1 IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA [ CIRCUIT BENCH AT PORT BLAIR ] *** CRR/26/2026 Iddi Janiki Ramayya Vs. The State Mrs. Shipra Mandal … for the petitioners Mr. Sumit Kumar Karmakar … for the State September 30, 2026 [AKB] Item No.8 1. The instant criminal revisional application has been preferred by the petitioner, Shri Iddi Janiki Ramayya, praying for quashing of the proceedings arising out of FIR No. 27 of 2025 dated 22.04.2025 and the consequential Charge-Sheet No. 30 of 2025, whereby he has been charge-sheeted under Section 223(b) read with Section 3(5) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023. 2. Ms. Shipra Mandal, learned advocate for the petitioner, submits that the impugned charge-sheet is unsustainable both in law and on facts. It is contended that there is a material discrepancy between the snorkeling register and the prosecution case, inasmuch as the register does not indicate that the petitioner accompanied any tourist at the relevant time, whereas the charge-sheet alleges that he accompanied Ms. Avani Singh. 3. Learned counsel further submits that the prosecution was initiated in contravention of the mandatory requirement of Section 215 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, 2 as there was no complaint in writing by the concerned public servant or by any duly authorised person. Instead, the proceeding was set in motion on the basis of the information lodged by the Station House Officer. It is, therefore, contended that the very foundation of the prosecution is vitiated for want of compliance with the statutory condition precedent. 4. It is further submitted that the proceedings against the co-accused arising from the same occurrence have already been quashed by this Court. According to learned counsel, the mere addition of Section 3(5) BNS, which embodies the principle of common intention and does not constitute an independent substantive offence, cannot cure the fundamental defect relating to cognizance under Section 215 BNSS. 5. Per contra, Mr. Sumit Kumar Karmakar, learned advocate appearing for the State, opposes the prayer for quashing and submits that the materials collected during investigation prima- facie disclose the involvement of the present petitioner in the alleged occurrence. It is contended that, at this stage, the Court ought not to undertake an elaborate appreciation or meticulous examination of the evidentiary materials collected by the investigating agency. 6. Learned counsel further submits that the evidence-taking process has not yet commenced and charge has also not been framed by the learned Trial Court. Accordingly, any conclusion as to the petitioner’s involvement at this stage would be premature. On such premise, it is urged that the materials on 3 record disclose a prima-facie case against the petitioner and, therefore, the prayer for quashing deserves to be rejected. 7. I have considered the rival submissions advanced on behalf of the parties and have carefully perused the materials available on record. 8. The principal issue for determination is whether cognizance of the alleged offence under Section 223(b) BNS could validly have been taken in the absence of a written complaint by the concerned public servant or a duly authorised public servant, as mandated by Section 215 BNSS. 9. Section 215 BNSS prescribes a statutory safeguard governing cognizance of the offences specified therein. The requirement of a complaint in writing by the competent public servant is a condition precedent and cannot be treated as a mere procedural formality. 10. In the present case, the materials on record disclose that no such written complaint was lodged by the concerned public servant. Rather, the proceeding was initiated on the basis of the information lodged by the Station House Officer, without any material demonstrating that the concerned public servant had authorised the SHO to institute the prosecution in the manner contemplated by Section 215 BNSS. The statutory requirement, therefore, stands unfulfilled. 11. The subsequent invocation of Section 3(5) BNS does not cure the defect. The said provision embodies the principle of common intention and does not constitute an independent substantive offence. Its addition cannot be utilised to 4 circumvent or dilute the mandatory condition governing cognizance of the substantive offence under Section 223(b) BNS. 12. The objection raised by the petitioner is thus jurisdictional in nature and is not dependent upon an appreciation of the sufficiency of the evidence collected during investigation. Consequently, the fact that charge has not yet been framed or that the evidence-taking process has not commenced does not answer the statutory objection. 13. It is also a relevant circumstance that the proceedings arising out of the same occurrence against the co-accused, namely N. Kiran, B. Papa Rao and G. Rajesh, have already been quashed by this Court by orders dated 25.09.2025, 09.02.2026 and 29.09.2026 respectively. While those orders are not independently determinative, they lend contextual support to the present challenge. 14. In the circumstances, the prosecution has failed to demonstrate compliance with the mandatory requirement of Section 215 BNSS. The absence of the requisite complaint constitutes a fundamental defect which cannot be cured by the materials collected during investigation. Accordingly, continuation of the criminal proceeding against the petitioner would be contrary to the statutory mandate. 15. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the considered opinion that the criminal proceeding arising out of FIR No. 27 of 2025 dated 22.04.2025, including the consequential Charge-Sheet No. 30 of 2025 dated 15.05.2025, 5 insofar as the present petitioner Shri Iddi Janiki Ramayya is concerned, cannot be sustained in law. Accordingly, the instant criminal revisional application, being CRR No. 26 of 2026, is allowed. 16. The FIR No. 27 of 2025 dated 22.04.2025 and the consequential Charge-Sheet No. 30 of 2025 dated 15.05.2025, insofar as the present petitioner Shri Iddi Janiki Ramayya is concerned, together with all consequential proceedings arising there from, are hereby quashed. 17. Let a copy of this order be sent to the Trial Court immediately. 18. Urgent Photostat certified copy of the order, if applied for, be given to the parties on payment of requisite fees. ( Prasenjit Biswas, J. )