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2026 DAILYLAW 4641 (ALL)

Zia-Ur-Rehman v. State of U. P.

2026-01-08

Samit Gopal

body2026
JUDGMENT : SAMIT GOPAL, J. 1. Heard Shri Syed Ali Murtza, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Raza Abbas, learned counsel for the revisionist, Shri Ajay Singh, learned AGA-I for the State-opposite party and perused the record. 2. This criminal revision under Sections 438 & 442 of BNSS, 2023, has been preferred by accused- Zia-Ur-Rahman before this Court against the order dated 29.09.2025 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge/Special Judge, Anti Corruption, Meerut, in Case No. 41/185 of 2017 (State of UP v. Fazal-ur-Rahman and others), arising out of Case Crime No. 17 of 2008, under Sections 408, 409, 120-B IPC and Section 13(1)C r/w Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Police Station- Chhatari, District- Bulandshahar, whereby the trial court concerned has rejected the application for discharge dated 26.08.2025 of the accused-revisionist filed under Section 227 CrPC and numbered as Application No. 80-Kha. 3. The facts of the case are that a First Information Report was lodged on 27.01.2008 as Case Crime No. 17 of 2008, under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 120-B IPC and Sections 7/13(1)D r/w Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, Police Station- Chhatari, District- Bulandshahar by Ram Murti Yadav (Inspector), Uttar Pradesh Vigilance Establishment, Meerut Division, Meerut against the revisionist and Fazal- ur-Rahman, the Head Clerk. The matter was investigated and a charge sheet dated 8-12-2017 was filed against both the accused under Sections 409, 408, 120-B IPC and Sections 13(1)C r/w Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, on which, the court concerned took cognizance vide its order dated 21-12-2017. A sanction for prosecution against the applicant and co-accused under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act r/w Section 197 CrPC was accorded vide order dated 17-5-2017 by the District Inspector of Schools, Bulandshahar. 4. A sanction for prosecution against the applicant and co-accused under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act r/w Section 197 CrPC was accorded vide order dated 17-5-2017 by the District Inspector of Schools, Bulandshahar. 4. After filing of charge sheet dated 8-12-2017, an application under Section 482 CrPC No. 10516 of 2018 (Zia-ur-Rahman v. State of UP and another), challenging the entire proceedings of the aforesaid charge sheet dated 8-12-2017, as pending before the Special Judge, Prevention of Corruption Act, Meerut was filed before this Court, in which, a Division Bench of this Court, by order dated 30-3-2018, although refused to interfere in the matter and the prayer as made was refused, but directed that the applicant therein shall appear and apply for bail, and the bail was directed to be decided as per the directions given therein. The said order is extracted herein below: "Heard learned counsel for the applicant and learned A.G.A. for the State. The present application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. has been filed for quashing entire proceedings of charge sheet dated 8.12.2017 in Case No.41/185 of 2017, Case crime no. 17 of 2008, u/s 13(1)(c) read with Section 13(2) Prevention of Corruption Act and u/s 408,409,120B IPC pending before the learned Special Judge (Prevention of Corruption Act), Meerut. The contention of the counsel for the applicant is that no offence against the applicants is disclosed and the present prosecution has been instituted with a malafide intention for the purposes of harassment. He pointed out certain documents and statements in support of his contention. From the perusal of the material on record and looking into the facts of the case at this stage it cannot be said that no offence is made out against the applicant. All the submissions made at the bar relate to the disputed questions of fact, which cannot be adjudicated upon by this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. At this stage only prima facie case is to be seen in the light of the law laid down by Supreme Court in cases of R.P. Kapur Vs. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 866, State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 SCC (Cr.) 426, State of Bihar Vs. P.P.Sharma, 1992 SCC (Cr.) 192 and lastly Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. Vs. Mohd. Saraful Haq and another (Para-10) 2005 SCC (Cr.) 283. The disputed defence of the accused cannot be considered at this stage. State of Punjab, A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 866, State of Haryana Vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 SCC (Cr.) 426, State of Bihar Vs. P.P.Sharma, 1992 SCC (Cr.) 192 and lastly Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. Vs. Mohd. Saraful Haq and another (Para-10) 2005 SCC (Cr.) 283. The disputed defence of the accused cannot be considered at this stage. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and after perusing the averments made in the present application, no case for any interference has been made out. Accordingly, the prayer, as made above, is refused. However keeping in view the specific avernment as made in paragraph nos. 17 onwards, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the case, it is directed that in case the applicant appears and surrenders before the courts below within 45 days from today and applies for bail, his prayer for bail shall be considered and decided on its own merits in view of the settled law laid by this Court in the case of Amrawati and another Vs. State of U.P. reported in 2004 (57) ALR 290 as well as judgement passed by Hon'ble Apex Court reported in 2009 (3) ADJ 322 (SC) Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh Vs. State of U.P. For a period of 45 days from today or till the applicant surrenders and applies for bail, whichever is earlier, no coercive action shall be taken against the applicant. However, in case, the applicant does not appear before the courts below within the aforesaid period, coercive action shall be taken against him. It is further directed that in case the applicant succeeds in getting bail and in case he is so advised, he may file discharge application before the court concerned which shall be considered and disposed of by the court concerned in accordance with law after hearing all parties concerned. Learned counsel for the applicant is permitted to raise all such grounds as may be available to him while moving discharge application, if he is so advised. With the aforesaid direction, the application U/s 482 is disposed of finally." 5. Learned counsel for the revisionist submits that in compliance of the said order of the Division Bench, the revisionist appeared before the trial court concerned and has been granted bail. 6. With the aforesaid direction, the application U/s 482 is disposed of finally." 5. Learned counsel for the revisionist submits that in compliance of the said order of the Division Bench, the revisionist appeared before the trial court concerned and has been granted bail. 6. Subsequently, an application for discharge under Section 227 CrPC dated 26-8-2025 was filed by the revisionist before the trial court concerned, copy of which has been annexed as Annexure-18 to the affidavit filed in support of the present revision, which stood dismissed vide order impugned dated 29-9-2025 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge/Special Judge, Anti Corruption, (V.B.U.P.S.E.B.), Meerut. The present revision has thus been filed before this Court with the aforesaid prayer. 7. Learned counsel for the revisionist submits as under: (i) The revisionist is not a public servant. (ii) The competence of the officer granting sanction is challenged and it is submitted that the sanction order is totally perverse and illegal and deserves to be set aside. (iii) No offence under Section 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is made out since the revisionist is not a public servant. (iv) The authority competent to remove the revisionist is the Committee of Management, and thus it was only the appropriate authority who could accord sanction for prosecution. (v) A First Information Report was lodged on 19.04.2007 as FIR No. 235 of 2007 at P.S.- Kotwali Nagar, District Bulandshahr against the revisionist, the Principal, and Head Clerk under Sections 420, 467, 468, and 471 IPC, alleging that the management and employees of the college had deposited Rs. 1,99,504/- towards TDS of the employees for the financial year 2000-01 through verified bank challans, but the said bank challans were found to be fake and the Income Tax Department had suffered loss of TDS to the said incident. The said FIR was lodged by the Income Tax Officer of the concerned wing. (vi) In the said FIR, the revisionist and other accused were exonerated and a final report dated 27-10-2007 was filed, which was accepted by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Bulandshahar, vide order dated 28-2-2013. Copies of the FIR, final report, and said order have been placed before the Court, which are annexed as Annexures- 6, 7, and 8 to the affidavit filed in support of the instant revision. Copies of the FIR, final report, and said order have been placed before the Court, which are annexed as Annexures- 6, 7, and 8 to the affidavit filed in support of the instant revision. It is submitted that subsequently, the present First Information Report has been lodged on similar set of facts, which is illegal. (vii) The provision under Section 227 CrPC is a beneficial legislation, and thus the court concerned dealing with the application for discharge has to consider the matter in its entirety and has to see that the rejection should be such which should not affect the person's liberty since after rejection of the discharge, charge has to be framed which is a serious consequence. In order to buttress the said submission, reliance has been placed on the judgement of the Apex Court in the case of Kewal Krishan S/O Lachman Das v. Suraj Bhan and Anr.; AIR 1980 SC 1780 (para-10) and Century Spinning & Manufacturing Co. Ltd. and others v. State of Maharashtra: (1972) 3 SCC 282 (para-17) which are as under :- "10. The proposition that in cases instituted on complaint in regard to an offence exclusively triable by the Court of Session, the standard for ascertaining whether or not the evidence collected in the preliminary inquiry discloses sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused is lower than the one to be adopted at the stage of framing charges in a warrant case triable by the Magistrate, is now evident from the scheme of the new Code of 1973. Section 209 of the Code of 1973 dispenses with the inquiry preliminary to commitment in cases triable exclusively by a Court of Session, irrespective of whether such a case is instituted on a criminal complaint or a police report. Section 209 says: "When a case instituted on a police report or otherwise the accused appears or is brought before the Magistrate and it appears to the Magistrate that the offence is triable exclusively by the Court of Sessions, he shall commit the case to the Court of Session". If the Committing Magistrate thinks that it is not necessary- to commit the accused who may be on bail to custody, he may not cancel the bail. This has been made clear by the words "subject to the provisions of this Code relating to bail" occurring in Clause (b) of Section 209. If the Committing Magistrate thinks that it is not necessary- to commit the accused who may be on bail to custody, he may not cancel the bail. This has been made clear by the words "subject to the provisions of this Code relating to bail" occurring in Clause (b) of Section 209. Therefore, if the accused is already on bail, his bail should not be arbitrarily cancelled. Section 227 of the Code of 1973 has made another beneficent provision to save the accused from prolonged harassment which is a necessary concomitant of a protracted trial. This Section provides that if upon considering the record of the case, the documents submitted with it and the submissions of the accused and the prosecution, the Judge is not convinced that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused, he has to discharge the accused under this Section and record his reasons for so doing." __________x_____________x___________x________ "17. Coming now to the facts of this case, in our view, the question principally depends on the scope and effect of the notification dated September 22, 1949, the circular dated November 2, 1964 and the Deviation Order, dated June 25, 1965. If, on this material, the Court comes to the conclusion that there is no ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence, then it can appropriately consider the charge to be groundless and discharge the accused. The argument that the Court at the stage of framing the charges has not to apply its judicial mind for considering whether or not there is a ground for presuming the commission of the offence by the accused is not supportable either on the plain language of the section or on its judicial interpretation or on any other recognised principle of law. The order framing the charges does substantially affect the person's liberty and it is not possible to countenance the view that the Court must automatically frame the charge merely because the prosecuting authorities, by relying on the documents referred to in Section 173, consider it proper to institute the case. The responsibility of framing the charges is that of the Court and it, has to judicially consider the question of doing so. The responsibility of framing the charges is that of the Court and it, has to judicially consider the question of doing so. Without fully adverting to the material on the record it must not blindly adopt the decision of the prosecution." (viii) The trial court failed to appreciate that the revisionist is not a public servant and thus cannot be prosecuted under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The sanction order is by an incompetent authority and thus, the trial court dismissed the application for discharge in a cryptic manner. The present revision is thus good on merits and law and liable to be allowed. 8. Per contra, learned counsel for the State submitted as under: (i) The discharge application of the revisionist has been rejected by the trial court concerned by a detailed and speaking order considering the facts of the matter and also the law on the subject. (ii) The factual aspects in the matter cannot be the basis of discharge as the same cannot be seen at this stage. (iii) The revisionist was appointed with the approval of the District Inspector of Schools as forwarded by the Committee of Management, and thus his removal by the District Inspector of Schools is a legal act, and he can removed by the District Inspector of Schools legally. (iv) There is sufficient material against the revisionist which would entitle him to be tried. (v) The defence and merits of the case cannot be seen at this stage, which is the stage of claiming discharge as the same is subject matter of trial. (vi) As per Section 21(12)(b) of the Indian Penal Code, the revisionist would be a person who is a public servant, as he is getting remuneration from a local authority. (vii) The present revision is devoid of any merit and deserves to be dismissed. 9. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and perusing the records, the factual aspects of the matter are that an FIR was lodged on 20.02.1997 against the revisionist and one other person by the Inspector, UP Vigilance Department, alleging that in an open inquiry by the Vigilance Department, it transpired that the revisionist, who was the Manager of M.Y.M. Inter College, Bulandshahar, and Fazal-ur-Rahman, the Head Clerk of the said college, had opened R.D. accounts of 54 employees for 5 years on a subscription of Rs. 100/- per month from 20.02.1997 on various dates, and the said accused used to deduct Rs. 100/- each from the salary of the employees and used to deposit it in the post office in the said account. Although, Rs. 100/- used to be deducted monthly from the salary of the employees' accounts, the Head Clerk only deposited part of it for 14 months in the RD account of the employees. Rs. 2,09,300/- was not deposited by the Head Clerk in the RD account of the employees despite the same being deducted from their salary. On a complaint regarding it being made on 24-11-2001, on 7-12-2001, the Head Clerk, Fazal-ur- Rahman, transferred the money from his account to the concerned accounts of the employees, and the interest on it was given in cash to the employees. Thus, the accused misappropriated Rs. 2,09,300/- from the RD accounts of the employees, and the said amount was not deposited in the account. Forged deposit challans were shown and presented by the Head Clerk, whereas no amount was deposited in the bank. On a complaint, the Head Clerk and the Manager deposited Rs. 1,99,504/- and other amounts along with interest on 28-1-2002. Thus, there has been conspiracy, cheating, and misappropriation of money, and the accused thus gained illegal money by cheating and forgery. The matter was investigated, and in the meantime, a request for sanction for prosecution was sent to the District Inspector of Schools concerned, which was accorded vide order dated 17-5-2017 against the revisionist and co- accused. Charge sheet dated 8-12-2017 was then submitted, on which, the court concerned took cognizance vide order dated 21-12-2017. 10. An application for discharge under Section 227 CrPC was filed, which has been rejected by the trial court concerned by the impugned order dated 29-9-2025. This revision has thus been filed before this Court. At this stage, two basic submissions have been raised which are regarding the competence of the sanctioning authority to accord sanction for prosecution and the second is that the revisionist is not a public servant, and thus, his prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act is illegal. Insofar as the question regarding the validity of sanction is concerned, the law on the said subject is well-defined. The Apex Court in the case of State Rep. Insofar as the question regarding the validity of sanction is concerned, the law on the said subject is well-defined. The Apex Court in the case of State Rep. by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti Corruption Chennai City-I Department Versus G. Easwaran : 2025 SCC online SC 643 in paragraph-12 has held that once cognizance has been taken, the validity of sanction order is to be seen during the course of trial. It has been held as under :- "………Validity of the sanction is an issue that must be examined during the course of the trial. In Dinesh Kumar v. Chairman, Airport Authority of India (2012) 1 SCC 532 ; followed in CBI v. Pramila Virendra Kumar Agarwal, (2020) 17 SCC 664 ), this principle is reiterated as follows: "10. In our view, invalidity of sanction where sanction order exists, can be raised on diverse grounds like non-availability of material before the sanctioning authority or bias of the sanctioning authority or the order of sanction having been passed by an authority not authorised or competent to grant such sanction. The above grounds are only illustrative and not exhaustive. All such grounds of invalidity or illegality of sanction would fall in the same category like the ground of invalidity of sanction on account of non- application of mind—a category carved out by this Court in Parkash Singh Badal [ (2007) 1 SCC 1 ], the challenge to which can always be raised in the course of trial." (emphasis supplied) 11. Similar view was also taken by the Apex Court in the case of Director, Central Bureau of Investigation v. Ashok Kumar Aswal : (2015) 16 SCC 163 , where it was held that: "15. All the above apart, time and again, this Court has laid down that the validity of a sanction order, if one exists, has to be tested on the touchstone of the prejudice to the accused which is essentially a question of fact and, therefore, should be left to be determined in the course of the trial and not in the exercise of jurisdiction either under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 or in a proceeding under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution." (emphasis supplied)" 12. Further, the Apex Court in the case of The Karnataka Lokayuktha Police Vs. Further, the Apex Court in the case of The Karnataka Lokayuktha Police Vs. Lakshman Rao Peshve : SLP (CRL.) No. 11870/2023, decided on 16.09.2025 has held that an accused cannot be discharged for invalidity of sanction. The same is extracted herein below. "4. We have perused the impugned judgments. With respect to the predicate offence under the PC Act, the High Court discharged the respondent while going into the issue of validity of the sanction which is specifically prohibited under Section 19(3) (a) of the PC Act. The aforesaid decision of the High Court is obviously contrary to the law laid down by this Court in 'State Vs. T. Venkatesh Murthy', reported in (2004) 7 SCC 763 , 'State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Virender Kumar Tripathi' reported in (2009) 15 SCC 533 and in 'State of Bihar & Ors. Vs. Rajmangal Ram', reported in (2014) 11 SCC 388 ." 13. Thus, insofar as the argument regarding the competence of the officer concerned for granting sanction is concerned, the law for it is trite that once cognizance has been taken, the same is to be seen during the course of the trial and further it has been held that an accused cannot be discharged for invalidity of the sanction. Thus, the said argument does not appeal to the Court at all. 14. Further, the question regarding the applicant being a public servant or not is concerned, the undisputed fact in the matter is that the revisionist was appointed as the Manager of the said school by the Committee of Management, which was sent to the District Inspector of Schools concerned, who granted approval for his appointment and thus, he was appointed therein. Further, the fact that the institution is a minority institution and is aided by the government is also not disputed. The fact thus that the revisionist is a Manager of a minority institution aided by the government and appointed under the approval of the District Inspector of Schools concerned is not disputed. Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code makes the revisionist a public servant. Thus, the question that the revisionist is not a public servant also does not appeal to the Court. The judgement and order of the trial court is a detailed judgement and order considering the matter on its merit which rejected the application for discharge. Section 21 of the Indian Penal Code makes the revisionist a public servant. Thus, the question that the revisionist is not a public servant also does not appeal to the Court. The judgement and order of the trial court is a detailed judgement and order considering the matter on its merit which rejected the application for discharge. The said judgement and order is a well-considered judgement and order. It does not call for any interference. 15. Insofar as the fact regarding previous FIR being lodged, final report being submitted and the same being accepted by the court concerned is related, the said issue therein was with regard to the non-deposit of T.D.S. (Tax Deducted at Source) in the relevant account of the Income Tax Department and filing of a challan which was found to be forged as no such money was deposited. The dispute therein was different than the present dispute and thus, there is no bar in lodging of the present first information report and further proceedings therein. There is thus, no ground in the present revision. The present revision lacks merit and is liable to be dismissed. 16. Accordingly, the instant revision is hereby dismissed. 17. The Registrar (Compliance) shall communicate this order to the trial court concerned, within a period of two weeks.