JUDGMENT : SAURABH SHYAM SHAMSHERY, J. 1. Heard Sri V.K. Singh, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Samarth Singh, learned counsel for petitioner and Sri I. R. Singh, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Adarsh Singh, learned counsel for Respondent-College. 2. Petitioner was selected on the post of Principal and was allotted a College, namely, Madan Lal Inter College, Bisauli, Budaun vide order dated 08.12.2022. Since he was not allowed to join on the post of Principal by Committee of Management, therefore, he has to approach the District Inspector of Schools, Budaun and under his direction petitioner was finally allowed to join on the post of Principal w.e.f. 21.01.2023. 3. According to petitioner, he has discharged his duties with diligence still he was served with an order dated 28.07.2025 whereby he was put under suspension by Manager of concerned College on alleged allegation of financial irregularities, indiscipline and for violation of orders of Management etc. 4. Subsequently, petitioner was served with a charge sheet dated 25.08.2025 on 47 charges. The proposal of suspension was approved vide order dated 20.09.2025 passed by District Inspector of Schools, Budaun. 5. Petitioner has challenged the approval of suspension order by way of filing Writ-A No. 17592 of 2025 which was disposed of vide order dated 21.11.2025 with direction to conclude disciplinary proceedings without interfering with approval of suspension order. Relevant part of judgment is reproduced hereinafter: “9. I have considered above submissions and perused the records. 10. It appears that charge sheet has as many as 47 charges which are mostly of embezzlement on various accounts and total amount is also very high i.e. more than 45 lakhs, however, at this stage, Court is not entering into controversy whether charges are correct or not as it would be the subject matter of inquiry, which is still pending. 11. 11. So far as submission in regard to malafide is concerned, Court if enters into that arena and makes comments, it would prejudice case of either party, though a direction in the suspension order that petitioner would not be allowed to enter the premises supports the case of petitioner to some extent but not to the extent to cause interference in the suspension order since allegations are of embezzlement and amount is more than 45 lakhs i.e. a huge amount and petitioner being Principal has access to the records, therefore, no ground is made out for causing interference. 12. In aforesaid circumstances, this writ petition is disposed of with a direction that since petitioner does not want to submit any other reply, he shall appear before Inquiry Committee on 28.11.2025 at 10.00 AM and Inquiry Committee will try to conclude the inquiry so far as proceedings is concerned on same day or preferably on next day and decision shall be taken within a week thereafter and immediately thereafter, proposal will be communicated to D.I.O.S. for approval. 13. After aforesaid proceedings is concluded, within a week, the D.I.O.S. shall take a decision after giving opportunity to petitioner as well as Manager of Committee of Management also. Since prescribed period is just less than a month, therefore, also, at this stage, impugned order is not interfered, however, in case despite cooperation of petitioner, disciplinary proceedings are not concluded within aforesaid period, the order of suspension and order of its approval shall be considered to be kept in abeyance, subject to outcome of inquiry and final order of D.I.O.S. concerned on it.” 6. Learned Senior Advocate appearing for petitioner submits that in terms of above referred order petitioner appeared before the Inquiry Committee on 28.11.2025 and tried to submit a detailed reply to the charge sheet running into about 500 pages, however, it appears that it was not accepted. An objection was also raised by petitioner to the constitution of Inquiry Committee, i.e., Members nominated in earlier Committee of Management were changed without prior information. 7. The Committee of Management proceeded with inquiry and Inquiry Committee submitted an Inquiry Report dated 30.11.2025 to Committee of Management. Manager of Committee of Management communicated the petitioner vide letter dated 01.12.2025 and asked him to collect copy of inquiry report on 06.12.2025 at about 05.00 PM from Camp Office. 8. 7. The Committee of Management proceeded with inquiry and Inquiry Committee submitted an Inquiry Report dated 30.11.2025 to Committee of Management. Manager of Committee of Management communicated the petitioner vide letter dated 01.12.2025 and asked him to collect copy of inquiry report on 06.12.2025 at about 05.00 PM from Camp Office. 8. Learned Senior Advocate submits that petitioner was under an apprehension that he would be hurt physically, therefore, he has not appeared at the Camp Office and informed the District Inspector of Schools accordingly. In these circumstances, petitioner has not received for whatsoever reason a copy of inquiry report and as such he has not submitted any reply to inquiry report. 9. Even in absence to reply to inquiry report the Committee of Management proceeded further and finally took a proposal dated 07.12.2025 and proposed the punishment of termination. For reference scanned copy of aforesaid proposal is pasted hereinafter: 10. The aforesaid proposal was thereafter sent to District Inspector of Schools for approval vide a letter dated 07.12.2025 and by means of impugned order dated 15.12.2025 it was approved. 11. Learned Senior Advocate for petitioner submits that from perusal of impugned order it would clearly evident that District Inspector of Schools, Budaun has not applied independent mind and without considering reply submitted by the petitioner and that no copy of inquiry report was submitted to petitioner, still the proposal was accepted. 12. Learned Senior Advocate referred the reply submitted before District Inspector of Schools. He further submits that due procedure was not followed and petitioner was served with major punishment, as such, disciplinary proceedings are vitiated. 13. Per contra, learned Senior Advocate appearing for Respondent- College, raised an issue of maintainability that petitioner has efficacious and effective alternative remedy to file an appeal against impugned order. 14. In reply to aforesaid preliminary objection, learned Senior Advocate for petitioner refers para 45 of writ petition that if said grounds are considered it may be a case that petitioner can approach this Court at first instance. Para 45 of the writ petition is reproduced hereinafter: “45. 14. In reply to aforesaid preliminary objection, learned Senior Advocate for petitioner refers para 45 of writ petition that if said grounds are considered it may be a case that petitioner can approach this Court at first instance. Para 45 of the writ petition is reproduced hereinafter: “45. That at the very outset it is also Informed that though against the Impugned order passed by the District Inspector of Schools the petitioner has an alternative remedy to file an Appeal before the Joint Director of Education but in view of the following reasons the petitioner has directly approached this Court by filing the instant writ petition: i. The impugned order passed by the District Inspector of Schools has approved the termination of the petitioner, which is an outcome of an ex parte inquiry and the same was done absolutely behind the back of the petitioner without fixing a specific date, time and place and no such oral hearing or opportunity to cross examine was provided to the petitioner. Since the said order has approved a thing which has been done in violation of the principles of natural justice, the same has directly been challenged before this Hon'ble Court. ii. The order of the District Inspector of Schools is a non speaking order and the same has not considered the specific reply/representation of the petitioner, which is also violative of principles of natural justice. iii. All the relevant papers and the documents on the basis of which the entire action has been taken against the petitioner were not provided to him including the copy of the Inquiry report, so the present writ petition has been filed directly before this Hon'ble Court assailing the impugned orders.” 15. On merit, learned Senior Advocate for Respondent-College submits that once the petitioner has refused to come to the Camp Officer to receive the copy of inquiry report, he cannot take a ground to challenge the proceedings that principle of natural justice was not followed. Petitioner has intentionally not cooperated with disciplinary proceedings and all charges were proved on basis of material that petitioner has committed embezzlement of a very huge amount. 16. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for State-Respondents has supported the impugned order that on basis of inquiry report, the District Inspector of Schools has approved proposal of termination and it does not require to pass a very detail order. 16. Learned Standing Counsel appearing for State-Respondents has supported the impugned order that on basis of inquiry report, the District Inspector of Schools has approved proposal of termination and it does not require to pass a very detail order. The consideration on basis of reply submitted by petitioner is sufficient to take a decision to approve or disapprove the proposal and since in present case, District Inspector of Schools has taken a decision to approve proposal and, therefore, there is no legal infirmity that natural justice was not complied with. Impugned order does not require any interference. Learned Standing Counsel has also supported the preliminary objection. 17. I have considered the aforesaid submissions and perused the material on record. 18. At first instance, the Court has to consider, whether preliminary objection raised by learned Senior Advocate for Respondent-College is sustainable or not. 19. In this regard, the Court takes note of para 45(i), (ii) and (iii) of the writ petition wherein petitioner has mentioned reasons why he has approached this Court at first instance despite there is an alternative remedy to file an appeal before Joint Director of Education. 20. The Court takes note of above referred facts of present case that at first instance Respondent-Committee of Management has refused to accept a detail reply filed by petitioner running into 500 pages, therefore, the stand of petitioner was not effectively presented before Inquiry Committee. There is serious objection to the constitution of Inquiry Committee also. 21. The Court also takes note of a fact that a copy of inquiry report was not served upon petitioner. Once petitioner has refused to receive a copy of inquiry report at the Camp Officer (which is a residential place of Manager), the Committee of Management was required to sent it to petitioner by Speed Post or by way of Dasti but no such attempt was made. 22. An argument of learned Senior Advocate for Respondent-College that this Court has passed a specific direction in earlier round of litigation to conclude proceedings expeditiously, would not mean that this Court has asked that principle of natural justice may not be followed. 23. Second show cause notice alongwith copy of inquiry report is a must requirement to proceed further and since it was not followed and not much disputed by learned Senior Advocate appearing for Respondent-College. 23. Second show cause notice alongwith copy of inquiry report is a must requirement to proceed further and since it was not followed and not much disputed by learned Senior Advocate appearing for Respondent-College. Therefore, the Court finds that there is an infirmity and irregularity in disciplinary proceedings that principle of natural justice was not complied with. 24. In view of above, the Court is of the view that objection with regard to maintainability of writ petition on ground of alternative remedy is unsustainable. In this regard the Court takes note of a judgment passed by Supreme Court in the case of M/S. Godrej Sara Lee Ltd. vs The Excise And Taxation Officer-Cum-Assessing Authority and others, (2023) SCC OnLine SC 95 and relevant paras thereof are reproduced hereinafter: “4. Before answering the questions, we feel the urge to say a few words on the exercise of writ powers conferred by Article 226 of the Constitution having come across certain orders passed by the high courts holding writ petitions as “not maintainable” merely because the alternative remedy provided by the relevant statutes has not been pursued by the parties desirous of invocation of the writ jurisdiction. The power to issue prerogative writs under Article 226 is plenary in nature. Any limitation on the exercise of such power must be traceable in the Constitution itself. Profitable reference in this regard may be made to Article 329 and ordainments of other similarly worded articles in the Constitution. Article 226 does not, in terms, impose any limitation or restraint on the exercise of power to issue writs. While it is true that exercise of writ powers despite availability of a remedy under the very statute which has been invoked and has given rise to the action impugned in the writ petition ought not to be made in a routine manner, yet, the mere fact that the petitioner before the high court, in a given case, has not pursued the alternative remedy available to him/it cannot mechanically be construed as a ground for its dismissal. It is axiomatic that the high courts (bearing in mind the facts of each particular case) have a discretion whether to entertain a writ petition or not. It is axiomatic that the high courts (bearing in mind the facts of each particular case) have a discretion whether to entertain a writ petition or not. One of the self-imposed restrictions on the exercise of power under Article 226 that has evolved through judicial precedents is that the high courts should normally not entertain a writ petition, where an effective and efficacious alternative remedy is available. At the same time, it must be remembered that mere availability of an alternative remedy of appeal or revision, which the party invoking the jurisdiction of the high court under Article 226 has not pursued, would not oust the jurisdiction of the high court and render a writ petition “not maintainable”. In a long line of decisions, this Court has made it clear that availability of an alternative remedy does not operate as an absolute bar to the “maintainability” of a writ petition and that the rule, which requires a party to pursue the alternative remedy provided by a statute, is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law. Though elementary, it needs to be restated that “entertainability” and “maintainability” of a writ petition are distinct concepts. The fine but real distinction between the two ought not to be lost sight of. The objection as to “maintainability” goes to the root of the matter and if such objection were found to be of substance, the courts would be rendered incapable of even receiving the lis for adjudication. On the other hand, the question of “entertainability” is entirely within the realm of discretion of the high courts, writ remedy being discretionary. A writ petition despite being maintainable may not be entertained by a high court for very many reasons or relief could even be refused to the petitioner, despite setting up a sound legal point, if grant of the claimed relief would not further public interest. Hence, dismissal of a writ petition by a high court on the ground that the petitioner has not availed the alternative remedy without, however, examining whether an exceptional case has been made out for such entertainment would not be proper. 5. A little after the dawn of the Constitution, a Constitution Bench of this Court in its decision reported in 1958 SCR 595 (State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Mohd. Nooh) had the occasion to observe as follows: “10. 5. A little after the dawn of the Constitution, a Constitution Bench of this Court in its decision reported in 1958 SCR 595 (State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Mohd. Nooh) had the occasion to observe as follows: “10. In the next place it must be borne in mind that there is no rule, with regard to certiorari as there is with mandamus, that it will lie only where there is no other equally effective remedy. It is well established that, provided the requisite grounds exist, certiorari will lie although a right of appeal has been conferred by statute, (Halsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 11, p. 130 and the cases cited there). The fact that the aggrieved party has another and adequate remedy may be taken into consideration by the superior court in arriving at a conclusion as to whether it should, in exercise of its discretion, issue a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings and decisions of inferior courts subordinate to it and ordinarily the superior court will decline to interfere until the aggrieved party has exhausted his other statutory remedies, if any. But this rule requiring the exhaustion of statutory remedies before the writ will be granted is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law and instances are numerous where a writ of certiorari has been issued in spite of the fact that the aggrieved party had other adequate legal remedies. ***” 6. At the end of the last century, this Court in paragraph 15 of the its decision reported in (1998) 8 SCC 1 (Whirlpool Corporation vs. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai and Others) carved out the exceptions on the existence whereof a Writ Court would be justified in entertaining a writ petition despite the party approaching it not having availed the alternative remedy provided by the statute. The same read as under: (i) where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights; (ii) where there is violation of principles of natural justice; (iii) where the order or the proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction; or (iv) where the vires of an Act is challenged. 7. Not too long ago, this Court in its decision reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 884 (Assistant Commissioner of State Tax vs. M/s. Commercial Steel Limited) has reiterated the same principles in paragraph 11. 8. 7. Not too long ago, this Court in its decision reported in 2021 SCC OnLine SC 884 (Assistant Commissioner of State Tax vs. M/s. Commercial Steel Limited) has reiterated the same principles in paragraph 11. 8. That apart, we may also usefully refer to the decisions of this Court reported in (1977) 2 SCC 724 (State of Uttar Pradesh & ors. vs. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd.) and (2000) 10 SCC 482 (Union of India vs. State of Haryana). What appears on a plain reading of the former decision is that whether a certain item falls within an entry in a sales tax statute, raises a pure question of law and if investigation into facts is unnecessary, the high court could entertain a writ petition in its discretion even though the alternative remedy was not availed of; and, unless exercise of discretion is shown to be unreasonable or perverse, this Court would not interfere. In the latter decision, this Court found the issue raised by the appellant to be pristinely legal requiring determination by the high court without putting the appellant through the mill of statutory appeals in the hierarchy. What follows from the said decisions is that where the controversy is a purely legal one and it does not involve disputed questions of fact but only questions of law, then it should be decided by the high court instead of dismissing the writ petition on the ground of an alternative remedy being available.” 25. Now the Court proceed to consider, whether due procedure to conduct disciplinary proceeding was followed or not as there is an evident violation of principle of natural justice. 26. In the present case, petitioner is admittedly facing serious charges, therefore, they are required to be proved after due process and after affording petitioner adequate opportunity to present his case. 27. From the facts mentioned above, it is very clear that petitioner’s reply to charge sheet which was running into 500 pages was not received by the Disciplinary Committee. Therefore, Court finds that first was irregularity erupted at this stage. 28. The second irregularity erupted when admittedly copy of inquiry report was not handed over to petitioner. 27. From the facts mentioned above, it is very clear that petitioner’s reply to charge sheet which was running into 500 pages was not received by the Disciplinary Committee. Therefore, Court finds that first was irregularity erupted at this stage. 28. The second irregularity erupted when admittedly copy of inquiry report was not handed over to petitioner. Even though he was asked to collect it from Camp Office but once petitioner has communicated that he has an apprehension of threat of physical harm, as a fair employer, the Committee of Management ought to have sent a copy of inquiry report to petitioner, either by Speed Post or by Dasti and further to show that they want to conduct a fair inquiry, the place of inquiry can be shifted within the premises of College Campus, however, admittedly such fairness was not shown and as such second legal infirmity was committed. 29. In aforesaid circumstances, the Court finds that the writ petition is maintainable and since it is evident that legal infirmities are committed in disciplinary proceedings, therefore, it becomes defective from the stage when a reply to charge sheet was not taken on record and since District Inspector of Schools concerned has not taken note of aforesaid factors, therefore, impugned order is bad in law. 30. Accordingly, impugned orders dated 15.12.2025 and 24.12.2025 are hereby set aside. The proposal adopted by Committee of Management has also required interference accordingly set aside. It is directed that disciplinary proceedings be commenced from the stage of submitting reply to charge sheet. Petitioner is directed to serve a copy of reply at the Office of Manager, Committee of Management within the premises of College within a period of two weeks from today so that further proceedings be concluded expeditiously. The inquiry shall be conducted within the premises of College concerned. 31. With aforesaid observations/ directions, the writ petition is disposed of.