1 IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION [CIRCUIT BENCH AT PORT BLAIR] PRESENT: THE HON'BLE JUSTICE MADHURESH PRASAD AND THE HON’BLE JUSTICE PRASENJIT BISWAS MAT/6/2026 SHRI BISESWAR MONDAL AND ANOTHER … APPELLANTS VS. SHRI D. UDAIYAR AND OTEHRS … RESPONDENTS For the appellants : Mr. K. Vijay Kumar For the respondent no.1 : Mr. K.M.B. Jayapal For the respondent nos.2 to5 : Ms. Babita Das Heard on : September 30, 2026 Judgment delivered on : September 30, 2026 MADHURESH PRASAD, J. 1. Heard learned advocates for the parties. 2. The appeal is arising out of an order dated 16.12.2025 passed by the learned Single Judge Bench in the writ proceeding whereby and whereunder, the learned Single Judge Bench has passed a direction restraining the licensing authority from giving a fresh 2 licence for a bar-cum-restaurant in favour of the respondent no.6 in the writ petition, in the premises which the writ petitioner claims to be occupying as a tenant under a sublet agreement dated 26.08.2011. 3. There is no dispute that a civil suit bearing O.S.No. 22 of 2025 is pending in respect of the writ petitioner’s alleged right to continuing in possession of the premises in question as a tenant. The suit is pending in the file of the Court of Civil Judge (Senior Division), Mayabunder. 4. The writ petition was filed by the plaintiff alleging that the respondent no.5 does not have right in respect of the premises in question. Bar licence in respect of the premises in question was obtained in the name of the respondent no.6 ( Smt Jayanti Mondal). However, the writ petitioner was paying rent to husband of respondent no.6, i..e Biseswar Mondal (respondent no.5 in the writ petition) for running of the Bar Business by the writ petitioner. It was alleged by the writ petitioner that despite grant of ad interim injunction in the pending suit, the respondents no.5 & 6 in collusion with the respondent no.2 are procuring a bar licence in respect of the suit premises. Considering the case made out by the writ petitioner, the order dated 16.12.2025 was passed by the learned Single Judge which is impugned before us in the present appeal. 3 5. Learned advocate for the appellant has assailed the order as being unsustainable in law. 6. Learned advocate representing the writ petitioner however submits that the petitioner is in possession of the premises as a tenant and therefore on a collusion being discovered between the respondent and the licensing authority, he was faced with tangible apprehension which was sufficient to invoke the writ jurisdiction. More so considering the fact that in the suit between the parties, already an order of ad interim injunction was passed. He further submits that since an issue of collusion was raised between the state authority and the respondent, resort to writ proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India was sustainable in the eye of law. 7. In support of his submission he has relied upon the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam and others vs. Government of Tamil Nadu and another reported in (2016) 2 SCC 725 and Shalini Shyam Shetty and Another vs. Rajendra Shankar Patil reported in (2010) 8 SCC 329. 8. We have been informed that the order of temporary injunction dated 11.02.2026 in the pending suit, has subsequently been set aside by the appellate court vide order dated 25.09.2026, in Misc.Appeal No.1 of 2026 and it was declared that both the parties to 4 the suit shall maintain status quo in respect of the nature, character and possession of the suit premises as on the date of presentation of the temporary injunction till disposal of the suit. 9. The photocopy of the order is handed over to the Court. Passing of the order in the Misc. appeal no.1 of 2026 is a fact not in dispute. 10. We considered the submissions recorded above, the legal position emanating from the two judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India and the fact of the pendency a civil suit between the parties before a civil court of competent jurisdiction. Therefore, we are of the view that the entire claim of the writ petitioner in the writ petition was founded on his assertion of his alleged right to occupation of the premises in question as a tenant; which right was the substantial issue pending consideration in the O.S.No.25 of 2025 filed by him. 11. The writ petitioners claimed tenancy rights, as against respondent nos. 5 and 6, is pending consideration before the Civil Court where it is yet to be decided with reference to evidence. We, therefore, do not approve of invocation of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by the writ petitioner. 12. The plea of collusion by State authorities was raised in the writ petition without any factual details based on which the petitioners 5 could establish any collusion between the respondent no.2 and the writ petitioner. 13. The writ petitioner also did not array the individual incumbent in the office of the respondent no.2. 14. We, therefore, find no substance in the plea of collusion raised by the writ petitioner. Apparently such plea is raised with an oblique motive, only to invoke the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In absence of any factual details, the bald plea of collusion cannot sustain invocation of writ jurisdiction by the writ petitioner. 15. We also considered the two judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India relied upon by the learned advocate for the writ petitioner. So far as judgment in the case of Shalini Shyam Shetty and Another1 (supra), we find that in view of the facts and circumstances considered above, the same does not support the maintainability of the writ petition to settle private disputes, and substantially raising a grievance against the private individual, premised of assertion of tenancy rights, which right itself is pending adjudication in a Civil Court. Paragraph 59, 60 & 61 68 of the judgment reads: “59. It has repeatedly been held by this Court that a proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution is not the appropriate forum for adjudication of property disputes or disputes relating to title. In Mohd. 1 (2010) 8 SCC 329 6 Hanif v. State of Assam [(1969) 2 SCC 782] a three-Judge Bench of this Court, explaining the general principles governing writ jurisdiction under Article 226, held that this jurisdiction is extraordinary in nature and is not meant for declaring the private rights of the parties. (See SCC p. 786, para 5 of the Report.) In coming to the aforesaid conclusion in Hanif [(1969) 2 SCC 782] , this Court referred to the Constitution Bench decision in T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa [AIR 1954 SC 440]. 60. Following the aforesaid principles in Hanif [(1969) 2 SCC 782] , this Court in Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Kalyani Banerjee [(1973) 1 SCC 273] held that serious questions about title and possession of land cannot be dealt with by writ court. In formulating these principles in Kalyani Banerjee [(1973) 1 SCC 273] , this Court relied on the Constitution Bench decision in Sohan Lal [AIR 1957 SC 529] (see SCC p. 282, para 16 of the Report) 61. Again in State of Rajasthan v. Bhawani Singh [1993 Supp (1) SCC 306] this Court held that a writ petition is not the appropriate forum to declare a person's title to property. (See SCC p. 309, para 7 of the Report.). … … … 68. For the reasons aforesaid, it is held that the High Court committed an error in entertaining the writ petition in a dispute between landlord and tenant and where the only respondent is a private landlord. The course adopted by the High Court cannot be approved. Of course, the High Court's order of non-interference in view of concurrent findings of facts is unexceptionable. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs.” 16. Insofar as the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam and others2 (supra), we find that the same also does not enure to the petitioner’s benefit on the issue of maintainability of writ petition. 17. The facts and circumstances in which the judgment was rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court are at stark variance with the 2 (2016) 2 SCC 725 7 facts and circumstances arising for consideration in the present case. In the case of Adi Saiva Sivachariyargal Nala Sangam and others3 (supra), the petitioners had filed writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, the writ petition was instituted by an Association of Archakas and individual Archakas of Sri Meenakshi Amman Temple of Madurai. The writ petition was filed challenging a Government Order and an Ordinance. 18. In that case, the objection of maintainability was raised by the respondents therein on a premise that the writ petition was premature. Only when the government order is given effect to by actual appointment of Archaka or Archakas, it would be open to the petitioner to raise the issue. It is in this context that the Apex Court held that the petitioners therein could not be non-suited at the threshold merely because a government order had not been given effect to. The Apex Court held that the petitioners need not wait for actual prejudice and adverse effect and consequence, since the apprehension was well founded and furnished a cause of action for moving the Court. 3 ibid 8 19. We therefore have no hesitation in holding that two judgments of the Hon’ble Apex Court relied upon by the learned advocate for the writ petitioner do not support the petitioner’s contention as both the judgments are factually distinguishable. 20. We therefore find that resort to the writ proceeding in respect of such matters substantially pending in the Civil Court in a suit was unsustainable in the eyes of law. 21. If any direction was required in respect of the suit premises, it was for the writ petitioner to avail such relief/raise such grievance against the respondents, who are defendants in the suit, in the pending civil proceeding. 22. Appeal is disposed of reserving the liberty of the writ petitioner to avail appropriate remedies in the pending suit or in any other Court/forum of competent jurisdiction, in accordance with law. 23. The order of the learned Single Judge dated 16.12.2025 is set aside. The appeal is allowed. As a result, the writ petition is dismissed. 24. We make it clear that the present order is limited for the purposes of disposal of the writ petition. Any observation made 9 herein shall not be relied upon by the parties as having any persuasive value in the pending suit. 25. All parties are directed to act on a server copy of this order duly downloaded from the official website of this Court. ( Madhuresh Prasad, J. ) I agree. ( Prasenjit Biswas, J. )