JUDGMENT : SIDDHARTH NANDAN, J. 1. With the consent of the parties, since the question is purely legal in nature, the present writ petition is being decided at the admission stage. 2. Heard Shri Prabhaker Awasthi, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Saurabh Tripathi, Advocate and Shri Chandra Jeet Yadav, Advocate on behalf of the petitioner. Shri R.K. Ojha, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Shri Satya Prakash Rai, Advocate and Shri Vashishtha Dhar Shukla, Advocate on behalf of respondent no.5 and Shri Kartikeya Saran, learned Additional Advocate General along with learned Standing Counsel for the State-respondents. 3. The present writ petition has been filed with the following reliefs: “ i. Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Certiorari calling for the records of the case and to quash the impugned order dated 08.08.2025 passed by the Regional Level Committee, respondent no. 2 (Annexure no. 1 to the writ petition). ii. Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Certiorari calling for the records of the case and to quash the impugned order dated 02.09.2025 passed by the District Inspector of Schools, Mirzapur, (Annexure no. 2 to the writ petition). iii. Issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of Mandamus commanding the respondents to permit the petitioner Committee of Management to continue to discharge day-to-day affairs of the Institution on the strength of valid election having been held on 24.07.2024 which has been approved by the District Inspector of Schools on 26.07.2024.” 4. Shri Prabhakar Awasthi, learned Senior Counsel has assailed the order dated 08.08.2025 to submit that in District Mirzapur, a society in the name and style of “Janta Janardan Shiksha Samiti”, was registered under the provisions of Societies Registration Act, 1860 Act,1860 in the year 1973. 5. The aforesaid society initially established a Junior High School, which was subsequently upgraded as High School and thereafter as an Intermediate School. The Junior High School was under grand-in-aid and the High School Section and Intermediate, is not under the grand-in-aid of the State Government. 6. Certain dispute arose, with respect to the Committee of Management, which led to filing of various writ petitions and eventually vide order dated 19.09.2017 passed in Lal Chandra Singh vs. State of U.P. and others , Writ-C No.43742 of 2017. 6. Certain dispute arose, with respect to the Committee of Management, which led to filing of various writ petitions and eventually vide order dated 19.09.2017 passed in Lal Chandra Singh vs. State of U.P. and others , Writ-C No.43742 of 2017. this Court found that the parties are at variance, as to whether, there has been a determination of the Members of the General Body of the Society; and as contemplated by Section 4B of the Act, pursuant to the directions given by this Court in Writ-C No.25100 of 2017, vide order dated 19.09.2017, the writ petition was disposed of, by requiring the Regional Level Committee to examine, whether there has been a determination of the General Body as contemplated by Section 4B of the Act or not. 7. In compliance of the observations made by this Court, the Regional Level Committee proceeded to pass an order dated 20.12.2017, discarding the election dated 09.04.2017; which was a subject matter of challenge in Writ-C No.3861 of 2018; and vide order dated 30.01.2018, the writ petition was partly allowed with the following directions: “(a) The order dated 20.12.2017 passed by the Regional Level Committee to the extent it refuses to accord approval to the election dated 09.04.2017 is affirmed; (b) the order impugned dated 20.12.2017 to the extent it determines the electoral college of the institution as comprising of 30 members with a direction to hold election with the said 30 members general body is hereby set aside; (c) the Regional Level Committee shall undertake a fresh exercise to determine the general body of the Institution in the light of the observations and the directions contained in the order dated 19.09.2017 passed in Writ-C No.43472 of 2017. The said exercise shall be completed within a period of eight weeks from the date of furnishing certified copy of this order upon the Joint Director of Education, Vindhaychal Region, Mirzapur. The parties concern would be at liberty to file their respective evidences to enable the Regional Level Committee to effectively conclude the aforesaid exercise. (d) The fresh elections, alleged to have been held on 21.01.2018, shall abide the result of the decision taken by the Regional Level Committee pursuant to the direction given herein above.” 8. The parties concern would be at liberty to file their respective evidences to enable the Regional Level Committee to effectively conclude the aforesaid exercise. (d) The fresh elections, alleged to have been held on 21.01.2018, shall abide the result of the decision taken by the Regional Level Committee pursuant to the direction given herein above.” 8. Eventually, the District Inspector of Schools vide order dated 18.04.2018, approved the election of one Virendra Pratap Singh, as Manager and the Regional Level Committee vide its order dated 10.07.2018, approved the list of 13 Members as submitted by Shri Virendra Pratap Singh; and being aggrieved against the aforesaid orders one Lal Chandra Singh filed Writ-C No.28345 of 2018, specifically raising a ground that the Regional Level Committee is repeatedly not following the directions issued by this Court, for determining the list of valid members of the society, as per directions/observations made by this Court on 19.09.2017 and 30.01.2018, in true spirit. This Court issued notices to the respondents vide its order dated 21.08.2018 in Writ-C No.28345 of 2018 and against the same a Special Appeal No.840 of 2018 was preferred which was disposed of vide order dated 11.09.2018, to decide the writ petition expeditiously. 9. Subsequently, one Shri Awadh Narain Singh filed Writ-C No.34780 of 2019 with a prayer that his signatures be attested as Manager, which petition was disposed of vide order dated 01.11.2019 that District Inspector of Schools, Mirzapur, may decide the representation of the petitioner, for attestation of the signature of the newly elected Manager of the Institution. However, the District Inspector of Schools vide its order dated 09.01.2021 discarded the election set up by Shri Awadh Narain Singh and directed for fresh elections. Subsequently, elections were held on 23.01.2021, wherein, Shri Lal Chandra Singh is said to be elected as Manager and his signatures were attested and approved on 01.02.2021. 10. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid orders, Shri Virendra Pratap Singh filed Writ-C No.10788 of 2021, which is pending. Subsequently, elections were held on 23.01.2021, wherein, Shri Lal Chandra Singh is said to be elected as Manager and his signatures were attested and approved on 01.02.2021. 10. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid orders, Shri Virendra Pratap Singh filed Writ-C No.10788 of 2021, which is pending. The term of the Committee of Management being 3 years, is said to have expired on 22/23.01.2024; but it has been alleged that one Shri Virendra Pratap Singh had set up an election dated 17.12.2023 and the District Inspector of Schools attested his signatures vide order dated 16.02.2024; and against which Writ-C No.16396 of 2024 was filed and an interim order has been granted on 31.05.2024 and subsequently an order of single operation has been passed on 21.06.2024. 11. Rival election has been set up by the petitioner’s Committee of Management on 24.07.2024, which has also been approved by the District Inspector of Schools vide its order dated 26.07.2024; where after Writ-C No.16396 of 2024 was rendered infructuous, vide order dated 05.09.2024 as the term of the earlier Committee of Management had expired on 23.01.2024; and thereafter fresh election had also taken place, which was approved by the District Inspector of Schools. 12. The order of the District Inspector of Schools dated 26.07.2024, was challenged by Shri Virendra Pratap Singh in Writ-C No.32375 of 2024, which was disposed of by this Court vide order dated 13.11.2024, granting liberty to approach the Regional Level Committee. 13. In pursuance of the order of this Court dated 13.11.2024, notices were issued by the Joint Director of Education on 30.01.2025, fixing 06.02.2025. It transpires that on the basis of a report of the District Inspector of Schools dated 29.07.2025 and the objection of Shri Virendra Pratap Singh dated 06.05.2025 (which the petitioner alleges were never supplied to him), the impugned order dated 08.08.2025 has been passed. Thereafter, the consequential order has also been passed by the District Inspector of Schools, Mirzapur on 02.09.2025, approving and attesting the signatures of respondent no.6. 14. Hence, the present writ petition. Issues 15. Thereafter, the consequential order has also been passed by the District Inspector of Schools, Mirzapur on 02.09.2025, approving and attesting the signatures of respondent no.6. 14. Hence, the present writ petition. Issues 15. As a preliminary issue has been raised by Shri Prabhakar Awasthi, learned Senior Counsel, the following issue is framed, as such:- (i) Since, as per the Government Order dated 19.12.2000, a three Member, Regional Level Committee has been constituted, in aid to Section 16A(7) of the Intermediate Education Act, 1921; whether in absence of any one Member, the decision taken by the remaining two Members, will be a valid decision; and for a want of Quorum, can be said to be in substantial compliance of the Government Order dated 19.12.2000; and further whether the doctrine of necessity or doctrine of silence, can be invoked in aid to the decision of the Regional Level Committee (as constituted by the Government Order dated 19.12.2000). Discussion 16. Shri Prabhakar Awasthi, learned Senior Counsel has argued that perusal of the impugned order dated 08.08.2025, will clearly indicate that the Joint Director of Education, Vindhyachal Mandal, Mirzapur has appended his signature in dual capacity of (i) Joint Director of Education; and (ii) Deputy Director of Education; and as such the impugned order dated 08.08.2025 along with consequential order dated 02.09.2025 is liable to be vitiated, as neither the quorum was complete nor there was substantial compliance, pertaining to the quorum of the committee, as envisaged under the Government Order dated 19.12.2000. 17. It is an admitted fact that Deputy Director of Education, who was a Member of the Regional Level Committee, Vindhyachal Mandal, Mirzapur, was transferred and one Shri Udai Bhan, Joint Director of Education, Vindhyachal Mandal, Mirzapur, was given the additional charge on 06.03.2025, i.e. much prior to the passing of the order dated 08.08.2025; and the said fact has not been disputed by the State-respondents. 18. Shri Prabhakar Awasthi, learned Senior Counsel has placed heavy reliance on the following extract of the Government Order dated 19.12.2000, which is reproduced below: 19. 18. Shri Prabhakar Awasthi, learned Senior Counsel has placed heavy reliance on the following extract of the Government Order dated 19.12.2000, which is reproduced below: 19. He has submitted that the Government Order dated 19.12.2000 has been issued in aid to Section 16A-(7) of the Act, 1921; and placing heavy reliance on the aforementioned extract of the Government Order dated 19.12.2000, he has submitted that the necessity for issuance of the Government Order dated 19.12.2000, arose on account of the fact, that the Government was continuously receiving complaints, with respect to the Prescribed Authorities/Competent Authorities under the “Intermediate Act, 1921” and “U.P. High School and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salary of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1971”; who were allegedly misusing their powers and therefore with an object to de-centralize the powers of the prescribed authorities, the Regional Level Committee was constituted, under the Chairmanship of the “Regional Joint Director of Education”, in which “Regional Deputy Director of Education” and the “District Inspector of Schools” of the concerned district, shall be the Members. 20. He has further submitted that in spite of the fact that the powers/functions of different authorities, were provided under the aforementioned enactments, the following functions were assigned to the Regional Level Committee:- (a) Attesting the signatures of the Manager (which is otherwise the function/power of the District Inspector of Schools) (b) Appointment of Authorized Controller (which is otherwise the function/power of the Joint Director of Education) (c) All Management related disputes (which is otherwise the function/power of the Joint Director of Education, (d) Seniority disputes of the teachers (which is to be determined by the Manager and against the same the appeal lies before the Joint Director of Education) (e) Salary Approvals, except court cases 21. He has further submitted, to buttress his argument, that though different prescribed authorities, were nominated for the exercise of powers with respect to the aforementioned domains, which is now to be exercised by the Regional Level Committee; but in spite of the same, the Government has issued the Government Order in purported exercise of Article 162 of the Constitution of India with an object to bring transparency and decentralize the decision making process, bringing efficiency; and in case any one Member of the Regional Level Committee, does not participate in the proceedings, the order is liable to be vitiated, since the very objective to decentralize the powers and to bring in more transparency, as well as, accountability, shall be defeated. 22. He has further argued that the plain reading of the Government Order, clearly spells out the objective and the necessity of complete quorum, and nothing can be read into the said Government Order; and as such the Committee can only function with the presence of all the three Members, but for a situation, there is an impossibility, to complete the quorum. 23. Per contra, Shri Kartikeya Saran, learned Additional Advocate General has submitted that though it is not disputed that the Joint Director of Education, Vindhyachal Mandal, Mirzapur was acting in a dual capacity of Deputy Director of Education (Intermediate), Vindhyachal Mandal, Mirzapur as well; but merely on account of non-availability of the Deputy Director of Education, the impugned order dated 08.08.2025 cannot be said to be vitiated. He has laid stress on the fact that the Government Order dated 19.12.2000, itself requires that the Regional Level Committee shall meet atleast twice within a month and the said contemplation is evident of the fact, that the disputes which are to be decided and within the domain of the Regional Level Committee, by virtue of the Government Order dated 19.12.2000, are itself of urgent nature; and out of 18 regions in the State of U.P., there are more than 8 regions, where one of the three Members are not available; and as such considering the urgency to the resolution of the disputes of the Committee of Management, as enumerated in the Government Order itself, it is of paramount importance that the Regional Level Committee, continues to function, unless there is an alternative available; and hence he submits that the Doctrine of Necessity is attracted in the present case. 24. 24. He has further submitted that though the object for issuing the Government Order, in question, apart from increasing efficiency in the administration of Educational Institution, was also distribution of the work, by referring certain issues to the Regional Level Committee; but in absence of any allegations of mala fides or by not raising any objections, regarding the incompetence of the Regional Level Committee, on account of non-compliance of the quorum and the decision having been taken unanimously, there has been a substantial compliance. He submits that it is trite law that the Government Order cannot override a statute, however since there is no mandatory stipulation as regard the requirement of a quorum in Section 16A(7) of the Act, 1921, the composition of the Committee is not mandatory but directory. 25. He has relied upon the decision of the Constitution Bench in State of U.P. and others vs. Babu Ram Upadhyay , AIR 1961 Supreme Court 751. to submit that where the statute does not provide for a contingency of the non-compliance with the provision, the provision shall always be directory; but the Court may ascertain the real intention of the legislature, by examining entire scheme of the Act. For ready reference para-29 of Babu Ram Upadhyay (supra) is reproduced below : “29. The relevant rules of interpretation may be briefly stated thus: When a statute uses the word "shall", prima facie, it is mandatory, but the Court may ascertain the real intention of the legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute. For ascertaining the real intention of the Legislature the Court may consider, inter alia, the nature and the design of the statute, and the consequences which would follow from construing it the one way or the other, the impact of other provisions whereby the necessity of complying with the provisions in question is avoided, the circumstance, namely, that the statute provides for a contingency of the non-compliance with the provisions, the fact that the non-compliance with the provisions is or is not visited by some penalty, the serious or trivial consequences that flow therefrom, and, above all, whether the object of the legislation will be defeated or furthered. (emphasis supplied)” 26. (emphasis supplied)” 26. He further relies upon the decision in the case of Deepak Yadav vs. State of U.P. and others 2022:AHC-Lko:41271, to submit that where the Government Order also do not prescribe the consequence of non-compliance, the same shall only be directory and not mandatory. For ready reference para-34 of the Deepak Yadav (supra) is reproduced below: “34. The provisions of Government Orders dated 9th May, 1997 and 1st August, 1997 are only to ensure that a public servant is not harassed and is not faced with base less and false allegations. It is not the mandate of the said Government Orders that no preliminary inquiry can proceed unless and until the complaint is given on affidavit It is only a measure as to filter baseless and motivated complaints and to provide guidelines to the authorities to see that a person making complaint is serious about his complaint and there is substantial material in the same and is not made with oblique motive without having any basis. The said Government Orders also do not prescribe the consequences of non compliance and therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the said Government Orders are, only 'guidelines' and are directory and not mandatory. […] (emphasis supplied)” 27. Therefore, insisting upon the strict compliance with the composition of the Committee, as prescribed in the Government Order, will only be a futility and an empty formality, which will militate against the object of the Government Order, i.e. to introduce fairness and efficiency in the resolution of disputes, pertains to the administration and management of the Institution. 28. He has relied upon a decision of a Constitution Bench in CCE vs. Hari Chandra Shri Gopal (2011) 1 SCC 236 , to submit that applying the “Doctrine of substantial compliance”, the question whether the requirements relate to the “substances” or “essence” of the statute is to be seen and if the strict adherence to those requirement is a pre-condition. For ready reference para-24 of Hari Chandra Shri Gopal (supra) is reproduced below: “34. The test for determining the applicability of the substantial compliance doctrine has been the subject of a myriad of cases and quite often, the critical question to be examined is whether the requirements relate to the "substance" or "essence" of the statute, if so, strict adherence to those requirements is a precondition to give effect to that doctrine. The test for determining the applicability of the substantial compliance doctrine has been the subject of a myriad of cases and quite often, the critical question to be examined is whether the requirements relate to the "substance" or "essence" of the statute, if so, strict adherence to those requirements is a precondition to give effect to that doctrine. On the other hand, if the requirements are procedural or directory in that they are not of the "essence" of the thing to be done but are given with a view to the orderly conduct of business, they may be fulfilled by substantial, if not strict compliance. In other words, a mere attempted compliance may not be sufficient, but actual compliance with those factors which are considered as essential" (emphasis supplied)” 29. He lastly submits that the Government Order dated 19.12.2000 is silent on the issue, as to what recourse is to be taken in case any one of the Members of the three Member Committee is indispensable. 30. Per contra, Sri Prabhakar Awasthi, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner has submitted that the “Doctrine of necessity” can only be invoked when there is an “impossibility” in meeting out the contingencies of completion of the quorum; while the remaining two Members of the Committee of Management had an option to seek guidance from the Government, and by way of nomination of a member from the neighboring region, till the time regular appointment is made to the said post and the concerned Member by its designation is available, the Government could have made a “stop gap” arrangement; and as such the “doctrine of necessity” is not attracted in the present case, since a plausible re-course was available, to the chairman of the RLC, to meet the mandate of the G.O. dated 19.12.2000, which holds the field. 31. As far as, the “Doctrine of Silence” being referred is concerned, it is linked to the “living tree doctrine” i.e. to fill the gaps to meet out the contingencies which may arise due to “silence” in the enactment or the Government Order; and the purpose is to keep the provision of law relevant and effective, by allowing the Courts to fill gaps where the enactment does not explicitly provide for a situation. However, the interpretation must be objective, based on constitutional principles rather than subjective judicial satisfactions. 32. However, the interpretation must be objective, based on constitutional principles rather than subjective judicial satisfactions. 32. Learned counsel for the petitioner has also relied upon a decision of the coordinate Bench of this Court dated 04.04.2025 in Committee of Management Shri D.C. Vedic Inter College and another vs. State of U.P. and others , Writ- C No.7644 of 2025 to submit that in an identical circumstances, where the quorum of the “Regional Level Committee” was incomplete, direction was issued to the District Inspector of Schools, to remit the records to the Regional Level Committee, who shall decide the dispute of the parties, with complete quorum. He has also submitted that the issue of prejudice was also raised in the aforesaid decision but the same was rejected and the matter was remitted back, since the constitution of the “Regional Level Committee” was not proper, inasmuch as instead of three Members, only two Members heard the matter. 33. He has also relied upon a decision of this Court dated 08.10.2025 in Committee of Management Kakori Shaheed Inter College and another vs. State of U.P. and others , Writ-C No.24221 of 2025 wherein, also the issue as to whether one of the Member could act in dual capacity, to complete the quorum on the ground of necessity arose but however keeping the said issue open, the writ petition was disposed of with a direction that a fresh decision shall be taken by the Regional Level Committee, comprising of all the three Members. 34. In order to meet the aforesaid arguments, Shri Kartikeya Saran, learned Additional Advocate General has placed reliance on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Election Commission of India and another vs. Dr. Subramaniam Swamy and another , (1996) 4 SCC 104 specifically on paras-15, 16 and 17, which is being reproduced hereinbelow: " 15. The next question then is if the Chief Election Commissioner, for reason of possible bias, is disqualified from expressing an opinion, how should the Election Commission conduct itself? Subramaniam Swamy and another , (1996) 4 SCC 104 specifically on paras-15, 16 and 17, which is being reproduced hereinbelow: " 15. The next question then is if the Chief Election Commissioner, for reason of possible bias, is disqualified from expressing an opinion, how should the Election Commission conduct itself? As pointed out earlier Shri Sanghi, the learned counsel for the appellant, has very frankly and with his usual fairness stated that the Chief Election Commissioner preferred this appeal only because he genuinely believed that the scheme of Article 324 did not conceive of a decision by majority, but if the Court comes to the conclusion that a decision can be reached without the Chief Election Commissioner participating in decision-making in the special circumstances of the case, the latter is not at all keen or anxious to hear and adjudicate upon the matter at issue before the Election Commission. We are quite conscious of the high office the Chief Election Commissioner occupies. Ordinarily we would be loath to uphold the submission of bias but having regard to the wide ramification the opinion of the Election Commissioner would have on the future of Ms J. Jayalalitha, we think that the opinion, whatever it be, should not be vulnerable. The participation of the Chief Election Commissioner in the backdrop of the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court would certainly permit an argument of prejudice, should the opinion be adverse to Ms J. Jayalalitha. Therefore, apart from the legal aspect, even prudence demands that the Chief Election Commissioner should recuse himself from expressing any opinion in the matter. However, the situation is not so simple, it is indeed complex, in that, what would happen if the two Election Commissioners do not agree and there is a conflict of opinion between them? That would lead to a stalemate situation and the Governor would find it difficult to take a decision based on any such opinion. In such a situation, can the doctrine of necessity be invoked in favour of the Chief Election Commissioner? 16. We must have a clear conception of the doctrine. It is well settled that the law permits certain things to be done as a matter of necessity which it would otherwise not countenance on the touchstone of judicial propriety. In such a situation, can the doctrine of necessity be invoked in favour of the Chief Election Commissioner? 16. We must have a clear conception of the doctrine. It is well settled that the law permits certain things to be done as a matter of necessity which it would otherwise not countenance on the touchstone of judicial propriety. Stated differently, the doctrine of necessity makes it imperative for the authority to decide and considerations of judicial propriety must yield. It is often invoked in cases of bias where there is no other authority or Judge to decide the issue. If the doctrine of necessity is not allowed full play in certain unavoidable situations, it would impede the course of justice itself and the defaulting party would benefit therefrom. Take the case of a certain taxing statute which taxes certain perquisites allowed to Judges. If the validity of such a provision is challenged who but the members of the judiciary must decide it. If all the Judges are disqualified on the plea that striking down of such a legislation would benefit them, a stalemate situation may develop. In such cases the doctrine of necessity comes into play. If the choice is between allowing a biased person to act or to stifle the action altogether, the choice must fall in favour of the former as it is the only way to promote decision-making. In the present case also if the two Election Commissioners are able to reach a unanimous decision, there is no need for the Chief Election Commissioner to participate, if not the doctrine of necessity may have to be invoked. 17. We think that is the only alternative in such a situation. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the proper course to follow is that the Chief Election Commissioner should call a meeting of the Election Commission to adjudicate on the issue of disqualification of Ms J. Jayalalitha on the grounds alleged by Dr Swamy. After calling the meeting he should act as the Chairman but then he may recuse himself by announcing that he would not participate in the formation of opinion. If the two Election Commissioners reach a unanimous opinion, the Chief Election Commissioner will have the opinion communicated to the Governor. After calling the meeting he should act as the Chairman but then he may recuse himself by announcing that he would not participate in the formation of opinion. If the two Election Commissioners reach a unanimous opinion, the Chief Election Commissioner will have the opinion communicated to the Governor. If the two Election Commissioners do not reach a unanimous decision in the matter of expressing their opinion on the issue referred to the Election Commission, it would be necessary for the Chief Election Commissioner to express his opinion on the doctrine of necessity. We think that in the special circumstances of this case this course of action would be the most appropriate one to follow because if the two Election Commissioners do not agree, we have no doubt that the doctrine of necessity would compel the Chief Election Commissioner to express his views so that the majority opinion could be communicated to the Governor to enable him to take a decision in accordance therewith as required by Article 192(1) of the Constitution. " 35. He has contended that in the aforesaid decision, the Apex Court was ceased with an issue regarding the participation of the “Chief Election Commissioner” as a Member/Chairman of the Committee, in the background of the findings of the learned Single Judge, as well as, the Division Bench, to the effect that his participation may cause prejudice and may be adverse to Ms. J. Lalita; but in spite of the aforesaid, the Apex Court had opined that the proper course to be followed is that the Chief Election Commissioner, should call the meeting of the Election Commission, to adjudicate the issue of disqualification of Ms. J. Lalita; and after calling upon the meeting he may recuse himself and in case if the two Election Commissioners do not reach a unanimous decision in the matter of expressing their opinion, invoking the doctrine of necessity, the Chief Election Commissioner may also express his opinion. 36. Learned Additional Advocate General has also placed reliance on the ratio of the case in Smt. Kamla Devi vs. State of U.P. and others , 2014 (8) ADJ 525 (DB) to rely upon paras-15, 16, 17 and 18, which is reproduced below: "15. 36. Learned Additional Advocate General has also placed reliance on the ratio of the case in Smt. Kamla Devi vs. State of U.P. and others , 2014 (8) ADJ 525 (DB) to rely upon paras-15, 16, 17 and 18, which is reproduced below: "15. In accordance with the provisions of Adhiniyam 1961, elected members of Zila Panchayat shall constitute an electoral college to participate and cast their vote in the meeting called to consider the Motion of No Confidence in Pramukh or Up-Pramukh of Kshettra panchayat. There is no dispute between the parties on the fact that all the members, who participated in the meeting of No Confidence were elected members of Zila Panchayat. The only point of issue between them is that 11 members, details of whom, have been set out in paragraph 14 of the writ petition, who had undisputedly not subscribed to the oath or affirmation and participated and voted of the meeting of No Confidence, could have done so and their participation and voting was invalid, on account of their having not subscribed to oath or affirmation. 16. The provisions of Adhiniyam 1961 do not contain any provision with respect to any oath or affirmation by any of the elected member of Kshettra panchayat. Since no such provision exists in the Adhiniyam, there is also no consequence provided for not subscribing or affirmation to oath. The provisions for subscribing to oath or affirmation by a Pramukh or elected member of Kshettra panchayat was introduced for the first time by the Uttar Pradesh Kshettra Panchayats and Zila Panchayats (Oath of Office of Adhyaksha or Pramukh Etc.) Rules 1994 framed in exercise of powers conferred by Uttar Pradesh (Kshettra Panchayats and Zila Panchayats) Adhiniyam, 1961. The relevant provision of the Rules pertaining to oath or affirmation, in case of elected member of Zila Panchayat is contained in Rule 3 (3), which is as under. ''3- Manner of taking oath or affirmation. (1) .......... (2) ............ The relevant provision of the Rules pertaining to oath or affirmation, in case of elected member of Zila Panchayat is contained in Rule 3 (3), which is as under. ''3- Manner of taking oath or affirmation. (1) .......... (2) ............ (3) The members of Zila Panchayat and Kshettra Panchayat before taking their seats for the first time as such members shall make or subscribe oath or affirmation, in the case of member of Zila Panchayat before the Adhyaksha and in his absence before the Mukhya Adhikari and in the case of members of the Kshettra Panchayat before the Pramukh and in his absence before the Khand Vikas Adhikari, in the form set out in the Appendix.'' 17. The 1994 Rules does not provide for any consequence of not taking oath or affirmation by a member. The Adhiniyam of 1961 also neither prescribes any provision for any oath to be taken or the affirmation to be made nor it prescribes any consequence fur such an omission. 18. In the absence of any provision in the Adhiniyam of 1961 or the Rules prescribing any consequence for omission to subscribe to oath or affirmation, it cannot be held that such a member ipso facto looses his membership or in any manner becomes disqualified to either participate or vote in the meeting of No Confidence. His status, despite having failed to subscribe to oath or affirmation, continues to be that of an elected member and he continues to be a member of the electoral college. Participation of such member would neither render the meeting of No Confidence illegal nor vote cast by such member/members is liable to be excluded." Conclusion 37. In the humble opinion of this Court, facts on which the “doctrine of necessity” was invoked in the case of Election Commission of India (supra), was on account of the fact that there was only one "Chief Election Commissioner" and there was no other authority, who could have stepped in his shoes; and he was also to act upon as a Chairman of the Committee, and in the contingency, there was no unanimous decision, there was no other option but to seek his opinion also, to break the tie; and therefore the invocation of “doctrine of necessity” was imperative. 38. 38. As far as the ratio of the case in Smt. Kamla Devi (supra) is concerned, wherein, in the proceedings of no-confidence motion, in which there was provision under the U.P. Keshtra Panchayat and Zila Panchayat Adhiniyam, 1961, that the elected Member of the Zila Panchayat shall constitute an electoral college to participate and cast their vote, in a meeting in pursuance of a no-confidence motion, the Court was confronted with a question that, whether an elected Member of the Zila Panchayat can cast his vote, without subscribing to the oath or affirmation in view of the provisions of U.P. Kshettra Panchayats and Zila Panchayats (Oath of Office of Adhyaksh or Pramukh etc) Rules, 1994. 39. The Division Bench of this Court had opined that since there was no provision in the Rules, 1994 which provides for the consequence, for not subscribing or affirmation to oath and the requirement under the Adhiniyam, 1961 also did not prescribe any provision for any oath to be taken or affirmation to be made and as such the omission in the said enactments, towards the consequence, would be construed to the effect that an elected Member, who is a Member of the electoral college, can participate in the meeting, in pursuance of a no confidence motion. 40. In the facts of the present case though in the Government Order dated 19.12.2000, no consequence is provided, in case the quorum is not complete; but looking at the objective and the necessity which arose before the State Government, for the issuance of the Government Order dated 19.12.2000 i.e. to de-centralize the powers from a single authority, by constituting a RLC, which was required to look into the various issues; and would include the Joint Director of Education, the Deputy Director of Education and the District Inspector of Schools of the district arose. The same is indicative of the fact, that the powers has to be divested from the single authority, to be exercised by a three Member Committee. 41. The same is indicative of the fact, that the powers has to be divested from the single authority, to be exercised by a three Member Committee. 41. The role of the Joint Director of Education as a Chairman of the Committee, along with the “Regional Deputy Director of Education” and the concerned “District Inspector of Schools” of the district, cannot be merged or else, the very objective of the Government Order dated 19.12.2000 would fail and as such the ratio of the judgment of Kamla Devi (supra) also cannot come to the rescue of the State, as it was on a different set of facts, not applicable in the facts of the present case. 42. At this stage, I think it appropriate to refer to the judgment in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh and another vs. Dr. Mohanjit Singh and others ; 1988 Suppl. SCC 562 wherein, a Government Order dated 21.09.1976 was under consideration, which provides for a Selection Committee, consisting of two representative of the Management, two Professors or Readers representing the University and a representative of the Director of Education. A situation arose, that in the meeting for selection, the representative of Director Higher Education was not present, though two representative of the Management and that of the University participated; however the absent Members subsequently agreed with the selection. 43. In the aforesaid circumstances, the Apex Court considered the objective of the Government Order, concluding that the government order made it clear that the Selection Committee is intended to function as a body; and in case all the Members are present at the selection there would have been a scope for exchange of views, when the candidates appeared and the selection would have been in terms of the scheme; but in absence of the quorum, the Selection Committee cannot function, as per the scheme envisaged by the government order. 44. I may also refer to a decision rendered by the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in Writ Appeal No.31 of 2022 decided on 01.08.2023 ( Arshad Ahmad vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others ), wherein the constitution of a “Permanent Lok Adalat” was under consideration and the object of there being a non-judicial member, in tribunal like “Permanent Lok Adalat” was being considered. In the said background, the concept of “dissent” or “dissenting view” was considered, to hold a sacramental place in a judicial process. 45. In the words of William Brennan, “dissent” contribute to the integrity of the (Judicial) process not only by directing attention to perceived difficulties with the majority’s opinion but … also by contributing to the market place of competing ideas: which means that when a composite body, having full quorum is contemplated under the scheme, the entire concept recognizes adjudication by the “three Member Tribunal” and the object of the government order, in question, clearly perceives the two authorities, who are otherwise also provided under their respective statute to determine the issues: but apart from the said two authorities another authority to be the “Regional Deputy Director of Education”, was contemplated as a member of the “three Member Committee” constituting the “Regional Level Committee”; and accordingly unless all the three Members are present but for any unavoidable reasons leading to an impossible situation, to fulfill the quorum; and he becomes irreplaceable, till then, it is imperative that all the three Members participate in the meeting and discharge their duties; since the concept of “dissent”, hold a sacramental place in the judicial process. 46. The judgment of the 3 Judges Bench of the Apex Court in Election Commission of India (supra) was referred with affirmation recently in the case of X vs. O/O Speaker of the House of People and others , 2026 (2) ADJ 523 (SC) to which we now gainfully refer to. It is also noteworthy that the judgment in the case of X (supra) also refers to a quote, from the preface of the celebrated work of Michael Foley's in “Silence of Constitution”, which is reproduced below: "Abeyances refer to those constitutional gaps which remain vacuous for positive and constructive purposes. They are not, in any sense, truces between two or more defined positions, but rather a set of implicit agreements to collude in keeping fundamental questions of political authority in a state of irresolution. Abeyances are, in effect, compulsive hedges against the possibility of that which is unresolved being exploited and given meanings almost guaranteed to generate profound division and disillusionment. Abeyances are important, therefore, because of their capacity to deter the formation of conflicting positions in just those areas where the potential for conflict is most acute. Abeyances are, in effect, compulsive hedges against the possibility of that which is unresolved being exploited and given meanings almost guaranteed to generate profound division and disillusionment. Abeyances are important, therefore, because of their capacity to deter the formation of conflicting positions in just those areas where the potential for conflict is most acute. So central are these abeyances, together with the social temperament required to sustain them, that when they become the subject of heightened interest and subsequent conflict, they are not merely accompanied by an intense constitutional crisis, they are themselves the essence of that crisis.'' In Part II, Chapter Four, the author has also dealt with the constitutional gaps and the arts of prerogative. To the extent relevant, it reads as follows (p. 82): ''Gaps in a constitution should not be seen as simply empty space. They amount to a substantial plenum of strategic content and meaning vital to the preservation of a constitution. Such interstices accommodate the abeyances within which the sleeping giants of potentially acute political conflict are communally maintained in slumber. Despite the absence of any documentary or material form, these abeyances are real, and are an integral part of any constitution. What remains unwritten and indeterminate can be just as much responsible for the operational character and restraining quality of a constitution as its more tangible and codified components.'' 47. In the facts of the present case, an inescapable conclusion is to the effect that though the “doctrine of silence” can be read into a statute or the Government Order in this case, to fill up certain gaps but the Court has to be conscious to the objectives of the said enactment or the policy; and in case anything has to be read into i.e. the words which are not there, there has to be a dominating necessity or it would lead to violence to the said statute; as such nothing is to be added to or taken from the statute. There seems to be a silence in the Government Order, on the question, when it comes to a contingency, where one of the Member is not available but in the said circumstances it also cannot be construed that the remaining members or one of the Members, while acting in a dual capacity can undertake on to themselves, the role of the third member. Presence of every member, by it’s designated post, envisages a meaningful discussion and an opinion, in which case, there is a possibility to sway the opinion of other members; and more so over, the “dissenting opinion” may reflect the integrity and transparency, in the decision making process. The mere fact that the two members, gave a unanimous decision, cannot overcome the lacuna, of non- fulfillment of the quorum; but for a situation, leading to “impossibility” to do so. 48. The argument of the respondents that since the decision was a unanimous decision and even if the third Member was present, it would have not made any difference to the ultimate conclusion; also cannot be accepted because when a proceeding encapsulates the presence of a third Member by virtue of its position/post, the expertise which it may bring to the proceedings, cannot be ignored or taken over by any other Member of the Committee; as such unless situation arises where there is an impossibility of a substitution or nomination, the “doctrine of necessity” cannot be invoked, as already stated herein above. 49. The Committee could have easily sought for a guidance from the Government, who could have nominated a “Deputy Director of Education” of a neighboring region, to fill in the gap, so that the objective of the Government Order for adjudication by a three Member Committee, could have been achieved and without any violence to the policy decision, itself. Even if it is a unanimous decision, the value of the “dissent” cannot be undermined, as the presence and participation of each member is a mandate, which contribute to the integrity of the process; and any interpretation to the contrary would only do violence, to the objective of the Government Order. 50. In the last leg of argument though the learned Additional Advocate General has placed reliance on the judgment of Apex Court in the case of State of U.P. and others vs. Sudhir Kumar Singh and others , (2021) 19 SCC 706 relying on para-42.3 and 42.5 to contend that no prejudice has been alleged by the petitioner by the decision but he has fairly submitted that the said ratio is in context to the principles of natural justice. For ready reference para-42.3. and 42.5 is reproduced below: “ 42.3. For ready reference para-42.3. and 42.5 is reproduced below: “ 42.3. No prejudice is caused to the person complaining of the breach of natural justice where such person does not dispute the case against him or it. This can happen by reason of estoppel, acquiescence, waiver and by way of non-challenge or non-denial or admission of facts, in cases in which the Court finds on facts that no real prejudice can therefore be said to have been caused to the person complaining of the breach of natural justice. 42.5. The “prejudice” exception must be more than a mere apprehension or even a reasonable suspicion of a litigant. It should exist as a matter of fact, or be based upon a definite inference of likelihood of prejudice flowing from the non- observance of natural justice.” 51. Now we refer to the ratio in the judgment of Babu Ram Upadhyay (supra) as relied upon by the respondents to submit that the composition as envisaged under the Government Order dated 19.12.2000, is only “directory” and not “mandatory” in nature. It is not res integra that the usage of the word “shall” can also be construed to mean “may”; but however, as inferred by the Apex Court in the case of Babu Ram Upadhyay (supra) itself, for ascertaining the real intention of the legislature, the Court may consider, inter alia, the nature and design of the statute. 52. It is not res integra that the usage of the word “shall” can also be construed to mean “may”; but however, as inferred by the Apex Court in the case of Babu Ram Upadhyay (supra) itself, for ascertaining the real intention of the legislature, the Court may consider, inter alia, the nature and design of the statute. 52. Accordingly, the argument of the learned Additional Advocate General, though at the first instance seems to be attractive that where the statute does not provide for a contingency of a penalty, of non-compliance with the provision, the said provision has to be interpreted as “directory” and not “mandatory” in nature; but however, this Court cannot loose sight of the fact that the very necessity for bringing out the Government Order dated 19.12.2000, was on account of the fact that the decision which were being taken with respect to the subject matter of the Government Orders, by the concerned authorities as envisaged under the “Intermediate Act, 1921” and “U.P. High Schools and Intermediate Colleges (Payment of Salary of Teachers and other Employees) Act, 1971” was marred by instances of mala fides and colourable exercise of power; and therefore, with an object to de-centralize the powers, atleast with respect to crucial issues, which are fundamental to the running of an Institution or a college, a three Member “Regional Level Committee” was created and the same also found approval from the various decisions of this Court, as well as, the Apex Court; and accordingly in case any necessity which may reduce the quorum of the Regional Level Committee, will be detrimental and a death blow, to the very object of the Government Order dated 19.12.2000. 53. The situation would have been different, if there is some technical difficulty in replacing any one of the three Regional Level Officer by the government, as was in the case of Election Commission of India (supra); but as fairly admitted by the learned Additional Advocate General that in case of a contingency, where one of three Members of the “Regional Level Committee” is not available, it is always open for the government to make a nomination from a neighbouring region, as a “stop gap” arrangement, to carry on the functioning of the Regional Level Committee; and even otherwise the recourse to Article 226 of the Constitution of India, seeking nomination from the government in certain circumstances, is also open. 54. I may also refer to the argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Act, 1921 authorizes the “Joint Director of Education” to look into the managerial disputes and the Act, 1971 authorizes the “District Inspector of Schools”; however the introduction of the “Deputy Director of Education” in the “Regional Level Committee”, who is the only neutral Member and otherwise not vested with any functions; and as such his absence from the quorum of the Regional Level Committee, would do highest violence to the Government Order dated 19.12.2000. 55. The learned Additional Advocate General has submitted in response that admittedly, the “Joint Director of Education” was having the charge of the “Deputy Director of Education” and Joint Director of Education had issued notices on 30.01.2025 fixing 06.02.2025; where after though some hearings took place before the “Regional Level Committee” with complete quorum, but subsequently on account of the transfer of the “Deputy Director of Education” on 06.03.2025, the “Joint Director of Education” was given the additional charge of “Deputy Director of Education” and thereafter substantial hearing was done before the aforesaid two Members, of which the “Joint Director of Education” was holding the dual charge of “Deputy Director of Education”; and no objection regarding the constitution of the Committee was made in the proceedings (though the same has been seriously disputed by learned counsel for the petitioner); however the said issue becomes inconsequential since the question of prejudice in that sense, is not an issue before this Court, simply for the reason, the shortage in quorum, itself does violence to the objective of the constitution of the Regional Level Committee and the opinion of “dissent” which may influence the decision of the other two members, cannot be discarded, there being no situation of impossibility, to get a substitution, by nomination. 56. Shri R.K. Ojha, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the private respondents has submitted that since the constitution of the Regional Level Committee, is region specific, and in case the “Regional Deputy Director of Education” is not available, and the scheme does not contemplate transfer of the cases to any other region and the consequence of non- fulfillment of the quorum has also not been provided, there exist a situation of “impossibility” for fulfilling the quorum. He has further submitted that there is no power with the government to make any nomination as well; but he has fairly submitted that the remedy of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is nevertheless available and the affected party could approach this Court seeking a nomination from the government, or for transfer of the case to a neighbouring region. He has fairly stated that the said contingency has to be addressed by the government but till such time, it is addressed, the “doctrine of necessity” may be invoked and in case government has given a dual charge to one individual, who participates in the proceedings of the Regional Level Committee, the same, cannot be invalidated. He has also submitted that the Government Order has not been issued merely in aid of Section 16A-7 of the Act, 1921 but other matters e.g. question of seniority etc. are the domain of the Regional Level Committee. 57. As far as, the first contention of Shri R.K. Ojha, learned Senior Counsel, to the effect that since the constitution of Regional Level Committee is region specific and if any Regional Member of the said Committee is not available, the case cannot be transferred to any other region or in absence of any other procedure, being provided in the Government Order dated 19.12.2000, there will be stalemate; this Court finds that the government is not bereft of its power to either transfer the adjudication to a neighbouring Regional Level Committee or to nominate an authority by way of a “stop gap” arrangement, to continue the proceedings before the Regional Level Committee. In case, any alternate or a procedure to address the issue is not provided under the government order; and there is a duty casted upon the Regional Level Committee, it could have easily sought for a guidance from the government or the parties seeking an adjudication before the Regional Level Committee, is also not remedy-less, for they could approach this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in a given case. 58. 58. It is also pertinent to observe here, that merely because a majority opinion has been arrived at, also cannot be a basis, for holding a decision as valid, since the “Doctrine of Dissent” as considered herein above clearly postulates, the role of the third member, in the discussion and expression of his opinion, which may affect the decision making or opinion of other members, thereby changing the opinion of the majority in his favour; and in the said circumstances, it is held that the 3 rd member’s presence cannot be discarded and every effort is to made, to achieve the object of the Government Order, unless there is a circumstance, of “impossibility”, where the “Doctrine of necessity”, will be applicable. 59. Another reason can be, in case a Regional Joint Director of Education is holding the charge of “Regional Deputy Director of Education”, it can also be said that, one individual alone, will form the majority, which will alone do violence to the objective of the Government Order dated 19.12.2000, which is to decentralize the power and bring transparency, also strengthening the integrity of the process. Relief 60. In view of the aforesaid, I find that the impugned order dated 08.08.2025 cannot be sustained and is accordingly set aside, with the following directions:- (i) The Joint Director of Education, Vindhyachal Mandal, Mirzapur, is directed to seek a nomination from the government within a period of two weeks from the date of receipt of the certified copy of this order, in case, till date no “Deputy Director of Education” has taken charge. (ii) Respondent no.1 on receipt of such a request, shall proceed to nominate Regional Deputy Director of Education, from a neighbouring region as an adhoc Member of the Regional Level Committee, Vindhyachal Mandal, Mirzapur. (iii) On the constitution of the Regional Level Committee, Vindhyachal Mandal, Mirzapur as per the Government Order dated 19.12.2000, the Committee shall proceed to decide the issue within a period of three weeks from the date of aforementioned nomination, after adhering to the principles of natural justice and notice to all the parties concerned. (iii) On the constitution of the Regional Level Committee, Vindhyachal Mandal, Mirzapur as per the Government Order dated 19.12.2000, the Committee shall proceed to decide the issue within a period of three weeks from the date of aforementioned nomination, after adhering to the principles of natural justice and notice to all the parties concerned. (iv) Respondent no.1 is directed to issue a circular to all the Regional Level Committees, constituted under the Government Order dated 19.12.2000, prescribing a procedure or a standard operating procedure (SOP), indicating the procedure to be followed by all the Regional Level Committees in the State of Uttar Pradesh, in case any one of the Members as contemplated under the Government Order dated 19.12.2000, is not available and ensure strict compliance of the same, keeping in mind, the observations and law discussed, herein above. 61. Registrar (Compliance) is directed to send a copy of this order to the respondent no.1-Principal Secretary, Ministry of Secondary Education, U.P. at Lucknow for necessary compliance; and issuance of directives/standard operating procedure, to be followed by “Regional Level Committees” in the aforesaid contingencies. 62. Before parting with the judgment, a special mention of Ms. Pratibha Verma (Research Associate), attached with my chamber is to be made, as she was instrumental in providing research and deserves appreciation by the Court for the same. 63. With the aforesaid observations/directions, the writ petition stands allowed. However, no order as to costs.