23.09.2026 Sl. No.4 Ct. No.14 ss IN THE HIGH COURT AT CALCUTTA CONSTITUTIONAL WRIT JURISDICTION APPELLATE SIDE W.P.A. No. 18808 of 2025 Babula Sardar Versus The State of West Bengal & Ors. Md. Sarwar Jahan Sk. Nayeemul Haque Ms. Shalini Sen Ms. Sahina Parvin …for the Petitioner Mr. Brijendra Pratap Singh Mr. Asit Kumar De … for the State Mr. Nadeem Sulaiman Mr. Mijanul Kabir … for the Madrasah Board Mr. Pratik Dhar, Sr. Adv. Ms. Madhurima Sarkar … for the Madrasah Service Commission 1. By the present writ petition the petitioner seeks for setting aside and/or cancellation of the impugned orders of transfer bearing Memo No.354/1(8)- ME/OM-07-ME/23 dated 24th March, 2025 as well as Memo No.1050/1(9)-ME/OM-07-ME/23 dated 4th August, 2025 issued by the OSD & EO, Director of Madrasah Education, West Bengal and Memo No.MSC/83/1(9)/2025 dated 24th March, 2025 issued by respondent no.5, Secretary, West Bengal Madrasah Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as „Commission‟) and for cancellation of all consequential acts and orders. 2. The petitioner contends that he was recommended to the post of Assistant Teacher in History (H/PG) of Hatisala Sarojini High Madrasah (H.S.) (hereinafter 2 referred to „the said Madrasah‟) on 1st October, 2008 and subsequently, was appointed as an Assistant Teacher vide appointment letter dated 27th October, 2008. Pursuant to appointment letter the petitioner joined his duty on 1st November, 2008. On 26th March, 2011 the Secretary of the said Madrasah issued conformation letter in favour of the petitioner. Subsequent thereto upon receiving prior permission from the District Inspector of Schools (SE), South 24- Parganas, the Managing Committee of the said Madrasah issued notice for appointment of Assistant Headmaster of the said Madrasah. In response to the said notice the petitioner applied for the post of Assistant Headmaster. The petitioner appeared in the interview and on being successful, was approved in the panel and was appointed as Assistant Headmaster of the said Madrasah, where he joined in the said post on 19th December, 2023. The petitioner discharged his function as Assistant Headmaster without any blame from any corner. However, suddenly transfer order was issued by respondent no.5, Secretary of the Commission on 24th March, 2025 recommending the petitioner for transfer to Haripur Islasmia Senior Madrasah (Kamil), District Murshidabad from the present Madrasah. Such approval was made on the recommendation of OSD & EO Director, Directorate of Madrasah Education, West Bengal. Surprisingly, on the very next date i.e. 25th March, 2025 the Teacher-in-charge of the 3 Haripur Islamia Senior Madrasah (Kamil), District Murshidabad issued an appointment letter in favour of the petitioner for the post of Assistant Teacher in the permanent post of History (Hons./PG) in the Secondary Section (IX-X). Such order of transfer was cancelled on 21st April, 2025 and further recommendation for special transfer of the petitioner was made from the said Madrasah to Chakjiara High Madrasah, District Hooghly. Again, on 4th August, 2025 the order of recommendation dated 21st April, 2025 was cancelled and the petitioner was directed to abide the earlier recommendation of transfer dated 24th March, 2025. The impugned transfer order and subsequent cancellation order have been issued without any authority of law and the same suffers from non-compliance of principle of natural justice. Being aggrieved by the action of the respondent authorities, the petitioner has preferred the present writ petition. 3. Md. Sarwar Jahan, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that the approval order records that such transfer has been made for the public interest and for the welfare of the students. However, the action of the respondent authorities in making repeated recommendation for transfer from one school to other upon cancellation of the earlier recommendation does not show that the same has been made for the welfare of the students rather it reveals of malafide on the part of the respondent 4 authorities. There is no plausible reason made out by the respondent authorities for effecting transfer of the petitioner from the said Madrasah. Although on earlier occasion it was submitted on behalf of the State of defalcation of Madrasah funds by the petitioner and this Court was pleased to call for the CAG report, however, the report filed by the State- respondents annexing the CAG report does not reveal of any allegations against the petitioner. The recommending authorities have also failed to show before the Court the necessity of transferring an Assistant Headmaster from the District of South 24- Parganas to the District of Murshidabad and then to the District of Hooghly and again recommending him for the District of Murshidabad when there was availability of other assistant teachers in Madrasahs in the adjoining districts. In light of his above submissions, he seeks for setting aside of the impugned order of transfer dated 24th March, 2026 and other consequential orders. 4. Mr. Brijendra Pratap Singh, learned Advocate representing the State-respondents submits that the CAG report shows that there were some anomalies with regard to maintenance of student-wise distribution register of text books and school bags, student-wise invoice registers as a proof for actual purchase of Tabs during 2022-23 to 2024-25 and execution of Mid-day meal scheme and moreover the 5 actual closing balance was comprehensively understated. 5. Mr. Pratik Dhar, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the Commission submits that ordinarily the Court should not interfere with the transfer orders which are made in public interest and for administrative reasons unless the transfer orders are made in violation of any mandatory statutory rule or on the ground of malafide. A government servant holding a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at one place or the other and he is liable to be transferred from one place to the other. Moreover, transfer orders issued by competent authority do not violate any of the legal rights of an employee since transfer is an incidence of service. To buttress his contention, he relies on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in (i) Shilpi Bose (Mrs.) and ors. versus State of Bihar and ors., reported in 1991 Supp (2) SCC 659; (ii) State of U.P. and ors. versus Gobardhan Lal, reported in (2004) 11 SCC 402; (iii) Union of India and ors. versus S.L. Abbas, reported in (1993) 4 SCC 357; (iv)Rajendra Singh and ors. versus State of Uttar Pradesh and ors., reported in (2009) 15 SCC 178. Furthermore there is no such ground depicted in the transfer order that it has been issued as punitive action against the petitioner. The transfer order has been precisely issued for the public interest and for the welfare of the students. The only ground on which 6 the transfer order can be interfered with by the Court is on the ground of any malafide action. He further indicates that in the event the petitioner tries to make out a case of malafide, the persons against whom such allegation is made, has to be impleaded as party-respondents in the present proceeding. If the petitioner chooses not to implead those persons, it leads to an irresistible inference that the allegations have no legal efficacy. In support of his contention, he relies on the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court passed in State of Bihar and anr. versus P.P. Sharma, IAS and anr., reported in 1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 and the decision of Hon’ble Division Bench passed in Bidananda Mandal -versus- Union of India and ors., reported in 2026 SCC OnLine Cal 9197. He further submits that if the Court finds that that such transfer order has been issued as a punitive measure, then the matter may be relegated to the authority concerned for reconsideration. 6. In reply to the submissions advanced on behalf of the State as well as the Commission, Mr. Jahan, learned Advocate for the petitioner submits that the transfer order of the petitioner from one district to other that too within a short span of time, clearly shows malafide on the part of the respondent authority. Further the report of the State respondents would show that the inspection was held on 18th September, 2025 which is after the issuance of transfer order. Meaning thereby that transfer issuing authority on 7 the date of transfer cannot make out a sustainable case of defalcation of money against the petitioner. The petitioner has all along discharged his functions with utmost sincerity and in an unblemished manner. 7. Upon hearing learned Advocates for the respective parties, the only issue which falls for consideration is whether the orders of transfer dated 24th March, 2025 and 21st April, 2025 issued by the recommending authority are sustainable or not. 8. It is found from the order of transfer dated 24th March, 2025 as well as 21st April, 2025 that the same has been issued in terms of Rule 33(d) of the West Bengal Madrasah Service Commission Recruitment (Selection and Recommendation of persons for Appointment and Transfer to the Posts of Teacher and Non-Teaching Staff) Rules, 2023 (hereinafter referred to as „Rules of 2023). 9. For convenience of discussion, Rule 33(d) of Rules of 2023 is reproduced hereunder: “33. Transfer on Special ground. – An incumbent/staff may be transferred on special ground under the following circumstances :- (a) xxxx xxxx xxxx (b) xxxx xxxx xxxx (c) xxxx xxxx xxxx (d) If the Commission is satisfied on the recommendation of Directorate of Madrasah Education, that for public interest or for the welfare of the students of any Madrasah, any staff is required to be transferred irrespective of his/her willingness.” 10. Upon bare reading of the aforesaid provisions, it appears that the Commission on being satisfied on the recommendation of the Directorate of Madrasah 8 Education that for public interest or for the welfare of the students of any Madrasah may effect transfer on special ground irrespective of his or her willingness. The recommendation issued by the Commission dated 24th March, 2025 clearly records that the recommendation is made for the interest of public service and for welfare of students. It has been vociferously argued on behalf of the petitioner that such repeated transfer without any plausible reason smacks of malafide. Be that as it may, only because repeated transfer orders have been issued against the petitioner may not lead to a conclusion that it has been issued malafide particularly in the absence of any other attending circumstances. Moreso, the transfer order has been issued not as a punitive action but for public interest and welfare of the students. Now the question arises as to whether a transfer order issued in public interest can be interfered by the court or not. 11. In order to examine such issue, it will be apposite to reproduce the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in its different decisions as hereunder: a) Paragraph 4 of Shilpi Bose (supra) – “4. In our opinion, the courts should not interfere with a transfer order which is made in public interest and for administrative reasons unless the transfer orders are made in violation of any mandatory statutory rule or on the ground of mala fide. A government servant holding a transferable post has o vested right to remain posted at one place or the other, he is liable to be transferred from one place to the other. Transfer orders issued by the competent authority do not violate any of his legal rights. Even if a transfer order is passed in violation of executive instructions or orders, the courts ordinarily 9 should not interfere with the order instead affected party should approach the higher authorities in the department. If the courts continue to interfere with day- to-day transfer orders issued by the government and its subordinate authorities, there will be complete chaos in the administration which would not be conducive to public interest. The High Court overlooked these aspects in interfering with the transfer orders.” (b) Paragraph 8 of Gobardhan Lal (supra) – “8. A challenge to an order of transfer should normally be eschewed and should not be countenanced by the courts or tribunals as though they are Appellate Authorities over such orders, which could assess the niceties of the administrative needs and requirements of the situation concerned. This is for the reason that courts or tribunals cannot substitute their own decisions in the matter of transfer for that of competent authorities of the State and even allegations of mala fides when made must be such as to inspire confidence in the court or are based on concrete materials and ought not to be entertained on the mere making of it or on consideration borne out of conjectures or surmises and except for strong and convincing reasons, no interference could ordinarily be made with an order of transfer.” (c) Paragraph 7 of S.L. Abbas (supra) – “7. Who should be transferred where, is a matter for the appropriate authority to decide. Unless the order of transfer is vitiated by mala fides or is made in violation of any statutory provisions, the court cannot interfere with it. While ordering the transfer, there is no doubt, the authority must keep in mind the guidelines issued by the Government on the subject. Similarly if a person makes any representation with respect to his transfer, the appropriate authority must consider the same having regard to the exigencies of administration. The guidelines say that as far as possible, husband and wife must be posted at the same place. The said guideline however does not confer upon the Government employee a legally enforceable right.” (b) Paragraph 8 of Rajendra Singh (supra) – “8. A government servant has no vested right to remain posted at a place of his choice nor can he insist that he must be posted at one place or the other. He is liable to be transferred in the administrative exigencies from one place to the other. Transfer of an employee is not only an incident inherent in the terms of appointment but also implicit as an essential condition of service in the absence of any specific indication to the contrary. No government can function if the government servant 10 insists that once appointed or posted in a particular place or position, he should continue in such place or position as long as he desires.” 12. Thus, it is settled proposition of law that the courts should not ordinarily interfere with a transfer order which is made in public interest and for administrative reasons unless the transfer orders are made in violation of any mandatory statutory rule or on the ground of malafide. Bearing in mind the aforesaid principles, let me revert back to the facts and find out the whether the transfer order stems from malafide action or not. In paragraph no.11 of the writ petition it is contended that though the petitioner discharged his functions without any blame but some persons having political hold in connivance with teaching and non-teaching staff and students tried to harm the reputation of the petitioner and threatened him to transfer to other school by applying political hold. Such allegation appears to be evasive inasmuch as no specific person has been named by the petitioner who is the author of said political clout or the teaching and non-teaching staff or the students who were involved in transferring the petitioner from the school. The petitioner has not impleaded the persons against whom he has made such allegations. As the petitioner chose not to implead them, the allegation made in relation to malafide loses legal efficacy. This Court finds substance in the submissions of Mr. Dhar, learned Senior Advocate 11 representing the Commission relying on P.P. Sharma (supra) and Bidananda Mandal (supra). 13. Before parting although the State has produced the audit observation wherein some anomalies were detected during audit. However, those are the matters to be dealt with administratively by the State authorities. There is nothing on record to suffice that the transfer order has got any manner of relationship with the report furnished by the State and the CAG report, more particularly, when such enquiry was made after issuance of transfer order. 14. In the above conspectus, the writ petition falls short of merit. 15. Accordingly, writ petition being WPA 18808 of 2025 stands dismissed. 16. Consequently, connected applications, if any, stand disposed of. 17. Interim orders, if any, stand vacated. 18. There shall be no order as to costs. 19. Urgent photostat certified copy of the order, if applied for, be given to the parties on compliance of all necessary legal formalities. (Bivas Pattanayak, J.)