[2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB] HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN BENCH AT JAIPUR D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 17755/2025 Mahavir Prasad Vaishnav, S/o Shri Ram Prasad Vaishnav, Aged About 73 Years, R/o Gusaiyon Ka Mohalla VPO Harmara, Dist. Ajmer-305812 (Raj.). Retired As Postal Assistant, Madanganj- Kishangarh Ho Under Postal Division Ajmer-305001. ----Petitioner Versus 1. Union Of India, Through, Secretary, Department Of Posts, Government Of India, Ministry Of Communications And Information Technology, Dak Bhawan, Sansad Marg, New Delhi-110001. 2. Director (VP), Department Of Posts, Government Of India, Ministry Of Communications And Information Technology, Dak Bhawan, Sansad Marg, New Delhi- 110001. 3. Chief Post Master General, Rajasthan Circle, Postal Department, Jaipur (Rajasthan)-302007. 4. Senior Superintendent Of Post Offices, Ajmer Division, Ajmer (Rajasthan) -305001. 5. Union Public Service Commission, Through Its Secretary, Dholpur House, Shahjahan Road, New Delhi - 110069. ----Respondents Connected With D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 10837/2025 1. Union Of India, Through, Secretary, Department Of Posts, Government Of India, Ministry Of Communications And Information Technology, Dak Bhawan, Sansad Marg, New Delhi-110001. 2. Director (VP), Department Of Posts, Government Of India, Ministry Of Communications And Information Technology, Dak Bhawan, Sansad Marg, New Delhi- 110001. 3. Chief Post Master General, Rajasthan Circle, Postal Department, Jaipur (Rajasthan)-302007. 4. Senior Superintendent Of Post Officers, Ajmer Division, Ajmer (Rajasthan)-305001 5. Union Public Service Commission, Through Its Secretary, Dholpur House, Shahjahan Road, New Delhi- 110069. ----Petitioners Versus Mahavir Prasad Vaishnav, S/o Shri Ram Prasad Vaishnav, Aged About 73 Years, R/o Gusaiyon Ka Mohalla Vpo Harmara, Dist. Ajmer-305812 (Raj.) Retired As Postal Assistant, Madanganj- Kishangarh Ho Under Postal Division Ajmer - 305001. ----Respondent [2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB] (2 of 29) [CW-17755/2025] For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Mukesh Kumar Agarwal Mr. Devanshu Agarwal (for respondent in D.B. C.W.P. No.10837/2025) For Respondent(s) : Mr. Bharat Vyas, ASG assisted by Ms. Anima Chaturvedi and Mr. Sanjay Mishra (for petitioner in D.B. C.W.P. No.17755/2025) HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE INDERJEET SINGH HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE RAVI CHIRANIA Order 1. Date of conclusion of Arguments 10.02.2026 2. Date on which the judgment was reserved 10.02.2026 3. Whether the full judgment or only operative part is pronounced Full 4. Date of pronouncement 19.02.2026 Per Hon’ble Ravi Chirania, J. 1. The present writ petition bearing No.17755/2025 has been filed by the petitioner - Mahaveer Prasad Vaishnav, aged about 73 years, challenging the impugned order dated 07.04.2025, passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal, Jaipur Bench, Jaipur, whereby the Original Application No.784/2024 (hereinafter referred to as ‘O.A.’) was allowed and the impugned punishment order dated 04.09.2024 was quashed, however, the learned Tribunal remanded the matter back to the respondents to take a decision afresh on the quantum of punishment within a period of three months. The writ petition bearing No. 10837/2025, has been filed by the Union of India, [2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB] (3 of 29) [CW-17755/2025] challenging the punishment order dated 04.09.2024 as quashed by the learned Tribunal. 2. Insofar as the writ petition filed by the petitioner – Mahaveer Prasad Vaishnav is concerned, learned counsel for the petitioner - Mr. Mukesh Agrawal, submitted that the petitioner was initially appointed in the Postal Department in the year 1971 and was promoted from time to time on various posts by the respondents in recognition of his unblemished service record in the department. 3. Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner was issued an impugned memorandum of charge-sheet dated 19.05.2015 in respect of a transaction which took place in the department on 28.05.2011. The petitioner was served the charge-sheet under sub-clause(i) of clause (b) of sub rule (2) of Rule 9 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Rules of 1972’). 4. Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner retired from service on 30.06.2011, and after retirement, he was issued the impugned charge-sheet. He submitted that as per the above mentioned Rule 9 of the Rules of 1972, a charge-sheet can be issued within a period of four years from the date of the alleged incident. In the present case, just nine days before expiry period of four years, the memo of charge- sheet was issued to him by the respondent. It is further submitted that the respondent appointed an Enquiry Officer, who, after conducting the enquiry, submitted his report dated 02.08.2019. Learned counsel submitted that the following [2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB] (4 of 29) [CW-17755/2025] charges were levelled against the petitioner in the said memorandum of charge-sheet, which read as under:- ARTICLE-I “That the said Shri Mahavir Prasad Vaishnaw, retired Postal Asstt., Madanganj-Kishangarh H.O. while working as officiating APM (SB), Madanganj Kishangarh H.O. from 19-11-2010 and onwards allowed/ sanctioned following withdrawal on 28-05- 2011 from Madanganj Kishangarh HO SB account no. 432644 through cheque, whereas no cheque book was issued to the depositor of said amount no. 432644. S. No. SB A/C No. Date Amount of withdrawal Cheque No. 01 432644 28.05.2011 27800 242500 The said account was silent, which was fraudulently revived by Sh. Pawan kumar Choudhary Postal Asstt on 05-03-2011 and thereafter bogus deposit entries were made in it through data entry module and raised the balance of the account. Said Shri Mahavir Prasad Vaishnaw, retired Postal Asstt. and offg Asstt. Post Master (SB), Madanganj-Kishangarh H.O. passed the above mentioned bogus/fraudulent payment through cheque from the cheque book issued for the another SB account no. 442004 irregularly without carrying out prescribed checks, violating the provision of Rule 33 (3) (b) read with Rule 21 of Appendix I of P.O. SB Manual Volume-I. He also failed to obtain KYC documents from the payee at the time of making above payment, violating the orders contained in SB order no. 18/2010 issued by Ministry of communication and [2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB] (5 of 29) [CW-17755/2025] IT, Department of Posts, New Delhi under no. 109- 04/2007-SB dated 24-08-2010. It is therefore, alleged that by doing so said Shri Mahavir Prasad Vaishnaw, retired Postal Asstt. and the then Asstt. Post Master (SB) Madanganj- Kishangarh H.O. has failed to maintain absolute integrity and devotion to duty and acted in a manner which is unbecoming of a govt servant and also failed to take all steps to ensure the integrity and devotion to duty from his subordinates as supervisor as required under Rule 3(1) (1) (ii) (iii) and 3 (2) (i) of CCS (Conduct) Rules 1964.” 5. The Enquiry Officer submitted his report, on the basis of which the Disciplinary Authority passed the impugned punishment order without properly considering the submissions and grounds raised by the petitioner in his representation dated 30.07.2024 and also ignoring the fact that the matter is more than 15 years old and further the petitioner has rendered more than 36 years of unblemished service in the respondent - Department. It is further submitted that the petitioner neither played any mischief nor committed any fraud or embezzlement etc. in the alleged incident for which the impugned charge-sheet was issued. Learned counsel further submitted that the Disciplinary Authority, by impugned punishment order dated 04.09.2024, imposed a harsh and shockingly disproportionate punishment of withholding 30% of the petitioner’s monthly pension for a period of 3 years from the date of passing the punishment order. [2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB] (6 of 29) [CW-17755/2025] 6. The said impugned punishment order was challenged by the petitioner before the learned Tribunal by way of O.A. No. 784/2024. Thereafter, the respondent filed a detailed reply before the learned Tribunal. After considering the submissions and the grounds as raised in the O.A., the report of the Enquiry Officer and the punishment order dated 04.09.2024, the learned Tribunal allowed the O.A. vide order dated 07.04.2025 and quashed and set aside the impugned punishment order dated 04.09.2024. 7. Learned counsel submitted that to this extent, the learned Tribunal passed a well considered and reasoned order after noticing and exercising all the facts and circumstances of the case, including the documentary evidence available on record. However, the petitioner has been compelled to approach this Hon’ble Court by way of the present writ petition as the learned Tribunal, while quashing the impugned punishment order dated 04.09.2024, committed a serious error in remanding the matter back to the respondent for re-examination in regard to the quantum of punishment. It is submitted that, despite considering and noticing the peculiar facts of the case, that no loss was caused to the Government by the petitioner and the persons who caused the loss and were responsible, had already deposited the embezzled amount and the charge against the petitioner was only in respect of supervisory negligence. 8. Learned counsel further submitted that the withholding of 30% of the petitioner’s monthly pension for a period of three years was severe and harsh and was, therefore, rightly quashed [2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB] (7 of 29) [CW-17755/2025] by the learned Tribunal, however, remanding the matter back to the respondents at this stage, when the petitioner is more than 73 years old, is unjustified, unreasonable and erroneous in the facts and circumstances of the present case on the basis of material available on record. 9. Learned counsel further submitted that it is an admitted fact that the petitioner discharged his duties in a fair and diligent manner, however, the fraud was committed by two employees, namely Pawan Kumar Chaudhary, Postal Assistant and Shri Ram Narayan Meena. It is also an admitted fact that the alleged fraud was committed by the said two persons and the petitioner was in no manner involved in any of illegality or fraudulent act etc.. The documents placed before the petitioner were signed by him in a bona fide manner. This fact was also available on record before the Enquiry Officer as well as the Disciplinary Authority. 10. Learned counsel further submitted that the petitioner has not caused any loss to the respondent Department and further the persons, who were actually responsible for the loss have already deposited the amount, in such circumstances, therefore, the punishment order was neither fair nor justified and was rightly quashed by the learned Tribunal. However, remanding the matter back, without any justified reason or cogent grounds, renders the impugned order, to that extent, as illegal. 11. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner has relied upon certain judgments passed by Hon’ble [2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB] (8 of 29) [CW-17755/2025] Supreme Court and the Delhi High Court. The first judgment as cited is of the Division Bench of Delhi High Court in D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 245/2012 titled as Union of India & Ors. Vs. R.P. Sharma (Rtd.) decided on 04.10.2012. In the said judgment, in Para 6, the Court considered the issue of ‘grave misconduct’ and relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of D.V. Kapoor Vs. Union of India reported in 1990 (4) SCC 314. The Court also considered the judgment in the case of P.N. Bhat Vs. Union of India reported in 2012 SCC OnLine Del 4979 decided on 20.09.2012. Paras No.5, 6, 7 & 8 of the judgment, as referred, are reproduced here as under:- “5. Explanation (b) following Rule 8(5) of the CCS (Pension) Rules reads as under:- "(b) the expression 'grave misconduct includes the communication or disclosure of any secret official code or password or any sketch, plan, model, article, note, document or information, such as is mentioned in Section 5 of the Official Secrets Act, 1923 (19 of 1923), (which was obtained while holding office under the government) so as to prejudicially affect the interests of the general public or the security of the State. 6. The Tribunal considered the question whether, even if Article-II of the charge stood established against the charged officer, it would amount to grave misconduct'? In doing so, the Tribunal examined the above extracted Rules as also decisions of the Supreme Court including the decision in the case of D.V. Kapoor Vs. Union of India: 1990 (4) SCC 314. [2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB] (9 of 29) [CW-17755/2025] Finally, the Tribunal concluded as under:- "22. It is noted that the act of commission or omission must be intentional or willful (mens rea). The nature of misconduct must be serious and grave. The misconduct like corruption, embezzlement. causing financial loss, Criminal offence, moral turpitude and the like can be termed as "grave". But error of judgment, supervisory lapse, inadvertent negligence, delay in taking action not causing any financial loss and not getting nomination cannot be construed as "grave misconduct." 23. Thus the cited Rule and judicial pronouncements cast the responsibility on the President to hold the pensioner guilty of grave misconduct or negligence for which the findings in the departmental enquiry must be assessed to reach the conclusion that the misconduct or negligence is grave. In the present case, the IO held both charges as "not proved" and the Disciplinary Authority disagreeing with the said findings issued the note which on consideration we found to have violated the Rule 15(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules. Ultimately, the UPSC in its advice found the Article-1 of the charge as "not proved" and the Article-II of the charge as "proved". In para 10 of this order, we have reproduced the Charge-II, as per which the Applicant failed to follow prescribed procedure in accepting/allowing nomination in 5 MIS accounts. This is a procedural lapse. There is no evidence to prove his lack of integrity or financial loss to the Respondents. Such negligence has been explained by the Applicant in his reply which is relevant but not properly appreciated. There is no misappropriation by the Applicant, [2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB] (10 of 29) [CW-17755/2025] nor there is any financial loss to the Department or to the customers and holders of the said MIS Accounts. What best could have been done in such a procedural lapse would have been to impose a minor penalty. That could have been possible when he was in service but not after his retirement. In our considered opinion, the Applicant committed a simple misconduct but not grave misconduct. By no stretch of imagination the procedural lapse committed by the Applicant can be termed as grave misconduct. We find that UPSC has in a casual and routine manner advised the President that the charge in Article- II is a misconduct of grave nature which was followed simply by the President. This approach, in our opinion, is arbitrary and non-application of mind. Hence, we find that the penalty order dated 17.3.2010 passed by the President is legally not sustainable and deserves to be quashed. From the above, it can be seen that the Tribunal noted that the UPSC in a casual and routine manner advised the President that Article 2 of the charge amounted to misconduct of a grave nature which was also simply followed by the President (Disciplinary Authority)." 7. We agree with the observation of the Tribunal that the UPSC has dealt with the issue of 'grave misconduct in a very casual and mechanical manner. There is no discussion as to how the alleged misconduct under Article-II of the charge could be regarded as 'grave misconduct within the meaning of Explanation (b) after Rule 8(5) of the CCS(Pension) Rules, 1972. Consequently, we agree with the finding of the Tribunal that a case of *grave misconduct has not been made out. And, unless that is made out, there can be no order of cut in pension under Rule 9(1) of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972. We have taken a similar view in Professor P.N. Bhat Vs. UOI and Ors.; WP(C) No. 8245/2008 [2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB] (11 of 29) [CW-17755/2025] decided on 20th September, 2012. We have held that until and unless there is a clear finding of 'grave misconduct, the provisions of Rule 9 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 cannot be invoked. 8. Thus, without going into the issue of whether the Disagreement Note of the Disciplinary Authority did or did not conform to the requirement of law in so far as Rule 15(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965 is concerned, on this ground alone, the cut in pension cannot be sustained.” 12. On the basis of above judgment passed by Delhi High Court in the case of R.P. Sharma (supra), learned counsel submitted that the Court considered the expression grave misconduct. The Court also considered the intentional or willful misconduct and after considering the same, punishment of stoppage of 10% pension for five years was held to be erroneous and was quashed. 13. Learned counsel further relied upon the judgment passed by in Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amresh Srivastava Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. Reported in AIR 2025 SC 1746 decided on 01.04.2025 in which the Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the delay in issuance of charge-sheet and other issues and quashed and set aside the punishment order. The relevant paras No. 16, 17, 18 and 19 of judgment, as referred reads, are as under:- “16. In the present case, we are of the considered view that the charges alleged against the Appellant in the chargesheet fall under the category of a wrongful order, which does not appear to have been influenced by [2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB] (12 of 29) [CW-17755/2025] extraneous factors or any form of gratification. It appears that the order has been passed in good faith, without any indication of dishonesty. Furthermore, the facts outlined in the Show Cause Notice do not suggest any such impropriety. The power exercised by the Appellant in his capacity as a Tehsildar, while passing the order of Land Settlement Order, cannot be considered of a nature that would warrant disciplinary proceedings against him. The decision relied upon by the Counsel for the Appellant as mentioned above, supports this view. Consequently, the first question is answered in favor of the Appellant. 17. As to the second question, regarding whether delay is a ground for stopping the departmental proceedings at the stage of the charge-sheet itself, suffice it to say that this varies from case to case. However, in the instant case where there is unexplained inordinate delay in initiating departmental proceedings despite the alleged misconduct being within the knowledge of the department, but still no departmental proceedings are initiated, the answer must go in favour of the employee. However, there may be cases where the department was not even aware of such irregularities or the misconduct, which is of such a nature that it is indicative, based on material considerations of factors other than merit, such as extraneous influences and gratifications. In such cases, such a delay, by itself would not be a valid ground to scuttle the initiation of the process of departmental proceedings. 18. Reference in this regard can be made to the decision of this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh and Anr. 738, wherein the court noted that there was no reason to interfere with the quashing as the disciplinary proceedings were initiated after 12 years of delay. A reference should also be made to the decision of this Court in P.V. Mahadevan v. MD, T.N. Housing Board, where it has been reiterated that continuing the departmental proceedings after an undue delay would be unjust, causing unnecessary mental distress and damaging the [2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB] (13 of 29) [CW-17755/2025] reputation of the employee for the mistakes committed by the department in initiating disciplinary proceedings. 19. In view of the above, the present appeal is allowed and the Impugned judgment dated 30.04.2019 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside and consequently the order dated 26.04.2017 passed by the learned Single Judge stands restored.” 14. Learned counsel further submitted that he has annexed the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 12630/2020 titled as Sitaram Acharya Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors., decided on 19.10.2023 in which the following judgments of the Hon’ble Surpreme Court were considered and examined and noticing the serious delay in issuing the charge-sheet, more specifically five days before the retirement, the learned Single Judge found the action of the employer to be arbitrary and quashed the punishment order. The relevant paras of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, as considered in the judgment by Single Judge in the case of Sitaram Acharya (supra), are reproduced here as under:- “The legal principles governing the issue of delay in initiating departmental proceeding and its effect has been considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 1995 (2) SCC 570 State of Punjab Vis. Chaman Lal Goyal wherein following principles were laid down. "It is trite to say that such disciplinary proceeding must be conducted soon after the irregularities are committed or soon after discovering the Irregularities. They cannot be Initiated after lapse of considerable time. It would not be fair to the [2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB] (14 of 29) [CW-17755/2025] delinquent officer. Such delay also makes the task of proving the charges difficult and is thus not also in the interest of administration. Delayed initiation of proceedings is bound to give room for allegations of bias, malafides and misuse of power. If the delay is too long and is unexplained, the court may well interfere and quash the charges. But how long a delay is too long always depends upon the fact, of the given case. Moreover, if such delay is likely to cause prejudice to the delinquent officer in defending himself, the enquiry has to be interdicted. Wherever such a plea is raised, the court has to weigh the factors appearing for and against the said plea and take a decision on the totality of circumstances. In other words, the court has to indulge in a process of balancing." Again the Hon'ble Supreme Court in 1998 (4) SCC 154, State of Andra Pradesh Vis. N. Radhakishan, while dealing with the issue of quashing the enquiry proceedings on the ground of delay, laid down the following general proposition of law. "It is not possible to lay down any predetermined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where there is delay in concluding disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the court has to take into consideration all the relevant factors and to balance and weigh thern to determine if it is in the interest that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay particularly when the delay is abnormal and there is no explanation for the delay. The delinquent employee has a right that disciplinary proceedings against him are concluded expeditiously and he is not made to undergo mental [2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB] (15 of 29) [CW-17755/2025] agony and also monetary loss when these are unnecessarily prolonged without any default on his part in delaying the proceedings. In considering whether the delay has vitiated the disciplinary proceedings the court has to consider the nature of charge, its complexity and on that account the delay has occurred. If the delay unexplained prejudice to the delinquent employee is writ large on the face of it. It could also be seen as to how much the disciplinary authority is serious in pursuing the charges against its employee. It is the basic principle of administrative justice that an officer entrusted with a particular job has to perform his duties honestly, efficiently and in accordance with the rules. If he deviates from his path he is to suffer a penalty prescribed. Normally, disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to take their course as per relevant rules but then delay defeats justice. Delay causes prejudice to the charged is officer unless it can be shown that he is to blame for the delay or when there is proper explanation for the delay in conducting the disciplinary proceedings. Ultimately the court is to balance considerations." these two diverse In the case of M.V. Bijlani (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the initiation of disciplinary proceedings after 6 years and continuation of the same for a period of 7 years, prejudiced the delinquent officer and quashing the proceedings, it has been held in para 16 as under: "16. So far as the second charge is concerned, it has not been shown as to what were the duties of the Appellant in terms of the prescribed rules or otherwise. Furthermore, it has not been shown either by the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority as to how and in what manner the maintenance of ACE-8 Register by way of sheets which were found attached to the estimate file were [2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB] (16 of 29) [CW-17755/2025] not appropriate so as to arrive at the culpability or otherwise of the Appellant. The appellate authority in its order stated that the Appellant was not required to prepare the ACE-8 Register twice. The Appellant might have prepared another set of register presumably keeping in view the fact that he was asked to account for the same on the basis of the materials placed on records. The Tribunal as also the High Court failed to take into consideration that the disciplinary proceedings were initiated after six years and it continued for a period of seven years and, thus, initiation of the disciplinary proceedings as also continuance thereof after such a long time evidently prejudiced to the delinquent officer." Similar view has been expressed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of P.V. Mahadevan (supra), in para 11 which reads as under:- “11. Under the circumstances, we are of the opinion that allowing the respondent to proceed further with the departmental proceedings at this distance of time will be very prejudicial to the appellant. Keeping a higher government official under charges of corruption and disputed integrity would cause unbearable mental agony and distress to the officer concerned. The protracted disciplinary enquiry against a government employee should, therefore, be avoided not only in the interests of the government employee but in public interest and also in the interests of inspiring confidence in the minds of the government employees. At this stage, it is necessary to draw the curtain and to put an end to the enquiry. The appellant had already suffered enough and more on account of the disciplinary proceedings. As a matter of fact, the mental agony and sufferings of the appellant due to the protracted disciplinary proceedings would be [2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB] (17 of 29) [CW-17755/2025] much more than the punishment. For the mistakes committed by the department in the procedure for initiating the disciplinary proceedings, the appellant should not be made to suffer." Likewise in the case of UCO Bank Vs. Rajendra Kumar Shukla reported in 2018 (14) SCC 92, it has been held in para 12 as under:- "12. We do not find any reason to interfere with the judgment and order passed by the High Court. However, it is necessary for us to highlight a few facts which were brought to our notice during the course of submissions made by learned Counsel. The first issue of concern is the enormous delay of about 7 years in issuing a charge sheet against Shukla. There is no explanation for this unexplained delay. It appears that some internal discussions were going on within the Bank but that it took the Bank 7 years to make up its mind is totally unreasonable and unacceptable. On this ground itself, the charge sheet against Shukla is llable to be set aside due to the inordinate and unexplained delay in its issuance." Similarly the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case of Bhupendra Pal Singh Vs. Union of India & Ors. reported in 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 6073, has culled out certain principle and the same are summarized as under in para 32: "32. The principles that can be culled out from the aforesaid decisions may be summarized as below: a. It would always be desirable to initiate disciplinary proceedings immediately after the alleged misconduct is detected but if charge-sheet is issued after a considerable length of time has passed since such detection, it would be unfair to [2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB] (18 of 29) [CW-17755/2025] the charged officer to proceed against him on the basis of stale charges. b. Disciplinary proceedings may not be interdicted at the stage of charge-sheet and should be allowed to proceed according to the relevant rules since a charge-sheet does not affect any legal right of the delinquent unless, of course, it suffers from an invalidity that strikes at the root of the proceedings. c. If there is delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings by drawing up charges against the delinquent and such proceedings are challenged, the disciplinary authority is under an obligation to explain the reasons for the delay; and, depending upon the worth of such reasons, the Court may proceed to decide one way or the other. d. There cannot be any exact measurement of the length of delay by reference to years to fall into the category of 'too long a delay', and what would amount to the same has to be decided depending upon the facts of a given case. e. Should the delay be found to be too long and unexplained, that would definitely have a bearing on the seriousness of the disciplinary authority to pursue the charges against the charged officer and the Court may, in a fit and proper case, quash the proceedings because prejudice to the officer in such case would be writ large on the face of it. f. Even if, in a given case, the delay is satisfactorily explained, the charge-sheet could still be quashed if the charged officer proves to the satisfaction of the Court that he would be severely prejudiced if the proceedings were allowed to continue, a fortiori, lending credence to the claim of unfair treatment. [2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB] (19 of 29) [CW-17755/2025] g. For the mistakes committed by the department in the procedure for initiating disciplinary proceedings, the charged officer should not be made to suffer. h. Delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings per se may not be a vitiating factor, if the charges are grave and in such case the gravity of the charges together with the factors, for and against the continuation of the proceedings, need to be balanced before arriving at a just conclusion." The respondents have failed to satisfy this Court that why no disciplinary action was taken against the petitioner for a considerable time and why they have waited for a considerable period of ten years and why the charge- sheet was served upon the petitioner on 26.07.2012 just five days before his retirement which was due on 31.07.2012 such action of the respondent is quite arbitrary. The departmental enquiry was completed after retirement of the petitioner and it took a considerable period of eight years. The petitioner has been punished for the alleged misconduct which is occurred 18 years back, therefore, such action of the respondents is quite unjustified. In view of the above, the impugned punishment order is not sustainable in the eye of law and the same is quashed and set aside. The amount deducted from the pension of the petitioner be refunded to the petitioner with interest @9% per annum within a period of three months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order.” 15. Learned counsel submitted that in the said case, the charge-sheet was issued with a delay of five days prior to the retirement of the concerned employee, whereas in the present [2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB] (20 of 29) [CW-17755/2025] case, the charge-sheet was issued almost four years after the petitioner’s retirement. He further submitted that impugned order passed by the learned Tribunal, to the extent it remands the matter for reconsideration on the quantum of punishment, is perverse, particularly considering the fact that the petitioner is now 73 years of age. On this ground also, the impugned order, to the extent of remand, deserves to be quashed and set aside. 16. Per Contra, learned ASG, Mr. Bharat Vyas, counsel for the respondent submitted that, being aggrieved by the order dated 07.04.2025, they have also filed a writ petition bearing No.10837/2025, challenging the impugned order whereby the learned Tribunal quashed the punishment order dated 04.09.2024. 17. The learned ASG further submitted that the learned Tribunal committed a serious mistake in quashing the punishment order by ignoring the fact that there was no illegality or irregularity in conducting the departmental proceedings. It is submitted that the punishment was rightly imposed, as the case pertains to supervisory negligence on the part of the petitioner employee. Therefore, the order of the learned Tribunal is bad in law and deserves to be quashed. 18. Learned counsel further submitted that the charge framed against the petitioner employee pertained to supervisory negligence, which was found to be proved by the Enquiry Officer in his report. It is further submitted that the disciplinary authority, after providing sufficient opportunity of hearing, [2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB] (21 of 29) [CW-17755/2025] passed the punishment order, whereby the petitioner was punished/penalized with the stoppage of 30 percent of his monthly pension for a period of three years. 19. Learned counsel submitted that in the matters of departmental proceedings, the Courts have only limited powers while exercising judicial review of the orders passed by the Tribunals or authorities. In the absence of any violation of Rules, procedural irregularity or illegality or no allegation of violation of principles of natural justice, the learned Tribunal committed a serious error in quashing the impugned punishment order. 20. In support of the submissions, the learned ASG cited the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of B.M. Shastri Vs. Karnataka Gramin Bank reported in (2023) 18 SCC 197 decided on 23.02.2023. 21. Learned counsel submitted that in the case of B.M. Shastri (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court refused to interfere with the punishment order on the ground that there was no procedural irregularity committed by the disciplinary authority, and that the charges leveled against the employee were proved by cogent evidence on record. Paras No.7 & 8 of the judgment, being relevant, as cited, reads as under:- “7. After having heard learned counsel for both the parties and on perusal of the allegations as levelled against the appellant, it is apparent that he has not verified the genuineness of the debits of interest on deposit; not noticed the non genuine/fraudulent transactions; not verified or noticed the [2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB] (22 of 29) [CW-17755/2025] fraudulent/unauthorized alterations, inflating of the amounts; failed to check/verify vouchers, sub-Day Books, cash scrolls, Day Book, General Ledger and Trial Balance; failed to notice the crediting of the amounts to BCC and SB Heads. There were fraudulent reduction and defalcation of the balance under interest account, diversion of funds from interest income received by the Bank, fraudulent diversion of funds out of interest income received/receivable on the loan accounts. Therefore he has facilitated V.S. Shetty to commit such fraud resulting into mis- appropriation of money. The working of the Bank is required to be of the highest standards, otherwise, the trust and confidence reposed in the customers would be shaken. 8. In view of the foregoing, the article of charges levelled against the appellant has been proved considering the cogent evidence brought on record. There is no procedural Irregularity while holding the departmental enquiry. The Disciplinary Authority, on the basis of the material brought in enquiry, rightly recorded a finding proving charge levelled against the appellant. In the facts of the present case, in our view, the penalty of dismissal is not shockingly disproportionate. Therefore, we do not find any perversity in the impugned order passed by the Division Bench warranting interference by this Court. There is no merit in this appeal, which is, accordingly dismissed. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, stands disposed of.” 22. In view of the above submissions, the learned ASG submitted that the writ petition filed by the petitioner employee, Mahaveer Prasad Vaishnav, to the extent of seeking [2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB] (23 of 29) [CW-17755/2025] a remand, be dismissed and further the writ petition filed by Union of India, challenging the impugned order dated 07.04.2025, whereby the learned Tribunal quashed the punishment order dated 04.09.2024, as being perverse and contrary to the law settled by the Hon’ble Apex Court, with regard to interference in matter of departmental proceedings and punishment orders be allowed and said impugned order dated 07.04.2025 be quashed and set aside. 23. Heard, learned counsel for the parties. 24. This Court noted the fact that the petitioner employee was appointed in the Postal Department in the year 1971 and retired on 13.06.2011, after rendering 36 years of unblemished service record. 25. As noted from the pleadings before the learned Tribunal, the petitioner was granted timely and regular promotions by the respondents, considering his clean service record and he retired while serving as Postal Assistant. After his retirement on 30.06.2011, the petitioner was issued the impugned charge- sheet dated 19.05.2015, just nine days short of the four years period prescribed under Rule 9 of the Rules of 1972, in respect of an incident which took place on 28.05.2011, where some illegal transactions and embezzlement were committed by two other employees of the respondent Department namely, Pawan Kumar Chaudhary and Shri Ram Narayan Meena. Rule 9 of the Rules of 1972 is reproduced here as under:- [2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB] (24 of 29) [CW-17755/2025] 9. Right of President to withhold or withdraw pension - (1) The President reserves to himself the right of withholding a pension or gratuity, or both, either in full or in part, or withdrawing a pension in full or in part, whether permanently or for a specified period, and of ordering recovery from a pension or gratuity of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Government, if, in any departmental or judicial proceedings, the pensioner is found guilty of grave misconduct or negligence during the period of service, including service rendered upon re- employment after retirement : Provided that the Union Public Service Commission shall be consulted before any final orders are passed: Provided further that where a part of pension is withheld or withdrawn the amount of such pensions shall not be reduced below the amount of rupees three hundred and seventy-five per mensem. (2) (a) The departmental proceedings referred to in sub-rule (1), if instituted while the Government servant was in service whether before his retirement or during his re-employment, shall, after the final retirement of the Government servant, be deemed to be proceedings under this rule and shall be continued and concluded by the authority by which they were commenced in the same manner as if the Government servant had continued in service : Provided that where the departmental proceedings are instituted by an authority subordinate to the President, that authority shall submit a report recording its findings to the President. (b) The departmental proceedings, if not instituted while the Government servant was in service, whether before his retirement, or during his re- employment, - (i) shall not be instituted save with the sanction of the President, (ii) shall not be in respect of any event which took place more than four years before such institution, and (iii) shall be conducted by such authority and in such place as the President may direct and in accordance with the procedure applicable to departmental proceedings in [2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB] (25 of 29) [CW-17755/2025] which an order of dismissal from service could be made in relation to the Government servant during his service. (3) omitted (4) In the case of Government servant who has retired on attaining the age of superannuation or otherwise and against whom any departmental or judicial proceedings are instituted or where departmental proceedings are continued under sub- rule (2), a provisional pension as provided in Rule 69 shall be sanctioned. (5) Where the President decides not to withhold or withdraw pension but orders recovery of pecuniary loss from pension, the recovery shall not ordinarily be made at a rate exceeding one-third of the pension admissible on the date of retirement of a Government servant. (6) For the purpose of this rule, - (a) departmental proceedings shall be deemed to be instituted on the date on which the statement of charges is issued to the Government servant or pensioner, or if the Government servant has been placed under suspension from an earlier date, on such date ; and (b) judicial proceedings shall be deemed to be instituted- (i) in the case of criminal proceedings, on the date on which the complaint or report of a police officer, of which the Magistrate takes cognizance, is made, and (ii) in the case of civil proceedings, on the date the plaint is presented in the court. 26. This Court noted that the two employees were found to be involved in the embezzlement of the public money and had deposited the said amount stated to be Rs.27,800/-. It is not in dispute rather admitted fact that no ill motive, mala fide intent, manipulation, dishonesty, undue favour or any other misconduct was alleged or levellled against the petitioner, [2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB] (26 of 29) [CW-17755/2025] however, the only allegation against the petitioner was of supervisory negligence. The respondent, Union of India, has consistently maintained, both in its writ petition before this Court as well as in reply before the learned Tribunal, that the case against the petitioner pertains to supervisory negligence, due to which the fraudulent withdrawal happened. However, this fact cannot be denied that the petitioner neither gained any undue benefit nor took any money while performing his official duties in respect of the alleged incident. 27. This Court is of the considered view that an employee who serves an institution with utmost dedication, integrity and an unblemished service record cannot be punished without any basis and specific/serious allegation. His unblemished service record cannot be tarnished on the basis of an unfounded or baseless isolated incident, particularly when he is neither involved directly nor indirectly. 28. The facts of the present case are apt for the above observation. If employees with an unblemished service record are not taken care of by their employer then the same would discourage and demoralize such employees. It is for this reason that this Court, in the given facts and circumstances of the case, is inclined to interference in the present case while exercising its powers of judicial review in the matters of departmental proceedings, considering the above discussed settled law. 29. This Court has considered the findings recorded by the learned Tribunal in its order dated 07.04.2025, by which the [2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB] (27 of 29) [CW-17755/2025] O.A. filed by the petitioner was allowed and the punishment order was quashed. However, the Tribunal remanded the matter back to the respondents for reconsideration of the quantum of punishment. As regards the writ petition filed by the Union of India challenging the said order is concerned, this Court finds that the learned Tribunal, after considering of the complete record, rightly quashed the impugned punishment order dated 04.09.2024. Therefore, the writ petition filed by the Union of India is dismissed as devoid of merit. 30. This Court shall now considered the challenge made by the petitioner employee to the order of the Tribunal dated 07.04.2025, to the extent of remanding the matter. As discussed above, the petitioner employee was not involved in any kind of fraud, embezzlement or any misconduct etc. He had rendered an unblemished service of 36 years and retired from the service of the respondent on 30.06.2011, without having been served with any show-cause notice or charge-sheet. However, after his retirement, he was issued the impugned memorandum of charge dated 19.05.2015, just nine days short of four year limitation period prescribed under Rule 9 of the Rules of 1972. There is no justification on record for the issuance of the impugned charge-sheet and initiating departmental proceedings nearly four years after the date of retirement. The delay, as noted, remained unexplained and highly unjustified in the facts and circumstances of the case. 31. Further, the allegation against the petitioner related only to alleged supervisory negligence. This Court finds that an [2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB] (28 of 29) [CW-17755/2025] employee like the petitioner, who had been granted regular promotions from time to time throughout in his 36 years of unblemished service and who was not involved in any improper or illegal activity had acted in faith and belief, while signing certain cheques and documents. Such conduct cannot be said to have committed even in supervisory negligence. In day to day office work, the employees are required to act with faith and confidence in each other in the office environment and documentation as prepared by the subordinates and other employees is generally treated and considered to be true with no unfairness or fraud. 32. It is reasonably not possible for a senior officials or staff to scrutinize all documents or transactions carried out by subordinate staff, even after due diligence and taking due care and caution in each case in day to day official work and in case any subordinate employee commits any fraud, embezzlement etc. by misrepresenting the facts, then for such acts the senior/higher official or staff who had no ill motive, negligence etc. cannot be penalized/punished in terms of above settled law of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Therefore, the learned Tribunal rightly quashed the punishment order, however, the delay of almost four years as occurred in issuance of charge-sheet, after the petitioner’s retirement and considering that no benefit was taken by the petitioner employee and the fact that petitioner is now over 73 years of age, renders the delay inordinate and unjustified. This Court considering the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Ambrish Shrivasta (supra), [2026:RJ-JP:6408-DB] (29 of 29) [CW-17755/2025] RP Sharma (supra) and other judgments finds that the order passed by the learned Tribunal of remanding the matter back to the respondents on the quantum of punishment is unjustified sfter so many years when the petitioner has retired in the year 2011 (15 years back) and deserves interference by this Court in the facts and circumstances of the present case. 33. This Court is of the view that if honest, dedicated and devoted government employees, who are made scapegoats or unnecessarily involved in departmental proceedings without any involvement, are not protected, then and the same would demoralize such employees and would affect the overall working of an institution. 34. The above observations are made in light of the fact that the petitioner has served for 36 years with an unblemished record and the respondent has failed to point out any misconduct except the one mentioned in the case. 35. In view of the above discussion, this Court finds the order of remand to be erroneous and, being perverse, is quashed and set aside. The writ petition filed the by the petitioner employee is allowed and the writ petition filed by Union of India is dismissed. (RAVI CHIRANIA),J (INDERJEET SINGH),J PAYAL/AMAN/13-14