2026:HHC:11 IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. Appeal No. 208 of 2013 Reserved on: 16.12.2025 Date of Decision: 01.01.2026 State of H.P. ...Appellant Versus Suresh Kumar ...Respondent Coram Hon’ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting?1 No For the Appellant/State: Mr Prashant Sen, Deputy Advocate General. For the Respondent : M/s Dushyat Dadwal and Shashwat Dadwal, Advocates. Rakesh Kainthla, Judge The present appeal is directed against the judgment dated 23.01.2013, passed by learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No.2, Palampur, District Kangra (learned Trial Court) vide which the respondent (accused before the learned Trial Court) was acquitted of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304-A of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same 1 Whether reporters of Local Papers may be allowed to see the judgment? Yes. 2 2026:HHC:11 manner as they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience.) 2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present appeal are that the police presented a challan against the accused before the learned Trial Court for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of the IPC. It was asserted that the informant Pyare Lal (PW6) was going to the Gas Agency in Lamba Gaon on 18.05.2010 at about 10:15 AM. Rajinder Kumar (since deceased) came from Lamba Gaon riding a bike bearing registration No. HP-34A-1844 towards Jhunga Devi. A Tipper bearing registration No. HP-37B-5172 came from Jhunga Devi and hit the motorcycle. Rajinder Kumar (since deceased) fell and sustained injuries to his head. The Tipper stopped after some distance. The driver identified himself as Suresh Kumar. The accident occurred due to the high speed of the Tipper and the negligence of the accused. The matter was reported to the police, and an entry (Ext.PW9/A) was recorded in the Police Station. SI Gambhir Chand (PW8) visited the spot to verify the correctness of the information. He recorded the informant’s statement (Ext.PW1/A) and sent it to the Police Station, where FIR (Ext.PW8/B) was registered. SI Gambhir Chand (PW8) conducted 3 2026:HHC:11 the inquest on the dead body and prepared the report (Ext.PW8/D). He filed an application (Ext. PX) for conducting the postmortem examination of Rajinder Kumar and obtained the postmortem report (Ext.PY). SI Gambhir Chand (PW8) took the photographs of the spot (Ext.PW8/E1 to Ext.PW8/E5). He prepared the site plan (Ext.PW8/F). He seized the Tipper and motorcycle vide memo (Ext.PW4/A). He seized the documents of the tipper and the motorcycle vide memos (Ext.PA and Ex.PW4/B). Rajinder Kumar (PW3) examined the motorcycle and Tipper. He found that there was no mechanical defect in them that could have led to the accident. He issued the reports (Ext.PW3/A and Ext.PW3/B). SI Gambhir Chand (PW8) handed over the motorcycle to the owner Sanjeev Kumar vide memo (Ext.PW2/A). The owner of the tipper, Karan, issued a certificate (Ext.PB) stating that the accused was driving the tipper at the time of the accident. The statements of prosecution witnesses were recorded as per their version, and after completion of the investigation, the challan was prepared and presented before the learned Trial Court. 3. Learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to summon the accused. When the accused appeared, a notice of 4 2026:HHC:11 accusation was put to him for the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304-A of the IPC, to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. 4. The prosecution examined nine witnesses to prove its case. Janak Singh (PW1) and Bishamber Dass (PW5) are eyewitnesses. Mahinder Singh (PW2), Sarvan (PW4) and Sanjeev Kumar (PW7) witnessed various recoveries. Rajinder Kumar (PW3) conducted the mechanical examination of the vehicle. Informant Pyare Lal (PW6) did not support the prosecution’s case. SI Gambhir Singh (PW8) investigated the matter. HC Subhash Chand (PW9) proved the entry in the daily diary and signed the FIR. 5. The accused, in his statement recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., admitted that he was driving the tipper bearing registration No. HP 37B-5172 at the time of the accident. He stated that he was driving the tipper at a slow speed. The witnesses were related to Rajinder, and they deposed falsely against the accused. He claimed that he was innocent. He did not produce any evidence in defence. 6. Learned Trial Court held that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were not satisfactory. Informant Pyare Lal 5 2026:HHC:11 did not support the prosecution’s case. The witnesses stated that the tipper was being driven at a high speed, but failed to give any estimate of the speed. No skid marks were found on the spot to show that the tipper was being driven at a high speed. The site plan (Ext. PW8/F) showed that there was sufficient space for the motorcycle to cross. The motorcycle had hit the rear tyre of the tipper, and the negligence of the accused was not established. Hence, the learned Trial Court acquitted the accused of the commission of offences punishable under Sections 279 and 304A of the IPC. 7. Being aggrieved by the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court, the State has filed the present appeal asserting that the learned Trial Court failed to properly appreciate the material on record. The testimonies of prosecution witnesses were discarded for untenable reasons. Janak Singh (PW1) and Bishamber Dass (PW5) specifically stated that the accident occurred due to the high speed of the tipper and the negligence of the accused. These statements were ignored by the learned Trial Court. The mere fact that the informant, Pyare Lal, had not supported the prosecution’s case was not sufficient to acquit the accused. Therefore, it was prayed that the present 6 2026:HHC:11 appeal be allowed and the judgments and order passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 8. I have heard Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellant/State and Mr Dushyant Dadwal and Shashwat Dadwal, learned counsel for the respondent/accused. 9. Mr Prashant Sen, learned Deputy Advocate General, for the appellant/State, submitted that the learned Trial Court failed to properly appreciate the material on record. The eyewitnesses specifically stated that the accident had occurred due to the negligence of the accused and the high speed of the tipper. The site plan proved that the accident had occurred on the right side of the road for the tipper. Driving the tipper towards the right side was an act of negligence. Learned Trial Court relied upon the testimony of Pyare Lal to record the acquittal. However, he was declared hostile and cross-examined with his previous statement. His statement could not have been used to discard the prosecution’s case. Hence, he prayed that the present appeal be allowed and the judgment passed by the learned Trial Court be set aside. 7 2026:HHC:11 10. Mr Dushyant Dadwal, learned counsel for the respondent/accused, submitted that the mere use of the term “high speed” is not sufficient to prove the negligence of the accused, unless the approximate speed of the vehicle was established. Learned Trial Court had rightly held that there was no evidence of the approximate speed of the tipper. The site plan does not correctly depict the spot position because Jhunga Devi and Lamba Gaon are not mentioned in it, and it cannot be inferred that the tipper was being driven towards the right side of the road. Learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while recording the acquittal, and this Court should not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court while deciding an appeal against acquittal. Hence, he prayed that the appeal be dismissed. 11. I have given considerable thought to the submissions made at the bar and have gone through the records carefully. 12. The present appeal has been filed against a judgment of acquittal. It was laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 176: (2025) 5 SCC 433 that the Court can interfere with a judgment of acquittal if it is patently perverse, is based on 8 2026:HHC:11 misreading/omission to consider the material evidence and reached at a conclusion which no reasonable person could have reached. It was observed at page 440: “12. It could thus be seen that it is a settled legal position that the interference with the finding of acquittal recorded by the learned trial judge would be warranted by the High Court only if the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity; that the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; and that no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record.” 13. This position was reiterated in P. Somaraju v. State of A.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2291, wherein it was observed: “ 12. To summarise, an Appellate Court undoubtedly has full power to review and reappreciate evidence in an appeal against acquittal under Sections 378 and 386 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973. However, due to the reinforced or ‘double’ presumption of innocence after acquittal, interference must be limited. If two reasonable views are possible on the basis of the record, the acquittal should not be disturbed. Judicial intervention is only warranted where the Trial Court's view is perverse, based on misreading or ignoring material evidence, or results in a manifest miscarriage of justice. Moreover, the Appellate Court must address the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal before reversing it and assigning its own. A catena of the recent judgments of this Court has more firmly entrenched this position, including, inter alia, Mallappa v. State of Karnataka 2024 INSC 104, Ballu @ Balram @ Balmukund v. The State of Madhya Pradesh 2024 INSC 258, Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka 2024 INSC 320, and Constable 907 Surendra Singh v. State of Uttarakhand 2025 INSC 114.” 9 2026:HHC:11 14. The present appeal has to be decided as per the parameters laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. 15. Site plan (Ext.PW8/F) shows the road going from Alampur towards Jaisinghpur. It does not show Lamba Gaon or Jhunga Devi, which were mentioned in the statement (Ext.PW8/A). It mentions the place of the accident at point ‘A’, but in the absence of Jhunga Devi and Lamba Gaon, it cannot be concluded that the truck was towards the right side of the road. The site plan shows the tipper at point ‘C’, and its face is shown towards Jaisinghpur. If it is concluded that the tipper was going towards Jaisinghpur, the point ‘A’ was towards the left side of the tipper, and the site plan does not support the prosecution’s case that the tipper was being driven towards the wrong side of the road. Thus, not much advantage can be derived by the prosecution from the site plan. 16. Janak Singh (PW1) stated that a tipper came from Bhawarna and a motorcycle came from Lambagaon. Tipper hit the motorcycle. The accident occurred due to the negligence of the tipper driver because he had not provided sufficient space for the motorcycle to cross. He stated in his cross-examination that the tipper was going uphill and the motorcycle was going 10 2026:HHC:11 downhill. He admitted that the vehicle has a slow speed while going uphill and a higher speed while going downhill. He admitted that he was behind the tipper and could not see the motorcycle. 17. The statement of this witness does not establish the prosecution’s case. He admitted that a vehicle going uphill has a slower speed compared to a vehicle going downhill. Since the tipper was going uphill, the tipper had a slower speed than the motorcycle, as per his version. Therefore, his cross-examination does not support his statement in the examination-in-chief that the tipper was being driven at a high speed. 18. He admitted in his cross-examination that he was moving behind the tipper and could not see the motorcycle. Therefore, he had not witnessed the actual accident, and his testimony cannot be used to conclude the rashness or negligence of the accused. 19. Bishambar Dass (PW5) stated that he and Janak Raj were returning to their home. They saw a tipper coming from Jhunga Devi at a high speed. A motorcycle was coming from Lamba Gaon. The tipper hit the motorcycle. The accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused because he had not 11 2026:HHC:11 moved his vehicle to the side of the road, and had not provided any space for the motorcyclist to cross. He admitted in his cross- examination that the tipper was going uphill and the motorcycle was going downhill. He admitted that the motorcyclist was driving the motorcycle at a high speed. He could not say that the motorcycle skidded and hit the rear tyre. He volunteered to say that the tipper was towards its side and the motorcycle was towards the other side. 20. The testimony of this witness also does not establish the prosecution’s case. He stated in his cross-examination that the motorcycle was being driven at a high speed. His statement that the truck had not provided sufficient space for the motorcycle to cross is falsified by the site plan, wherein the accident is shown to have taken place towards the own side of the road. Further, his statement that the tipper was towards its side and the motorcycle was towards the other side shows that the tipper driver was driving the tipper towards the correct side; hence, his testimony does not establish the prosecution’s case. 21. Pyare Lal (PW6) did not support the prosecution’s case. He was permitted to be cross-examined. He denied that Rajinder Kumar was riding the motorcycle, and a tipper came 12 2026:HHC:11 from the opposite side, which hit the motorcycle. He denied that the tipper was moving at a high speed. He admitted that Janak Singh and Bhishambar had reached the spot in his presence. He admitted that the driver of the tipper revealed his name as Suresh, and he was the accused present in the Court. 22. His testimony does not support the prosecution’s case. He categorically denied that the accused was driving the tipper at a high speed. Thus, no advantage can be derived from his testimony. 23. It was submitted that the eyewitnesses stated that the tipper was being driven at a high speed, which shows the recklessness of the accused. This submission will not help the prosecution. Learned Trial Court had rightly noticed that the mere use of the term “high speed” by a witness is not sufficient unless the approximate speed of the vehicle is mentioned. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohanta Lal vs. State of West Bengal 1968 ACJ 124 that the use of the term ‘high speed’ by a witness amounts to nothing unless it is elicited from the witness what is understood by the term 'high speed'. It was observed: 13 2026:HHC:11 “Further, no attempt was made to find out what this witness understood by high speed. To one man, the speed of even 10 or 20 miles per hour may appear to be high, while to another, even a speed of 25 or 30 miles per hour may appear to be a reasonable speed. On the evidence in this case, therefore, it could not be held that the appellant was driving the bus at a speed which would justify holding that he was driving the bus rashly and negligently. The evidence of the two conductors indicates that he tried to stop the bus by applying the brakes; yet, Gopinath Dey was struck by the bus, though not from the front side of the bus, as he did not fall in front of the bus but fell sideways near the corner of the two roads. It is quite possible that he carelessly tried to run across the road, dashed into the bus and was thrown back by the moving bus, with the result that he received the injuries that resulted in his death.” 24. This position was reiterated in State of Karnataka vs. Satish 1998 (8) SCC 493, wherein it was held: “Merely because the truck was being driven at a "high speed" does not bespeak of either "negligence" or "rashness" by itself. None of the witnesses examined by the prosecution could give any indication, even approximately, as to what they meant by "high speed". "High speed" is a relative term. It was for the prosecution to bring on record material to establish as to what it meant by "high speed" in the facts and circumstances of the case. In a criminal trial, the burden of providing everything essential to the establishment of the charge against an accused always rests on the prosecution, and there is a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused until the contrary is proved. Criminality is not to be presumed, subject, of course, to some statutory exceptions. There is no such statutory exception pleaded in the present case. In the absence of any material on the record, no presumption of "rashness" or "negligence" could be drawn by invoking the maxim "res ipsa loquitur.” 14 2026:HHC:11 25. This Court also held in the State of H.P. Vs. Madan Lal 2003 Latest H.L.J. (2) 925 that speed alone is not a criterion for judging rashness or negligence. It was observed: - “It may be pointed out that speed alone is not a criterion to decide rashness or negligence on the part of a driver. The deciding factor, however, is the situation in which the accident occurs.” 26. This position was reiterated in the State of H.P. Vs. Parmodh Singh 2008 Latest HLJ (2) 1360 wherein it was held: “Thus, negligent or rash driving of the vehicle has to be proved by the prosecution during the trial, which cannot be automatically presumed even on the basis of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Mere driving of a vehicle at a high speed or slow speed does not lead to an inference that negligent or rash driving had caused the accident resulting in injuries to the complainant. In fact, speed is no criterion to establish the fact of rash and negligent driving of a vehicle. It is only a rash and negligent act as its ingredients, to which the prosecution has failed to prove in the instant case.” 27. Therefore, the accused cannot be held liable merely because the witnesses had stated that the tipper was being driven at a high speed. 28. It was submitted that the witnesses stated that the accident occurred because of the negligence of the accused. This submission will not help the prosecution. A witness can only depose about the fact which had occurred in his presence, and he 15 2026:HHC:11 is not permitted to draw inferences from the facts. The inferences have to be drawn by the Jury or the Judge when he is sitting without a Jury. It was laid down by Goddard LJ in Hollington v. Hawthorn 1943 KB 507 at 595 that a witness cannot depose about negligence. It was observed: “It frequently happens that a bystander has a full and complete view of an accident. It is beyond question that while he may inform the court of everything he saw, he may not express any opinion on whether either or both of the parties were negligent. The reason commonly assigned is that this is the precise question the court has to decide, but in truth, it is because his opinion is not relevant. Any fact that he can prove is relevant, but his opinion is not.” 29. Similar is the judgment in State of H.P. vs. Niti Raj 2009 Cr.L.J. 1922 (HP), where it was held: “It is not necessary for a witness to say that the driver of an offending vehicle was driving the vehicle rashly. The issue whether the vehicle was being driven in a rash and negligent manner is a conclusion to be drawn on the basis of evidence led before the Court.” 30. Thus, no advantage can be derived from the statement made to the witnesses that the accident occurred due to the negligence of the accused. 31. Therefore, the learned Trial Court had taken a reasonable view while acquitting the accused, and this Court will 16 2026:HHC:11 not interfere with the reasonable view of the learned Trial Court even if another view is possible. 32. In view of the above, the present appeal fails, and it is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of 33. In view of the provisions of Section 437-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 481 of Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) the respondent is directed to furnish bail bonds in the sum of ₹50,000/- with one surety of the like amount to the satisfaction of the learned Registrar (Judicial) of this Court/ learned Trial Court which shall be effective for six months with a stipulation that in the event of a Special Leave Petition being filed against this judgment or on grant of the leave, the respondent on receipt of notice thereof shall appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 34. A copy of the judgment, along with the record of the learned Trial Court, be sent back forthwith. (Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 1st January, 2026 (Nikita)