APHC010198272026 IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI (Special Original Jurisdiction) [3521] WEDNESDAY,THE FIFTEENTH DAY OF APRIL TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY SIX PRESENT THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL PETITION Nos: 3072, 3073 & 3083 of 2026 Crl.P.No.3072 of 2026 Between: 1.PUSHPAM APPALA NAIDU, D/O. APPALA NAIDU AGED 62 YEARS, MANAGING DIRECTOR, M/S. QUEST NET ENTERPRISES INDIA PVT. LTD. NO.7 RAIN TREE PALACE, 9TH FLOOR, MC NICHOLS ROAD CHET PET, CHENNAI-31, TAMIL NADU. ...PETITIONER/ACCUSED AND 1.THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, Rep by its Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati. through Deputy Superintendent of Police CID, RO, Nellore. ...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT Counsel for the Petitioner/accused: 1.K V ADITYA CHOWDARY Counsel for the Respondent/complainant: 1.PUBLIC PROSECUTOR Crl.P.No.3073 of 2026 Between: 1.AUGUSTINE JOSEPH @ AUGUSTINE, S/O. JOSEPH, 45 YEARS. DIRECTOR, M/S. QUEST NET ENTERPRISES INDIA PVT. LTD., 91 BLOCK, 4TH MAIN ROAD, ANNA NAGAR, CHENNAI, R/O. D.NO. 33, 2 HALLS ROAD EGMORE, CHENNAI AND NO.7, BAKIYATHOMMAN NAGAR, MAGAPPAIAN, CHENNAI. ...PETITIONER/ACCUSED AND 1.THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, Rep by its Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati. through Deputy Superintendent of Police CID, RO, Nellore. ...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT Counsel for the Petitioner/accused: 1.K V ADITYA CHOWDARY Counsel for the Respondent/complainant: 1.PUBLIC PROSECUTOR Crl.P.No.3083 of 2026 Between: 1.R KAMAKSHI RANGANATHAN, W/O.RAVI MANI, D/O.RANGANATHAN, AGED 56 YEARS, R/O.NO.58/2, 1ST MAIN ROAD, BESANT NAGAR, CHENNA-600090, PRESENTLY RESIDING AT H.NO.110/3, 7TH AVENUE, BESANT NAGAR, CHENNAI-600090 ...PETITIONER/ACCUSED AND 1.THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, through Deputy superintendent of Police, CID, RO, Nellore, rep.by Public Prosecutor, High Court of Judicature of Amaravathi ...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT Counsel for the Petitioner/accused: 1.HABIBULLA SHAIK Counsel for the Respondent/complainant: 1.PUBLIC PROSECUTOR The Court made the following: 3 COMMON ORDER: These three Criminal Petitions, though instituted separately by different accused persons, arise from a common substratum of facts, assail orders passed in analogous proceedings, and raise identical questions of law pertaining to the jurisdiction and conduct of the learned Trial Court in implementing appellate bail orders. Inasmuch as the facts and circumstances governing these three matters are substantially similar and the legal issues raised are common, this Court has deemed it expedient and appropriate to hear and dispose of all three petitions by way of this common order. 2. Criminal Petition No.3072 of 2026 has been filed under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita Act, 2023 (for brevity ‘the BNSS’) by the Petitioner/Accused No.2, seeking to quash the proceedings against him in Crl.M.P.No.444 of 2026 in C.C.No.11 of 2022 on the file of the learned Principal Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge under A.P.P.D.F.E.Act, Nellore. 3. Criminal Petition No.3073 of 2026 has been filed under Section 528 of ‘the BNSS’ by the Petitioner/Accused No.4, seeking to quash the proceedings against him in Crl.M.P.No.443 of 2026 in C.C.No.5 of 2017 on the file of the learned Principal Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge under A.P.P.D.F.E.Act, Nellore. 4. Criminal Petition No.3083 of 2026 has been filed under Section 528 of ‘the BNSS’ by the Petitioner/Accused No.6, seeking to quash the proceedings against him in Crl.M.P.No.442 of 2026 in C.C.No.5 of 2017 on the file of the 4 learned Principal Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge under A.P.P.D.F.E.Act, Nellore. 5. Sri K.S. Murthy, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of Sri K.V. Aditya Chowdary, learned Counsel on record, represented the Petitioners in Crl.P.Nos.3072 and 3073 of 2026. Sri Habibulla Shaik, learned Counsel, appeared and advanced arguments on behalf of the Petitioner in Crl.P.No.3083 of 2026. This Court has heard the learned counsel at length and has carefully considered the submissions advanced before it. 6. The genesis of the present petitions lies in a judgment rendered by the learned Principal Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, Nellore, on 30.03.2026 in C.C.Nos.5 of 2017, 10 of 2022, 11 of 2022, and 14 of 2022. By the said elaborate judgment, the learned Sessions Judge, after due trial, recorded a finding that the accused persons before him were not guilty of the charge framed under Section 5 of the Andhra Pradesh Protection of Depositors of Financial Establishments Act, 1999 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). The accused were, however, convicted for the offences punishable under Sections 420 and 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the I.P.C.,’) and sentenced accordingly. 7. Being aggrieved by the said judgment of conviction and sentence, the respective accused persons preferred Criminal Appeals before this Court. This Court, upon consideration of the appeals, was pleased to suspend the sentences awarded to the respective accused and enlarged them on bail subject to specific conditions, including the execution of a personal bond of 5 Rs.50,000/- with two sureties of like amount each, surrender of passports to the custody of the court, and a condition prohibiting departure from the country without prior permission of this Court. The aforesaid orders of suspension of sentence and grant of bail were passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in I.A.No.1 of 2026 in Crl.A.No.204 of 2026 (in respect of Accused No.2), in Crl.A.No.205 of 2026 (in respect of Accused No.4), and in Crl.A.No.207 of 2026 (in respect of Accused No.6). 8. In implementation of the aforesaid appellate orders, the respective accused persons presented themselves before the learned Trial Court and sought to furnish sureties in terms of the conditions stipulated by this Court. However, the learned Sessions Judge, instead of giving effect to the appellate mandate in its letter and spirit, proceeded to scrutinise and cross-examine the tendered sureties on matters entirely alien to the legitimate inquiry of verifying solvency, ultimately rejecting the sureties on grounds neither legally valid nor judicially sustainable. The accused persons, being thereby deprived of the liberty secured to them by the express order of this Court, were constrained to approach this Court by way of the present petitions. 9. Sri K.S.Murthy, learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner/Accused No.2 in Crl.P.No.3072 of 2026 submits that the learned Trial Court, in declining to accept the sureties tendered pursuant to the explicit directions of this Court in Crl.A.No.204 of 2026, has acted in derogation of binding appellate authority and in excess of jurisdiction. The insistence upon sureties commensurate with an alleged figure of Rs.500 crores, unsupported by record or conviction, 6 constitutes a manifest miscarriage of justice and a clear departure from the order of suspension of sentence already granted. The Petitioner was acquitted under Section 5 of the Andhra Pradesh Protection of Depositors of Financial Establishments Act, 1999 (for brevity ‘the Act.,’) and convicted only under Sections 420 and 406 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ and this Court has already safeguarded against flight risk by directing that the Petitioner shall not leave the country without permission, while the passport remains in judicial custody. The Petitioner, who was on bail throughout the trial and cooperated with proceedings, cannot be subjected to arbitrary rejection of sureties or denial of liberty contrary to the appellate mandate. 10. Learned Senior Counsel for the Petitioner/Accused No.4 in Crl.P.No.3073 of 2026 submits that the Learned Trial Court, in refusing to honour the bail conditions stipulated by this Court in Crl.A.No.205 of 2026, has transgressed the limits of its authority and rendered an order contrary to law and record. The reliance upon speculative figures of Rs.500 crores and 1600 victims, neither proved nor forming part of the conviction, is wholly irrelevant when the Petitioner stands acquitted under Section 5 of ‘the Act.,’ and convicted only under Sections 420 and 406 of ‘the I.P.C.’ The Petitioner, a practising lawyer at the Madras High Court who resigned from the company as early as 2009, has been wrongly treated as a continuing director and subjected to onerous surety requirements far beyond the Rs.50,000/- bond mandated by this Court. The passport being in judicial custody, and the condition against leaving the country already imposed, the apprehension of 7 abscondence is illusory. The Petitioner’s cooperation throughout trial and compliance with judicial directions entitle him to the benefit of bail, and the rejection of sureties by the learned Trial Court is arbitrary, capricious, and violative of the appellate order. 11. Sri Habibulla Shaik, learned Counsel for the Petitioner/Accused No.6 in Crl.P.No.3083 of 2026 submits that the learned Trial Court, in dismissing Crl.M.P.No.442 of 2026 and refusing to accept either the sureties tendered or the cash deposit offered under Section 445 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ has acted wholly without jurisdiction and in derogation of the binding order of this Court in Crl.A.No.207 of 2026. Once the learned Appellate Court has suspended the sentence and directed release on bail upon execution of a bond of Rs.50,000/- with two sureties, the role of the learned Trial Court is purely ministerial, confined to implementing the appellate mandate. By re‑evaluating the gravity of the offence, invoking speculative figures of Rs.500 crores and 1600 victims, and imputing a risk of abscondence despite the surrender of passport and the condition against leaving the country, the learned Trial Court has exceeded its remit and virtually nullified the order of this Court. Such insistence on local sureties and rejection of cash deposit is arbitrary, capricious, and violative of the statutory discretion under Section 445 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ which expressly permits deposit of money in lieu of sureties, particularly where the accused is a resident of another state. 12. Sri Habibulla Shaik, learned Counsel for the Petitioner/Accused No.6 further submits that the Petitioner was acquitted under Section 5 of ‘the Act.,’ 8 and convicted only under Sections 420 and 406 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ reliance upon the acquitted charge to deny bail is legally unsustainable. The Petitioner has already surrendered her passport, furnished responsible sureties in the form of her husband and brother (an advocate at Chennai), and demonstrated cooperation throughout trial. The apprehension of abscondence is thus illusory and unfounded. The learned Trial Court’s order, by imposing onerous and impracticable conditions, defeats the very purpose of suspension of sentence and amounts to abuse of process. It is requested that this Court be pleased to set aside the order dated 13.04.2026 of the learned Principal District Judge‑cum‑Special Judge, Nellore, and direct acceptance of cash surety in lieu of local sureties, thereby effectuating the bail granted by this Court and securing the ends of justice. 13. Upon careful consideration of the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel on both sides, a perusal of the impugned order, and an examination of the record placed before this Court, this Court is of the considered opinion that the learned Sessions Judge has, in the circumstances of the present case, acted in a manner that is inconsistent with the nature and scope of his jurisdiction in the matter of implementing an appellate bail order. 14. The position of law in this regard admits of no ambiguity. When a superior appellate court, having applied its judicial mind to the facts and circumstances of the case, suspends a sentence of conviction and directs release of the convicted accused on bail upon execution of a bond of a specified sum with sureties, the learned Court below to which the matter is 9 remitted for implementation of that order is vested with no independent discretion to traverse beyond the boundaries of the appellate order. The role of the executing court, in such circumstances, is essentially administrative and ministerial in character. It is confined to verifying, in accordance with the rules governing the taking of bail, whether the sureties offered are solvent and otherwise fit and proper persons to stand as surety, and upon being so satisfied, to accept the bail and issue the release warrant forthwith. The learned Court below possesses no jurisdiction whatsoever to re-examine the merits of the case, to assess independently the gravity of the offence, to invoke considerations of public interest or the magnitude of the alleged crime, or to impose additional conditions of its own making over and above those expressly stipulated by the learned Appellate Court. Any such exercise of power by the learned Court below would be a transgression of jurisdiction and, in substance, a collateral challenge to the order of the learned Appellate Court, which is impermissible in law. 15. In the present case, the learned Sessions Judge committed a serious error of jurisdiction in interrogating the tendered sureties, namely Devadas Sompalli, School Assistant (Telugu), and Mallela Vijay Kanth, on matters pertaining to the magnitude of the case, the quantum of the alleged fraud, the number of victims, and other extraneous considerations bearing no relevance whatsoever to the legitimate inquiry of assessing the financial solvency and fitness of the sureties. The endorsement made by the learned Sessions Judge on the salary slip of the surety Devadas Sompalli reads thus: “The surety does 10 not know the particulars of the amount, hence surety is rejected.” This endorsement is conspicuously and fundamentally deficient in that it fails to disclose with any degree of clarity or precision the nature of the “particulars of the amount” to which it refers. It leaves entirely undetermined whether the rejection proceeds on the ground that the surety was unaware of the quantum of the bond for which he was standing surety, which would be a matter capable of being readily explained and rectified, or whether it proceeds on the ground that the surety lacked knowledge of the amount allegedly involved in the commission of the offence itself, which would be a wholly irrelevant and legally extraneous consideration. Either way, the order of rejection is arbitrary in its reasoning and unsustainable in law. 16. This Court finds it necessary to observe, with considerable emphasis, the fundamental incongruity in the approach adopted by the learned Sessions Judge. The very court which, by its own elaborate and considered judgment dated 30.03.2026, had expressly returned a finding of not guilty against the accused in respect of the charge under Section 5 of ‘the Act.,’ and which had accordingly acquitted them of the said charge, proceeded in the impugned order to invoke that very acquitted charge as the foundation for imposing onerous and disproportionate surety requirements. There is no rational or legal basis for a court, having itself recorded an acquittal on a particular charge, to subsequently deploy that charge, or the factual allegations underlying it, as a ground for denying to the accused the benefit of bail granted by the learned Appellate Court. The conviction before the court, at the 11 relevant point of time, was only in respect of the offences punishable under Sections 420 and 406 of ‘the I.P.C.’ The references to Rs.500 crores and 1,600 victims, figures referable exclusively to the acquitted charge under ‘the Act.,’ were entirely alien to the lawful exercise of the Court’s ministerial function in the matter of implementing the appellate bail order. 17. With regard specifically to the grievance of the Petitioner/Accused No.6, who is a resident of the city of Chennai and who was unable to furnish local sureties from within the territorial jurisdiction of the learned Sessions Court at Nellore, this Court deems it appropriate to recall and reiterate the authoritative pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court on this question. 18. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in the decision in Moti Ram v. State of Madhya Pradesh1, categorically and unequivocally held that the insistence by any court upon the production of local sureties, to the exclusion of sureties who may otherwise be solvent and responsible persons residing elsewhere, constitutes a violation of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India. The imposition of such a condition strikes at the fundamental right to equality before the law and the right to personal liberty, for it operates in a discriminatory and oppressive manner against accused persons who happen to be residents of a place other than the jurisdiction of the court in question. Such a practice strikes hardest at persons of limited means, who lack the social connections necessary to procure local sureties in a distant jurisdiction, 1 (1978) 4 SCC 47 12 and it is therefore inconsistent with the constitutional mandate of equal protection of the law. 19. This Court further takes note of the subsequent decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramachandra Thangappan Aachari v. State of M.P2 wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court observed that an accused person shall be enlarged on bail on a personal bond, without insisting on the production of a local surety, in order to ensure meaningful compliance with the directions issued in its bail order. This exposition of the law reinforces the principle that the procedural mechanism of bail must not be allowed to become an instrument of incarceration by the imposition of technically burdensome and practically infeasible conditions. 20. Applying these authoritative principles to the facts of the present case, the insistence of the learned Sessions Judge that the Petitioner/Accused No.6, being a resident of Chennai, procure local sureties from Nellore, was wholly contrary to the settled constitutional and legal position. The Petitioner having tendered her husband and her brother, who is a practising Advocate at the Madras High Court, as sureties, the learned Sessions Judge was duty-bound to examine those sureties for the purpose of satisfying himself as to their solvency and fitness, and upon being so satisfied, to accept them and release the accused. 21. This Court also observes that the applications filed by the accused persons before the learned Sessions Judge were styled under Section 445 of 2 Spl(Crl).No.3363/2024 on 18.09.2024 13 ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ seeking permission to deposit cash in lieu of sureties. It would have been open to the learned Sessions Judge, had he been of the view that only this Court was competent to grant any relaxation or modification of the conditions of bail imposed by the appellate order, to have returned the applications for want of jurisdiction, with a direction to the applicants to approach the appropriate forum. However, the learned Sessions Judge, entertained the applications and to adjudicate upon them on merits, was obligated to do so in conformity with the law governing such applications and not to decide them on grounds that were legally untenable. Having assumed jurisdiction to entertain the applications, the dismissal of those applications on the irrelevant and unsustainable grounds adverted to in the impugned order cannot be countenanced by this Court. 22. In the light of the foregoing analysis and for the reasons set out hereinabove, this Court is of the opinion that the impugned orders of the learned Principal Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge, Nellore, declining to accept the sureties tendered by the respective accused persons are legally unsustainable, being in excess of jurisdiction, contrary to the binding directions of this Court, inconsistent with the constitutional principles enunciated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, and bereft of any legally valid rationale. 23. Accordingly, the three Criminal Petitions are allowed and disposed of in the following terms: 14 In so far as Crl.P.No.3072 of 2026 is concerned, the proceedings in Crl.M.P.No.444 of 2026 in C.C.No.11 of 2022 on the file of the learned Principal Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge under the A.P.P.D.F.E. Act, Nellore are hereby quashed. The learned Sessions Judge is directed to forthwith accept the sureties submitted by the Petitioner/Accused No.2, to satisfy himself as to their solvency in the ordinary course, and upon being satisfied that the sureties are otherwise in order, to accept the same and issue a release warrant in favour of the Petitioner/Accused No.2, without subjecting the sureties to any interrogation touching upon the magnitude of the offence or the amounts alleged to have been involved in the case. In so far as Crl.P.No.3073 of 2026 is concerned, the proceedings in Crl.M.P.No.443 of 2026 in C.C.No.5 of 2017 on the file of the learned Principal Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge under the A.P.P.D.F.E. Act, Nellore are hereby quashed. The learned Sessions Judge is directed to consider the sureties submitted by the Petitioner/Accused No.4 in accordance with law and, upon being satisfied as to their solvency and fitness, to accept the same and issue a release warrant without delay. In so far as Crl.P.No.3083 of 2026 is concerned, the proceedings in Crl.M.P.No.442 of 2026 in C.C.No.5 of 2017 on the file of the learned Principal Sessions Judge-cum-Special Judge under the A.P.P.D.F.E. Act, Nellore are hereby quashed. The learned Sessions Judge is directed to accept the sureties of the husband and the brother of the Petitioner/Accused No.6, both 15 residents of Chennai, or any other sureties of any persons provided the same are otherwise found to be in order upon due verification. 24. All other conditions imposed by this Court in the respective bail orders passed in Crl.A.Nos.204, 205, and 207 of 2026 shall remain operative in their entirety and shall be strictly complied with by the respective accused persons. 25. The learned Sessions Judge is directed to give effect to this order and issue the release warrants as directed herein with all practicable expedition. 26. The Criminal Petitions are accordingly allowed and disposed of in the aforesaid terms. As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed. __________________________ Dr. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO,J Date: 15.04.2026 VTS