the chargesheet till its end. (iii) The phrasing of the article of charges clearly revealed formation of advice of the authorities in finding of guilt of the delinquent; Nothing sort of this pointed out by the petitioner in this regard.” [10.2] It would also be apt to refer the observations of Satish Kumar Ishwardas Gajbhiye & Ors (supra), which read thus: “13. We do not think the position of law has changed since then. In the case of Champaklal Chimanlal Shah v. The Union of India, 1964 AIR(SC) 1854, some form of preliminary enquiry was found to be justifiable under certain circumstances. It was observed in this judgment: "12. Before however we consider the facts of this case, we should like to make certain general observations in connection with disciplinary proceedings taken against public servants. It is well known that government does not terminate the services of a public servant, be he even a temporary servant, without reason; nor is it usual for government to reduce a public servant in rank without reason even though he may be holding the higher rank only temporarily. One reason for terminating the services of a temporary servant may be that the post that he is holding comes to an end. In that case there is nothing further to be said and his services terminate when the post comes to an end. Similarly a government servant temporarily officiating in a higher rank may have to be reverted to his substantive post where the incumbent of the higher post comes back to duty or where the higher post created for a temporary period comes to an end. But besides the above, the government may find it necessary to terminate the services of a temporary servant if it is not satisfied with his conduct or his suitability for the job and or his work. The same may apply to the reversion of a public servant from a higher post to a lower post where the C/SCA/3782/2026 ORDER DATED: 17/03/2026 post is held as a temporary measure. This dissatisfaction with the work and/or conduct of a temporary servant may arise on complaint against him. In such cases two courses are open to government. It may decide to dispense with the services of the servant or revert him to substantive post without any action being taken to punish him for his bad work and/or conduct. Or the Government may decide to punish such a servant for his bad work or misconduct, in which case even though the servant may be temporary he will have the protection of Article 311(2). But even where it is intended to take action by way of punishment what usually happens is that something in the nature of what may be called a preliminary enquiry is first held in connection with the alleged misconduct or unsatisfactory work . In this preliminary enquiry the explanation of the government servant may be taken and documentary and even oral evidence may be considered. It is usual when such a preliminary enquiry makes out a prima facie case against the servant concerned that charges are then framed against him and he is asked to show cause why disciplinary action be not taken against him. An enquiry officer (who may be himself in the case where the appointing authority is other than the Govern- ment) is appointed who holds enquiry into the charges communicated to the servant concerned after taking his explanation and this enquiry is held in accordance with the principles of natural justice. This is what is known as a formal departmental enquiry into the conduct of a public servant. In this enquiry evidence both documentary and oral may be led against the public servant concerned and he has a right to cross- examine the witnesses tendered against him. He has also the right to give documentary and oral evidence in his defence, if he thinks necessary to do so. After the enquiry is over, the enquiry officer makes a report to the Government or the authority having power to take action against the servant concerned. The government or the authority makes up its mind on the enquiry report as to whether the charges have been proved or not and if it holds that some or all the charges have been proved, it determines tentatively the punishment, to be, inflicted on the public servant concerned. It then communicates a copy of the enquiry officer's report and its own conclusion thereon and asks him to show cause why the tentative punishment decided upon be, not inflicted upon him. This procedure is required by Article 311(2) of the Constitution in the case of the three major punishments i.e. dismissal, or removal or reduction in rank. The servant, concerned has then an C/SCA/3782/2026 ORDER DATED: 17/03/2026 opportunity of showing case by making a representation that the conclusions arrived at the departmental enquiry are incorrect and in any case the punishment proposed to be inflicted is too harsh." 18. We have quoted the judgment of the Calcutta High Court (supra), with which we concur. The principle of law that emerges from that judgment is that though a private citizen is permitted to do what is not prohibited in law, a statutory authority can do only what is permissible in law. As such in our considered view, the order directing the preliminary inquiry in the present case, in the form it was undertaken, was not justified in law. In situations where Rules do not provide for holding preliminary enquiry before initiating disciplinary action, the principle laid down in the case of Champaklal Chimanlal Shah (supra) would prevail. But the nature of enquiry in such a situation would be in the nature of information gathering exercise, on the basis of which the authorities would decide whether to proceed in the matter or not. In this case, as we have already observed, the preliminary enquiry resulted in issue of Article of Charges, the phrasing of which clearly revealed formation of advice of the authorities in finding of guilt of the respondent no. 1.” (emphasis supplied) [10.3] So, in the peculiar background of the facts, the Hon’ble Apex Court in aforesaid decision held that the issuance of charge- sheet against the delinquent on the basis of the preliminary inquiry is bad in law. Nonetheless, it is not an absolute proposition of law that no preliminary inquiry can be initiated by the State prior to issuance of a charge-sheet. [10.4] It is remained undisputed in the case on hand that during the course of preliminary inquiry, petitioner was called upon by the authority concerned and after recording his statement, report was prepared. The petitioner has all thorough out without raising any objection participated in the departmental inquiry, rather on its conclusion when called upon, replied to the show cause notice as well. Nothing is made out on the record to show that authority in present case has formed any advice of guilt against the petitioner when issued the impugned charge-sheet, rather as can be seen, the principles of natural justice has been observed at all stages. In view of the aforesaid, the said decision would not help the case of the petitioner. Page 12 of 14 C/SCA/3782/2026 ORDER DATED: 17/03/2026 [10.5] Even, the bare perusal of the impugned charge-sheet, produced on record, would indicate that issuance of charge-sheet was not solely on the basis of the preliminary report. Even otherwise, at the relevant point of time, when the petitioner has not questioned the impugned charge-sheet, rather, participated in the inquiry, then as per the doctrine of estoppel and waiver, at this belatedly stage, petitioner cannot be allowed to challenge the impugned charge-sheet, on any counts.” 13. Apart from and in addition to the above observations, what is considered by this Court is the fact that on an earlier occasion also, in the year 2019, the petitioner had preferred a petition challenging the action of the respondents, apprehending termination. At that time, the petitioner’s case was considered and whatever procedural lacuna was alleged was subsequently corrected by the respondent authority. 14. Today, when the inquiry has already concluded and a subsequent show-cause notice has been issued to the petitioner, learned advocate Mr. Vaibhav Vyas could not point out any procedural lacuna in respect of the subsequent show-cause notice issued pursuant to the order passed by the Coordinate Bench in the first round of litigation. 15. Therefore, when no procedural illegality has been pointed out by learned advocate Mr. Vaibhav Vyas, I do not see any reason to keep the proposed order of punishment in abeyance for a specific period, simply for the reason that the show-cause notice issued by the respondents, though answered by the petitioner, is yet to be considered by the respondents. If any relief is granted in favour of the petitioner at this stage, the same may influence the ongoing departmental proceedings and the issue relating to the C/SCA/3782/2026 ORDER DATED: 17/03/2026 imposition of punishment, if at all the respondents decide to impose any major penalty upon the present petitioner. 16. Therefore, at this juncture, when learned advocate Mr. Vaibhav Vyas could not point out any procedural illegality in the ongoing departmental inquiry, including the show-cause notice, I do not deem it appropriate to pass any order directing the respondent authorities to keep the proposed order of punishment in abeyance for a specific period. 17. However, it is clarified that this Court has not considered the matters on merits, and as and when, and if at all, orders of punishment are imposed upon the petitioners, it will always be open for the petitioners to raise all the contentions which they may wish to raise, even on merits, in accordance with law. 18. Accordingly, without entering into the merits of the matter, and considering the fact that the petitioner could not point out any procedural irregularity, as well as considering that the present petition is premature in nature, the present petition stands dismissed and the same is accordingly dismissed. (NIRZAR S. DESAI,J) SAVARIYA Original copy of this order has been signed by the Hon'ble Judge. Digitally signed by: RAJNISH NARENDRA SAVARIYA(HC00179), PRINCIPAL PRIVATE SECRETARY, at High Court of Gujarat on 17/03/2026 17:35:10