HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5542 MFA No. 2839 of 2019 - 1 - R IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU DATED THIS THE 31ST DAY OF JANUARY, 2026 BEFORE THE HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE TARA VITASTA GANJU MFA NO. 2839 OF 2019 (MV-D) BETWEEN: 1. SMT LAKSHMAMMA W/O LATE GANGAPPA AGED ABOUT 62 YEARS 2. RAMAKRISHNAPPA AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS S/O LATE GANGAPPA PRESENTLY R/A C/O NARASAPPA NO.8, 10TH CROSS KUSHALAPPA LAYOUT BHUVANESHWARI NAGAR BENGALURU-560040 PERMANENT R/O MALLASANDRA VILLAGE G BOMMASANDRA POST GOWRIBIDANUR TALUK CHIKKABALLAPURA DISTRICT-561 208 …APPELLANTS (BY SRI. NAGARAJA REDDY.D., ADVOCATE) AND: 1. UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO LTD NO.1114/63, II FLOOR TAKUR COMPLEX, S C ROAD YESHWANTHPURA BANGALORE-560 022 REP. BY ITS MANAGER 2. SRI NARASIMHA S MAJOR, NO.8, 3RD CROSS HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5542 MFA No. 2839 of 2019 - 2 - 8TH MAIN, NEAR LCR SCHOOL GOKULA, YESHWANTHAPURA BENGALURU-560 022 …RESPONDENTS (BY SMT.MANJULA N. TEJASWI, ADVOCATE FOR R1; VIDE ORDER DTD 20.03.2024 NOTICE TO R2 IS HELD SUFFICIENT) THIS MFA IS FILED UNDER SECTION 173(1) OF MV ACT AGAINST THE JUDGMENT AND AWARD DATED 30.10.14 PASSED IN MVC NO.4317/12 ON THE FILE OF THE MEMBER, MACT & XX ASCJ, BENGALURU [SCCH-22], PARTLY ALLOWING THE CLAIM PETITION FOR COMPENSATION AND SEEKING ENHANCEMENT OF COMPENSATION. THIS APPEAL, COMING ON FOR HEARING, THIS DAY, JUDGMENT WAS DELIVERED THEREIN AS UNDER: CORAM: HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE TARA VITASTA GANJU ORAL JUDGMENT 1. The present appeal has been filed, Judgment and Award dated 30.10.2014, in MVC No.4317/2012 passed by the Learned XX Additional Small Causes Judge and Member, MACT, at Bengaluru, [hereinafter referred to as the “Impugned Award”]. 2. By the Impugned Award, the appellants/claimants have been awarded a compensation of Rs.3,10,000/- with interest at the rate of 6% per annum. The liability however, was accorded on the owner of the vehicle alone by the learned Tribunal. HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5542 MFA No. 2839 of 2019 - 3 - 3. Briefly the facts are that, on 09.03.2012 at about 07.30 p.m. the deceased Gangappa (husband of the appellant No.1 and father of appellant No.2) was riding as a pillion rider on a motorcycle bearing Registration No.KA-43-H-8794, and near Alipura-Thondabavi road, near Jyothinagar Lake Brigde, Gowribidanur Taluk. At that time, the rider of a Bajaj Caliber Duo bearing Registration No.KA-04-X-730 stated to be driving at a high speed in a rash and negligent manner collided with the motorcycle. As a result of which, the deceased fell from the motorcycle and sustained severe injuries. He was immediately shifted to Government Hospital, Gowribidanur, and thereafter to Bowring and Lady Curzon Hospital, Bengaluru. The deceased however, succumbed to his injuries on 11.03.2012. 4. The appellants/claimants filed a claim petition before the learned Tribunal. The matter was contested by the Respondent/Insurance Company before the learned Tribunal. The owner did not appear despite service and was proceeded with ex parte. HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5542 MFA No. 2839 of 2019 - 4 - 5. Based on the pleadings between the parties, the learned Tribunal framed the following issues: "1. Whether the petitioners prove that the accident occurred on 09.03.2012 at about 7.30 p.m. near Gowribidanur Taluk, Jyothinagar lake bridge, Chikkaballapura District was caused due to rash and negligent driving of Bajaj Caliber Deo bearing Reg. No.KA-04-X-730 by its driver who dashed against Hero Honda Motor cycle bearing Reg. to which deceased No.KA-43-H-8494. Due Gangappa who was travelling as a pillion rider in the said vehicle sustained grievous injuries and succumbed to it? 2. Whether 1 respondent further proves that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the claim petition as contended in para No.3 of his written statement? 3. Whether 1st respondent proves that the rider of Motor cycle bearing Reg. No.KA-43-H-8494 was not holding valid and effective Driving licence as on the date of accident? 4. Whether the petitioners are entitled for compensation? If so, how much and from whom? 5. What order or Award?" 6. The learned Tribunal after examining the pleadings and evidence between the parties passed the Impugned Award awarding compensation in the sum of Rs.3,10,000/- to the appellants/claimants. 7. Learned counsel for the appellants/claimants raises three contentions before this Court which are: HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5542 MFA No. 2839 of 2019 - 5 - (i) Firstly, he submits that, the learned Tribunal has considered the notional income of the deceased at Rs.5,000/- per month. However, as per the circular issued by the Karnataka Legal Service Authority, the notional income of the deceased for the accident of the year 2012, should have been taken at Rs.7,000/- per month. (ii) Secondly, it is contented that the learned Tribunal has only awarded Rs.10,000/- for loss of consortium. However, since they were two family members, and in terms of the judgment of National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Pranay Sethi1 filial consortium should have been awarded in the sum of Rs.40,000/- each for family member. (iii) Lastly, it is contented that the learned Tribunal wrongly held that the insurance company shall not to be liable in the matter. He relies on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Pappu and Others 1 (2017) 16 SCC 680 HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5542 MFA No. 2839 of 2019 - 6 - Vs. Vinod Kumar Lamba and Another2, to submit that the Respondent/Insurance Company is liable to pay the claim amount to the claimant initially, with the liberty to recover the amount from the owner of the vehicle in accordance with the law. He submits that an order for the Respondent/Insurance Company to avoid liability, it has to establish breach on the part of the owner of the vehicle and merely saying that there was no driving licence does not avoid liability of the Respondent/Insurance Company. 8. The learned counsel for the appellants/claimants has relied upon the judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of Pappu and Others' case to submit that it is a well settled legal principle that the liability of an insurance company cannot be avoided merely for the lack of production of a driving licence. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent/Insurance Company, on the other hand submits that the officer of the Respondent/Insurance Company was examined as RW-1 to prove breach of the insurance policy. In addition, 2 (2018) 3 SCC 208 HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5542 MFA No. 2839 of 2019 - 7 - it is contended by learned counsel for the Respondent/Insurance Company that the son of the deceased was 32 years old at the time when the award was passed. Hence, for calculation of dependency, he should not be included as a dependent and the deduction may be made accordingly. 9.1. However so far as concerns, the notional income being Rs.7,000/- per month for the year 2012, there is no dispute by the learned counsel for the Respondent/Insurance Company that it has been wrongly calculated. In addition, on the award for filial consortium, there is also no dispute by learned counsel for Respondent/Insurance Company that it has to be awarded in terms of judgment in the case of Pranay Sethi's case. 9.2. Learned counsel for the Respondent/Insurance Company has further contended that the appellant No.2 has stated that he was doing coolie work, in his cross- examination conducted on 03.07.2014. It is thus contended that since the appellant No.2 was not HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5542 MFA No. 2839 of 2019 - 8 - dependent on the income of the deceased, for the loss of dependency only one half should be deducted. 10. Having heard the learned counsel for both the parties and on perusal of the record of the learned Tribunal, the following points would arise for consideration in this appeal: "i) Whether the deduction in the case of a earning male member of a family has to be considered? ii) Whether the insurance company is exclusively liable or should a pay and recovery order should have been passed?" 11. The record reflects that the owner of the vehicle /Respondent No.2 has neither appeared before the Tribunal nor has he appeared before this Court, despite service being effected. Thus, the Respondent No.2 has been proceeded with ex parte before this Court as well on 20.03.2024. 12. The law on the liability of the Insurance Company in the case of a fake, invalid or non-existent driving licence is no longer res integra. The Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd vs Swaran Singh And HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5542 MFA No. 2839 of 2019 - 9 - Others3, while examining the defence of the insurance company that the offending vehicle was not driven by an authorized person and or a person not having a valid driving licence held that it is obligatory on the part of the Respondent/Insurance Company to substantiate the defence and a mere plea would not suffice. The relevant extract is set out below: “84. We have analysed the relevant provisions of the said Act in terms whereof a motor vehicle must be driven by a person having a driving licence. The owner of a motor vehicle in terms of Section 5 of the Act has a responsibility to see that no vehicle is driven except by a person who does not satisfy the provisions of Section 3 or 4 of the Act. In a case, therefore, where the driver of the vehicle, admittedly, did not hold any licence and the same was allowed consciously to be driven by the owner of the vehicle by such person, the insurer is entitled to succeed in its defence and avoid liability. The matter, however, may be different where a disputed question of fact arises as to whether the driver had a valid licence or where the owner of the vehicle committed a breach of the terms of the contract of insurance as also the provisions of the Act by consciously allowing any person to drive a vehicle who did not have a valid driving licence. In a given case, the driver of the vehicle may not have any hand in it at all e.g. a case where an accident takes place owing to a mechanical fault or vis major. (See Jitendra Kumar [(2003) 6 SCC 420 : JT (2003) 5 SC 538]. 88. Section 10 of the Act provides for forms and contents of licences to drive. The licence has to be 3 2004 (3) SCC 297 HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5542 MFA No. 2839 of 2019 - 10 - granted in the prescribed form. Thus, a licence to drive a light motor vehicle would entitle the holder there to drive the vehicle falling within that class or description. 89. Section 3 of the Act casts an obligation on a driver to hold an effective driving licence for the type of vehicle which he intends to drive. Section 10 of the Act enables the Central Government to prescribe forms of driving licences for various categories of vehicles mentioned in sub-section (2) of the said section. The various types of vehicles described for which a driver may obtain a licence for one or more of them are: (a) motorcycle without gear, (b) motorcycle with gear, (c) invalid carriage, (d) light motor vehicle, (e) transport vehicle, (f) road roller, and (g) motor vehicle of other specified description. The definition clause in Section 2 of the Act defines various categories of vehicles which are covered in broad types mentioned in sub-section (2) of Section 10. They are “goods carriage”, “heavy goods vehicle”, “heavy passenger motor vehicle”, “invalid carriage”, “light motor vehicle”, “maxi- cab”, “medium goods vehicle”, “medium passenger motor vehicle”, “motor-cab”, “motorcycle”, “omnibus”, “private service vehicle”, “semi-trailer”, “tourist vehicle”, “tractor”, “trailer” and “transport vehicle”. In claims for compensation for accidents, various kinds of breaches with regard to the conditions of driving licences arise for consideration before the Tribunal as a person possessing a driving licence for “motorcycle without gear”, [sic may be driving a vehicle] for which he has no licence. Cases may also arise where a holder of driving licence for “light motor vehicle” is found to be driving a “maxi-cab”, “motor-cab” or “omnibus” for which he has no licence. In each case, on evidence led before the Tribunal, a decision has to be taken whether the fact of the driver possessing licence for one type of vehicle but found driving another type of vehicle, was the main or contributory cause of accident. If on facts, it is found that the accident was caused solely because of some other unforeseen or intervening causes like mechanical failures and similar other causes having no nexus with the driver not possessing requisite type of licence, the insurer will not be allowed to avoid its liability merely for technical breach of conditions concerning driving licence. HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5542 MFA No. 2839 of 2019 - 11 - 90. We have construed and determined the scope of sub-clause (ii) of sub-section (2) of Section 149 of the Act. Minor breaches of licence conditions, such as want of medical fitness certificate, requirement about age of the driver and the like not found to have been the direct cause of the accident, would be treated as minor breaches of inconsequential deviation in the matter of use of vehicles. Such minor and inconsequential deviations with regard to licensing conditions would not constitute sufficient ground to deny the benefit of coverage of insurance to the third parties. 91. On all pleas of breach of licensing conditions taken by the insurer, it would be open to the Tribunal to adjudicate the claim and decide inter se liability of insurer and insured; although where such adjudication is likely to entail undue delay in decision of the claim of the victim, the Tribunal in its discretion may relegate the insurer to seek its remedy of reimbursement from the insured in the civil court. 92. It may be true as has been contended on behalf of the petitioner that a fake or forged licence is as good as no licence but the question herein, as noticed hereinbefore, is whether the insurer must prove that the owner was guilty of the wilful breach of the conditions of the insurance policy or the contract of insurance. In Lehru case [(2003) 3 SCC 338 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 614] the matter has been considered in some detail. We are in general agreement with the approach of the Bench but we intend to point out that the observations made therein must be understood to have been made in the light of the requirements of the law in terms whereof the insurer is to establish wilful breach on the part of the insured and not for the purpose of its disentitlement from raising any defence or for the owners to be absolved from any liability whatsoever. We would be dealing in some detail with this aspect of the matter a little later. 93. The Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 provides for grant of learner's licence. [See Section 4(3), Section 7(2), Section 10(3) and Section 14.] A learner's licence is, thus, also a licence within the meaning of the provisions HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5542 MFA No. 2839 of 2019 - 12 - of the said Act. It cannot, therefore, be said that when a vehicle is being driven by a learner subject to the conditions mentioned in the licence, he would not be a person who is not “duly licensed” resulting in conferring a right on the insurer to avoid the claim of the third party. It cannot be said that a person holding a learner's licence is not entitled to drive the vehicle. Even if there exists a condition in the contract of insurance that the vehicle cannot be driven by a person holding a learner's licence, the same would run counter to the provisions of Section 149(2) of the said Act. 94. The provisions contained in the said Act provide also for grant of driving licence which is otherwise a learner's licence. Sections 3(2) and 6 of the Act provide for restriction in the matter of grant of driving licence, Section 7 deals with such restrictions on granting of learner's licence. Sections 8 and 9 provide for the manner and conditions for grant of driving licence. Section 15 provides for renewal of driving licence. Learner's licences are granted under the Rules framed by the Central Government or the State Governments in exercise of their rule-making power. Conditions are attached to the learner's licences granted in terms of the statute. A person holding learner's licence would, thus, also come within the purview of “duly licensed” as such a licence is also granted in terms of the provisions of the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. It is now a well-settled principle of law that rules validly framed become part of the statute. Such rules are, therefore, required to be read as a part of the main enactment. It is also a well-settled principle of law that for the interpretation of statute an attempt must be made to give effect to all provisions under the rule. No provision should be considered as surplusage. [Emphasis Supplied] 12.1. The Swaran Singh case crystallized these findings by holding that merely stating that the driver of a vehicle did not have a licence or had a invalid or fake licence by itself is not enough to avoid liability by an Insurance HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5542 MFA No. 2839 of 2019 - 13 - Company. They must also establish breach on the part of the owner of the vehicle. Unless the breach is so fundamental that it has contributed to the cause of the accident, the Insurance Company cannot avoid its liability. The relevant extract is set out below: “110. The summary of our findings to the various issues as raised in these petitions are as follows: (i) Chapter XI of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 providing compulsory insurance of vehicles against third party risks is a social welfare legislation to extend relief by compensation to victims of accidents caused by use of motor vehicles. The provisions of compulsory insurance coverage of all vehicles are with this paramount object and the provisions of the Act have to be so interpreted as to effectuate the said object. (ii) Insurer is entitled to raise a defence in a claim petition filed under Section 163A or Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 inter alia in terms of Section 149(2)(a)(ii) of the said Act. (iii) The breach of policy condition, eg disqualification of driver or invalid driving licence of the driver, as contained in Sub- section (2)(a)(ii) of Section 149, have to be proved to have been committed by the insured for avoiding liability by the insurer. Mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualification of the driver for driving at the relevant time, are not in themselves defences available to the insurer against either the insured or the third parties. To avoid its liability towards insured, the insurer has to prove that the insured was guilty of HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5542 MFA No. 2839 of 2019 - 14 - negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the condition of the policy regarding use of vehicles by duly licensed driver or one who was not disqualified to drive at the relevant time, (iv) The insurance companies are, however, with a view to avoid their liability must not only establish the available defence(s) raised in the said proceedings but must also establish breach' on the part of the owner of the vehicle; the burden of proof where for would be on them. (v) The court cannot lay down any criteria as to how said burden would be discharged, inasmuch as the same would depend upon the facts and circumstance of the case. (vi) Even where the insurer is able to prove breach on the part of the insured concerning the policy condition regarding holding of a valid licence by the driver or his qualification to drive during the relevant period, the insurer would not be allowed to avoid its liability towards insured unless the said breach or breaches on the condition of driving licence is/ are so fundamental as are found to have contributed to the cause of the accident. The Tribunals in interpreting the policy conditions would apply "the rule of main purpose" and the concept of "fundamental breach" to allow defences available to the insured under Section 149(2) of the Act. (vii) The question as to whether the owner has taken reasonable care to find out as to whether the driving licence produced by the driver, (a fake one or otherwise), does not fulfil the requirements of law or not will have to be determined in each case……” [Emphasis Supplied] HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5542 MFA No. 2839 of 2019 - 15 - 13. In the case of Pappu and Others while relying on a judgment of Swaran Singh's case has held that in order for an insurance company to avoid its liability towards the insured, it has to prove that the insured was guilty of negligence or failed to exercise reasonable care in a matter of fulfilling the condition of policy regarding use of vehicles by a licensed driver. It has further been held that the mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualification of the driver at the relevant times is not in themselves defences available to the insured against either the insured or the third party. With a view to avoid liability, the insurance company must also establish breach on the part of the owner of the vehicle and the burden of proof would be on them. The relevant extract of Pappu and Others’ case is set out below: “9. On the basis of these pleadings, the matter proceeded before the Tribunal. Admittedly, the respondent No.1 owner of the vehicle did not produce any evidence in support of his plea taken in the Written Statement that the offending vehicle was plied by an authorised person having a valid driving permit. All that respondent No.1 did was to produce a driving licence purportedly of one Joginder Singh. The Tribunal adverted to the said driving licence but found that nowhere the owner of the vehicle has asserted that the Truck No.DIL-5955 was in fact driven by said Joginder Singh at the time of the accident. On the basis of the pleadings, the Tribunal HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5542 MFA No. 2839 of 2019 - 16 - framed issue No.3 and answered the same in favour of the Insurance Company as follows: “Issue No.3: Whether the Truck No. DIL-5955 was not being driven by a person having valid and effective driving licence?” XXX XXX XXX 10. This view taken by the Tribunal was assailed before the High Court by the claimants. No other contention was raised before the High Court except about the liability of the Insurance Company. The High Court, after analysing the record, negatived the said contention in the following words: “5. The only question which has been raised before this Court is, whether Insurance Company has rightly been held not liable by holding that Truck No. DIL 5955 was not being driven by a person having valid licence. This Court has to consider, whether findings recorded in respect of issue no.3 is correct or not. 6. Learned counsel for the appellants could not dispute that neither any pleadings nor evidence have been led before Tribunal to suggest or to tell, as a matter of fact, that aforesaid truck was being driven by Sri Joginder Singh. It is not in dispute that owner of aforesaid vehicle produced driving licence which was in the name of Sri Joginder Singh but at no stage it is pleaded or brought on record before Tribunal that Sri Joginder Singh was the person who was driving aforesaid Truck. XXX XXX XXX 16. The next question is: whether in the fact situation of this case the insurance company can be and ought to be directed to pay the claim amount, with liberty to recover the same from the owner of the vehicle (respondent No.1)? 17. This issue has been answered in the case of National Insurance Company Ltd. (supra). In that case, it was contended by the insurance company that once the defence taken by the insurer is accepted by the Tribunal, it is bound to discharge the insurer and fix the liability HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5542 MFA No. 2839 of 2019 - 17 - only on the owner and/or the driver of the vehicle. However, this Court held that even if the insurer succeeds in establishing its defence, the Tribunal or the Court can direct the insurance company to pay the award amount to the claimant(s) and, in turn, recover the same from the owner of the vehicle. The three-Judge Bench, after analysing the earlier decisions on the point, held that there was no reason to deviate from the said well- settled principle. In paragraph 107, the Court then observed thus: “107. We may, however, hasten to add that the Tribunal and the court must, however, exercise their jurisdiction to issue such a direction upon consideration of the facts and circumstances of each case and in the event such a direction has been issued, despite arriving at a finding of fact to the effect that the insurer has been able to establish that the insured has committed a breach of contract of insurance as envisaged under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of sub-section (2) of Section BHH149 of the Act, the insurance company shall be entitled to realize the awarded amount from the owner or driver of the vehicle, as the case may be, in execution of the same award having regard to the provisions of Sections 165 and 168 of the Act. However, in the event, having regard to the limited scope of inquiry in the proceedings before the Tribunal it has not been able to do so, the insurance company may initiate a separate action therefor against the owner or the driver of the vehicle or both, as the case may be. Those exceptional cases may arise when the evidence becomes available to or comes to the notice of the insurer at a subsequent stage or for one reason or the other, the insurer was not..." 18. Further, in para 110, the Court National Insurance Co.Ltd. (National Insurance Co.Ltd. V. Swaran Singh, (2004)3 SCC 297 has observed thus: "110. Summary of Findings: XXX XXX XXX (iii) The breach of policy condition, e.g. disqualification of driver or invalid driving licence of the driver, as contained in Sub- HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5542 MFA No. 2839 of 2019 - 18 - section (2)(a)(ii) of Section 149, have to be proved to have been committed by the insured for avoiding liability by the insurer. Mere absence, fake or invalid driving licence or disqualification of the driver for driving at the relevant time, are not in themselves defences available to the insurer against either the insured or the third parties. To avoid its liability towards insured, the insurer has to prove that the insured was guilty of negligence and failed to exercise reasonable care in the matter of fulfilling the condition of the policy regarding use of vehicles by duly licensed driver or one who was not disqualified to drive at the relevant time, (iv) The insurance companies are, however, with a view to avoid their liability must not only establish the available defence(s) raised in the said proceedings but must also establish 'breach' on the part of the owner of the vehicle; the burden of proof where for would be on them. (v) The court cannot lay down any criteria as to how said burden would be discharged, inasmuch as the same would depend upon the facts and circumstance of each case. (vi) Even where the insurer is able to prove breach on the part of the insured concerning the policy condition regarding holding of a valid licence by the driver or his qualification to drive during the relevant period, the insurer would not be allowed to avoid its liability towards the insured unless the said breach or breaches on the condition of driving licence is/are so fundamental as are found to have contributed to the cause of the accident. The Tribunals in interpreting the policy conditions would apply “the rule of main purpose” and the concept of “fundamental breach” to allow defences available to the insurer under Section 149(2) of the Act..” [Emphasis Supplied] HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5542 MFA No. 2839 of 2019 - 19 - 14. Learned counsel for the respondent/Insurance Company has contended that this burden was discharged by the Respondent/Insurance Company and in this behalf reliance is placed on evidence of the witness R.W.1 and Exhibit R2, the extract of the driving licence which shows that the driving licence is for a different class. Thus, it is contended that that there is a breach of the insurance policy and the burden has been discharged by the respondent. 15. This Court is unable to agree. Undisputedly, the driver of offending vehicle did have a driving licence. However, the driving licence was for a light motor vehicle. Thus, this was a case of a driver possessing driving licence of one type of vehicle and found driving another type of vehicle. The Respondent/Insurance Company cannot be said to have discharged the burden qua breach of its liability just by producing a driving licence and examining its officer who has produced the extract of the driving licence. It is not disputed that the driver of the offending vehicle was not a party to the proceedings. The HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5542 MFA No. 2839 of 2019 - 20 - owner although was a party, did not appear either before this Court or the learned Tribunal. 16. As stated above the Supreme Court in the Swaran Singh and Pappu & Others’ cases have examined this very contention and have held the Respondent/Insurance Company as liable to pay compensation. However, since the driver of the offending vehicle did have driving licence for light motor vehicle and not for a motor cycle with gear, the Respondent/Insurance Company could not have been absolved of its liability but it is entitled to be granted orders for pay and recovery. 17. On the second issue raised, it is not disputed that the deceased was married. The Supreme Court in the case of Sarla Verma and Others Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation And Another4 has held that while calculating loss of dependency, it is incumbent to deduct amounts for personal and living expenses. In the case of married persons where the number of dependant family 4 (2009) 6 SCC 121 HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5542 MFA No. 2839 of 2019 - 21 - members is 2 to 3, the deduction should be 1/3rd. The relevant extract is below: "30. Though in some cases the deduction to be made towards personal and living expenses is calculated on the basis of units indicated in Trilok Chandra⁴, the general practice is to apply standardised deductions. Having considered several subsequent decisions of this Court, we are of the view that where the deceased was married, the deduction towards personal and living expenses of the deceased, should be one-third (1/3rd) where the number of dependent family members is 2 to 3, one-fourth (1/4th) where the number of dependent family members is 4 to 6, and one-fifth (1/5th) where the number of dependent family members exceeds six. 31. Where the deceased was a bachelor and the claimants are the parents, the deduction follows a different principle. In regard to bachelors, normally, 50% is deducted as personal and living expenses, because it is assumed that a bachelor would tend to spend more on himself. Even otherwise, there is also the possibility of his getting married in a short time, in which event the contribution to the parent(s) and siblings is likely to be cut drastically. Further, subject to evidence to the contrary, the father is likely to have his own income and will not be considered as a dependant and the mother alone will be considered as a dependant. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, brothers and sisters will not be considered as dependants, because they will either be independent and earning, or married, or be dependent on the father." [Emphasis Supplied] 18. The Respondent/Insurance Company has contended that since the son of the deceased is aged about 35 years, he cannot be treated as a dependent for the purpose of computing loss of dependency, particularly HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5542 MFA No. 2839 of 2019 - 22 - when he is stated to be an earning member working as a coolie. Whether or not such a person can be treated as a dependant of the deceased would necessarily depend upon the facts and evidence on record. The Supreme Court in the case of National Insurance Company Limited vs. Birender Singh and others5 has held that the compensation is payable to major sons of a deceased, however the extent of compensation payable would depend on the circumstances of the case including their livelihood and whether they were also dependant on the income of the deceased. It was further held that since they were also dependent on the income and living together, the deduction of income for personal and living expenses would be 1/3rd in terms of the judgment in the Pranay Sethi’s case. It is apposite to set out the relevant extract from Birender Singh’s case as below: 13. In para 15 of Manjuri Bera [Manjuri Bera v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2007) 10 SCC 643 : (2008) 1 SCC (Cri) 585] , while adverting to the provisions of Section 140 of the Act, the Court observed that even if there is no loss of dependency, the claimant, if he was a legal representative, will be entitled to compensation. In the concurring judgment of S.H. Kapadia, J., as his Lordship then was, it is observed that 5 (2020) 11 SCC 356 HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5542 MFA No. 2839 of 2019 - 23 - there is distinction between “right to apply for compensation” and “entitlement to compensation”. The compensation constitutes part of the estate of the deceased. As a result, the legal representative of the deceased would inherit the estate. Indeed, in that case, the Court was dealing with the case of a married daughter of the deceased and the efficacy of Section 140 of the Act. Nevertheless, the principle underlying the exposition in this decision would clearly come to the aid of Respondents 1 and 2 (claimants) even though they are major sons of the deceased and also earning. 14. It is thus settled by now that the legal representatives of the deceased have a right to apply for compensation. Having said that, it must necessarily follow that even the major married and earning sons of the deceased being legal representatives have a right to apply for compensation and it would be the bounden duty of the Tribunal to consider the application irrespective of the fact whether the legal representative concerned was fully dependent on the deceased and not to limit the claim towards conventional heads only. The evidence on record in the present case would suggest that the claimants were working as agricultural labourers on contract basis and were earning meagre income between Rs 1,00,000 and Rs 1,50,000 per annum. In that sense, they were largely dependent on the earning of their mother and in fact, were staying with her, who met with an accident at the young age of 48 years. [Emphasis Supplied] 19. In the present case as well, the appellant No.2 was working as a daily wager/agricultural labourer. No evidence has been placed on record by the Respondent/Insurance Company that the appellant No.2 was residing separately. As in the case of such families, HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5542 MFA No. 2839 of 2019 - 24 - the appellants would have been dependant on the income of the deceased as well. Thus, in terms of the judgment of the Supreme Court in Sarla Verma’s case, 1/3rd of the income is to be deducted towards personal and living expenses of the deceased. 20. In view of the discussions as stated above, the compensation awarded inclusive of escalation is required to be enhanced in the following manner: Sl. No. Particulars Amount (Rs.) 01. Towards loss of dependency 50% of Rs.7,000= [Rs.3,500x12x7] 2,94,000-00 02. Towards loss of filial consortium 88,000-00 03. Towards loss of estate 16,500-00 04 Towards funeral and obsequies ceremony expenses 16,500-00 Total 4,15,000-00 21. Hence, the appellants are entitled to total compensation of Rs.4,15,000/- along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of petition till the date of realization. HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5542 MFA No. 2839 of 2019 - 25 - 22. Accordingly, the Court proceeds to pass the following directions: ORDER (i) The appeal is allowed-in-part. (ii) The Impugned Judgment and Award dated 30.10.2014 in MVC No.4317/2012 passed by the XX Additional Small Causes Judge, Bangalore, is modified to the extent that the appellants/claimant are entitled to enhanced compensation of Rs.1,05,000/- along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of petition till the date of realization, in addition to Rs.3,10,000/- that has been awarded by the learned Tribunal. (iii) The Respondent/Insurance Company shall deposit the enhanced compensation with interest at the rate of 6% p.a. within a period of eight weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment. HC-KAR NC: 2026:KHC:5542 MFA No. 2839 of 2019 - 26 - (iv) On such deposit of compensation, the same shall be released in favour of the appellants/ claimants. (v) The remaining portion of the Impugned Award of the learned Tribunal remains undisturbed. (vi) The Registry is directed to transmit a copy of this Judgment to the concerned Tribunal, along with its records. (vii) The Registry is directed to draw the modified Award accordingly. (viii) No order as to costs. Sd/- (TARA VITASTA GANJU) JUDGE HR/YN. List No.: 1 Sl No.: 17 Digitally signed by TARA VITASTA GANJU Location: HIGH COURT OF KARNTAKA